A Fire to be Lighted: The Training of American Astronauts From 1959 to the Present by Peterson, Tyler David
 A FIRE TO BE LIGHTED: THE TRAINING OF AMERICAN ASTRONAUTS FROM 
1959 TO THE PRESENT  
 
A Dissertation 
by 
TYLER DAVID PETERSON 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Chair of Committee,  Jonathan Coopersmith 
Committee Members,  Jason Parker 
    Walter Kamphoefner 
    Adam Seipp 
    Greg Chamitoff 
Head of Department,  David Vaught 
 
 
May 2017 
 
Major Subject: History 
 
Copyright 2017 Tyler David Peterson 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the training of American astronauts from the selection of the 
original Mercury astronauts in 1959 to the present, as crews of six work aboard the 
International Space Station.  It makes the primary argument that through all of those 
years, the training sequence has successfully adapted to the challenges of preparing 
astronauts for flight far more than it has failed.  It will examine in more detail than any 
previous publication how training devices for the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, 
Space Shuttle, and International Space Station programs helped astronauts to make this 
statement true.  This study will also make the argument that the successful training of 
astronauts helped prove the value of sending them into space.  Sessions at a variety of 
locales, from electronic flight simulators, to neutral buoyancy pools, to virtual reality 
laboratories have given astronauts the mental and physical flexibility in space missions 
that only they possess.  In other words, they are not automatons, but rather people who 
can develop their skills through training.   
This study will demonstrate that when their missions began, those skills 
contributed to spectacular successes in space.  Astronauts have returned a bevy of 
scientific data from their scientific experiments in Earth orbit and from their walks on 
the Moon during Apollo thanks to their trained eyes and minds.  They have also serviced 
the Hubble Space Telescope and constructed an International Space Station that is longer 
than a football field thanks to their training.  As the 21st century continues, astronauts 
will journey on bolder missions to near Earth asteroids, back to the Moon, and onto 
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Mars.  The instructors who train them for those missions, whether belonging to a 
government or a company, will benefit from reading this study because they will gain a 
sense of what training methods have worked historically and understand the  
tremendously strong track record of human accomplishments in space given adequate 
training.                   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Two astronauts standing in the Lunar Module (LM) heard the familiar voice of 
Capsule Communicator (CapCom) Charlie Duke: “Eagle, you are Go for powered 
descent.”  A few minutes later, Eagle’s descent engine fired at an altitude of 50,000 feet 
and began the long braking maneuver that would culminate in the vehicle coming to a 
complete stop on the surface of the Moon.  But the LM pilot and flight controller Steve 
Bales each found a critical glitch with Eagle’s computer: a 1201 program alarm.  Bales 
realized that this meant the computer was overloaded with tasks and going through 
software restarts.  This suggested the computer would not have the capacity to guide the 
crew through the landing.  Given that the powered descent sequence only took about 
twelve minutes, Bales knew he had little time to make a decision.  He finally decided 
that he could not let the crew continue with a balky computer.  He would have to tell 
Flight Director Gene Kranz the disappointing news that the Moon landing was scrubbed. 
 “Flight, Guidance,” he said.  “Something is wrong in the computer.  I’ve got a 
bunch of computer alarms.  Abort the landing…Abort!” 
Kranz relayed the call to Duke, who told the astronauts.  In seconds, they 
jettisoned the LM descent stage and ignited the ascent stage engine.  The two astronauts 
were on their way back to a rendezvous with their crewmate in the Command Module.  
Their planned landing site in the Sea of Tranquility would remain untouched by human 
hands.  With that decided, Dave Scott and Jim Irwin climbed out of the simulator.  Both 
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the astronauts and the flight controllers would need to participate in a debriefing session 
with lead Simulator Supervisor Dick Koos, who had just instituted the computer alarm 
into the landing sequence.  Koos explained the severity of the problem, then offered his 
startling conclusion: “This was not an abort.  You should have continued the landing.”  
According to Koos, Bales should have quickly understood that despite the overflow 
message, the computer still maintained the capacity to keep the LM guidance system and 
thrusters in operation while updating crew displays.  He should have unflappably told 
Kranz, “We’re Go on that alarm.”  Instead, he had called for an abort with undue haste.1       
When Bales left the Mission Control Center (MCC) on that afternoon of July 5, 
1969, he knew that Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin were at their Cape Kennedy crew 
quarters that very moment.  400,000 Americans from government, industry, and 
academia had contributed to an Apollo program that had cost billions of dollars in 
taxpayer money, but in two weeks the success of Apollo would depend on Armstrong 
and Aldrin working in concert with the flight controllers of the Manned Spacecraft 
Center (MSC, later renamed the Johnson Space Center [JSC]).  If a glitch arose in 
Eagle’s machinery, either an astronaut or a controller would need to know how to 
respond.  If somebody made a wrong response during that twelve minute period, two 
possibilities beckoned.  Armstrong and Aldrin might abort and return home with the 
knowledge that they had failed in their mission, only to find out later that the abort had 
been unnecessary.  Or Eagle might crash, splatter Armstrong and Aldrin onto the Sea of 
                                                          
1  Gene Kranz, Failure Is Not An Option: Mission Control From Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2000), 267-271.  
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 Tranquility, and the world would mourn the first American astronauts lost in space.   
Fifteen days later, the controllers learned a lesson about the value of the training 
process.  The millions of people watching or listening to the landing sequence on July 20 
had no idea about the training session of July 5.  Even Armstrong and Aldrin were 
unaware.  But when Aldrin called out during the descent, “Program alarm.  It’s a 1202,” 
Bales, Duke, Kranz, and their colleagues in the MCC backroom all remembered the 
simulation.2  After consulting with computer engineer Jack Garman in the backroom, 
Bales determined that the landing could continue.  The decision saved the mission, but 
the controllers could not make the actual landing themselves.  As Eagle passed through 
2,000 feet, Duke quietly told Kranz, “I think we better be quiet from here on, Flight!3  
The touchdown depended instead on Armstrong, too busy to speak to controllers because 
he was searching for a suitable landing site.  The Apollo 11 Commander had studied 
maps of the Moon containing the landmarks he would fly past.  He had spent 383 hours 
in the LM simulator, a machine that mimicked every switch and readout of the real 
vehicle.  He had also spent time flying the Lunar Landing Training Vehicle (LLTV), a 
vehicle featuring a single jet engine that could be adjusted to cancel five-sixths of the 
vehicle’s weight, thus simulating flight in lunar gravity.4  This late in the descent, his 
training took precedence over that of the flight controllers.  He found a safe site amid a 
crater and boulder field, precisely controlling the LM’s lateral motion and rate of 
descent, and finally spoke to the waiting world after his vehicle came to rest: “Houston, 
                                                          
2  Ibid, 288.  
3  Ibid, 290.  
4  James R. Hansen, First Man: The Life of Neil A. Armstrong (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 321-465.  
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 Tranquility Base here, the Eagle has landed.” 
Each of the men involved in this twelve-minute sequence was tremendously 
accomplished on his own merits.  For instance, Bales had earned an engineering degree 
from Iowa State University and had spent several years working in the Flight Dynamics 
Branch during the Gemini and Apollo programs.  His superiors trusted him enough to 
give him a flight controller assignment for Gemini XI, when he was only 23 years old.5  
Garman had earned an engineering degree from the University of Michigan and had also 
been hired at a young age to specialize in Apollo computers.6  Armstrong occupied his 
own remarkable niche in the history of aviation even before Apollo 11, given his combat 
missions in Korea and groundbreaking flights aboard the X-15 aircraft.  Yet prior to the 
mission, each of these men shared another title in addition to their glamorous jobs and 
achievements: student.  This title owed to the reality that they needed to undergo training 
to assure themselves and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
that they could carry out their mission successfully.  As two scholars have written, “The 
success of any organization depends on appropriate use of human assets available in the 
organization.  All other assets could only be supplementary to human assets…The 
organization has to concentrate necessarily on developing the ability, wisdom, and skills 
of its workforce.”7  The Apollo spacecraft, containing over a million parts between the 
Command/Service Module (CSM) and Lunar Module, was the most complex machine 
                                                          
5  Billy Watkins, Apollo Moon Missions: The Unsung Heroes (Westport: Praeger, 2006), 3-6.  
6  John R. Garman, Interviewed by Kevin M. Rusnak, March 27, 2001, Houston, Texas, 
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/oral_ histories/GarmanJR/GarmanJR_3-27-01.pdf (accessed February 6, 2016).  
7  Chidambaram Vijayabanu and Ramachandran Amudha, “A Study on Efficiency of Employee Training: Review of 
Literature,” Business: Theory and Practice Vol. 13, No. 3 (2012): 275.    
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ever devised.  No one person could know each part in detail.  This underscored the 
importance of a team of instructors determined to test human resources, the astronauts 
and flight controllers, under the most realistic simulated conditions possible.  Nearly half 
a century after the triumph of Apollo 11, instructors from around the world still work 
closely with astronauts. 
This dissertation will examine the training of American astronauts from the day 
the “Original Seven” Mercury astronauts reported for work in 1959 through the present, 
as crews of six live and work aboard the International Space Station (ISS).  It will make 
the primary argument that from Mercury to the ISS, the training sequence has met the 
challenges of preparing astronauts for flight far more than it has failed.  It will address 
several training inadequacies, but the plethora of oral and written evidence from nearly 
sixty years overwhelmingly indicates that the benefits have outweighed the drawbacks.  
This dissertation will demonstrate why this is true in more detail than any previous 
publication, by taking a program by program and a mission by mission approach to 
training.  It will also make the argument that the successful training of astronauts has 
helped prove the value of sending them into space.  Scientists, especially physicists and 
astronomers, have criticized the idea of sending humans into space since the Mercury 
era.  These scientists have pointed out that robotic vehicles can return data from space at 
a lower cost than human vehicles, and with no risk to life.8  But robotic vehicles lack the 
mental and physical flexibility that astronauts have brought into space through their 
                                                          
8  Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, Robots in Space: Technology, Evolution, and Interplanetary Travel 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 17.  
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training.  Astronauts have carried out tasks that would not have been possible on purely 
automated missions, from flying manual reentries into Earth’s atmosphere, to making 
equipment repairs during Extravehicular Activities (EVAs), to exploring the Moon far 
more extensively than possible using only robotic technology.  The decision to pursue 
human spaceflight has brought about all of these successes, and the reason they are 
successes is that astronauts have brought trained minds to space.  This dissertation will 
therefore explore how training empowered humans to draw upon the skills that they 
uniquely possessed. 
The idea that astronauts needed to train to contribute useful tasks on space 
missions did not simply happen inevitably.  When the Mercury program began, the 
Space Task Group (STG) at NASA’s Langley Research Center (LRC) in Virginia 
needed to make an organizational determination of what astronauts could contribute.  In 
1959, without any human spaceflight experience to draw upon, Robert Voas gave the 
“Original Seven” tasks that made them systems engineers, scientific observers, and even 
pilots of the vehicle’s attitude.9  This demonstrated the desire of the STG members to 
make astronauts much more than mere passengers while aboard a spacecraft, and to a 
much greater extent than the Soviet cosmonauts in training at the same time.10 
What did this organizational determination portend for astronaut training?  It 
meant that the construction of training technology would have to reflect the desire to 
                                                          
9  Robert B. Voas, “Astronaut Training,” in Mercury Project Summary (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-45, 1963), 173-
175.     
10  Slava Gerovitch, Soviet Space Mythologies: Public Images, Private Memories, and the Making of a Cultural 
Identity (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 98.    
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assign astronauts significant tasks.  Although the software in the Apollo Lunar Module 
had the ability to guide the vehicle to a safe touchdown on the Moon, the Commander on 
all six moon landings took manual control during the final phase of descent.11  Despite 
the prowess of the software aboard the Space Shuttle orbiters, the Commander on all 
missions took manual control during the last five minutes of the descent.  Whether 
hovering above the lunar surface to search for a safe landing site or closing in on a 
shuttle runway on a glideslope seven times steeper than a commercial airliner, human 
judgment augmented onboard software.12  The construction of the Lunar Landing 
Training Vehicle and Shuttle Training Aircraft (STA) for astronauts followed this 
determination to assign astronauts these functions.  The determination to allow 
astronauts from the Mercury era through the Space Shuttle era the tasks of managing 
systems and maneuvering the vehicle, especially during emergencies, meant that crews 
would also need high fidelity simulators of their spacecraft cockpits.  The determination 
to allow astronauts the task of repairing equipment such as the Hubble Space Telescope 
meant that crews would need an underwater facility to replicate EVAs.  The 
determination to send astronauts to the Moon meant that crews would need geology 
instruction to take best advantage of the greater physical and mental flexibility they 
offered over robot explorers.                     
 This dissertation will painstakingly examine the evidence that these devices 
succeeded in their task of helping astronauts become well prepared to meet the 
                                                          
11  David Mindell, Digital Apollo (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008), 6.  
12  Stephen Clark, “How Does NASA Train Pilots to Land the Space Shuttle?” May 25, 2010, Spaceflight Now, 
http://www. spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts132/100525landing/ (accessed February 4, 2016).        
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challenges that their flights would present to them.  The chapters will cover every 
program to date: Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, Space Shuttle, and 
ISS.  The discussion of each program will begin with an assessment of the training 
devices used for it: what purpose the devices served and the astronauts’ comments about 
them (the instructors valued the astronauts’ opinions as users of spaceflight technology).  
The ultimate indication of the success of training would come with the astronauts’ 
performances in flight.  The discussion of each program will therefore move on to 
describe the spaceflights.  Although well-known and written about extensively, the 
flights are still instructive when examined from a standpoint of how training aided the 
astronauts.  The discussion of each program will then end by briefly describing what 
lessons the training experience can offer in understanding the history of spaceflight. 
 The training of astronauts has evolved both quantitatively and qualitatively over 
the nearly sixty years from the introduction of the Mercury astronauts to the present.  In 
his training to become the first American to orbit Earth aboard Friendship 7 in 1962, 
John Glenn spent 60 hours in a procedures trainer preparing for a flight about five hours 
long.13  When Ed White trained to become the first American to make an EVA in 1965, 
he spent only 12 hours in an Air Bearing Facility and a handful of hours in a KC-135 
aircraft preparing for his brief jaunt outside the Gemini IV cabin.  Yet as the duration and 
complexity of the flights increased, training needed to keep pace.  The training staff 
dramatically expanded as President John F. Kennedy made his commitment to send 
humans to the Moon by the end of the 1960s and the responsibility for supporting human 
                                                          
13  See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.    
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spaceflight moved to a lavishly funded new facility in Texas in 1962.  By this point, a 
division at the new space center had become devoted to training personnel.14  By the 
time the Apollo 11 crew trained for the first Moon landing, Neil Armstrong and Buzz 
Aldrin spent close to 1,300 hours in training on a bevy of tasks Glenn could not have 
foreseen in 1962: from simulations in two spacecraft, to docking, to rendezvous, to a 
lunar landing, to geological exploration once outside the lander on the lunar surface.15  
Though the first few astronaut groups consisted entirely of pilots, who expressed initial 
reluctance in focusing on scientific tasks such as lunar geology training, this dissertation 
will argue that those who ultimately reached the Moon embraced their lunar geology 
training.  The Apollo astronauts convincingly reframed the identity of the astronaut corps 
around prowess in scientific tasks as well as piloting tasks, and this would not have been 
possible without this commitment to geology training.16  
 Though later astronauts did not travel as far from Earth as the Apollo Moon 
crews, the training time and level of sophistication only increased.  For instance, each 
member of the STS-124 crew in 2008 spent about 1,940 hours in training, meaning they 
spent six hours in training for every hour spent in space.  The 50 International Space 
Station expeditions since 2000 have proven to be the ultimate endurance test in training, 
because crews must spend 24-30 months in training, during which time they must learn 
the Russian language and make overseas visits to Russia, Europe, and Japan.  This 
dissertation will demonstrate that these later crews benefited from a level of 
                                                          
14  See Chapters 3 and 4  of this dissertation.  
15  See Chapter 7 of this dissertation.  
16  See Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this dissertation.   
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sophistication in training that increased thanks to advances in computers that could more 
accurately simulate the space environment and even provide a virtual reality experience 
beginning in 1993.  The crews of Space Shuttle and International Space Station missions 
also benefited from a training experience that became more standardized over time, as 
training personnel and astronauts learned what priorities to emphasize after an increasing 
number of astronauts had been exposed to the experience.  Astronauts even began to 
give formal training advice through an Instructor Astronaut program beginning in the 
Space Shuttle era.  Today, astronauts must balance a schedule that includes flying from 
site to site, making speaking engagements, and serving in Astronaut Office management 
positions, but training continues to be the heaviest burden on their time.17        
 A scholar who does not specialize in the history of spaceflight might wonder why 
a work on astronaut training is relevant to the scholarly community at large.  Astronaut 
training emerged in the post-World War II years, as the training of workers in the United 
States entered a new era.  In her essay on the subject, Deborah Alpert Sleight explains 
the major developments.  During the economic boom of the 1940s and 1950s, companies 
sought more efficient and less expensive methods of training workers.  The most popular 
way of doing this became giving workers individualized instruction, meaning instructors 
gave workers programmed materials divided into small steps which the learner could 
easily understand.  The instruction could be presented in book form, or inserted into a 
teaching machine, which two authors of a 1962 document described as, “devices that 
house, display, and present printed programmed instruction…Feedback is given when  
                                                          
17  See Chapters 12, 13, 14, and 15 of this dissertation.  
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the program is advanced through actuation of a lever, knob, or button, and the correct  
answer comes to view.”  By this point, organizations using individualized instruction 
methods had made serious strides in reducing learning time, producing a low error rate 
for learners, and improving learning through immediate feedback.  With the 
development of Computer Based Training on mainframe computers in the 1970s came a 
more modern form of individualized instruction that utilized the speed and visual 
displays of these machines.  By the last decades of the 20th century, Sleight explains that 
the United States had become a “knowledge society” in that “it emphasizes intellectual 
work more than manual work—the mind more than the hands.”  Given the high amount 
of knowledge needed to perform this work, instructors increasingly provided workers 
with job support tools to assist them.  Job support tools provide workers with step by 
step instructions on how to perform a task and are designed for use on or just before a 
task.18     
 When the Mercury astronauts began training for spaceflight, their circumstances 
made them exceptional compared to the workers who Sleight focuses upon in her work.  
First, they were training for a task that had no person had ever done before.  Training 
was not cut and dried at this point, because no person had yet experienced the sensations 
of riding a rocket into space, experiencing extended weightlessness, and hurtling back 
through Earth’s atmosphere.  The second chapter of this dissertation will explain how 
this resulted in Mercury instructors overtraining the astronauts and even exposing them 
                                                          
18  Deborah Alpert Sleight, “A Developmental History of Training in the United States and Europe,” 1993, Michigan 
State University, https:/www./msu.edu/~sleightd/trainhst.html (accessed March 13, 2017)..  
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to training facilities deemed unnecessary for future programs, once instructors had better 
understood how spaceflight affected the human body.  Second, astronauts belonged to a 
government organization rather than the companies in the private sector who Sleight 
mainly focuses upon.  The prestige of the United States during the Cold War would be 
riding on their efforts, which placed a premium on the need to spend money  
for training facilities that would help ensure humans would not be the weak link in 
human spaceflight operations.  Third, the instructors who would teach them would not 
actually take part in the task they were teaching; they would not fly in space themselves.  
Fourth, the training of astronauts focused on a small number of highly skilled people 
rather than the mass numbers of semi-skilled or unskilled workers that Sleight mentions 
in her history of training.19      
 But the instructors and astronauts from Mercury to the ISS were not completely 
isolated from the post-World War II developments mentioned by Sleight and the more 
than two dozen scholars that she cites.  Instructors provided astronauts with 
individualized instruction by preparing copious written material on spacecraft systems 
for them.  Although Sleight mentions the expense of individualized instruction as one of 
the drawbacks of this method, astronaut training began as a well funded institution given 
the national prestige at stake and has remained robustly funded ever since.  As explained 
in the twelfth chapter of this dissertation, astronaut instructors favored Computer Based 
Training during the 1970s as a modern form of individualized instruction.  Instructors 
quickly embraced this new training technology when it became available.  Sleight also 
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mentions a specialized form of Computer Based Training called embedded training.  
This refers to “incorporating training functions, either in whole or in part, into an 
operational system.”  Embedded training was a development that emerged primarily in 
the military to prepare soldiers for tasks such as air-to-air engagement and air combat 
maneuvering.  But training to operate spacecraft from Mercury to the ISS has also 
entailed astronauts using expensive simulators that have incorporated training functions 
into an operational system.  Astronauts have made use of the job support tools that 
Sleight mentions as well.  These include the checklists that they have brought with them 
on missions and, in recent years, the videos they watch aboard the ISS that provide them 
with training in the scientific experiments they have to perform.20   
 The training of astronauts has therefore fit into the pattern of late 20th century 
training developments in American society and can serve as a positive case study of an 
organization striving to successfully teach new skills.  Each chapter of this dissertation 
will explore ways that training helped astronauts solve unexpected glitches, in addition 
to demonstrating that astronauts have taken a far more positive than negative view of the 
training devices they have used over the years.  Each chapter will also show that training 
adapted to meet new challenges, from the Mercury era when the goal was simply to send 
humans into orbit aboard a phone booth sized cockpit, to the rendezvous and EVA of the 
Gemini era, to the geological exploration of the Apollo era, to the long duration missions 
of the Skylab and ISS eras, to the international cooperation of the Space Shuttle and ISS 
eras.  Throughout these years, as these new challenges required astronauts to train to 
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develop new skills, an institutional culture developed where astronauts valued training 
and received encouragement if they felt they needed additional training.  Shuttle 
Commander Eileen Collins explains that NASA adopted a philosophy of instituting 
malfunctions into simulations as a way of forcing astronauts into mistakes that would 
make them better prepared when on an actual mission.21  Though this dissertation will 
focus on spaceflight, scholars must understand that organizations throughout the United 
States and the world, whether in the public or the private sector, must adapt to new 
challenges through creative approaches to training.       
 Several scholars have indeed written books about the need for organizations to 
become “learning organizations” that adapt to meet new challenges.  For instance, 
Michael Marquardt wrote in 2011, “Unless an organization continuously adapts to the 
environment via speedy, effective learning, it will die.”22  Though Marquart’s book 
focused on organizations in the private sector, other scholars have made the case for 
learning as an essential component of success in government organizations.  “In today’s 
highly globalized world, a persuasive argument can be made that the organizations that 
most need to adapt to changing times are the large organizations in national or local 
governments,” wrote a Malaysian scholar in 2005.  “Employees’ skills…and an 
organizational learning culture are worth far more than government’s physical assets.”23  
The work on training and organizations illustrates that the study of astronaut training is 
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15 
 
not an isolated field without any value to the larger scholarly community.  The world in 
the 21st century is shifting more and more towards the “knowledge society” that Sleight 
describes, because as Marquart writes, “knowledge workers now outnumber industrial 
workers by 4 to 1.”24  These workers who must process vast quantities of information to 
perform their jobs cannot expect to succeed without training.  Astronaut training is 
relevant because it reflects a widespread development throughout modern society: 
teaching complex tasks to workers whose jobs require knowledge and not simply 
physical labor. 
 This dissertation will make extensive use of primary sources, which abound for 
an undertaking as large, expensive, and exciting as human spaceflight.  These primary 
sources have taken the form of entire books by astronauts and flight directors, material 
available online such as the JSC Oral History Project, and archived material such as the 
JSC History Collection at the University of Houston-Clear Lake, the John H. Glenn 
Archives at The Ohio State University, and the astronaut collections at the National Air 
and Space Museum, Texas Tech University, or Purdue University.  A few secondary 
sources are also helpful in understanding astronaut training.  The NASA History Office 
has produced detailed histories of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs that devote 
attention to preflight preparation.  Journalist Henry S.F. Cooper broke new ground in his 
book on the training of Space Shuttle crewmembers for a 1984 mission, while historian 
David Mindell provided great insight in his book into the human-machine interaction in 
the Apollo program (this interaction shaped the design of the spacecraft and thus the 
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simulators intended to train humans).  This dissertation will refer to these sources but 
break new ground by making new arguments and covering training methods more 
thoroughly than any previous publication. 
This dissertation is organized chronologically.  Astronaut training began with the 
era of the one-man Mercury spacecraft, the focus of the second and third chapters.  
Although no person had yet flown in space in 1959, NASA officials understood that the 
tasks of the first astronauts would most closely resemble the tasks of America’s most 
qualified pilots.  Instructors consequently drew upon techniques and equipment from the 
aviation industry in originating the training of the seven test pilots who became the 
Mercury astronauts.  These chapters will therefore delve into the training of National 
Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) pilots prior to the Mercury program, then 
describe the astronauts’ initial training runs aboard Mercury simulators in Virginia and 
Cape Canaveral.  They will also describe the astronauts’ detailed feedback on the 
training runs and the effectiveness of sending highly trained astronauts into space as 
indicated in the six successful piloted flights of the Mercury program. 
The fourth and fifth chapters will examine new developments in the Gemini 
program that followed Mercury.  Whereas Mercury astronauts could only fire thrusters to 
control their attitude, Gemini astronauts were able to change their orbits, rendezvous, 
and dock with other vehicles.  The latter astronauts thus rehearsed their complex flight 
maneuvers with simulators containing digital computers equal to the task and even scene 
generators to give them a realistic view of space outside the simulator windows.  The 
astronauts scheduled to make the first EVAs also underwent a detailed process of 
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preparation aboard the KC-135 aircraft and in underwater facilities.  These chapters will 
offer an assessment of the fidelity of these training methods.  Not every training decision 
worked, especially concerning EVA, and so this chapter will identify lessons learned 
from Gemini.  Yet these chapters will also recount the extensive evidence from the 
flights themselves that the training aided astronauts in demonstrating the unique skills 
they could bring to spaceflight. 
The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters will assess the Apollo program that sent 
Americans to the Moon.  Apollo astronauts operated in the most complex simulators 
constructed to date, in order to train for procedures that were unprecedented and remain 
unequaled since the program ended.  Crews needed to train for the powered descent 
sequence to the lunar surface, for instance, as well as the LM rendezvous and docking 
with the CSM that followed liftoff from the surface.  They would even need to prepare 
for the period when they passed over the far side of the Moon and lost contact with flight 
controllers.  Two of the three astronauts from each mission walked on the lunar surface, 
where they brought tools of exploration that robots could not match in part due to 
extensive training.  The point of walking on the Moon was to capture the lunar 
geological environment as accurately as possible through words to scientists on Earth 
and collection of rock samples to return to Earth.  Although the astronauts chosen to 
explore the lunar surface each had backgrounds in piloting rather than geology (except 
for Apollo 17’s Harrison “Jack” Schmitt), each successfully developed an aptitude for 
geology after undergoing the training sequence.  The attention within NASA to ensuring 
the astronauts were highly prepared for their tasks meant that Apollo remains a 
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compelling example of what humans can accomplish rather than automatons. 
The next chapters will focus on the flights which followed lunar exploration, 
which used Apollo hardware but sent crews to Earth orbit.  The ninth and tenth chapters 
will discuss the challenges associated with training the nine men who lived aboard the 
space station Skylab in 1973 and 1974.  Though these men would not travel as far away 
from Earth as their Apollo predecessors, they would spend up to 84 days in orbit and 
thus needed much more instruction in the operation of microgravity experiments.  The 
crews received lectures from Principal Investigators on the theory behind each 
experiment, then a presentation on the equipment and procedures needed to operate 
them.  This made for a more demanding training process than that experienced by any 
previous crew, but also the collection of compelling scientific data in orbit that 
demonstrated the potential of sending highly trained humans there.  The eleventh chapter 
will then discuss the training effort for the first joint mission in the history of human 
spaceflight.  Tom Stafford, Vance Brand, and Deke Slayton trained in the Soviet Union, 
while cosmonauts Alexei Leonov and Valery Kubasov trained in the United States prior 
to the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission.  The Americans then became the last astronauts to fly 
aboard an Apollo spacecraft when they docked with the Soyuz.  This chapter will 
demonstrate how their mission pioneered the concept of international training that guides 
American and Russian human spaceflight today.         
 The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth chapters will assess America’s longest 
human spaceflight program.  The Space Shuttle era brought about a new challenge for 
astronaut training upon the approval of the vehicle in 1972, because the Commander 
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needed to pilot the orbiter to a landing at the end of a mission rather than make a 
splashdown.  The orbiter also carried a complement of additional astronauts, called 
Mission Specialists, who performed experiments, operated orbiter equipment, and made 
EVAs but did not pilot the vehicle.  Payload Specialists from outside the space agency 
also flew on select missions.  The twelfth chapter will provide a brief overview of the 
entire program, assessing the equipment and procedures designed to simulate shuttle 
flights for each of these astronaut types.  The thirteenth and fourteenth chapters will then 
delve into the chronology of the program and the flight results that justified the training 
process.  As the years passed and the program recovered from the 1986 Challenger 
disaster, new emergency procedures for which the astronauts needed to train took shape.  
Astronauts prepared to bail out of the orbiter using an escape pole and rely on survival 
equipment located in their Launch and Entry Suit.  Simulation technology also 
progressed, as indicated by the use of virtual reality for the STS-61 mission, the first to 
service the Hubble Space Telescope in 1993.  The loss of the STS-107 crew aboard the 
shuttle Columbia in 2003 brought the program to a second prolonged delay, but also 
spurred the adoption of new training methods oriented around safety.  Instructors taught 
astronauts to operate an orbiter boom sensor system to allow them to search for damage 
to their Thermal Protection System, to make a pirouette maneuver that exposed the 
orbiter’s underside before docking to the ISS, and even to repair tile damage if 
necessary.  As they had since Mercury, NASA officials had made a determination of 
what astronauts could accomplish and devised sophisticated training methods in 
accordance with their ideas.  As a result, astronauts demonstrated their talent in 
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contributing to spaceflights. 
The fifteenth chapter will examine the latest era of human spaceflight.  In 1993, 
the administration of Bill Clinton reached an agreement to send American astronauts to 
the existing Russian space station Mir and then work with Russia on the new ISS.  This 
meant that Americans would have to travel to Russia, overcome the language barrier in 
working with cosmonauts and instructors, and adjust to new methods of preparation.  
This chapter will assess how Americans and Russians overcame their differences during 
the Shuttle-Mir program that launched the first American into space from Russian soil in 
1995 and concluded in 1998.  It will then move on to the ISS, which has housed 
multinational crews continuously since November 2, 2000.  When Americans began 
living aboard the ISS in stints of several months, the preparation process differed from 
the preparation for one to two week shuttle flights.  The timeline for ISS crewmembers 
was relaxed, which affected simulator training.  Staying aboard a station for several 
months also posed a psychological challenge for crewmembers, which affected the 
selection and training of crews.  This chapter will therefore demonstrate that the ISS era 
has marked a major turning point in the history of astronaut training.  Some of the tasks 
for which 1960s astronauts trained, such as piloting and geology, are no longer 
prevalent.  ISS astronauts must instead train to operate experiments, perform hardware 
maintenance, and adapt psychologically to long duration flight.  But once again, training 
has helped these astronauts to deliver scientific results that help to justify the human 
presence in space.  This chapter will bring the saga of human spaceflight to the present 
day, as new spacecraft such as NASA’s Orion, the SpaceX Dragon, and the Boeing 
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Starliner undergo development.  No matter which of these spacecraft prove to be most 
successful, the astronauts and instructors working on them should understand what 
training approaches have worked best in the nearly sixty years since the Mercury 
astronauts reported for work. 
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CHAPTER II 
MERCURY: “IT WAS ALL BRAND NEW” 
 
 Training for the historic act of sending the first Americans into space began at the 
southeast tip of the historic Virginia peninsula.  Just north of Hampton, a town English 
settlers had visited shortly after their 1607 arrival in the New World, a group of 
engineers had worked attempting to solve the problems of high-speed flight for several 
decades.  Shortly after the formation of the NACA in 1915, a selection board chose this 
site for a facility called the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory based on the temperate 
climate and location alongside a tidal river that would allow flying above both land and 
water.1  In April 1959, seven young men named Scott Carpenter, Gordon Cooper, John 
Glenn, Virgil “Gus” Grissom, Wally Schirra, Alan Shepard, and Deke Slayton found 
themselves walking here amid an expanse of laboratories, wind tunnels, and airplane 
hangars.  The men worked at seven desks inside a block-walled building that dated back 
to World War I.2   
In a nearby building, engineers at a new organization called NASA (having 
replaced NACA less than one year earlier) gave speeches to busloads of visitors.  “The 
Space Task Group has found the seven astronauts inspiring young men with whom to 
work,” the engineers repeatedly stated.  Since they would need the “detailed knowledge 
                                                          
1  James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958 
(Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4305, 1986), 11.  
2  Neal Thompson, Light This Candle: The Life and Times of Alan Shepard, America’s First Spaceman (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 2004), 177.    
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and skills that a pilot of a pioneering orbital space capsule must possess,” the seven were 
currently undergoing “an extensive program of training, indoctrination, and specialized 
education.”3  Yet at the time of these speeches, the facility housed only the most 
primitive of devices designed to mimic the Mercury spacecraft.  A collection of analog 
computers sat alongside a replica instrument panel, which sat above a couch for the 
seven to sit.4  What training devices would guide the astronauts in their quest to become 
the first humans to visit space, and what people would guide them in their efforts?  Were 
the seven taking part in a stunt, which would only result in their returning to their 
respective military services in a few years, or was this the beginning of a new line of 
work?  These questions remained to be answered in 1959, but already the Mercury 
astronauts could point to two inventions that had made simulations of complex flights 
possible: replica cockpits and analog computers. 
The use of a flight simulator was not new by the time the seven Mercury 
astronauts reported for work.  When military aviation blossomed during the 1910s, 
Americans and Europeans each understood the need to teach the skills of piloting to 
large groups of people.  After World War I ended, the expansion of flights carrying 
freight, mail, and paying passengers further established this need.  As New Yorker Edwin 
Link barnstormed the country and gave flying lessons during the 1920s, he wondered if a 
device designed to simulate flying could cut down on the cost of teaching the masses to 
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fly.  His experience manufacturing air-driven pianos and church organs in his father’s 
factory led him to a specific idea of how to do this: build an air-driven device that could 
simulate the motions of an aircraft.  By 1929, he had developed the first modern flight 
simulator: a machine where a pilot could sit inside a replica cockpit, manipulate the 
control stick, and feel compressed air tilt the cockpit in a corresponding direction.  The 
pilot would then look at a replica instrument panel, which would tell him the state of the 
aircraft.  In Thomas Hughes’s concept of a technological system, Link’s invention 
marked the first step in the evolution of flight simulation that eventually influenced 
spaceflight.  The U.S. Army Air Corps became Link’s first customer, buying six of his 
simulators in the 1930s.  Army officials realized that during flights in nighttime or bad 
weather, pilots would benefit from experience in instrument flying and that this 
experience did not have to come while in the air.  The Link simulator could give this to 
them more cheaply and less dangerously, and thus over half a million Allied pilots 
undertook training in the numerous simulators purchased by the Army during World War 
II.5  To return again to Hughes’s theory, flight simulation as a technological system had 
now reached a second step because it had transferred from Link to a major institution.            
Though the Link simulator only mimicked the motions of aircraft simply and 
inexactly, the invention provided a critical building block for spaceflight simulators in 
several ways.  The Link was the first machine that demonstrated flight training did not 
have to take place while in actual flight, an advantage that would enormously benefit 
astronauts given the enormous cost of launching people into space.  The Link could 
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move, giving pilots a physical sensation of their actions when they pitched, rolled, and 
yawed the simulator.  This meant that pilots could also become disoriented, just as 
astronauts later would aboard space simulators, but work on remaining calm and 
precisely monitoring their instruments.  The Link allowed early pilots to practice 
emergency drills, which would become a linchpin of astronaut training.  The Link also 
included an instructor sitting nearby, who would monitor the pilots’ actions just as 
generations of instructors would later monitor astronauts’ actions.6  But this machine did 
not provide the precision to replicate the exact motions of aircraft.  Flight simulation as a 
technological system had thus reached a third stage, in which a problem (what Hughes 
called a reverse salient) holds up the growth of the system.  Especially after World War 
II, when military aviators might have to operate aircraft under grim conditions in the 
Cold War, researchers at the NACA High Speed Flight Station (based at California’s 
Edwards Air Force Base) wanted to eliminate the problem by precisely simulating the 
motions of aircraft that could surpass Mach 1.   
Fortunately, the analog computer allowed them to do this during the decade after 
Chuck Yeager became the first pilot to break the sound barrier in 1947.  For centuries, 
humans have experimented with mechanical devices that gather data by measuring 
continuous changes in physical quantities, and then use this data to make calculations.  
But the development of the electronic analog computer in the twentieth century opened a 
new range of possibilities in simulating flight.  Engineers could use these computers to 
model (hence the name analog) the equations guiding the six degrees of freedom along 
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which aircraft would move.7  The United States Air Force (USAF) thus bought a set of 
Goodyear Electronic Differential Analyzer (GEDA) computers in 1952.  “We were asked 
if we could simulate the F-100 on a GEDA,” remembered Dick Banner, referring to the 
supersonic jet that would eventually become a crucial tool in the Vietnam War.  In the 
mid-1950s, “to the best of my knowledge, we were the first at NACA, Edwards, to 
simulate aircraft motions on a computer.”  Major universities began offering classes in 
analog computation at this time as well.8  Thus at the moment that Soviet and American 
engineers were preparing to launch the first artificial satellites into Earth orbit, and 
contemplating the launch of the first humans, a machine that would prove vital in 
conducting spaceflights and training for them entered engineers’ toolkits.     
The NACA managed to combine analog computers with replica cockpits 
beginning with simulations for the X-2 research aircraft.  For the first time, engineers 
had combined the two critical building blocks to spaceflight simulators.  The first replica 
cockpit in the Flight Simulation Lab consisted of a seat, an instrument panel, a 
hydraulic-powered control stick, and rudder pedals.  When a pilot manipulated the stick, 
he provided the required inputs into the equations that the computer calculated to guide 
the mock aircraft.  The pilot even saw visual displays out the window to heighten the 
fidelity of the simulation.  The simulation engineers only gradually convinced the pilots 
they sought to train of the importance of their work.  The older NACA pilots remained 
skeptical of the value of ground-based simulations during the mid to late 1950s.  Yet the 
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newer pilots “not only accepted the idea but in some cases insisted on the development 
of such simulators,” according to simulation engineer Gene Waltman.9       
Dick Day, one of the preeminent engineers at the High Speed Flight Station, 
understood the critical importance of analog computers.  In his presentation at a 1959 
meeting for the upcoming flights of the X-15 research aircraft, he said, “Prior to the 
general acceptance of the analog computer, essentially no ground-training devices were 
employed by NASA in guiding flight testing of research airplanes.  Rather, gradual in-
flight buildup to design conditions was depended upon.  However, certain types of 
control problems are not amenable to this approach since they are characterized by 
abrupt and violent instabilities.”  Thus the speed of computers became critical in 
modeling the behavior of aircraft and thereby understanding the motions that could 
threaten the vehicle and its pilot.10  The tragic death of Mel Apt aboard the X-2 aircraft 
in 1956, after he lost control of the vehicle due to roll coupling, especially prompted a 
renewed emphasis on simulating these dangerous conditions.11  Thanks to the rise of 
electronic analog computing that followed World War II, and the creative minds at the 
nation’s leading aviation research organization that knew how to apply this new 
capability, the era of precision in flight simulation had gained a foothold.     
 The simulation of high-speed aircraft flight reached a crescendo with the X-15.  
This NACA/NASA vehicle first flown in 1959 still holds the speed (4,519 miles per 
hour) and altitude (67 miles, beyond the Kármán line recognized as denoting the 
                                                          
9  Ibid, 9-10.  
10  Ibid, 173.  
11  Hansen, First Man, 148.  
28 
 
boundary between Earth’s atmosphere and space) records for a piloted, powered 
airplane.  Since the large aerospace company North American Aviation won the contract 
to manufacture the X-15, North American built a simulator of the aircraft linked to six 
analog computers.  Though their flights only lasted about ten minutes, X-15 pilots spent 
fifteen to twenty hours preparing for each one.  Historians have noted the shortcomings 
of the X-15 simulator in mimicking flights, such as the lack of motion and rudimentary 
displays out the window.12  Yet in historical context, this machine is one of the most 
critical building blocks for spaceflight simulation.  Waltman explained why when he 
remembered, “The X-15 simulator was the first complete ground-based simulation built 
by the FSL (Flight Systems Laboratory) for pilot training, mission planning, and 
research purposes.”13   
The method by which pilots prepared for X-15 flights especially bore a 
resemblance to astronaut training.  The pilots first performed several missions on the 
simulator that progressed as intended, with no hardware failures.  They had a chance to 
offer feedback at this point if they had any suggestions.  But during subsequent 
simulations, the pilots had to respond to a “malfunction generator” capable of simulating 
the failure of 23 aircraft systems.  If an engine failed, for instance, they had to quickly 
ascertain what emergency landing site they could reach.  “To date, this type of training 
program has been of great value to the X-15 program,” declared NASA’s Dick Day in 
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1961.14  Generations of astronauts would build on the legacy of the X-15 simulator when 
they undertook a training program characterized first by successful simulations, then by 
troubled simulations that tested their problem solving skills.  Astronauts would also have 
to prepare to follow detailed checklists while traveling at several times the speed of 
sound and while steeply descending from a space environment to air environment, 
building on the legacy of this simulator.  Neil Armstrong, the youngest of NACA’s X-15 
pilots, summarized the device as “probably the best simulator that had ever been built up 
to that time, in terms of its accuracy and dependability.”15                
 X-15 pilots also foreshadowed the training of future astronauts through their runs 
on the Navy’s centrifuge in Johnsville, Pennsylvania.  Researchers had long understood 
that the era of hypersonic flight would require preparation in not only the piloting aspect, 
but also the medical aspect.  Would flight at several thousand miles per hour produce a 
force of gravity so strong that pilots would be unable to function?  With the goal of 
answering this question, Navy officials spent over $2 million on a centrifuge arm that 
spun pilots located in a small gondola attached to it, so as to expose them to high G 
forces.  This aspect of the X-15 pilots’ training combined the elements of the two 
essential building blocks for spaceflight simulation, in that the gondola featured a replica 
X-15 cockpit and made use of analog computers so that the gondola could precisely 
mimic X-15 flight motions.  Once again, the centrifuge runs began with the intention of 
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simulating a nominal X-15 flight.  But the next step in the training program was to 
simulate emergency conditions, which could expose pilots to an accelerations as great as 
8 Gs.  These runs provided a crucial learning experience for the Mercury astronauts, 
because pilots showed they could monitor instruments without blacking out even at 
accelerations this high, so long as the vehicle he was riding in contained restraints.16  
Armstrong even handled 15 Gs and remained conscious despite the massive loss of 
blood from his head.  He then coauthored a report on the results which declared that high 
forces of gravity would not be a showstopper for pilots.17   
As the X-15 pilots underwent their training, aviation medical specialists were 
already looking ahead to the selection and training of pilots who would make the first 
flights into orbit.  In February 1957, two doctors at the School of Aviation Medicine in 
Texas wrote a report on the subject.  The problems they foresaw with spaceflight ranged 
from the physical (acceleration forces of up to 9 Gs, according to then current research) 
to the psychological (the separation of pilots from Earth aboard a tightly confined 
spacecraft).  Based on these issues, the doctors concluded that the first astronauts should 
come from the ranks of experienced pilots of high-performance aircraft.  They 
recommended that the astronauts should also exhibit strong motivation, a strong ability 
to cooperate with associates, positive interpersonal attitudes, and emotional stability.  
They also predicted the most useful forms of astronaut training: academic instruction  
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and experience in simulators and near-space conditions.18   
The two doctors were prescient in their analysis, except for one point: they 
foresaw the first astronauts reaching orbit aboard a winged vehicle like the X-15.  The 
future of American spaceflight beyond the fringes of Earth’s atmosphere lay not with 
vehicles like the X-15, but with small capsules launched atop rockets.  This was the 
“quick and dirty” approach to sending the first Americans into space, ideally ahead of 
the competing Soviet program.  A flurry of events in 1958 quickly established this as a 
national priority: the birth of NASA in October, the formation of NASA’s Space Task 
Group of engineers who gathered at the Langley Research Center to ascertain the details 
of the first piloted spacecraft beginning in November, and the announcement of Project 
Mercury in December.  The STG quickly established the guidelines of Mercury flights: 
the Redstone and Atlas boosters, both originally designed for military use, would be 
adapted to launch an astronaut into space aboard a bell-shaped capsule.  On initial 
flights, the Redstone would send the vehicle to a suborbital altitude of just over 100 
miles and a speed of just over 5,000 miles per hour.  On later flights, the Atlas would 
send the vehicle into orbit, where it would fly around the Earth once every ninety 
minutes at a speed of 17,500 miles per hour.  The vehicle would then fire retrorockets to 
decelerate, rotate so that the heat shield faced forward, and plunge through Earth’s 
atmosphere to a splashdown.19   
But what would an astronaut have to do during this time?  The romantic era of  
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pilots exerting complete control over their vehicles had passed, replaced by automation.  
One of the Mercury spacecraft contractors at the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation stated 
in a 1959 presentation, “If everything goes well and if the operator desires, the mission 
may proceed through launch, boost, orbit, reentry, and rescue without the astronaut 
turning a hand, since the automatic systems and the ground environment can control the 
vehicle.”  But he said in the same presentation, “The presence of a trained operator is 
very important for the success of the mission through the secondary control that he 
exercises.”20  NASA officials working on the Mercury program felt the same way, and 
this organizational determination would guide astronaut training through the Space 
Shuttle era.  The space agency could have treated the person aboard the  
vehicle as strictly a passenger at the mercy of automated maneuvers, and therefore 
placed the need to train that person on the backburner.  Yet the STG members and the 
contractors at McDonnell made the wise decision that astronauts could contribute vitally 
to Mercury missions.  This meant that astronauts would need training in the operation of 
the spacecraft. 
Why was this a wise decision?  Consider the failure rates of missions during the 
first years of the Space Age, beginning with the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957.  The 
Soviets successfully launched the first two Earth orbiting satellites that year, but in the 
U.S. the Vanguard attempt to orbit a satellite ended in catastrophe.  In 1958, the Soviets 
had one success against four failures.  The U.S. had seven successes against ten failures.  
In 1959, the Soviets had three successes against one failure.  The U.S. had eleven 
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successes against eight failures.21  The high failure rate confirmed that the reliability of 
automated space technology needed improvement.  Test pilots had experience in 
evaluating unreliable technology and making recommendations on how to improve it.  
These pilots possessed human brains, easily more powerful than any computer, which 
could experience firsthand the operation of the vehicle and therefore provide feedback 
that telemetry data on a screen could not provide.  The feedback could improve the 
safety of the spacecraft for future missions.  If an automated system malfunctioned, 
which was not a rare event as the statistics indicated, pilots could also manually guide 
the vehicle to safety.  Finally, sending humans into space aboard a Mercury spacecraft 
marked the first step in a sequence that resulted in the Apollo Moon missions.  The 
mental and physical flexibility of humans in exploring another celestial body would 
provide a key advantage for human spaceflight. 
 A variety of people deserve credit for making this organizational determination, 
both at NASA and McDonnell.  Electronics specialists felt the most strongly biased in 
favor of automation and against manual control in the Mercury spacecraft.  Even some 
of the most influential figures at the STG, such as Chris Kraft and spacecraft designer 
Max Faget, favored automation.  Faget recalled, “The thing would work without them, 
no doubt about it, and I to this day said that’s (automation) the way to do it, of course, 
because we didn’t know what they’d do when they got up there, how they’d react and all 
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that.”22  Yet two groups of people argued in favor of giving astronauts critical tasks 
aboard the spacecraft.  Not surprisingly, the test pilot community comprised the first 
group.  Human factors engineers comprised the second group.  These engineers 
specialized in the interaction between machines and the people intended to use them, and 
based on this expertise argued that the option of human intervention would make 
Mercury operations more robust.23  Since the Mercury astronauts had not yet been 
selected when this argument began, and therefore did not yet have a chance to voice 
their own opinions, they owed these people a debt of gratitude for advocating on their 
behalf.             
Some of this advocacy took place at McDonnell.  John Yardley, the chief 
spacecraft designer at McDonnell, favored the idea of a human role aboard the 
spacecraft.  In February 1959, the contractor hired a “human engineering expert” named 
Edward R. Jones.  Jones performed a statistical computation of the implications of 
failures in the automated systems aboard the Mercury spacecraft, and concluded that the 
astronauts served a vital function through their flexibility in responding to failures of 
these systems.  He wrote in a memo to Yardley, “A vast number of potentially different 
potential malfunctions may occur in the capsule’s systems, and the isolation of these 
malfunctions can be extremely difficult.  Mission reliability determinations assume the 
astronaut can detect and operate these systems without error.”  By the end of 1959, he 
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made a more strident statement in a presentation for the American Rocket Society: 
“Serious discussions have advocated that man should be anesthetized or tranquilized or 
rendered passive in some other manner in order that he would not interfere with the 
operation of the vehicle…As equipment becomes available, a more realistic approach 
evolves.  It is now apparent with the Mercury capsule that man, beyond his scientific 
role, is an essential component who can add considerably to systems effectiveness when 
he is given adequate instruments, controls, and is trained.”  Jones therefore 
recommended training the astronauts in procedures simulators.  By the end of 1959, 
Yardley and Jones had convinced the bulk of engineers at the contractor that they should 
treat astronauts as a vital component of the spacecraft.24 
The advocate of the human role who would become most essential to astronaut 
training, however, was NASA’s Robert Voas.  Voas had been educated as a 
psychologist, before working for the Navy on human factors aspects of naval aviation 
such as pilot selection, training, and operations.  The Navy then assigned him to the 
STG, where he was instrumental in devising a criteria for the selection of the first 
astronaut group and then administering their training program.25  Voas gave his most 
detailed public explanation of the human role aboard Mercury in a presentation at 
Boston’s Human Factors Society on September 14, 1960.  He argued, “Because of the 
limitations in the present state-of-the-art of engineering, ensuring…reliability is difficult, 
perhaps impossible, without man.  The astronaut can make his greatest contribution by 
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detecting malfunctions and taking corrective actions to overcome them.”26  Astronauts 
were necessary, then, to serve as “systems managers” in case of such malfunctions.  He 
also listed the other basic astronaut functions during a flight: monitor the critical 
sequences of a flight, navigate and maneuver the vehicle, communicate with the ground, 
make research observations, and participate in launch and recovery operations.27     
 Besides making statements that favored a strong human role aboard the Mercury 
spacecraft, Voas made clear that astronauts would be anything but idle between flights.  
He planned for the astronauts to contribute to spacecraft design at the McDonnell plant 
in St. Louis, Missouri, participate in the development of procedures and equipment, and 
disseminate information to the public.28  Voas had thus made an organizational 
determination that astronauts should be much more than passengers aboard a Mercury 
spacecraft, or “spam in a can” as some of their test pilot brethren called them.  The 
astronauts therefore can serve as one case study in what scholars Nelly Oudshoorn and 
Trevor Pinch call “the co-construction of users and technology.”  These scholars 
expanded upon the theory of social construction of technology to make an argument 
about the importance of users in consuming, modifying, domesticating, designing, 
reconfiguring, and resisting technological development.29  Those at NASA and 
McDonnell who worked on the Mercury spacecraft valued the contributions of the 
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“users” who would ride and operate it.  Voas mentioned in his 1960 presentation that, 
“Shortly after the astronauts reported to Project Mercury, they were given an opportunity 
to go to McDonnell, view the capsule mockup and make suggestions for the crew-space 
layout, instrumentation, and manual-control system.  These early contributions resulted 
in a number of significant improvements in these areas…The astronauts also aid in the 
Mercury program by contributing to the development of operational procedures for the 
vehicle, the launching site, and the range.”30                  
 While these critical organizational decisions were being made, the space agency 
went through with the selection of the Mercury astronauts.  Despite initial consideration 
of divers, balloonists, submariners, and mountain climbers, the STG members made the 
decision to choose military test pilots in December 1958.  Given the experience that 
military test pilots had with operating complex machinery and the risks that came with it, 
accumulating technical knowledge, and accepting discipline, the engineers at Langley 
considered them the best choices and President Dwight Eisenhower agreed.31  Voas 
remembered that the additional criteria for selection reflected his wish for an astronaut 
group that would require as little training as possible.  All applicants needed to be less 
than 40 years old, less than five feet eleven inches, in excellent physical condition, have 
a bachelor’s degree, be a graduate of test pilot school, and be a qualified jet pilot with at 
least 1,500 hours of flight time.  Voas and two colleagues screened the records of 508 
pilots and found 110 who met the criteria.  A selection committee consisting of 
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engineers and medical specialists then winnowed the 110 down to seven by April 1959.  
Scott Carpenter, Gordon Cooper, John Glenn, Gus Grissom, Wally Schirra, Alan 
Shepard, and Deke Slayton were, in Voas’s opinion, so healthy, highly motivated, and 
experienced that they made it “possible to utilize self-instruction to a great extent and 
thus to minimize the amount of formal group training required.”32  But the STG 
members were determined to prepare the seven to react to any conceivable emergency 
aboard a vehicle no pilot had ever flown before, and this meant a group including Voas, 
Joseph Loftus, and Raymond Zedekar needed to devise a training program.  By the time 
the seven first reported for work at Langley on April 27, Voas had completed the first 
outline.33 
His training program reflected the unique circumstances surrounding Mercury.  
When the seven took the stage at Washington D.C.’s Dolley Madison House for their 
first press conference on April 9, the national media lauded them to such a degree that 
the famous New York Times columnist James Reston wrote, “Those gloomy students of 
the American character who think we’ve lost the hop on our fastball should have been 
around here this week when seven young American men dropped into Washington on 
their way to outer space.”34  In the Cold War environment of 1959, when the Soviets had 
already embarrassed the U.S. by launching the first satellite into orbit and wished to 
launch the first person there as well, the men needed to do nothing more than show up at 
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a press conference to capture the American imagination.  The Mercury program also cost 
over $200 million of taxpayer money.  Given these factors, catastrophic pilot error 
during a Mercury flight would devastate the American public and NASA.  Voas thus 
wanted a level of reliability in the astronauts’ performance that he described as 
“unusual” in his summary of Mercury training.  He also pointed out that unlike new 
aircraft pilots, the seven could not train while in flight.35  On their very first flights, the 
spacecraft could endanger their lives if any critical system malfunctioned.  This placed a 
premium on ground-based training and suggested that when in doubt, Voas and his 
colleagues should over train the astronauts.   
Mercury training certainly reflected this, as Deke Slayton wrote in a 1961 essay 
called “Pilot Training and Preflight Preparation.”  He recalled, “Since no ground rules 
existed for the training of astronauts at the inception of the program, three basic 
philosophies were adopted: utilize any training device or method which has even remote 
possibilities of being of value; make the training as difficult as possible with these 
devices even though analytical studies indicate the task is relatively easy; and conduct 
the training on an informal basis except in the interests of intelligent scheduling of 
trainer and trainer time since we were all assumed to be well motivated mature 
individuals.”36  Over the last two years, Slayton had crisscrossed the country training on 
devices designed to simulate conditions that in some cases were very unlikely to take  
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place on a Mercury mission.  But Robert Voas and his colleagues did not have a 
textbook on astronaut training and could not guarantee the first space missions would go 
according to plan.  This meant testing a variety of training devices to ensure the 
astronauts were at the peak of their ability should a malfunction endanger the mission or 
their lives.  Slayton reflected, “As expected, some facets of the training program proved 
to be of relatively little value and will probably be eliminated from future training.  On 
the other hand, some items proved to be of very great value, and we will probably place 
much greater emphasis on these facets in future training.”37                          
The administration of the program took shape soon after the seven reported to 
Langley.  Robert Voas headed a training committee that included Bill Douglas, George 
Guthrie, and Raymond Zedekar.  Every Friday morning, these men would meet to 
review the astronauts’ training schedule for the upcoming week, approve it, and report it 
to Chuck Mathews, the Chief of the Operations Division at Langley.  In the afternoon, 
they would discuss the agenda with the astronauts.38  The instructors understood that the 
training devices and manuals still needed to be built, so they immersed the seven in 
classroom studies instead during their initial months on the job.  They also decreed that 
each astronaut should exercise at least four hours and fly aircraft at least three hours per 
week.39  “The physical activity was important not only in ensuring a high level of fitness 
at the time of launch but it also served the purpose of giving the pilot an opportunity to 
relax from the pressing technical problems which occupied the majority of his day,” 
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Voas explained, although the requirement to exercise a certain number of hours per 
week was eventually removed.40  The flight requirement reflected his argument, with the 
strong encouragement of the astronauts themselves, that the seven should keep up their 
piloting proficiency.  Voas and the astronauts reasoned that piloting was an essential part 
of the astronauts’ professional identities and that the seven should maintain their 
proficiency in making decisions that carried life or death consequences.  Training aboard 
a simulator did not carry these consequences, but actual flight did.  The Air Force 
consequently loaned them F-102 and F-106 aircraft and began a tradition in the astronaut 
corps that continues to this day with T-38s.41     
 The classroom training for new recruits also set a precedent that continues into 
the 21st century.  Langley engineers and scientists gave the astronauts 42 hours of 
lectures in 1959, divided between elementary mechanics and aerodynamics (10 hours), 
space physics (12 hours), principles of guidance and control (4 hours), space navigation 
(6 hours), communication (2 hours), and basic physiology (8 hours).42  Deke Slayton 
expressed his opinion that “all of us needed to brush up on basic mechanics and 
aerodynamics.  In addition, prior to this training we had been only briefly exposed to 
many fields of science.”  Along with his classroom instruction at Langley, he especially 
remembered the group’s astronomy lessons in North Carolina.  “Because one half of our 
orbital flight path will be on the dark side of the Earth, and because some people feel 
that stars can be seen even on the bright side, it was felt that some training in astronomy 
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was highly desirable,” Slayton reflected.  “Therefore, we went to the Morehead 
Planetarium at the University of North Carolina and were given basic instructions in the 
location of the various constellations and stars.”  The group then practiced navigating by 
the stars through a window like the one they would have in orbit, which “provided very 
valuable experience.”43  The idea of making astronauts well rounded at the outset of their 
careers through classroom instruction became a constant in the decades to come. 
The astronauts also spent hundreds of hours crisscrossing the country so they 
could attend briefings at various Mercury production facilities.  Their travels took them 
to NASA facilities at Cape Canaveral, Florida and Huntsville, Alabama, as well as 
contractor factories at McDonnell in St. Louis and Convair in San Diego, California, 
where contractors worked on the Atlas rocket.  The astronauts quickly found that as the 
public faces of the Mercury program, their visits held inspirational value.  Craftsmen at 
all levels now felt a personal connection to do their best in turning the numerous failures 
of the early years of the space age into successes, epitomized by Grissom’s famous 
“three word speech” in San Diego: “Do good work!”44  From July to December 1959, 
the seven traveled nearly one out of every three days.  They spent half of this time on 
individual trips related to their specialty areas of focus, but Robert Voas decided that 
they should spend the other half together.  He considered group training desirable 
because it easily facilitated the scheduling of activities with other organizations, and 
made for the most efficient use of astronaut and instructor time.  The emphasis on group  
                                                          
43  Slayton, “Pilot Training and Preflight Preparation.”  
44  Alexander, Grimwood, and Swenson, 241.     
43 
 
training extended through the Space Shuttle era.45 
The seven also received areas of specialty on which to focus during their 
training.  Scott Carpenter focused on communication and navigation, Gordon Cooper on 
development of the Redstone booster, John Glenn on cockpit layout, Gus Grissom on the 
manual and automatic attitude control systems, Wally Schirra on life support systems 
and pressure suits, Alan Shepard on tracking and recovery operations, and Deke Slayton 
on development of the Atlas booster.  The assignments meant that the seven had a 
chance to provide their input from a pilot’s viewpoint to engineers from Virginia to 
California.  Their input did consequently affect the design of the Mercury suit, cockpit 
layout, spacecraft hatch, and spacecraft window.46  The astronauts’ first year on the job 
thus provided further evidence of the kind of people NASA wanted.  The space agency 
did not want people who simply rode rockets like circus performers had once been shot 
out of cannons.  As NASA officials worked on the unproven Mercury spacecraft in 
1959, they instead wanted input from people experienced in the testing of unproven 
flight machinery.  They also expected valuable feedback from the astronauts after their 
flights took place.  But to prove the value of human spaceflight once the flights took 
place, they would need to train the seven in the operation of the vehicle.  What was the 
best way to do this?   
The answer to this question was not preordained.  The Langley personnel had to 
make choices based on potential value, potential hazards, and cost.  They considered 
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carrying the actual spacecraft to altitudes of up to 100,000 feet on balloon flights, 
placing it on a training device that simulated tumbling during the reentry sequence, and 
placing an actual spacecraft atop a launch vehicle during a static firing so an astronaut 
could climb aboard and experience the noise and vibration of a simulated launch.  But 
after several months of study, the instructors shelved all of these ideas as carrying too 
little value to justify the risk and cost.  When the instructors could use simulators to 
stand in for actual flight equipment, they generally did so to cut down on cost.47  By 
making a choice of simulators over actual vehicles, Mercury instructors had socially 
constructed the technologies of astronaut training.  As Mercury gave way to Gemini and 
Apollo, the choice of simulators would gather momentum (to use a phrase from 
Hughes’s concept of a technological system) and become the most vital form of 
astronaut training.                        
The Mercury astronauts trained on several such devices that built on the legacy 
of the computer age of flight simulation, still less than a decade old.  In the summer of 
1959, the McDonnell contractors supplied a hand controller for the astronauts to 
manipulate while looking at a Mercury attitude display simulated by an analog 
computer.  This device built the astronauts’ confidence in manually controlling the 
spacecraft should it become necessary during a flight.48  But the astronauts needed a 
replica of their entire spacecraft to feel prepared.  Thus the simulation engineers 
cannibalized a computer from an F-100 simulator to control a Closed Loop Analog 
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Static Simulator.  In this device, the men could sit in their custom-fitted couches, wear 
their pressure suits, see all the instruments in front of them that they would see during 
their flights, and turn the hand controller to pitch, roll, and yaw the spacecraft.  
Potentiometers sensed the movements of the controller and fed them into the computer, 
which in turn sent readings to the instrument panel in front of the astronaut.  The 
instructors then examined strip chart data from the astronauts’ manipulation of the 
controller to evaluate their performance.49 
Additional devices broke new ground by preparing the astronauts for the physical 
and visual sensations of their flights.  No such device was more painful than the Navy’s 
centrifuge in Johnsville.  The X-15 pilots had already survived runs producing 
accelerations of several times the force of gravity, but Mercury instructors wished to 
expose the astronauts to the specific conditions of a Mercury flight.  Thus the seven 
spent two weeks in August 1959 in Johnsville being whipped around a gondola at the 
end of the fifty-foot arm.50  The following April, the astronauts returned and this time 
climbed into a gondola modified to replicate all of the controls and displays of the 
Mercury cabin.  They wore their silver pressure suits and breathed pure oxygen, just as 
they would during a flight.  The instructors then played a recording of a rocket firing 
over the astronauts’ headsets, to expose them to the sound of liftoff (expected to be 90 to 
110 decibels), and programmed the computer to spin the centrifuge so as to simulate an 
entire flight from launch to reentry.  This meant that the arm spun fast enough to subject 
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the men to six Gs during a simulated Redstone liftoff and between eight and nine Gs 
during a simulated Atlas liftoff, because engineers had calculated the force these events 
would produce.  The astronauts still had to speak into their microphones despite the 
intense pressure, just as in an actual flight.  The pressure then abruptly dropped, 
simulating the cutoff of the booster engine and the transition to zero gravity, before 
building up again to simulate reentry.  Engineers felt much less confident in projecting 
the force of reentry, so the astronauts underwent runs of up to 16 Gs.51    
 But since preparation for spaceflight revolved around the “what if” questions, 
especially before any person had yet flown there, the centrifuge also simulated scenarios 
that were even more painful for the astronauts.  If the spacecraft had to make an 
emergency return prior to reaching orbit, the reentry angle would be much steeper than 
in a nominal mission.  This meant the astronauts would have to brace themselves for a 
force of gravity that would build up to 18 Gs in just 15 seconds, then decay in another 15 
seconds.  What if the escape tower had to whisk the spacecraft away from an exploding 
Redstone or Atlas and carry it to an emergency reentry and splashdown?  The firing of 
the escape rocket would make the astronauts feel a sudden burst of acceleration pressing 
them into their couches, but then the rocket would stop firing and aerodynamic braking 
would abruptly slow the spacecraft.  This would make them feel an abrupt onset of 
negative Gs that would throw them against their shoulder straps.  The instructors thus 
simulated this effect, called the “Eyeballs In, Eyeballs Out” test, by rotating the gondola 
180 degrees.  This subjected the riders to G reversals of as large as +9 G to -9 G, in just a 
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few seconds.52  “When we first talked about doing this, I didn’t think it would be 
possible,” Glenn wrote in a letter to a friend near the end of 1959.  “But in doing careful 
buildup we happily discovered that this was not so horrible.  At plus 9 G to minus 9 G 
we were bouncing around quite a bit but it was tolerable.”53            
The astronauts explored ways to counteract the pain of repeated runs on the 
centrifuge.  The seven each had two factors working in their favor: they sat lying on their 
backs and on seats that were custom fitted for them.  Even so, they could barely lift their 
arms to flip switches during the launch sequences and during reentry sequences, could 
not lift their arms at all.  The force of gravity whipped back the skin on their faces and 
even broke blood vessels on their backs.  They found that the best antidote was to tense 
their muscles in a strenuous effort to keep the blood from draining from their head and 
causing blackout.54  Glenn captured the ordeal best in his letter: “With the angles we 
were using, we found that even lying down at 16 Gs it took just about every bit of 
strength and technique you could muster to regain consciousness.  I found there was 
quite a bit more technique involved in taking this kind of G than we had thought.  Our 
tolerances from beginning to end of runs during the period we worked up there went up 
considerably as we each developed our own technique for taking this high G.  A few 
runs a day like that can really get to you.”55  He recalled in his memoir, “It’s something I 
never want to do again.”56 
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The entire NASA team reaped several benefits from the astronauts’ several trips 
to Johnsville, as one document from 1960 attests.  Medical specialists evaluated the 
effectiveness of the biomedical sensors strapped to each astronaut’s body and gathered 
physiological data, which they could use as baseline information for interpreting inflight 
and postflight data concerning each astronaut’s well-being.  A 16 mm camera inside the 
gondola even provided them with video of the astronauts under high acceleration.  
Engineers evaluated the astronauts’ personal equipment during this period of stress, such 
as the harness, couch, pressure suit, urine bag, and communication system.  The 
personnel who manned the console stations at Johnsville also gained experience in 
monitoring data during centrifuge runs, in preparation for their trips to worldwide 
tracking stations during Mercury missions.  The centrifuge training thus emphasized  
the notion of a Mercury team striving toward the goal of safe and successful 
spaceflight.57      
Robert Voas and the astronauts each agreed in the wake of Mercury’s success 
that the centrifuge was one of the crucial elements in preparing for flights, even if the 
runs were more stressful than actual missions.  During World War II, some American 
fighter pilots had found that high g-forces incurred in dives and turns had caused them to 
blackout, or left them unable to lift their arms.58  But after each of the seven had spent an 
average of 45 hours riding a centrifuge, Voas found that the astronauts could maintain 
consciousness and read instruments even under heavy accelerations.  The medical 
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specialists monitoring the biosensors strapped to each man’s body also found no 
showstoppers to a successful Mercury flight (the only bad news on the medical front was 
Slayton’s heart arrhythmia, which eventually resulted in his being grounded from 
spaceflight).59  The subjects of the runs were quick to point out during their postflight 
debriefings that the centrifuge was not the highest fidelity simulation machine.  “There is 
no correlation between any of the noise and vibrations on the centrifuge and that 
experienced in the flight case,” Shepard remembered.  The computer controlled noises 
and vibrations “were rather jerky” on the centrifuge and more violent and abrupt than the 
experience of riding a Mercury spacecraft to and from space, he believed.  Yet Shepard 
still picked the centrifuge as one of his top three training devices and stated, “I do feel 
that the centrifuge is valuable as a training aid during periods of launch and reentry…I 
think we’ll find it valuable for future training programs on this basis.”60  Grissom and 
Glenn also commented on the greater intensity of the centrifuge  
compared to actual flight, yet still picked it as one of their top three training devices.61     
The simulation of physical sensations took on a radically new form with arguably 
the most unique Mercury training device: the Multiple Axis Space Test Inertia Facility 
(MASTIF) at the Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio.  This device featured a 
large set of three concentric cages that rotated independently from each other, all with an 
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astronaut strapped inside one of the cages so he could be whipped around as if he was 
aboard a tumbling spacecraft.  Instructors could program the machine to either rotate 
one, two, or all three cages, and watch as the astronaut tried to use a hand controller to 
release spurts of gas that halted the rotation of the cages and stopped the tumbling.  After 
a mechanical engineer at Lewis conceived this machine in 1959, one of his colleagues 
and a test pilot at Lewis saw its potential as an aid to astronaut training and began an 
extensive test program designed to determine how much motion a human could 
withstand.  The two of them set a limit of 30 revolutions per minute for the machine, 
because any higher speed would risk sickness incapacitating the astronauts.62   
The Mercury astronauts quickly learned that the MASTIF stretched their 
capabilities as no other training device did, except for the centrifuge.  When Shepard 
went to Cleveland for his first run in February 1960, he had to press the red “chicken 
switch” that signaled instructors to stop the machine early.  But by March, all seven had 
learned to stop their rotation before sickness incapacitated them.63  Jerrie Cobb, one of 
the thirteen women pilots who underwent runs on some of the same training devices as 
the astronauts, also made a trip to Cleveland that year and impressed the instructors 
through her quick reactions in a 45-minute ride.64   
The astronauts agreed in retrospect that riding the MASTIF was a painful 
experience and definitely not their most important tool with which to prepare for their 
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missions.  Although all seven were seasoned test pilots who had flown tumbling aircraft, 
training aboard the MASTIF was unlike any experience they’d had and highlighted the 
separation between training for flight within the atmosphere and training for flight 
outside it.  Schirra called the machine “a bulldog tearing away at you.”65  In terms of the 
value of the machine, Shepard said during a debriefing, “Some of the disorientation 
devices that we used may be eliminated in future training programs as they are primarily 
a confidence-building device…it (the MASTIF) is certainly not an important training 
aid.”66  Glenn said during his debriefing, “The MASTIF and weightlessness, even 
though they were short, let you know that you could be in this kind of a crazy 
environment and do what you were supposed to do.  So they all fit into a background of 
confidence building.  But I would not say that our zero g training prior to flight was of 
real great importance nor would I say that the MASTIF was.”67  The Mercury astronauts 
were the last to use the MASTIF as a training device, though generations of children 
have ridden a version of the machine at Space Camp. 
 The Mercury flights would produce one other physical sensation that required 
training: weightlessness.  World War II had stimulated the thinking of scientists on this 
issue, just as it had on large G forces.  When Allied fighter and bomber planes flew over 
Germany, German fighter pilots developed a new type of pass on the enemy.  The 
Germans dove their planes from high altitudes, made their pass at the Allied bombers 
from below after a violent pull up, then evaded the enemy’s firepower through another 
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dive.  During this maneuver, German pilots experienced weightlessness during the 
pushover into the second dive.  The pilots reported disturbances of vision and frequent 
misses with their gunnery during this period.  With this knowledge in hand, several 
American pilots flew parabolic trajectories that produced brief periods of weightlessness 
during the 1950s.  Acclaimed aviators such as Chuck Yeager, Bill Bridgeman, and Scott 
Crossfield reported on the disorientation they felt.  But by the time the Mercury 
astronauts were selected, the USAF School of Aviation Medicine had made  
experiments on the effects of this condition and found that it was safe to conduct further  
research.68  
Training for weightlessness in the Mercury era was not nearly as important as in 
later programs, because in flight the astronauts would not be able to move from their 
seats.  Yet NASA medical specialists wanted data on the astronauts’ reactions to 
weightlessness and the instructors accommodated them by taking the astronauts aboard 
aircraft that flew a parabolic trajectory capable of inducing weightlessness.  The seven 
attained their first experience with this not aboard the KC-135 that eventually earned the 
affectionate nickname “Vomit Comet,” but aboard an aircraft with a very cramped cabin: 
the F-100.  The astronauts traveled to the School of Aviation Medicine in San Antonio, 
and for sixty seconds at a time performed psychomotor tasks aboard the F-100.  Eating, 
drinking, and speaking into a voice recorder did not present any serious problems, nor 
did the heart, respiratory rate and depth, or blood pressure data that medical specialists 
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received via telemetry.  But to practice maneuvering their bodies in weightlessness, the 
astronauts needed a large cargo aircraft.  The instructors thus arranged for runs aboard 
the C-131 at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio.  The seven donned crash 
helmets and experienced fifteen seconds of weightlessness in a padded cargo bay before 
the plane’s steep descent began and slammed them onto the floor and walls.69  By the 
time Mercury ended, each of them had trained in weightlessness for an average of 40 
minutes.70 
 In their postflight debriefing sessions, Shepard, Grissom, and Glenn considered 
this training a useful tool to build confidence but not one of their most important assets.  
“I don’t think that we have to fly it to the extent that we did,” Shepard recalled.  “I think 
that maybe one or two flights in the back seat of an F-100 and one or two flights in a 
KC-135 and a Convair are certainly plenty.  Weightlessness, as exhibited on a Redstone 
profile, provides no problem at all.”  Grissom and Glenn both remarked that the 
experience was not of great importance, with Glenn adding, “On the airplane flight, you 
don’t have the lengths of time to really settle down and really start working.”71  What 
appears clear in retrospect is that Robert Voas and his colleagues at Langley viewed the 
weightlessness training as a means to desensitize the astronauts to this novel feeling they 
would experience on their groundbreaking missions, as Voas alluded to in his summary 
of Mercury training when the program ended.  In completing their checklists, making 
                                                          
69  Caidin, 151 and Thompson, 189.  
70  Voas, “Astronaut Training,” 188.  
71  Mercury-Redstone 3 Technical Crew Debriefing, D22-27, Mercury-Redstone 4 Technical Crew Debriefing, C74-
75 and Mercury-Atlas 6 Technical Crew Debriefing, 11-4.  
54 
 
scientific observations, and especially in reacting to a potential emergency, the 
astronauts would have to set aside their reactions to the sensation and think rapidly and 
precisely.72  The weightlessness training was also a precursor of the future, when 
astronauts would need to learn to maneuver their bodies in a much more expansive 
environment than Mercury.  If Shepard, Grissom, and Glenn could have looked into the 
future and seen the progressively larger spacecraft that astronauts would fly, from 
Gemini to Apollo to a Skylab space station measuring 82 by 55 feet, they probably would 
have had a different assessment of weightlessness training.  
 From today’s perspective, it is surprising to note that Mercury instructors did not 
place a great emphasis on sending astronauts underwater to simulate weightlessness.  
The instructors did understand the principle of neutral buoyancy, meaning the condition 
in which a physical body’s density is equal to the density of the fluid in which it is 
immersed.  This condition offsets the force of gravity and causes the physical body to 
neither sink nor rise.  The “Original Seven” astronauts did test this principle in a tank at 
Langley.73  But as historian Michael Neufeld and NASA scientist John Charles 
recounted in a 2015 article, Mercury instructors did not take a great interest in this 
training method.74  The Astronaut Debriefing Forms for Alan Shepard, Gus Grissom, 
and John Glenn did contain the question, “Do you feel there is any future for submersion 
simulations for weightlessness training,” which suggests that Voas and his colleagues 
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were at least weighing the possibility.  But Shepard and Grissom each said no, while 
Glenn said he could not comment.  Comments such as Shepard’s “Weightlessness is not 
a real problem,” or Voas’s “The effects of weightless on performance appear to be minor 
and transitory,” illustrated the naiveté of astronauts and their instructors at a time before 
any astronaut had stepped outside a spacecraft to perform complex tasks.  Voas argued 
in a 1963 presentation, “Ground simulation methods using water seem to be too 
cumbersome and unrealistic to be fully acceptable substitutes,” and this attitude 
prevailed until the Gemini program.75   
The astronauts also prepared for the environmental conditions they would 
experience on their flights.  Engineers constructed an Environmental Simulator at the 
Navy Aircrew Equipment Laboratory in Philadelphia.  This simulator featured a 
spacecraft replica, pressurized to 5 psi as the real vehicles would be during flight, which 
was housed in a decompression chamber to simulate spaceflight.  The astronauts each 
took turns sitting inside and making the proper response to simulated emergencies, such 
as closing the faceplate on their pressure suits or dumping cabin pressure.  The 
astronauts also felt the heat and humidity they would feel during reentry.76  “We dressed 
in ventilated pressure suits and climbed into a steel box,” Deke Slayton remembered.  
“The interior of the box was heated up to approximately 250 degrees Fahrenheit 
 by radiating heat from quartz lamps through the walls.  We found that these 
temperatures were no great problem at all, and since the time this program was run, we 
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have discovered that our interior cabin heat load during an actual Mercury reentry is 
considerably lower.”77      
Robert Voas’s training program sent the seven across the country to experience 
still more environmental conditions.  In these earliest days when no person had yet flown 
in space, medical specialists feared the worst about how the human body would react.  
The seven therefore traveled to the Pensacola Naval Air Station and entered a “slowly 
revolving room” designed to simulate disorientation.  “This room rotates at 
approximately 10 r.p.m. in an attempt to simulate proposals for rotating a small 
spaceship to induce a small G-field artificially, with the assumption that weightlessness 
becomes a major problem,” Deke Slayton explained.78  Voas marked the “slowly 
revolving room” as being of “questionable value” in his summary of Mercury training, 
and indeed this type of disorientation training was discontinued after Mercury.79  The 
seven also traveled to Bethesda, Maryland and entered a carbon dioxide chamber.  “We 
climbed into the chamber; it was sealed; and the carbon dioxide content was gradually 
increased from a normal 0.05 percent to approximately 4 percent over a period of 3 
hours,” Slayton remembered.  “We were able to note the physiological effects such as 
increased breathing, pulse rate, flushing, and in some cases, a slight headache.  We feel 
that this carbon dioxide chamber was a valuable part of our training, since no one has 
been able to devise a completely satisfactory partial-pressure measuring device, at least  
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for measuring small partial pressures.”80     
The astronauts found training involving their actual spacecraft especially helpful 
in preparing for the environmental conditions of their flight.  When the men traveled to 
Cape Canaveral, they could sit inside their actual spacecraft as it sat inside a 
decompression chamber.  “This is one of the most valuable tests we do at the hangar,” 
recalled Gus Grissom.  “You get into the capsule and pump the chamber up to 200,000 
feet and see that everything works and works as it should.  This is another real 
confidence builder...So, on launch day, I had no feeling of sitting on top of a booster 
ready for launch.  I felt just like I felt at the hangar or anyplace else.  Here is home.  
Here are surroundings that are familiar to me.”81  Grissom’s comments support a point 
made by Tom Wolfe in his classic study of the Mercury astronauts, The Right Stuff.  
Wolfe argued that the point of the training exercises was largely to “desensitize” the 
astronauts to the heat, noises, and motions of the unprecedented act of sending a human 
into space.82  Grissom and his colleagues believed sitting aboard the actual vehicle was 
one of the most effective means of doing this.  
 One of the most crucial environments the astronauts would encounter during 
their flights was the ocean, because the mission profile called for a splashdown.  This 
meant the seven required training in exiting their spacecraft under normal and 
emergency conditions.  If all went according to plan, the vehicle would splash down 
only a few miles away from a recovery ship.  A helicopter would then fly from the ship 
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to the spacecraft, lower a hook onto it, and lift it partially out of the water so that the 
lower frame of the door was above the water line.  The astronaut would then climb out 
onto a raft, climb into a “horse collar” lowered to him, and ride it into the helicopter.83  
But as usual, the instructors had a list of “what if” questions that needed answering.  
What if the spacecraft splashed down off target and out of the range of recovery  
forces?  What if the vehicle became submerged beneath the ocean and the astronaut 
needed to make a quick escape?  What if the side hatch malfunctioned, and the astronaut 
had no choice but to exit through the top hatch?   
Robert Voas placed a high emphasis on the astronauts’ proficiency in water in 
light of these possibilities.  In May 1959, only one month after they first reported for 
work, he sent the men to a Naval Amphibious Base near Norfolk, Virginia and had them 
scuba dive with Underwater Demolition Unit Two.  The astronauts varied widely in 
underwater ability, from Scott Carpenter (a Navy man who would develop a 
distinguished record in undersea research) to Deke Slayton (an Air Force man who did 
not even know how to swim).84  The different backgrounds of the seven made this initial 
training necessary.  With all of them having this experience under their belts, they 
donned their pressure suits, went to a pool at Langley and made their first spacecraft 
egresses in February 1960.  The astronauts found they could exit the spacecraft in ten 
seconds even while the vehicle was submerged and the pool generated waves of up to 
two feet.  They also successfully practiced exiting from the top hatch.  The following 
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month, the seven went to the Pensacola Naval Air Station and spent a day training in the 
Gulf of Mexico.  This allowed them to train for the possibility of being temporarily 
stranded from recovery forces and drawing on survival equipment such as shark 
repellant packages and dye markers.  “We spent approximately one-half day in one-man 
rafts learning how to distill water, protect ourselves from the Sun, and signal the rescue 
forces,” Slayton recalled.  “This exercise convinced us that we could survive for a 
number of days if forced to reenter in an unspecified recovery area.”85             
The seven had to contend with one more “what if” question surrounding their 
return to Earth that required training.  What if a spacecraft landed so far off target that it 
missed the ocean altogether?  Engineers knew in 1960 that the orbital path of the 
vehicles would take them over the Atlantic Ocean, Africa, the Indian Ocean, Australia, 
the Pacific Ocean, and the continental United States.  If the spacecraft needed to make an 
emergency landing in a remote desert, particularly in Africa or Australia, the astronauts 
would need to know how to survive until recovery forces could locate them.  As usual in 
the Mercury training program, the armed forces could provide assistance in preparing the 
astronauts.  Air Force officials had selected Stead Air Force Base in Reno, Nevada as an 
ideal location for pilot survival training.  Pilots traveled there to take a three week class 
in Evasion, Resistance, and Escape.  Because of the success of this class, Robert Voas 
and his fellow instructors decided to send the astronauts to Stead for desert survival 
training in July 1960.86  “The field training area was characterized by scarcity of 
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vegetation, evidence of a limited amount of animal life, high daytime air and surface 
temperatures, and relatively cool nights, and was, therefore, considered to be 
representative of either the North African or Australian desert regions,” explained 
instructor Keith Lindell.87     
 The program lasted five and a half days and progressed from observation to 
hands-on activities.  For one and a half days, the astronauts received classroom 
instruction at the USAF Survival School.  The next day, each of them ventured into the 
desert and placed themselves alongside their own spacecraft mockup.  Each mockup 
contained a Mercury survival kit, which included first aid supplies, distress signals, a 
signal mirror, a radio, matches, a whistle, 10 feet of nylon cord, a knife, a flashlight, and 
six pints of drinking water.  The astronauts also had access to a sixty-three foot 
parachute used during the spacecraft’s descent.  The instructors told them to live on their 
own for the next three days, with only these items to assist them.  Amid daytime 
temperatures that hovered around 105 degrees, the seven cut up their parachutes to 
construct clothing and tents that shielded them from the Sun, and practiced signaling 
their location through mirrors and fires.88  But the length of time they could survive 
depended almost entirely on the amount of drinking water available, as Lindell explained 
in his memo on the session.  “The six pints of drinking water which is now provided in 
the Mercury capsule would be sufficient to maintain an astronaut in good physical 
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condition for approximately twenty-four hours, provided he were in good physical 
condition after impact, he remained out of the direct rays of the Sun except to perform an 
urgent task, and he remained sheltered and almost totally inactive once the urgent tasks 
had been accomplished,” he wrote.  After that, an astronaut would face “near-total 
incapacitation, both physical and mental.”  But since the instructors replenished each 
astronaut’s water supply, the seven survived for three days in Nevada.89         
In 1960, the training program entered a new era as the two simulators that the 
seven agreed were their most valuable training aids became operational.  Contractors at 
the Link Trainer Company in Binghamton, New York, under the direction of the 
McDonnell contractors, manufactured both of them.  The first was a motion-base 
simulator that gave them the physical and visual sensations of a flight, all wrapped in 
one machine.  The Air Lubricated Free Attitude (ALFA) trainer consisted of a replica 
spacecraft that moved via air jets in response to the hand controller.  The ALFA was thus 
a precursor of the motion-base training that Space Shuttle astronauts would experience 
into the 21st century.  It also contained an optical viewing system so when the astronauts 
looked through their periscope, they would see a simulated view of the Earth.  They 
could then practice orienting the spacecraft based on that view, in case a malfunction of 
their instruments would ever require them to do so.90  “The maximum effectiveness of 
the control jets I think is best practiced on the ALFA Trainer,” remembered Shepard in a 
debriefing session after he made his Freedom 7 flight.  “There is, of course, some 
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correlation between maximum effectiveness of control on the Procedures Trainer in the 
actual flight case, but I think the ALFA Trainer here is more valuable because you are 
able to observe movement in the horizon as well as movement on the instruments.”  He 
then picked the ALFA as one of the top three devices he would pick to feel adequately 
trained for a Mercury flight. Grissom did the same after his Liberty Bell 7 flight, stating, 
“I think it’s a very valuable trainer for this program or for any program which is coming 
along.”  Glenn also picked the ALFA as one of his top three training devices.  While 
acknowledging that the machine needed representations of stars and cloud cover over 
Earth to become as high fidelity as possible, he agreed that ALFA sessions were some of 
the most essential at the dawn of human spaceflight.91 
The other simulator was a fixed-base machine that also served as a precursor of 
astronaut training through the Space Shuttle era: the Mercury Procedures Trainer (MPT).  
Mike Collins remembered of his experience in the Gemini and Apollo simulators, “This 
was the very heart and soul of the NASA system; this was where we spent our time 
above all other choices…one is not to fly until the simulator has told him he is ready.”92  
The logic behind Collins’s statement was the complexity of the early spacecraft.  
Though much less complex than Gemini and Apollo, Mercury vehicles featured over 120 
controls inside the phone booth sized cockpit in which the astronaut would sit.  If an 
automated system failed, he would need to know the proper response from this set of 
controls.  The McDonnell contractors thus wrote an “Astronauts’ Handbook” that 
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described operating procedures under normal and emergency conditions.  In a normal 
orbital mission, the handbook called for the astronaut to complete a 130-item checklist.  
If an emergency took place during either launch, orbit, reentry, descent, or landing, the 
handbook listed 156 possible actions the astronaut could take to save the mission.93  The 
MPT replicated all the controls so that astronauts could practice all these actions in a 
risk-free environment.   
A task group at Langley made a critical decision: that astronauts should train in 
the MPT along with the flight controllers and those at tracking sites around the world 
who would support the missions.  This group formed in September 1959 under the 
leadership of Jack Cohen.  Although Cohen left the group after about a year, he 
contributed the idea of linking the MPT into the Mission Control Center.  This way, 
astronauts would train by operating controls in the simulator while flight controllers 
would train by following telemetry signals from the simulator in the control center.  This 
idea of an integrated simulation involving all people responsible for mission success 
endured through the Space Shuttle era.  The original members assigned to work with 
Cohen were Arthur Hand, Glynn Lunney, and Harold Miller.  Dick Hoover, Stanley 
Faber, Dick Koos, and William Sullivan had joined the group by 1960.94   
Some of these people had backgrounds as NACA engineers, while Koos joined 
the group on the basis of his experience in computers while working in the military.  “I 
was in the Army at Fort Bliss,” he explains.  “I had a bachelor’s degree in math and 
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economics, having double majored.  I really wasn’t sure about what I wanted to do or 
where I wanted to go.  But I ended up at Fort Bliss, working on antiaircraft programs.  It 
ended up being a perfect fit for what I did at NASA.  During the last part of my service 
down there, I was part of a group that was doing prototypical work with software 
programming.  It was for war games on air defense systems.  It was an IBM 650 vacuum 
tube computer with big drum memory.  I learned a little bit about machine language 
when I was there.  Whatever it was I put on my resume and sent it around, it caught 
someone’s attention at NASA.”95    
 Koos also remembers the vagueness of his job description when he left Iowa for 
Virginia in September 1960.  “When I was driving to Virginia, I had just gotten the offer 
in the mail and with it came this nice, slick brochure from the Langley Research Center,” 
he says.  “I was told, ‘We have some telemetry that will be between the Mercury 
Procedures Trainer and the control center.  Your job is to man a console during 
simulations and figure out what this is all about and what to do.’  We started from 
scratch.  There was no training for us.”  By the time he arrived, NASA had already been 
launching satellites into orbit for the past two years.  But he quickly learned that 
unmanned spaceflight had only limited applicability in his new job of simulating piloted 
Mercury flights, because “there wasn’t much monitoring of internal systems of satellites 
at that time.  Maybe the military had done something with the Discoverer program, but 
mainly it was just tracking to see where they could be.  There wasn’t any downlink of 
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internal systems until Mercury when they had a crewman onboard.  It was all brand 
new.”96    
What especially drove Koos and his colleagues was the knowledge that although 
engineers had provided computer driven simulations of aircraft flights over the past 
decade, simulations of spaceflights called for a new degree of urgency.  Even the X-15 
aircraft had a long series of flights that only gradually increased in speed and altitude.  
But the very first time an astronaut climbed inside a Mercury spacecraft, he would be 
propelled over 100 miles high and the spacecraft pushed to its limits of stress and 
endurance.  This meant that emergencies could threaten the astronauts’ lives, in which 
case they would need to understand the proper course of action.  The flight controllers 
would also receive data during such an emergency, and would also need to understand 
what to do.  If a controller received a particular signal, should he call for a mission abort 
or not?97  Koos and his colleagues decided that simulations should test the understanding 
of both astronauts and controllers.  Under their plan, Simulation Supervisors (SimSups) 
would institute malfunctions into the MPT, to which astronauts and controllers would 
have to respond. 
Koos remembers the criteria by which he and the other early SimSups decided to 
institute malfunctions.  “When we started, and this was new also, they had developed 
flight rules,” Koos explains.  “The rules stated that you should take this action if this sort 
of thing happens.  We picked at those mission rules and system limits and tried to 
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simulate something that could happen, so flight controllers could recognize it.  For 
example, if the cabin pressure valve didn’t seat itself at 5 psi during a Mercury launch, 
you had to do an abort.  The flight controller saw that, and he would have to take action 
and call to the flight director for an abort.  The crew had the same indicators onboard, 
but there were many indicators only available on the ground.  We also pulled 
communications lines to the control center at the Cape, so it would be down and then the 
backup control center would have to take over.  We also had remote sites across the 
world with somebody at the site to talk directly with the astronauts and also to monitor 
the data as they went over.  All communicated back to the control center by teletype, so 
we interfered with teletype communications.  That wasn’t really out of the ordinary, 
because in Australia those sites were out in the outback.  Some of that data went over the 
top of a wire fence, if you can believe that.  So it wasn’t out of the question to simulate 
that type of thing at all.  The other thing we did was to put failures in the instrumentation 
system (so that a controller would have to decide whether an indication on his console 
was real or just a glitch).”98      
 Thus began a tradition that continues to this day: the contest between SimSups 
who devised emergency scenarios and the astronauts and flight controllers who tried to 
solve them.  When asked if the groups developed a competitive mentality with one 
another, Koos says yes.  “We were the guys with the black hats,” he explains.  “In my 
later years, I was on the other side.  I wasn’t in simulation.  When you’re sitting there 
knowing that something is going to happen, and God only knows what they’re going to 
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do, I understand you’re under a fair amount of pressure.  And we’re the guys doing it.  
We developed that kind of (competitive) relationship.  It was like memories on a football 
team.  They get after each other.”99   
The SimSups believed that Jack Cohen’s idea of integrated simulations proved 
beneficial for the entire Mercury team.  Harold Miller remembered that the sessions 
successfully exercised procedures, interfaces, and mission rules, screened flight 
controllers and weeded out those who were not skilled at real time operation, and helped 
the astronauts and flight controllers meld as a team.100  His colleague Dick Koos shares 
these opinions today.  “I think Kraft and those guys would say that it allowed them to 
build the team,” he reflects.  “Wherever we ran a simulation, there was always a 
debriefing at the end.  Kraft started all that.  It was like a confessional.  Everybody went 
around the room.  We would have our say about what we tried to do.”101  Those 
debriefings gave flight controllers a sense of trepidation because they knew they would 
have to hear about their mistakes, but the controllers understood their value.  Glynn 
Lunney provided an apt description of simulations and debriefings from a flight 
controller’s point of view: “These sims were a baptism by fire.  The palms always got 
sweaty; any decision had to be justified, and one’s honor was at stake, naked in front of 
his peers and the boss.  And, most all of us spent some time in that naked position.  But, 
it did raise one’s determination to avoid screwing up.”102    
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The SimSups had at their consoles a list of cards containing possible 
malfunctions of spacecraft systems.  They would then flip a switch to institute a failure 
into a system and observe the action the astronaut took to correct the malfunction.103  
The SimSups would also fill out an Exercise Record Form for each run.  “It is not 
intended that the Exercise Record Forms be used as a ‘performance record,’ nor is there 
any intention to set up any kind of formal performance evaluation scheme or grading 
system,” simulation engineer Bruce Aikenhead explained in a memo.  “Rather, it is 
agreed that there seems to be too many intangibles for any simple system to be 
meaningful.”  He felt the forms would instead be useful for three purposes.  First, they 
would help to determine whether a particular astronaut was having trouble with systems 
management, indicating the need for more practice.  Second, they would help to 
determine whether all astronauts were experiencing difficulty of a sort which might be 
avoided by a change in a system or procedure.  Third, they would help in evaluating the 
training program when information from actual spaceflights became available.104  The 
form listed the name of the exercise, the trainee, the instructor, the date and time, 
whether pressure suits, restraint harnesses, helmets, gloves, and capsule lighting were 
used, the imposed malfunctions on each mission phase, and the corrective actions taken 
by astronauts.  One surviving form lists a three-orbit simulation that John Glenn made on 
August 15, 1960 and includes the following remarks: “Flight controllers need more 
practice…Can’t detect smell of smoke when pressure suit is in operation.  Check with  
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systems.  Modify trainer if necessary.”105             
 When the astronauts climbed into the MPT, they understood just how much the 
experience of a Mercury flight would differ from the aircraft they had flown.  Here, the 
pilot could not leave the ground through his own actions.  The “Astronauts’ Handbook” 
instead called for them to monitor the lights on the instrument panel in front of them 
during a completely automated rocket launch.  When the MPT reached simulated orbit, 
the vehicle could only have its path changed through attitude adjustments.  Even this was 
usually under the control of the Automatic Stabilization and Control System (ASCS), 
though the astronauts did have the option of taking control via the fly-by-wire and 
manual modes.  Simulator runs thus highlighted the impulse toward automation, but also 
that Mercury flights would seriously test the astronauts’ skills should emergencies 
intervene.  The seven might have to notice an engine failure, pass the information onto 
flight controllers, and then receive an order from the Capsule Communicator (CapCom) 
to fire the escape rocket that would be attached to the spacecraft in an actual mission.    
They might also have to determine the source of fire or fumes.  Or, in a preview of what 
would actually happen during the Mercury program, they might have to undertake the 
lifesaving maneuver of manually controlling the spacecraft attitude for reentry.106  The 
SimSups considered failures at each point of a mission fair game, but not catastrophic  
failures, because the point of the simulations was to determine if astronauts and flight  
                                                          
105  “Exercise Record Form,” August 15, 1960, Box 63, Folder 39, John H. Glenn Archives, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio.    
106  “Astronauts’ Handbook,” December 4, 1959, Box 58, Folder 2, John H. Glenn Archives, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio. 
70 
 
controllers could find a way out of emergencies.    
 The method of crew escape deserves special consideration, given the high 
number of launch failures in NASA’s first years.  Engineers decided that the most 
effective means of crew escape would be a tower containing a solid rocket motor, 
attached to the spacecraft, which would whisk the vehicle away from a rocket breaking 
apart on the pad or during the first 2 minutes and 23 seconds of ascent.  Though the 
vehicle would then expose the astronaut to exceptionally high G forces, in theory it 
would make a safe splashdown.  The engineers did develop an Abort Sensing and 
Implementation System (ASIS) that would electronically sense the impending failure of 
the Redstone or Atlas booster and activate the tower in time to save a spacecraft and 
astronaut.  But the astronaut also had access to a “chicken switch” in front of his left arm 
rest, which could initiate the abort sequence as well.107  Thus from the earliest era of 
spaceflight training, astronauts had to prepare to make a decision that could save their 
lives and drastically affect the national effort to achieve supremacy in space.  This 
underscored the necessity of a training program that could build their confidence, to use 
the phrase that Mercury astronauts emphasized in their debriefings.  In later programs, 
this escape system would be abandoned in favor of systems less likely to save crews.  
But most engineers would agree that during Mercury, astronauts had access to the best 
escape system attainable at the time.     
Robert Voas and his fellow instructors had to learn as they went along, and thus  
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invited feedback from astronauts on how they could improve procedures training.  The  
instructors faced the dilemma of whether to spend extra money improving the fidelity of 
the MPT, or trusting that the device did not need to simulate every aspect of a 
spaceflight.  One issue concerned whether to mount the MPT on a centrifuge, which 
would have cost $10 million.  Shepard, Grissom, and Glenn all answered no, with Glenn 
explaining, “I think the problems that we would have now in mounting the procedures 
instructor on the centrifuge would preclude any day-in, day-out procedures trainer 
operation.”  The first three astronauts to fly also generally recommended that the 
instructors did not need to go to great effort to simulate the sounds of a spaceflight, or 
the star field outside the vehicle, for the MPT.108  The men agreed that the SimSups had 
provided a proper balance between normal and emergency runs on the MPT.  Shepard 
supported the heavy emphasis on simulated failures, stating, “I think that in the training 
program one should specifically over-train.  By that I mean create more failures than 
could possibly occur in an actual flight.”  Glenn shared this sentiment, but remarked that 
SimSups should mix up normal and emergency runs without warning.  “If you know for 
sure during a simulation that they don’t plan to give you any emergencies, no matter 
how hard you fight it, there is a tendency to relax,” he argued.  “Maybe a third of the 
training runs should be normal runs, but without the trainee knowing when he is going to 
get a normal run.”109                         
 But when asked to evaluate the MPT in general, the astronauts universally  
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praised the device in their debriefings.  Especially given that President John F. Kennedy 
had challenged the nation to send men to the Moon, instructors wanted an assessment for 
the benefit of the Gemini and Apollo programs that would follow Mercury.  Shepard 
provided his assessment by declaring, “I feel that the procedures developed in meeting 
emergencies, in using manual override, and general observation are indeed valuable, and 
I think that for later capsules, we will find that the Procedures Trainer is one of our most 
valuable aids in preflight training programs.”  Though he believed in the need for a 
motion base simulator like ALFA, he praised the fixed base MPT as the most essential 
training asset.110  Grissom and Glenn also placed the MPT at the top of their lists, with 
Glenn explaining his choice by saying that this machine gave the best presentation of 
Mercury instruments and provided the best place to practice systems monitoring, failure 
analysis, and task loading.111                      
Long after the Mercury program ended, scholarly literature on training supported 
the astronauts’ contention that they stood to benefit from this kind of training.  In the 21st 
century, U.S. organizations alone spend more than $100 billion per year on employee 
training.  Researchers have performed experiments on the value of this, including for 
those in technical fields such as astronauts.  The researchers have measured trainees to 
find that mentally rehearsing tasks allows them to increase declarative knowledge (facts) 
and procedural knowledge (how to perform skilled tasks) for up to 10 days later.  
Researchers have also focused specifically on aviation, because human error has  
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consistently been one of the major causes of air crashes since the late 1970s.  Their 
studies have shown that errors in this field are often the result of inadequate team 
coordination, and thus pilots should focus on team-based training.  “This type of training 
is usually conducted using sophisticated flight simulators, and it addresses 
communication, teamwork, decision making, and awareness with respect to accidents 
and incidents and the role played by human error,” write two authors in a 2009 literature 
review on training.112  By including astronauts and flight controllers in integrated 
simulations, Mercury instructors emphasized teamwork.  Close cooperation with flight 
controllers remains an essential part of an astronaut’s identity, and sessions on the 
procedures trainer helped instill this into the original astronauts’ thinking while also 
helping them to mentally rehearse their tasks.  But would the seven ever get their chance 
to place all of this training to the test? 
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CHAPTER III 
MERCURY: “THE MOST EXTRAORDINARY COMPUTER OF ALL” 
 
The future of America’s fledgling space effort remained in doubt.  As 1960 
progressed, the astronauts demonstrated that their capabilities would not be the weak 
link in the Mercury program but realized that their hardware remained suspect.  The first 
attempted launch of the Mercury-Atlas combination failed miserably on July 29.  The 
first attempted launch of the Mercury-Redstone combination on November 21 was an 
even more embarrassing failure, as the rocket rose just four inches off the ground and 
settled back onto the launch pad.  Only the escape tower launched.1  Meanwhile, concern 
about the progress and the value of Project Mercury grew in Washington, D.C.  
President Dwight Eisenhower spent his last year in office less than enthusiastic about 
Mercury or human spaceflight in general, and the election of John F. Kennedy in 
November did not necessarily spell greater support for the program.  The Mercury team 
knew that Kennedy’s science adviser Jerome Wiesner was a fierce critic of human 
spaceflight.  Kennedy and Wiesner delegated a committee to write a report on Mercury, 
due in April 1961.  After visiting Langley, Cape Canaveral, and the McDonnell factory, 
the committee judged astronaut training to be in the highest reliability class of the 
program: 95 to 100 percent.  Thus the weak link of the program was not the people 
preparing to fly into space, but the boosters intended to take them there, judged to be in  
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the 70 to 85 percent class.2                
Despite the booster mishaps, the Mercury team by 1960 did have a mission in 
mind for the first launch of an American astronaut: Mercury-Redstone 3.  This would be 
a 15-minute suborbital flight.  During the fall, the astronauts began to move away from 
general training and toward preparation for this mission at the Johnsville centrifuge and 
in the MPT.3  “The malfunctions which can be simulated on the Procedures Trainer and 
which are relevant to the MR-3 mission have been reviewed and 50 failures selected 
which appear to cover all the major capsule systems,” Robert Voas wrote in a memo to 
the seven that November.  “These 50 failures have been distributed through 12 standard 
Redstone missions…It is hoped that the anticipated success of every man handling these 
malfunctions will demonstrate the readiness status of the astronauts for the MR-3 
mission…In order to determine the effects of the increased load due to these 
malfunctions on each astronaut’s ability to carry out the normal MR-3 mission, error 
scores for the retrofire period will be recorded as will the accuracy with which the pitch, 
yaw, and roll attitude maneuvers during the early part of the Redstone flight are 
performed.  After each mission, a debriefing will be held in which the astronaut should 
report the emergencies he recognized and any problems he had in handling them, 
together with his estimate of how well he performed the normal flight activities.”4  Voas 
thus signaled that astronaut training had entered a new phase, oriented toward a brief hop 
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that the Mercury team still hoped would be the first venture of a human being beyond 
planet Earth. 
The STG members at Langley took the training program into consideration when 
choosing the astronaut for that first mission.  On January 19, 1961, the seven stayed late 
in their office at the instruction of STG head Bob Gilruth.  Gilruth then walked into the 
room and dropped a bombshell on the astronauts: “Alan Shepard will make the first 
suborbital flight.”  He added that Gus Grissom would make the second flight and John 
Glenn would backup both Shepard and Grissom.  Over nearly two years, Shepard had 
impressed the STG members with his attention to detail in mastering the training 
devices, studying the spacecraft, and studying flight plans.  “We wanted to put our best 
foot forward,” wrote Walt Williams, and his colleagues agreed with him that Shepard 
should lead America into space based on technical ability.5  The other astronauts would 
participate in the mission, however, whether by backing him up (John Glenn), traveling 
to the pad for prelaunch preparations (Glenn and Gus Grissom), serving as Capsule 
Communicator (Gordon Cooper in the blockhouse prior to the launch and Deke Slayton 
in the Mercury Control Center during the mission), or flying F-106 chase planes at the 
launch site (Scott Carpenter and Wally Schirra).6   
As the mission drew nearer, Shepard spent more of his time at Cape Canaveral.  
The STG members and the astronauts themselves agreed that the crewmember for each 
Mercury mission should observe preflight tests of the spacecraft at the pad.  Thus he 
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spent 18 days in February at the Cape, watching as engineers tested the systems of the 
ship he had named Freedom 7, and climbing inside as the vehicle was placed in a 
decompression chamber.7  “Even though all the spacecraft are built to a specific set of 
drawings and specifications, each is an individual and has peculiarities which are not the 
same in the others,” explained Slayton.  “In order for the astronaut to become intimately 
familiar with his particular spacecraft, he participated in all the hangar checkouts on it.  
He participates in reaction control system checks where he can develop a good feel for 
his particular control system.  This participation is also where we get our primary 
environmental control system training.  The astronaut rides in the spacecraft when it is 
put in the pressure chamber for pressure checks, and he operates the environmental 
control system in conjunction with this checkout.  He also attends all meetings 
concerned with the checkout and modification of the spacecraft, so he is probably the 
one person most familiar with all details of the spacecraft.”8   
Besides these interactions with the real vehicle, Robert Voas and his colleagues 
made sure Shepard stayed sharp in his knowledge of Mercury spacecraft operation while 
at Cape Canaveral.  He participated in 120 simulations of his mission inside the MPT at 
Langley and the Cape.9  The logic of housing the device at the latter location was to 
ensure that the training regimen remained as intense as ever during the last months of the 
process, when the astronauts spent most of their time at the Cape.  The instructors did 
not want an astronaut so bogged down in other activities that his skills were rusty when  
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launch day arrived.  When asked about this during his debriefing, Shepard praised the 
intensity of training at this late stage.10   
On the morning of April 12, Shepard received a call in his Cape hotel room and 
heard the news he had dreaded: the Soviet Union had sent a cosmonaut into space in 
advance of his own launch.  Shepard knew that he could have been first.  He had felt 
ready to launch after the chimpanzee Ham had made a suborbital flight like his own in 
January.  Despite Ham’s safe return, Marshall Spaceflight Center Director Wernher von 
Braun and the STG members agreed to perform one more unmanned test of the Redstone 
after a faulty valve had resulted in an over acceleration of Ham’s Redstone.  That 
additional test had succeeded in March, but now came the news that Yuri Gagarin had 
not only become the first person to reach space, but had completed a one orbit mission of 
much greater speed, altitude, and duration than Shepard’s.  The feisty astronaut slammed 
his hand on a table in his hotel room.11        
 Gagarin had undertaken a training program to fly aboard the Vostok spacecraft 
that was similar in many respects but less varied than the Mercury program.  Only 
thirteen months earlier, in March 1960, he had reported for work in Star City, Russia.  
Over the ensuing year, he went through centrifuge runs that reached accelerations up to 
12 Gs.  He spent hours in a spacecraft mockup, manipulating controls until he could 
reach them while blindfolded.  He maintained his piloting skills by regularly flying 
aircraft, underwent survival training for an off-target landing, and underwent hours in an 
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isolation chamber designed to acclimatize him to sensory deprivation (as the Mercury 
astronauts had done during the selection process in 1959).  For two weeks prior to the 
April 12 flight, he and three other cosmonauts had studied the Vostok cabin at the 
Baikonur Cosmodrome just as Shepard had spent an increasing amount of time with 
Freedom 7 at the Cape.  The Mercury astronauts learned these details via an American 
analysis of about 200 reports and articles published in Soviet open literature.12  Still, 
Gagarin did not have the diversity of training devices that Shepard had available to him, 
from the MASTIF, to the revolving room, to the environmental simulator, to the ALFA.  
Part of the reason he required less training aboard a device like the ALFA was that the 
Vostok mission profile did not require him to manually control the spacecraft, as Shepard 
would during his Mercury mission.  As Soviet space historian Asif Siddiqi wrote, 
“Because of physicians’ concerns about the adverse effects of weightlessness on the 
psychology of the cosmonauts, precautions were taken to ensure that the cosmonaut 
could not control the spacecraft and endanger his life.”13 
 Despite his frustration, Shepard had less than one month remaining before his 
launch.  This meant it was time for the final element of the Mercury training regimen: 
multiple full rehearsals of launch day procedures.  On April 18, a transfer van sent 
Shepard from his living quarters in Hangar S to Launch Pad 5, where he rode the 
elevator to the top of the gantry that connected to the 83-foot Redstone rocket.  From 
                                                          
12  “Soviet Manned Spaceflight: The Soviet Cosmonaut Training System,” February 1962, Box 69, Folder 17, John 
H. Glenn Archives, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.    
13  Asif Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 (Washington, D.C.: NASA 
SP-4408, 2000), 278.  
80 
 
there, he walked across the crew access arm to the White Room, the small facility 
enclosing Freedom 7, and climbed inside the 100 cubic foot vehicle.  With the launch 
control team following along in the blockhouse, he went through a simulated countdown 
and flight.  He went through the process again the next day, and again on April 20 with 
the hatch closed and the gantry pulled away.  Medical specialists collected physiological 
data on him during these simulations, so as to gain assurance that he was healthy enough 
for his groundbreaking feat.  At the end of the simulations, he practiced an emergency 
evacuation that required him to leave the launch pad and board an armored vehicle that 
could quickly whisk him away from the Redstone.14  Shepard thus began the tradition of 
high fidelity launch simulations that Space Shuttle astronauts would undergo in their 
Terminal Countdown Demonstration Tests.  These rehearsals benefited Shepard by 
giving him familiarity with the people in the blockhouse and with Freedom 7’s 
hardware.  He also began an astronaut tradition by attending technical briefings on the 
launch preparations.15  Through all of this time, he focused on preventing any illnesses 
from hampering his performance.  “Medical personnel are continuously monitoring his 
health and ensuring he stays healthy during this period,” Slayton explained.  “Part of the 
program involves placing the astronaut on a special low-residue diet and collecting 
specimens for comparison with postflight specimens.”16     
 The preparation finally reached a conclusion in May, two years after Alan  
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Shepard had given up his career as a Navy test pilot to join a risky and fledgling space 
effort.  After a final briefing with Voas on his flight tasks the night before, he awoke on 
May 2 and donned his pressure suit only to find out that the heavy Florida rain had 
forced a launch cancellation.  Over the next two days, he released his tension by taking a 
long jog on the beach with John Glenn and even found the time to log a few more 
sessions in the MPT.  When he awoke at 1:10 a.m. on May 5, his preparation had 
reached an unprecedented level.17  He had spent two years preparing his mind and body 
not only for every voice communication and movement he would make while in his 
spacecraft, but for some of the most unlikely contingencies that his instructors could 
imagine.  He had gone through the same simulated 15 minute sequence more than a 
hundred times.  He had taken the ride to his actual spacecraft multiple times.  As if that 
had not been enough, he had even awoken on May 2 thinking this was his day to fly.  
The amount of money and time devoted to familiarizing him to his actions and 
surroundings easily surpassed that of Shepard’s aviation hero, Charles Lindbergh, and 
other explorers of the land, sea, or air.  None of those previous explorers had journeyed 
beyond their planet of origin, to an environment that contained no oxygen and which 
would expose a traveler to a constant state of free fall.  Most of these explorers also did 
not have national prestige riding on their efforts to the extent that Shepard did.     
 The paradox was that even the repetition of procedures could not eliminate the 
anxiety of May 5.  In response to a debriefing question, Shepard said he was most 
anxious when the White Room personnel closed Freedom 7’s hatch around him.  “I 
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don’t know how you overcome this,” he reflected.  “This is an individual problem, I 
think, and not a function of the training phase.”18  When the countdown reached T-2 
minutes and he heard each flight controller report a Go for launch, he reported that he 
felt so eager to lift off that the process seemed slow to him.  He did not hear much of the 
rest of the countdown due to his anxiety, during which time his heart rate rose from 80 to 
126.19  The training process thus did not eliminate Shepard’s emotions, but the objective 
of Voas’s training regimen was only to ensure that astronauts performed their tasks  
properly.  Shepard’s performance over the 15 minutes after the Redstone vaulted from 
the pad suggested that his training was sufficient for this new frontier.        
 The flight plan ensured that Shepard had the chance to make this point.  As the 
Redstone propelled him 116 miles high, he made 78 communications and monitored 27 
spacecraft events.  Especially during the five minutes that he was weightless, the flight 
plan kept him busy by requiring him to control the vehicle in pitch, roll, and yaw, and 
observe the Earth below him.  The flight thus kept him busier than a typical aircraft test 
flight of the kind Shepard had made during the 1950s.  When Robert Voas and three 
other instructors evaluated his performance, they found that “The pilot met all 
requirements of the mission, that he monitored and reported accurately the critical events 
of the flight, that he controlled the attitude of the spacecraft within normal limits, that he 
was alert at all times to novel or unprogrammed events, and that he showed no tendency 
to become fixated on irrelevant instrumentation or activities.”  The authors went even 
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further by declaring, “The close correspondence between attitude maneuvers or manual 
control in the simulator and those in flight indicate that the trainers used in the Mercury 
program were relatively successful in reproducing the vehicle characteristics in flight.”20  
Deke Slayton, the CapCom for the mission, concurred by stating, “The success of any 
training program can only be evaluated when compared with an actual flight.  It appears 
that our training was entirely adequate for the flight and that nothing was missed.”21  
Freedom 7 splashed down in the Atlantic Ocean after a voyage that engineers called “an 
unqualified success” and a waiting helicopter took Shepard to the USS Lake Champlain. 
 From there, he undertook an extensive debriefing of his training regimen both at 
Grand Bahama Island and back at Langley.22  This meant that Shepard, a student for two 
years, transitioned into an instructor by explaining his spaceflight experience for his 
instructors.  The debriefings were thus a prime example of the co-construction of users 
and technology.  The instructors did not treat Shepard as a mere passenger; they wanted 
to hear the knowledge Shepard had obtained as a user of the Mercury spacecraft, which 
could influence training technology.  With this in mind, the instructors asked him 
questions such as which training device he found most useful and what device he could 
have done without.  He also reported confidently, “I was sufficiently trained for the 
mission…I think we were over-trained rather than under-trained…I found that at no time 
during the flight did I run into anything unexpected as a result of having prepared for it 
                                                          
20  Robert Voas, John Von Bockel, Raymond Zedekar, and Paul Backer, “Results of In-Flight Pilot Performance,” 
June 6, 1961, Box 60, Folder 20, John H. Glenn Archives, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.       
21  Slayton, “Pilot Training and Preflight Preparation.”        
22  Alexander, Grimwood, and Swenson, 356-358.     
84 
 
using our training program.”23  Shepard was hardly alone in his assessment, as everyone 
from his fellow astronauts, to Voas, to Chris Kraft’s flight control team, to the people 
around the world who followed the mission marveled at the ease with which Shepard 
operated in an environment only one other person had ever trespassed.  The familiarity 
that the training regimen had provided enabled author Martin Caidin to write, “The 
performance of Alan Shepard was absolutely astounding in its crispness and matter-of-
fact control of everything that was happening…Shepard’s performance can be described 
only as flawless, or as close to perfection as one could ever possibly expect…We heard 
the voice of a test pilot, in absolute command of himself and his situation, confident, 
believing in his equipment and his team.  It was the most incredible performance I have 
ever had the privilege to hear.”24      
 But the most important person of all monitoring his performance was President 
Kennedy.  If Shepard had not succeeded in his mission, one can never know whether the 
President would have had the confidence in NASA to press for a long-term commitment 
in human spaceflight.  But a failure on the very first attempt to send an American to 
space would have certainly undermined the confidence of the President, members of 
Congress, and their constituents.  Kennedy instead went before Congress on May 25 and 
declared, despite knowing that his country had a scant 15 minutes of piloted spaceflight 
experience, “I believe this nation should commit itself, to achieving the goal, before this 
decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth.25  If 
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the astronauts and their instructors had felt that spaceflight was only a brief detour in 
their careers, here was the moment that captured more dramatically than any other that 
their profession would remain intact for the long haul.  Here was the moment that made 
clear the need for more astronauts beyond the “Original Seven,” that these astronauts 
would attempt ever more complex tasks that required more complex training, and that 
the personnel devoted to training would dramatically expand.  The expansion of 
spaceflight beyond Mercury would also require these personnel to move out of Virginia, 
to a new facility that could house a larger workforce and more equipment than 
Langley.26  The support of the federal government enunciated in 1961 paved the way 
toward the human spaceflight infrastructure to which 21st century Americans have 
become accustomed. 
 But for the time being, the Mercury team had to prepare for a second mission on 
July 21.  Although Gus Grissom’s mission was a repeat of Shepard’s 15 minute 
suborbital voyage, the Mitchell, Indiana native proved the differences between himself 
and Shepard through his flight and subsequent opinions on his training experience.  
Despite over a hundred sessions on the procedures trainer, extensive centrifuge training, 
and his experience flying combat missions in the Korean War, his heart rate soared even 
higher than Shepard’s.  Whereas Shepard had stayed below 140 during his entire flight, 
Grissom surpassed 150 during the five minutes he was weightless and 171 when Liberty 
Bell 7’s retrorockets fired to return him to Earth.  Thus he came close to the 180 level 
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that medical specialists considered reason to abort a mission.27  Grissom also reported 
feeling most anxious at a different point than Shepard.  “I think the time that I was the 
most anxious was during the early period of launch, the first 40 to 60 seconds when an 
abort might have occurred and the tower wouldn’t have jettisoned,” he recalled.  “I 
wasn’t really convinced that I could get everything unhooked, get the parachute out and 
get out the hatch in time.”  Though he did not feel that training could necessarily help 
him with this feeling, he said, “I felt that this was one of my weaker areas.”28  When he 
reached space, he reported one more feeling that separated him from Shepard: his urge to 
look out his window (because Grissom’s was the first spacecraft to be equipped with a 
window).  Since his procedures trainer runs did not simulate the view of Earth out the 
window, he felt distracted by the sight and fell behind on his checklist.  Fortunately, 
Grissom did match Shepard by completing all his significant assigned tasks successfully, 
including manual control of his spacecraft.29             
 Grissom felt the training process could have better prepared him for the infamous 
mishap that came next: the sinking of Liberty Bell 7.  This was the first serious 
emergency that an astronaut ever faced during a mission.  Fortunately, this emergency 
matched one the instructors had anticipated in their “what if” exercises, because they had 
sent the astronauts to practice emergency egresses in a Langley pool and in the Gulf of 
Mexico one year earlier.  Grissom heard a thud, saw the hatch cover blow away from 
him and salt water enter the vehicle, and knew his ship was rapidly sinking.  His life 
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depended on his reaction, and he vindicated the training process by correctly removing 
his helmet, grabbing the instrument panel with his right hand as he climbed out of the 
ship, and keeping himself afloat for four minutes in the Atlantic Ocean.  He remained in 
the water for this long because helicopter pilots Jim Lewis and John Reinhard initially 
focused on recovering Liberty Bell 7 rather than Grissom.  The pilots had judged that the 
astronauts enjoyed being in the water while in training, and thus the sight of Grissom 
outside the vehicle did not immediately alarm them.  George Cox, a pilot aboard a 
second helicopter, finally tossed a “horse collar” to Grissom that the astronaut used to 
lift himself to safety.30  “Extra training might have helped on the rapid egress, although it 
would be difficult to simulate,” Grissom reflected.  “You must have a suit on for this 
training, and when you’ve got to get out in a hurry you’re not going to be worried about 
ripping the suit…It probably ought to be done so we have a procedure firm and tight.  
This was an area where I felt I was weak.”31                      
  The knowledge accumulated by Shepard and Grissom helped to guide Voas as he 
decided on how astronauts should best prepare for the next step in the conquest of space: 
orbital flight.  Though the STG members had originally planned to launch all seven 
astronauts on suborbital flights, the success of the Shepard and Grissom suborbital 
voyages convinced them that this phase of Mercury had succeeded.  Instead of training 
each astronaut on 15 minute hops, it was time to match Gagarin.32  On the next piloted 
mission, John Glenn would ride an Atlas booster to an orbital velocity of 17,500 miles 
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per hour, and circle Earth three times over five hours.  This flight thus marked the 
chance for Voas to decide which tasks astronauts should perform during a long-term stay 
in microgravity, and have them train accordingly.  He placed great credence in what his 
students believed had worked best in the past.  That meant he favored the MPT as the 
most effective training device.  It meant he favored the idea of sending astronauts to 
observe their real spacecraft in preflight checkouts and, while in Cape Canaveral, attend 
engineers’ meetings concerning the spacecraft and mission.  It meant he favored the idea 
of egress training close to flight, granting Grissom’s request.33            
Yet orbital flights of several hours would also give the astronauts a chance to 
forge a new identity.  Since 1959, Voas had instituted a training program that had 
fostered their identities as troubleshooters of malfunctioning equipment; their runs in the 
ALFA and MPT simulators had served this purpose.  But his training program for the 
orbital phase of Mercury fostered their identities as scientific observers as well.  In 
September 1961, Voas wrote a memo to the astronauts concerning their duties in orbit.  
He determined they should train to recognize landmarks outside the spacecraft window, 
report on phenomena such as cloud cover and lightning as seen from the day and night 
sides of Earth, and scan star fields.  They would also have to take photos using handheld 
cameras.  Some of these observation duties could save an astronaut’s life in case of 
emergency; if the automatic attitude control system failed, Earth’s horizon or stars could 
provide reference points so the astronaut could orient his vehicle correctly for reentry.  
But the assigned duties would also prove an astronaut’s ability to bring the human 
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element into space science, a task which continues to this day in the ISS era.  The 
scientific identity Voas laid out for the Mercury seven required them to study star 
patterns in the Morehead Planetarium, study maps, and receive briefings from the U.S. 
Weather Bureau shortly before flight.34          
 Voas did not believe that this emphasis should preclude the kind of procedures 
training that might save the astronauts’ lives, as he made clear in a memo to them in 
March 1961.  “The Mercury trainers have hardly been experiencing a stampede during 
the last three months,” he complained.  “It is interesting to note that only two out of 
seven of you have put in enough time on the trainers to qualify for flight pay during this 
period.  While I am sure no one can say exactly how many hours on the trainers it takes 
to make an astronaut, it seems probable that it is not as near to zero as these figures 
indicate.  It is likely that most of you have spent several times this much time briefing 
the press and radio…The Mercury training facilities represent an investment of several 
million dollars and are occupying the efforts of a sizable staff.  We have just reviewed 
the costs of the training program to date and they run something on the order of three-
quarters of a million dollars per man.  I don’t believe that the present use of these 
facilities justifies this type of expenditure.  Far more important than this, however, is the 
fact that the time presently being devoted to the trainers is not consistent with you being 
adequately prepared for a Mercury flight.”35  Voas authored a report in September laying 
out the training procedures he expected astronauts to follow for the rest of the program, 
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which the STG members approved.  He called for at least three hours per week in the 
MPT, making clear the astronauts had reached a more intense phase of Mercury 
training.36 
 John Glenn underwent MPT training in three phases.  First, he sat inside wearing 
casual clothes in runs lasting ninety minutes.  He then donned his pressure suit in runs 
lasting five hours, matching his expected flight time.  But the final phase provided the 
greatest test of his skills, as the SimSups instituted emergencies in 30 minute sessions.  
Glenn saved several evaluation forms from the runs he made in preparation for his 
Friendship 7 flight.  During one session, the spacecraft experienced a direct current 
power failure at one minute after launch.  At 3 minutes and 50 seconds, a double direct 
current failure prompted the CapCom to call for an abort.  Yet Glenn did not abort and 
did not agree that the failure called for an abort.  “This is to be checked into,” the 
instructor remarked on the form.37  One of the other emergencies the SimSups instituted 
during this period, though with a different astronaut in the MPT, would prove prescient.  
An indication that the heat shield was loose appeared on the instrument panel, raising the 
possibility that the shield would become detached from the vehicle and expose the 
astronaut to incinerating heat.  Since the retrorocket package was located right 
underneath the heat shield, the controllers concluded that leaving the package in place 
through reentry (rather than jettisoning it, as planned) might help hold the shield in  
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place.38                       
 Integrated simulations took on a new level of importance during the preparation  
for Glenn’s flight, because Friendship 7 would orbit the Earth and therefore the teams at 
tracking stations around the globe would each have to communicate with Glenn.  
Though Chris Kraft’s flight control team at Cape Canaveral would have the ultimate 
authority for the mission, they would only be in direct contact with the astronaut when 
the spacecraft passed within range of the control center.  At all other times, they would 
depend on remote site teams in the continental United States, Mexico, the Grand Canary 
Island, Africa, the Indian Ocean, Australia, the Pacific Ocean, and Hawaii to stay in 
contact and assist in solving a life threatening problem.  The teams consisted of 
astronauts and NASA civil servants who were mostly recent college graduates and 
members of the electronics company Philco.39  Harold Miller recalled that the 
simulations included these far-flung personnel to develop teamwork in advance of a 
flight.  He remembered, “Altogether they were rather awkward, but most of the 
controllers endured well and seemed to get some benefit from seeing closed-loop data 
before they had to actually deploy.”40                   
 The state of preparation for a Mercury flight reached a new peak with Glenn’s 
experience, in part because his launch was delayed from December 1961 to the 
following February.  The time he spent on the procedures trainer preparing for Mercury-
Atlas 6 doubled the amount of time Voas had called for in his memo the previous 
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September: about 60 hours, during which time he reacted to 189 simulated systems 
failures.  He also spent 25 hours and 25 minutes inside Friendship 7 itself.  He adhered 
to the philosophy that an astronaut should stay as sharp as possible by training until the 
last possible moment before a groundbreaking flight, and indeed he spent the evening of 
February 19 by reading a section in the flight controller’s handbook on the ASCS.41  The 
advocates of an active human role aboard a spacecraft understood that when he climbed 
inside Friendship 7 the next morning, he had the first chance to prove a highly trained 
astronaut could be an integral component in orbit amid all of the technology surrounding 
him. 
 All evidence from February 20, 1962 indicates Glenn and the controllers devoted 
to his mission took a major step toward proving this point.  The scientists who had 
speculated that weightlessness would mentally and physically impair an astronaut 
listened as Glenn reported on how pleasant he felt in orbit.  One of his first tasks, at 
Voas’s suggestion, was to look out the window and estimate the distance between his 
spacecraft and the spent Atlas booster tumbling away from it.  His estimate matched the 
telemetry data very well, indicating an astronaut’s vision could be an asset.  He 
successfully took photos of landmarks on Earth below him and constellations above him.  
Even more importantly, he controlled the vehicle’s attitude in fly-by-wire mode when 
the ASCS caused the vehicle to drift about one and a half degrees per second to the right.  
The extensive time Glenn had spent building confidence on the ALFA and MPT 
simulators benefited him as he switched control modes and correctly oriented the vehicle  
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using the least amount of fuel.42  
The people supporting him back on Earth also benefited from the training 
process during the five hours that Glenn was in orbit.  When a flight controller at the 
Telemetry console saw the same loose heat shield indication that had appeared in 
training, spacecraft designer Max Faget suggested to Chris Kraft that Glenn leave his 
retrorocket package in place.  Though engineers later found the indication was false, the 
decision making at the Cape demonstrated the value of integrated simulations.  The 
performance of the remote site teams also demonstrated this, as CapComs around the 
world reacted to the loose heat shield alarm and communicated with Glenn under time 
pressure.  From California, Wally Schirra gave him the surprising news that he should 
leave the retrorocket package in place even after the retrorockets fired.  Alan Shepard 
then had a few minutes to explain to him why the flight controllers wanted him to do 
this.  When Glenn made it to the recovery ship Noa, Kraft lit a cigar in honor of the well-
honed teamwork that had brought Friendship 7 home safely.43    
What difference did it make to have a trained astronaut on an orbital Mercury 
flight?  The two previous flights without astronauts can help to answer this question.  On 
Mercury-Atlas 4 the previous September, the spacecraft had made one orbit and splashed 
down safely but had been plagued by control system malfunctions.  If an astronaut had 
been aboard, he could have taken over manual control and flown three orbits within 
attitude and fuel usage constraints.  On Mercury-Atlas 5 in November, yet another 
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control system malfunction cut the chimpanzee Enos’s flight to two orbits rather than 
three.  Again, an astronaut utilizing manual control could have completed the entire 
mission.  If Glenn had not been aboard Mercury-Atlas 6, Kraft would have had to end 
another mission early because not enough fuel would have been available in automatic 
mode for a three orbit flight.  If the heat shield signal had been correct, and Glenn had 
not overridden the automatic jettison of the retrorocket package, the vehicle would have 
been destroyed during reentry.44  Glenn had therefore helped to illustrate that the 
purpose of sending a human into space was not to simply make a hero who the world 
could celebrate with a ticker tape parade.  As long as they were trained adequately, 
astronauts had the gift of flexibility in overcoming malfunctions.   
 Glenn deserves the final word on the significance of his own voyage.  “The 
biggest single thing we’ve found most important is a general statement that a pilot can 
operate in this environment satisfactorily,” he argued during his debriefing.  “I think we 
can even judge from just this one flight that we probably know enough to say that in 
future designs we can rely on the pilot to be an operable part of the system, at least for 
missions of this length.  We don’t need quite so many automatic systems.  We don’t 
need systems designed so that we can completely perform the mission whether the man 
is or is not aboard.”45  When the “Original Seven” had made their trips across the 
country to training devices, they did not know if the longstanding concerns of scientists 
about their ability to function in space would prove true or not.  But Glenn had given the 
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space agency and the country an answer: so long as an astronaut had received extensive 
training, he could be a strong link in the operation of a mission.  This suggested NASA 
should continue to pour resources into training people to meet Kennedy’s challenge 
rather than the more difficult task of completely automating spacecraft.  By contrast, the 
Soviets would focus on designing and constructing heavily automated vehicles in their 
effort to send cosmonauts to the Moon.  Cosmonaut instructor Nikolai Kamanin felt this 
delayed the development of the Soyuz spacecraft to the point that the Soviets fell behind 
the U.S.46            
 The flight that followed Glenn’s featured an unprecedented situation: the 
replacement of a crewmember.  Deke Slayton had been training to make the second 
orbital mission since November 1961, but shortly after the new year began, NASA 
Administrator Jim Webb reevaluated his health in light of his heart arrhythmia that a 
centrifuge run had revealed.  Despite a lack of conclusive evidence that this condition 
would jeopardize him, Jim Webb and the STG members decided in March to replace 
Slayton with Scott Carpenter.47  This raised the question of whether Carpenter could 
train to make a flight on such short notice.  He had already logged 79 hours training 
inside Friendship 7 as Glenn’s backup, but this next mission featured new yaw and roll 
maneuvers and a series of new science experiments ranging from observation of a 
colored balloon, to observation of a weightless liquid inside a bottle, to observation of 
the Earth.  “He had been thrust into the complex MA-7 mission at short notice, when so 
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many unknowns still existed, and the overcrowded flight program was already proving 
burdensome and cause for some concern,” wrote Colin Burgess in his recent book on the 
mission.  “While he knew in his test pilot’s heart he was quite capable of carrying out a 
successful mission, he simply felt he was not fully prepared for the April launch date, 
and time was rapidly slipping away with the world’s eyes squarely on him.”  But after 
the mission slipped to May, Carpenter “built up confidence and began thinking again the 
way I’d been thinking for three years.”48 
 Carpenter’s performance on May 24 is easily the most controversial of any 
Mercury astronaut’s, even though he performed his assigned experiments and returned 
safely after three orbits.  This is primarily because of Chris Kraft.  “The Mercury capsule 
worked, but the astronaut didn’t,” the flight director wrote in his memoir about the 
Aurora 7 flight.  He explained that Carpenter felt too fascinated with his view and too 
dismissive of his own safety.  The astronaut consumed fuel at a dangerous rate and failed 
to report one critical problem with which the flight controllers could have helped him: 
the spacecraft instruments did not match the position of the horizon he could see out his 
window.  Instead, he left the control team and waiting world in deep suspense as he 
manually aligned his spacecraft for reentry and fired his retrorockets.  Yet he fired the 
retrorockets late and did not have the vehicle in the proper yaw attitude, meaning he 
splashed down 250 miles off target.  Kraft’s animosity caused him to swear “an oath that 
Scott Carpenter would never again fly in space.  He didn’t.”49  Carpenter stubbornly 
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denied Kraft’s view until his death in 2013, even claiming that the hard feelings toward 
him stemmed from his replacing Slayton on the mission.  “He and I have been on 
opposite sides of the appraisal of my flight,” he said.  “He thinks it involves the failure 
of the man, and I think it involves the failure of the machine.  And I think that there’s no 
meeting between the two of us.”50      
 In considering this dispute, a few points work in Carpenter’s favor.  The horizon 
scanner malfunction that hampered Aurora 7 could not be simulated on the MPT.  Kraft 
is correct that Carpenter could have responded more promptly to the horizon scanner 
flaw by promptly communicating the problem during his first orbit.  But in his defense, 
Carpenter had no training experience with the situation he encountered.  As far as the 
maneuvers that he did practice on the simulator were concerned, John Boynton of 
Langley’s Mercury Project Office gave Carpenter high marks in his report on the 
mission: “On the Mercury procedures trainers, the pilot achieved a high level of skill in 
performing maneuvers such as the turnaround, retrofire, and reentry rate damping.  The 
pilot reported that during the flight these particular maneuvers seemed familiar.”51  Kraft 
claims that “Carpenter had been Glenn’s backup and, in training sessions, wasn’t half as 
good at handling problems or emergencies,” but this opinion is uncorroborated.52  
Carpenter did well enough in his training runs that Bob Gilruth cleared him for the 
mission.   
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 Above all else, the Aurora 7 flight indicated once again the value of having  
highly trained astronauts aboard spacecraft because Carpenter made a manual reentry.  
As with John Glenn’s flight, one must imagine what would have happened if an 
astronaut had not been aboard.  The spacecraft attitude might have permanently 
remained outside an acceptable orientation for reentry.  But Carpenter overcame the 
horizon scanner error by looking out his window and aligning his spacecraft in pitch, 
even if he was off on the more difficult task of yaw alignment and returned off target.  
The flight controllers could not have done this for an unmanned vehicle.53  In short, there 
was a valid reason why the astronauts had undertaken a thorough training regimen.  The 
Mercury program was continuing to prove that a prepared space traveler had the 
flexibility to overcome failures in automatic systems.          
 But to continue that effort, the astronauts had to bid Virginia farewell and move 
to a new training site capable of housing an expanded human spaceflight workforce.  
After a site selection team surveyed twenty cities in Louisiana, Texas, Florida, 
Massachusetts, Ohio, Missouri, and California, NASA Administrator Jim Webb had 
announced Houston as the site of the Manned Spacecraft Center on September 19, 1961.  
The decision to place a thousand acre facility several miles south of downtown, 
bordering Clear Lake, owed to influence from Texas politicians, but also to a skilled 
workforce, a large industrial complex, nearby colleges and universities, port facilities, 
and a warm climate.  The STG members who had handled human spaceflight operations 
from Virginia formed the nucleus of the MSC staff.  NASA even offered employees and 
                                                          
53  Boynton, “The Pilot’s Role During Mercury System Failures,” 4-5.    
99 
 
their families a tour of the Houston area so they would feel comfortable with the move, 
and by the summer of 1962 over 700 had made the move.  On July 4, the seven 
astronauts received their official welcome in a Houston parade.  Their introductions, 
complete with cowboy hats and barbecue, began a new era in astronaut training as 
federal dollars afforded Houston thousands of skilled personnel, and state of the art 
facilities from aircraft, to simulators, to neutral buoyancy pools.54          
 When the astronauts moved to Houston, only two Mercury missions remained.  
After the overly dramatic Scott Carpenter flight, the task of restoring precision fell to a 
worthy candidate: Wally Schirra.  He had one new device to help him with this: the yaw 
recognition trainer.  Given that Carpenter had been off 24 degrees in his attempt to 
manually align his vehicle in yaw, the question remained whether any astronaut could 
pull off the feat by looking out the window of his spacecraft and using Earth as a 
reference.  This held implications not only for future reentries, but also for the 
rendezvous of two ships in orbit that would be needed to reach the Moon.  Thus the 
instructors built a 33-foot diameter screen that displayed a moving image of simulated 
clouds produced by a film strip moving through a slide projector.  Schirra placed a box 
over his head, which contained an opening the size and shape of the Mercury window, 
and gained a sense of the motion cues he would experience.  In judging Mercury training 
as a whole, Robert Voas deemed this device “essential.”55  By the time October rolled 
around, Schirra had undertaken the most efficient training program yet.  Boynton praised 
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Schirra’s willingness to make simulator runs only after he knew each system in depth, 
which permitted him to make rapid progress.56  Schirra also benefited from the 
experience of previous Mercury missions, which highlighted the importance of each 
flight as a stepping stone toward more precise training, more precise flying, and 
eventually the grandest goal in the history of exploration: the Moon.  On October 3, he 
went on to fly the most trouble-free Mercury mission of all: six orbits over nine hours, 
with no failures seriously threatening the mission.  His experience on the new trainer 
helped him align the vehicle in yaw with an error of only four degrees, even while using 
the nighttime Earth as a reference.57   
 Schirra paved the way toward the finale that the STG members had dreamed 
about since conceiving Mercury: a daylong mission.  As Gordon Cooper prepared for 
and flew his mission aboard Faith 7, he expressed his admiration at the speed of this first 
effort to send Americans into space.  Only four years and one month after sitting on that 
stage at the Dolley Madison House, hailed as a hero without even knowing just what the 
job of astronaut would entail, Cooper found himself sitting atop an Atlas rocket on May 
15, 1963.  “I consider it remarkable that Project Mercury ran so close to its originally 
planned time schedule,” he reflected.  “Few programs in the history of airplane 
development ever ran as close, and no airplane program ever had so many unknowns 
staring the test operations team in the face.”58  This was the reality in a Cold War 
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environment when NASA already consumed more than 2 percent of the federal budget 
(compared with about 0.5 percent today).  From past experience, Robert Voas and the 
training committee called for Cooper to undertake training in 10 to 12 hour days, at least 
six days a week from January through May.  His pattern of flights from Texas, to North 
Carolina, and to Florida continued to establish the life of an astronaut as a grueling 
profession detached from family.59  But they also built his confidence to the point that he 
remembered, “I had thought that I would become a bit more tense as the count neared 
minus 1 or 2 minutes, but found that I have been more tense for kickoff when playing 
football than I was for the launch of May 15.”60 
 None of the Mercury astronauts proved better than Cooper the value of sending a 
highly trained aviator into space.  The last person ever launched alone flew eighteen 
sublime orbits before encountering a flaw that could have been the work of a SimSup 
determined to test his mettle.  Only here his life was at stake.  The first sign of trouble 
came when he noticed the 0.05 G light had illuminated, inexplicably indicating that 
reentry had begun.  By the 21st orbit, a short circuit had struck the main inverter and left 
Cooper’s ASCS without power.  Once again, an unmanned mission would have failed to 
reenter in the proper attitude.61  Only an astronaut, drawing on his experience as a test 
pilot, sessions on the MPT and ALFA, and reports from colleagues who had already 
flown, could have achieved what Cooper pulled off next.  He took over manual control, 
aligned Faith 7 in pitch, roll, and yaw using stars and clouds as references, and 
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controlled the ship’s oscillations as he descended through the blast furnace of reentry.  
Scott Carpenter’s experience had shown how difficult it was to align the vehicle in yaw.  
But Cooper bettered Carpenter in all respects by using less fuel, completing all tasks on 
time, and staying so close to the pitch and yaw targets that the vehicle splashed down 
only four miles away from the recovery ship.62  When a smiling Cooper left Faith 7 and 
walked across the deck of the USS Kearsarge, he knew he had carried out a finale 
worthy of the 10 to 12 hour days of preparation.  Although Alan Shepard had expressed 
interest in a three-day mission, Administrator Jim Webb announced in June that the 
Mercury program was over.63                       
 The Mercury training experience contained several lessons applicable to future  
spaceflight.  Mercury established the idea that procedures simulators were the one most  
effective tool in preparing astronauts to fly successful missions.  The most effective 
MPT sessions of all involved astronauts and flight controllers, because these could refine 
mission rules and communication procedures.  The MPT was not perfect, as it lacked a 
simulation of the view out the window that could have especially helped Gus Grissom 
and Scott Carpenter.  The instructors would need to rectify this flaw for Gemini and 
Apollo simulators, because astronauts would need a simulated view in preparing for 
rendezvous and docking with another vehicle.  But in general, the training devices 
effectively built the astronauts’ confidence and helped them transition from the job of jet 
pilot to astronaut as effectively as possible given the state of computer technology.  The 
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instructors’ guesses concerning what devices astronauts would need to prepare were also 
generally accurate.  Only a few disorientation devices did not make it into future 
programs.64               
 But the most important legacy of the Mercury program concerned the ability of 
astronauts to contribute useful tasks.  The six piloted flights vindicated the original 
beliefs of Edward Jones, John Yardley, and Robert Voas, because of all of them only 
Schirra’s spacecraft would have completed the intended mission without an astronaut 
aboard.  The roughly $5 million spent on training devices was a plenty justifiable cost 
given that the entire program cost slightly more than $400 million and the training aided 
the astronauts in saving multiple missions.65  Future astronauts planned to draw upon 
this legacy of success in controlling the Mercury spacecraft until they found themselves 
standing on the surface of the Moon, in fulfillment of Kennedy’s challenge.  The 
President accurately summarized the legacy of Mercury while presenting Gordon 
Cooper with his Distinguished Service Medal: “I think one of the things which warmed 
us the most during this flight was the realization that however extraordinary computers 
may be that we are still ahead of them and that man is still the most extraordinary 
computer of all.  His judgment, his nerve, and the lessons he can learn from experience 
still make him unique and, therefore, make manned flight necessary and not merely that 
of satellites…I think before the end of the sixties we will send a man to the Moon, an 
American, and I think in doing so it is not merely that we are interested in making this 
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particular journey but we are interested in demonstrating a dominance of this new sea, 
and making sure that in this new, great, adventurous period the Americans are playing 
their great role, as they have in the past.”66
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CHAPTER IV 
GEMINI: “IN OUR BUSINESS THAT’S JUST TOUGH” 
 
 As the early 1960s progressed, a group of families populated the small 
communities to the southeast of Houston, from El Lago, to Seabrook, to Nassau Bay.  
The men at the head of these families were experienced jet pilots who looked to follow 
the successes of the “Original Seven” astronauts and fulfill the lunar challenge.  But the 
most powerful astronaut resided in Friendswood, to the west of the space center.  
Ironically, he was also the only one of the seven who had not flown during Mercury.  
When NASA needed a manager to coordinate all astronaut activities in 1962, MSC 
Director Bob Gilruth and Associate Director Walt Williams decided on Deke Slayton.  
“They had been looking at a couple of military guys when Al Shepard, in particular, 
decided, hell, if we’re going to have a boss, why bring somebody in from the outside and 
superimpose him on us?” Slayton remembered of the reasoning.1  Beginning in 
September, the grounded astronaut became vital for his responsibility in selecting future 
crews, giving the crews training assignments, and advising Gilruth and Williams on their 
progress.2        
 Slayton presided over a corps that expanded from seven to thirty by 1963.  Since 
the Gemini spacecraft would carry crews of two each on ten missions, the “Original 
Seven” would have to share the astronaut title.  Slayton, Shepard, and Warren North 
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formed the selection board for the second group, which featured slightly less stringent 
requirements than the original group.  The board considered candidates with scientific as 
well as engineering degrees and civilian as well as military test pilot experience.3  After 
a grueling physical exam at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio and interviews with 
the board, the “Next Nine” joined the “Original Seven” in September 1962.  In 
hindsight, Slayton argued that the second group of astronauts “is probably the best all-
around group ever put together.”4  Two of them, Elliot See and Ed White, would be lost 
in tragic accidents over the next five years.  But the other seven—Neil Armstrong, Frank 
Borman, Pete Conrad, Jim Lovell, Jim McDivitt, Tom Stafford, and John Young—
would all command Gemini missions and go on to receive the most prestigious position 
of all: Commander of an Apollo mission.  The expansion of the astronaut office 
continued with a third group of fourteen, selected in 1963.  This group featured five 
more men who would fly on Gemini (Buzz Aldrin, Gene Cernan, Mike Collins, Dick 
Gordon, and David Scott) and several Apollo moon voyagers.5   
Integrating the novices into the fold mainly followed the pattern established by 
the “Original Seven.”  The “Next Nine” received their introduction to spaceflight by 
traveling to Cape Canaveral, watching Wally Schirra’s launch, and meeting the flight 
controllers who worked the mission there.  Also at the Cape, the nine climbed aboard the 
Mercury simulator and learned to control a spacecraft in pitch, roll, and yaw.  All of the 
nine and fourteen received classroom instruction from some of the most qualified 
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scientific minds in the country, made centrifuge runs at Johnsville, made parabolic 
flights aboard the KC-135, and made water survival outings at Galveston Bay.  One 
difference was that these later astronauts made jungle survival outings in addition to 
desert survival.  John Young recalled, “Training for jungle survival took us to Panama, 
again divided into teams of two…From my surveying work in the Florida swamps, I 
knew you could do well in the jungle if you boiled the water, cut out hearts of palm with 
your machete, and caught fish using worms and safety-pin hooks.  So Gus and I got 
along well.”6     
As with the seven Mercury astronauts, the instructors counted on these new 
additions to assist them in the development of Gemini training.  When Deke Slayton 
gave the “Next Nine” their technical assignments, he assigned training and simulators to 
Armstrong.  This choice made sense, because Armstrong arrived at the astronaut corps 
after spending seven years in high speed flight research at the NACA/NASA.  Whereas 
most of the astronauts had flown for the military prior to joining, and had little 
experience with flight simulation, Armstrong found himself in an organization that 
pioneered the use of analog computers to simulate flight.  “No astronaut played a more 
vital role in the development of flight simulators for Gemini and Apollo than did 
Armstrong,” asserted Armstrong’s biographer James R. Hansen.  Armstrong did this by 
operating simulators not only for training purposes, but also to understand if the 
designers had mechanized the equations of motion properly.  He then offered feedback 
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for the designers to improve the machine and shared memos about his experiences with 
his fellow astronauts.  “The guys who were mechanizing the equations—sometimes 
contractors, sometimes NASA employees—oftentimes did not have the perspective of a 
pilot,” he recalled.  “They would just do the arithmetic without regard to the sense of 
being proper.”7  Charlie Bassett also assisted the instructors, as he received the same 
assignment on behalf of the third astronaut class.8  As with their Mercury predecessors, 
Armstrong’s and Bassett’s contributions illustrate the significance of the user in the 
development of spaceflight operations.         
 Below the astronauts on the new space center’s administrative structure was the 
MSC branch most focused on training: the Flight Crew Support Division (FCSD).  
Warren North, a World War II pilot who had joined NACA and then assisted Robert 
Voas in the selection and training of the Mercury astronauts, headed the division.  FCSD 
contained about 300 people divided into those who focused on the simulation of 
spaceflights, those who focused on the integration of crews with flight hardware, and 
those who focused on flight planning.9  The need for such a large workforce meant that 
participation in astronaut training had now become a career path for qualified college 
graduates.  As chief, North could report on their behalf through the chain of command 
that extended upward to Chief Astronaut Deke Slayton, to Gemini Project Office 
Manager James Chamberlin, and finally to Bob Gilruth and Walt Williams in the Office 
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of the Director.10  Meanwhile, the Flight Operations Division under the command of 
Chris Kraft contributed to training as well.  Mel Brooks oversaw flight controller 
training from this division, while the SimSups designed simulations from this division.11  
The transition from Mercury to Gemini thus included the formation of a large 
administration that would guide astronaut training through the 21st century. 
 Riley McCafferty, a simulator engineer and later the chief of the FCSD, 
explained the kind of people he sought to facilitate training in this branch and how he 
organized them.  “I went out and got good, qualified engineers who had aerospace, 
aeronautical, physics, and electrical engineering degrees,” he recalled.  “If you get a man 
with any one of these four, he’s been exposed to the world.”  He then used what he 
called a “military approach” to organize his personnel: “I believe that there’s a boss and 
a sub-boss, and there’s a general and a colonel and a captain and a major.  Because I feel 
like, in our program, where everything is so subject to change and everything is so 
subject to flexibility—that’s a big word, in this case—that if you aren’t regimented and 
the guy isn’t willing to do immediately what you want without a bunch of second-
guessing to you, you’ll never get the job done…I feel like you have to have a situation 
where you tell a guy, ‘I want you in here at five o’clock in the morning,’ and that guy’s 
going to be there at five o’clock in the morning.  You get a sort of pantywaist that says, 
well, I don’t like to work nights or I don’t like to work certain shifts.  In our business 
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that’s just tough.  We explain that to the guy before he comes on board.”12  Such were 
the sacrifices required of the personnel who toiled to meet President John F. Kennedy’s 
lunar commitment.             
 Why did the training profession dramatically expand as Mercury wound down 
and gave way to Gemini?  Gemini far surpassed Mercury in complexity of astronaut 
tasks, mainly due to two factors: rendezvous and EVA.  Mercury astronauts could only 
manipulate their spacecraft’s attitude.  Gemini astronauts were expected to change their 
spacecraft’s orbit so as to rendezvous and dock with an Agena Target Vehicle, which 
would require piloting tactics in accord with the laws of orbital mechanics and 
counterintuitive to a pilot on Earth.  By 1962, NASA had selected an Apollo mission 
configuration that called for two astronauts to take a small landing vehicle to the lunar 
surface, then lift off, rendezvous, and dock with the mothership in lunar orbit.  Gemini 
would be the crucial proving ground for this concept.  One of the two crewmembers on a 
Gemini mission was also expected to leave the spacecraft and maneuver in the vacuum, 
as opposed to the Mercury astronauts who remained strapped in their seats throughout 
their missions.  Again, this would be the proving ground for the feat of walking on the 
Moon in Apollo.  This raised the question of how to best prepare astronauts for the kind 
of weightlessness maneuvering that Mercury astronauts had not attempted.13                      
 Just a few months after Gemini received approval from NASA Headquarters, and 
 right after John Glenn became the first American to orbit, Harold Johnson of the FCOD  
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was already thinking about how to simulate these next generation missions.  He 
circulated a March 1962 memo that called for the contractors at the Link Trainer 
Company to assemble, as they had for Mercury, a mission simulator that could give 
astronauts, flight controllers, and remote site teams practice in normal and emergency 
conditions.  But just as the real Gemini spacecraft would be upgraded from Mercury, so 
would the simulator designed to mimic it, as Johnson expected the machine to provide 
the advanced visual display out the windows that Mercury astronauts had lacked.  He 
also called for a docking trainer, which would mimic all the displays a crew would have 
before them and simulate a view of the Agena moving in on them for a docking.  
Johnson also called for training in the landing sequence.  Since Gemini engineers 
envisioned the vehicle descending onto land under a paraglider, he believed crews would 
need experience with this via a boilerplate spacecraft.14  NASA made Johnson’s wish list 
official in 1963 by awarding contracts for the simulators he mentioned, with one 
addition.  Link manufactured a Gemini Mission Simulator and a Translation and 
Docking Simulator.  Dallas contractor Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., provided the addition: 
a Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator (DCPS).15 
 The DCPS became the latest device reflecting the idea that a trained astronaut 
could be one of the strongest assets during the most dangerous phases of spaceflight.  
The instructors knew that during a launch, the Commander sitting in the left-hand seat 
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could observe propellant tank pressures, engine status lights, and the rates and attitudes 
of the Titan booster carrying him to space.  But the Commander could do more than 
monitor; he could also actuate a switch that would direct the spacecraft guidance system 
to guide the Titan booster, in case the Titan’s own system caused the booster to drift off 
course.  He could also initiate an abort if necessary and activate a set of ejection seats 
that would fling him and his crewmate away from the Titan.  The Commander of each 
mission would need to know where to focus his attention during this fast-paced, high 
pressure phase and the criteria for actuating a guidance switch or aborting an ascent.  
The DCPS familiarized the astronauts with this, beginning in June 1964.  Since the 
device was connected to a computer complex, instructors could set the computers to 
simulate one of 80 possible launch sequences and the computers would alter the cockpit 
displays seen by the crew accordingly.  “Our rules on abort are two cues—if you get a 
light that says abort, you don’t do anything until you get some other cue,” recalled 
Stanley Faber, head of the Simulation Branch of the FCSD, of the decision making 
incumbent on the astronauts.  “Vibration is found to be a real good one, they can tell if 
they’ve lost an engine from the vibration profile that they’re feeling.”16  To mimic the 
environment the crews would be operating in, the computers controlled the sound inside 
the cabin in accordance with the acoustic histories observed during past launches and 
controlled the motion by pitching, yawing, and rolling the cabin.17 
 One problem that the astronauts and their instructors needed to grapple with  
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concerned the pogo effect that crews would experience during liftoff.  Like the Redstone 
and Atlas, the Titan booster was originally designed to carry intercontinental ballistic 
missiles as a payload.  The booster produced a pogo of 5.5 Gs, which would not be a 
problem for an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in the nose cone but would 
pose a problem for astronauts who needed to read their instrument panel and activate 
ejection seats if necessary.  Astronauts thus underwent runs on the DCPS and in a 
centrifuge to determine the limits of the pogo effect they could experience and still 
accomplish these tasks, and found the answer was about 1.5 Gs.  The results of these 
runs prompted the Titan contractors at the Martin Company in Baltimore to install a 
pogo suppressor in the booster.18  Gus Grissom explained the success of this effort in the 
debriefing following his Gemini III mission (NASA used roman numerals to denote 
missions in this program): “The booster ride is a lot smoother and a lot easier than the 
simulations…This booster is very smooth all the way.  We never felt it steer.  It’s like 
riding a Corvette.”19  Most Gemini astronauts made similar comments, the one exception 
being the pogo that plagued the Gemini V launch, and even in that case the effect lasted 
only a few seconds.20  The work of the FCSD had informed the engineering of hardware, 
and contributed to smooth liftoffs. 
Astronauts were unanimous in their agreement that training for emergencies 
aboard the DCPS was one of their most useful tools.  None of these men knew if they 
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would need to activate ejection seats with seconds to spare, in the tradition of aircraft pilots 
over the past several decades, but all felt this simulator gave them confidence in making 
that decision if necessary.  Gemini IV Commander Jim McDivitt attested during his 
debriefing, “We were able to do a great number of runs in a very short period of time, and 
we got all our abort procedures down pat in just a very short period of time.  I think that I 
can’t say enough for this.”  The instructors continued to value astronaut comments such 
as these, as indicated in the timing of the DCPS runs.  Gemini VIII astronauts Armstrong 
and Scott recommended finishing this training three weeks prior to launch, so as to ensure 
it was fresh on astronauts’ minds, and this became the standard for Gemini crews.21          
 But if a catastrophic failure caused an astronaut to pull a D-ring and eject from a 
Gemini spacecraft, he would also need experience in what would come next.  Pyrotechnic 
charges would whisk the two crewmembers away in their ejection seats and a parachute 
would then send them to a touchdown, either at land or sea.  “The ejection seat concept 
was selected for the Gemini spacecraft after careful consideration of weights, launch 
vehicle performance reliability, and total system integration required to provide escape 
over the complete flight region…This system has been tested for the worst conditions in 
altitude and dynamic pressure using anthropomorphic dummies and, in certain areas, 
men,” explained two MSC engineers in a technical report.22  Some of the Gemini 
astronauts eventually testified that the ejection seat was less safe than the escape tower 
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method used during Mercury before it and Apollo after it.23  Yet each of these men had 
experience with ejection seats from their careers as aircraft pilots and felt well prepared to 
operate a Gemini ejection seat after training in its operation.  The men also undertook 
parachute training in 1963 and 1964.  “Ground School at Ellington Air Force Base would 
tow you up into the air to about three hundred feet and cut you loose and then you 
maneuvered down to a landing,” Armstrong remembered.  “We did that over land as well 
as over water, the latter near Galveston Island off the coast of Texas, in the Gulf of Mexico.  
That training went for quite a substantial period of time on an intermittent basis.”24      
 But the most important task of the Gemini program concerned the rendezvous of 
spacecraft once in orbit.  The training for and execution of this new maneuver again 
reflected the idea of astronauts as being able to perform useful tasks in space, a legacy of 
Mercury.  Gus Grissom, the astronaut so closely involved with the development of the 
Gemini spacecraft at the McDonnell plant that the vehicle became known as the 
“Gusmobile,” called this ship “the first true pilot’s spacecraft.”  This especially applied to 
rendezvous, because the astronaut in the left-hand seat (the Commander) would have to 
make the final approach to the Agena.25  The instrument panel would provide him with 
details he would need to know to do this, such as the “8-ball” indicator for attitude 
reference and readouts of the range and range rate with respect to the Agena.  But the 
Commander himself would provide the trained mind interpreting the information the 
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computer provided.  The task of then manipulating the hand controller to fire Gemini’s 
sixteen thrusters would fall to him.  The thrusters would enable the spacecraft to catch up 
to the Agena, intercept it, and then slow the relative motion between the Gemini and the 
Agena so as to make a safe rendezvous.26  How could instructors ensure that the astronauts 
had the skill to meet with (and on later missions, dock with) another spacecraft? 
 The astronauts honed their skills first with classroom instruction, then with hands-
on simulations.  The instruction in orbital mechanics taught them that to catch up with a 
target, they would need to travel in a lower and therefore faster orbit, then travel to a higher 
orbit at just the right time to intercept the Agena.  Since this lesson was counterintuitive 
for pilots accustomed to flying aircraft on Earth, the classroom work introduced them to 
the demands of space maneuvering.  The hands-on work then took the astronauts to a 
simulator at the McDonnell plant to test rendezvous procedures.  These runs not only gave 
the astronauts confidence in maneuvering the Gemini toward the Agena, but also gave 
instructors the chance to stand alongside the simulator and decide what procedures worked 
best.  The amount of fuel astronauts used guided instructors in their projections of how 
much fuel crews would need on real missions.  The instructors found that the astronauts 
should ideally catch up with the Agena by traveling in an orbit 15 miles beneath it, before 
rising to a higher orbit with a transfer angle of 130 degrees.  For an ideal lighting situation, 
the Sun should be behind the Gemini as it slowed to a rendezvous with the Agena.  These 
conclusions point to an important side benefit of astronaut training: the value of simulators 
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in aiding mission planners.  But this earliest simulator contained only the displays of the 
Gemini Guidance and Control System and Propulsion System.  The astronauts needed a 
machine that mimicked the entire spacecraft and compellingly mimicked the visual 
sensation of a rendezvous.27             
The Translation and Docking Simulator (TDS), located in a 100 by 60 by 40 foot 
building at MSC, provided them with the level of sophistication they needed.  This device 
featured a rail assembly on which a simulated Gemini slid laterally toward a docking with 
a simulated Agena.  A simulator instructor could insert failures into the systems of both 
spacecraft.  Even in a normal rendezvous, the astronauts would have their hands full 
monitoring the instrument panel, watching the scene out the window, and maneuvering 
the vehicle in four degrees of freedom while the Agena moved in two degrees of freedom.  
Simulating failures tested their ability to improvise solutions as quickly as possible and 
informed mission planners as to the proper solutions.  For instance, simulating a thruster 
that would not turn on instructed the entire team in the unusual handling characteristics of 
a partially disabled Gemini.  Simulating a docking aid light that would not turn   
on instructed the team in the visibility needed for a rendezvous.28  After Wally Schirra 
became the first Gemini Commander to make a rendezvous in space, he called the device 
“probably one of the best dynamic devices we will ever find for this type of mission 
planning and training.”29  
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 Once again, training for rendezvous also allowed instructors to ask a pair of “what 
if” questions concerning human spaceflight.  What if the Gemini inadvertently moved out 
of plane with respect to the Agena, so that it approached its target while off to the side?  
The astronauts trained for this possibility aboard the TDS by making a helix-shaped 
approach to the target, known as a whifferdill in the tradition of pilots at air shows, to 
correct the error that had placed it off to the Agena’s side.30  What if the Gemini’s radar, 
computer, or inertial platform failed as the spacecraft approached the Agena?  The teams 
at MSC and McDonnell worked together to develop a chart displaying the data a crew 
would need to make a manual rendezvous.  An astronaut could use a sextant to measure 
the angle between the Gemini and the Agena he could see out his window, and plot this 
number on a chart to determine the time of ignition and velocity required for an upcoming 
engine burn to take them to the Agena.31  Before Gemini had ended, one crew would feel 
especially thankful for the training in whifferdills (Gemini X) and another for the backup 
rendezvous procedure (Gemini XII).             
 But the Gemini Mission Simulator (GMS), located both in Houston and the Cape 
beginning in 1964, provided the centerpiece of flight simulation.  After undergoing runs 
in the DCPS and TDS, both part-task trainers, the astronauts moved to this device to 
simulate all phases of a flight from launch through splashdown in sessions of up to four 
hours.  These simulations added a degree of realism over those in the part-task trainers 
because the astronauts could wear pressure suits and communicate with flight controllers 
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in case of a malfunction, continuing the legacy of integrated simulations that had proven 
effective during Mercury.  In integrated simulations, the flight controllers and tracking 
network personnel even received about 300 telemetry signals from the simulator in which 
to guide their decision making.  The simulator also replicated the exact cockpit stowage 
configuration so that crewmembers could learn how to operate with equipment, 
experiments, camera, and food strewn around them.32  
 One look inside the simulator underscored that these astronauts needed more 
proficiency than their Mercury predecessors.  The Gemini instrument panel dwarfed the 
Mercury instrument panel.  Especially in case of an emergency, astronauts would need to 
quickly know the location of the panels for the flight parameters, the environmental 
control system, the fuel cells, the propulsion system, the communications system, the 
inertial platform, and water management.  They increased their proficiency in systems 
management in stages: first by listening to briefings on each Gemini system, then by using 
six breadboard-type trainers that replicated the control displays of the spacecraft, and 
finally by sitting aboard the GMS with the eyes and ears of SimSups and flight controllers 
on them.33  Each of the men who climbed inside the simulator had flight experience 
ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 hours, and this was the reason they were chosen as astronauts: 
their ability to manage systems at high speeds when their life depended on their quick 
reactions.       
Training aboard the GMS included preparation not only for the task of piloting,  
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but also a task that preoccupies astronauts through the 21st century: carrying out 
experiments in the unique microgravity environment.  Knowing the success of the 
Mercury program in proving the potential of humans as assets in this environment, NASA 
accepted Gemini experiment proposals from universities, laboratories, hospitals, industry, 
and government agencies.  The selected proposals mainly fell into three categories: study 
of the Earth and the space around it, technology demonstrations, and studies of the effects 
of weightlessness on astronauts’ bones, muscles, and bodily fluids.  The Principal 
Investigators (PIs) fortunate enough to have their proposals selected then gave a briefing 
to the crew for which their experiment was assigned, which included their estimate on the 
training the crew would have to perform.34   
For instance, Paul Lowman gave at least one two to three hour briefing as the PI 
for the Synoptic Terrain Photography Experiment.  He brought orbital photos from 
previous missions, geologic maps of the areas the next Gemini crew would fly over, and 
the flight path maps so he could discuss which areas he wanted the crew to photograph.  
The photos previous crews had taken served as a guide of what to do and what not to do.  
Eventually the crews had access to a notebook at the Cape Kennedy crew quarters 
containing the best and worst photos from the Mercury and Gemini programs.  Lowman 
also gave astronauts the scientific rationale for each photo he wanted them to take during 
the briefings, with the hope that this background detail would develop their interest in the 
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subject and possibly lead them to observe targets that he had not discussed.35    Training 
for these experiments established an important precedent: astronauts needed to begin their 
mission understanding not only the operation of each experiment, but also the principles 
underlying them.  Training personnel would expect astronauts through the ISS era to be 
not merely mechanics, but knowledgeable experimenters.           
The last task astronauts needed to perform aboard the GMS concerned the reentry 
through Earth’s atmosphere.  Not only could a Gemini astronaut choose to eject during 
launch, change the spacecraft’s orbit, pilot the spacecraft to a rendezvous and docking, 
and perform experiments, he could also exercise control during reentry.  By placing his 
hand on the control stick and consulting the “8-ball” attitude indicator, he could damp 
oscillations in pitch and yaw while rolling the vehicle to affect its lift.  These maneuvers 
could control the splashdown point by up to 300 miles down range and more than 25 miles 
side to side.  Once through the atmosphere, the astronauts could consult the altimeter 
readout and light indications to deploy the drogue and then main parachute in advance of 
splashdown (NASA Associate Administrator George Mueller announced in 1964 that the 
idea of a paraglider guiding the spacecraft to a land touchdown had been shelved, meaning 
all flights would end in splashdowns).36  The determination to give astronauts useful tasks 
once again guided the space agency in allocating time, money, and personnel to the 
training process. 
The procedures for integrated simulations, involving not only astronauts but also  
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flight controllers and the SimSups who gave them problems to solve, evolved during the 
Gemini era.  Carl Shelley remembered the preparation that went into the job of being a 
SimSup.  While the flight controllers SimSups were trying to train received classroom 
instruction in spacecraft systems, “we went to all the same courses…The training people 
were basically just like controllers who had the job of training the other guys associated 
with them.”37  Meanwhile, Shelley’s colleague Harold Miller made the decisions on how 
SimSups would go about their work.  He decided to install a simulation control room at 
MSC, separated only by a viewing window from the Mission Operations Control Room 
(MOCR).  This allowed a SimSup to sit at his computer console injecting failures into the 
spacecraft, see all the controllers and displays the flight controllers saw, and then stay in 
close contact with the controllers for debriefing sessions.  Miller also established the job 
of “sim coordinator.”  During the training for each mission, the sim coordinator worked 
with the SimSup to generate and document all the specific cases intended to test the crew 
and controllers.  “Without these guys we would never have been able to run the number 
and quality of sims we did for each mission,” Miller explained.38   
Both Miller and Shelley believed the entire human spaceflight operation owed a 
debt of gratitude to the SimSups.  Astronauts and flight controllers alike might have griped 
that the problems the SimSups injected into simulations were unrealistic, but Miller argued 
that actual events proved their complaints wrong in many cases.  “(Flight Director) Cliff  
Charlesworth would, after several simulations, tell me that was the most unrealistic  
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simulation he had ever seen,” he recalled.  “Invariably that specific problem would occur 
in the mission and he would have to eat crow.”  The design of simulations by people such 
as Miller and Shelley thus foresaw the problems that flight controllers would have to 
grapple with while astronauts’ lives were on the line.  Miller also felt the competition 
between SimSups and the flight controllers who tried to solve the problems they 
implemented was healthy, because this toughened the controllers prior to a real mission.  
“Controllers would say that simulations were more stressful than the real missions, which 
of course was our objective,” he explained.39  Shelley agreed with these thoughts, while 
also noting that the training procedures established during these early years persisted into 
the 21st century.  “Fundamentally, the same types of activity go on,” he explained.  
“Training teams spend a lot of time…really understanding what are you trying to do and 
what can go wrong in this situation, or how does the flight control team plus its 
infrastructure really gear itself up to support this activity, and where are the weaknesses 
in the overall plan.”40  The fact that the concept of integrated simulations survived through 
multiple generations indicated the value of the work these 1960s pioneers did.                 
 The astronauts offered their own praise of GMS runs.  When asked to evaluate the 
machine, they followed their Mercury predecessors by consistently saying that a simulator 
replicating their vehicle was the most useful way to build their confidence in advance of 
a groundbreaking flight.  As Commander of the first piloted mission, Gus Grissom set the 
tone by saying, “The mission simulator is the best trainer we have.  It looks exactly like a 
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spacecraft, and when we got inside that spacecraft on launch day, for all you could tell, 
you were just sitting right in the trainer.”41  Twenty months later, Jim Lovell echoed this 
thought as Commander of the last mission: “There is no doubt in my mind that the Gemini 
Mission Simulator is the best single device in preparing for a Gemini mission.”42  When 
asked to assess the device in a conference at the end of the program, Tom Stafford and 
Pete Conrad pointed out that simulator data closely matched flight data and concluded, 
“The success with which the flight crews accomplished each Gemini mission was a direct 
result of high-fidelity simulation training.”43  But these glowing comments should not 
disguise the progress over the course of Gemini that eliminated two shortcomings in 
simulation.   
 The first was a problem inherent in a fast-paced program designed to meet 
Kennedy’s end-of-the-decade lunar commitment: making sure the Gemini Mission 
Simulator kept up with the updates in the actual spacecraft and could turn around quickly 
to support the training of new crews.  The program featured ten piloted flights in only 
twenty months, meaning the simulator needed to undergo updates and train new crews at 
a quick pace.  “They could make changes in the spacecraft faster than we could make them 
to the simulator,” explained Stan Faber.  “The reason for that is that they would develop 
their hardware and make sure it worked and then they’d say, let’s stick it in the spacecraft.  
Well, that’s when we would start developing it for the simulator and the lead time could 
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be expensive.”44  Astronauts made comments such as Ed White’s “I think, also, they’re 
caught as second-rate citizens as far as keeping their simulators up to date and getting the 
latest spacecraft changes in them.”  His Gemini IV crewmate Jim McDivitt also voiced the 
complaint, “I think the big problem with it is that it takes too long to turn it around.  I think 
that we’re fooling around with it too much, committing it to supporting other functions 
besides flight crew training.”45   
These complaints contrasted with the positive debriefing comments of the Gemini 
IX-A crew, about one year later.  Tom Stafford commented, “The crew station was 
upgraded to our configuration and, in fact, we had the control system change into the crew 
station at approximately the same time that the spacecraft had a control system change 
into it.  All in one day, which I thought was very good…The Gemini Mission Simulator 
has finally matured into a very worthwhile apparatus and it’s available for training a large 
percent of the time.  Also, the crew can work in it two shifts a day, plus occasionally a 
night shift.  The modifications and maintenance and repair to the simulator was done from 
midnight to six or seven in the morning and this worked out very good.”46  Stafford’s 
comments underscored the time that hundreds of FCOD personnel spent away from 
families in an era when human spaceflight progressed more rapidly than in the post-Apollo 
era.  One lunar scientist offered one of the best summations of this era, while looking back 
thirty years after Apollo 11: “Space advocates often lament the lack of direction of today’s 
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space program…They look back wistfully on the glory days of Apollo, when espirit de 
corps was high, the work days were long and hard, and sleeves were rolled up and teeth 
were set in determination.  It was like a war then.  It was.  And we won it.”47  Those who 
worked night shifts on the simulator, making sure the device was up to date and ready to 
support crews, were as much a part of that war as those who cut the metal on the rockets 
and spacecraft.  
 The other major shortcoming was the one that Robert Voas had considered one of 
the major weaknesses of Mercury training: simulating a realistic view out an astronaut’s 
window.  This remained a weakness through the first three Gemini flights.  Gus Grissom 
noted during his debriefing after commanding the first flight: “An out-the-window display 
would certainly be of value.  It would give you confidence that you can align the spacecraft 
in yaw…If we had a good out-of-the-window display, I think it would add a lot to our 
confidence that we can do it.”48  Fulfilling Grissom’s request required a new innovation 
in the world of astronaut training: the digital computer.  Whereas analog computers 
measure changes in physical quantities to make calculations, digital computers process 
discrete quantities numerically (as 0s and 1s).  Digital computers were more versatile and 
accurate than their predecessors, meaning they were much better candidates to simulate 
the motion, instrument panel displays, or out-the-window views of a spaceflight.  One of 
the people who understood this was Harold Miller, the simulation designer.  “We were 
scheduled to fly Gemini missions on a two-month schedule and to keep a hardware/analog 
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simulator up to date would have been an impossible task and possibly improperly train the 
flight controllers and crew,” he recalled.  “The battle over how to simulate the Agena was 
a rather bitterly fought battle between Mel Brooks and me…The argument finally came 
to a head in John Hodge’s office where IBM (the company awarded the contract for 
computers) presented the arguments for a digital simulation.  Mel argued for the analog 
version.  In what I considered, for the time, a real leap forward, Hodge agreed to let IBM 
simulate the Agena’s trajectory and systems.”49        
On the basis of this logic, the GMS also featured three digital computers that 
controlled cockpit displays for the crew and signals to control the scene generators the 
crew would see outside their windows.50  The Farrand Optical Company of the Bronx, 
New York won the contract to create the scene generators, as they later would for the 
Apollo Command and Lunar Module simulators.  The contractors for that company 
created scenes via an infinity optics display system.  This refers to a system of projection 
whereby the distance from an eyepiece to an objective is set to infinity.  A tube lens is 
then placed within the body tube between the eyepiece and objective to produce an 
intermediate image.  Although this system did not become commonplace until the 1980s, 
a German microscope manufacturer had begun experimenting with it in the 1930s.51  
The Farrand contractors utilized this principle to project an Agena Target Vehicle, a star 
field, and the Earth for viewing outside the GMS window by astronauts.  Beginning 
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when Wally Schirra and Tom Stafford trained to make the first space rendezvous on 
Gemini VI-A, crews saw this scene move outside their window to approximate flying in 
space.  Thanks to the infinity optics system, all of the elements in the scene appeared to 
move correctly even as the astronauts moved their heads.  The astronauts reported that 
the visual simulations could have used more accuracy in mimicking the magnitude of the 
lights on the Agena, but that otherwise they benefited from being able to visualize scenes 
outside their windows.52   
Stan Faber remembered the significance of this technological leap forward.  He 
said of the Gemini Mission Simulator, “Our big jump there was in the visual area.”  He 
explained the jump by pointing to the desire of NASA instructors like himself to build 
off the capabilities of aircraft simulation: “Traditionally, in airplane simulations and 
training of pilots, they trained them to land on the runway with a camera-model type 
system.  I can remember the first one I ever saw, happened to have been at the FAA’s 
headquarters in Oklahoma, and it was the worst television picture I ever saw.”  NASA 
instructors thus funded the development of superior digitally generated images while 
collaborating with aircraft instructors at the Air Force on how best to go about this.  “In 
fact, I, for a time was on the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
committee on simulation, and that was just so I could go visit these other people and see 
what they were doing and how they were handling things,” Faber remembered.53  
Through the invention of one of the defining technologies of the twentieth centuries (the 
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digital computer), and through a team effort to apply this technology, the instructors 
solved what Thomas Hughes would call one of the reverse salients in the technological 
system of astronaut training.  Gemini astronauts could train for the sensation of looking 
out a window while a target vehicle approached at 17,500 miles per hour.  Nobody could 
know at this point that the astronauts on the last Gemini mission would need to do this to 
make a manual rendezvous when the automatic system failed.  It was only one of the 
many glitches that crewmembers on ten Gemini missions encountered, each of which 
deserve consideration from a training standpoint.      
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CHAPTER V 
GEMINI: “I HAD MY BUTT WORKING FOR ME” 
 
The vehicle nicknamed the “Gusmobile” had a fitting first Commander.  As the 
training progressed and engineers moved the spacecraft and Titan booster closer to flight 
readiness, Deke Slayton knew he would have to select crews for the ten piloted Gemini 
missions.  He explained that he developed five guidelines in selecting crews: he 
considered everybody acceptable for any mission when selected by NASA; he 
considered some astronauts more qualified than others for specific missions, however; 
he tried to match people in a two-man crew based on talents and personal compatibility; 
he always kept future requirements and training in mind; and he assumed a ten percent 
attrition rate in the astronaut corps each year.  He also favored assigning the job of 
Commander to those with spaceflight experience.  Of the six Mercury veterans who had 
that experience, only four remained in consideration for Gemini missions (John Glenn 
departed to pursue a political career and Scott Carpenter, viewed as unacceptable to 
management because of his Mercury flight, would depart in 1967 without flying another 
mission).  Slayton decided in 1963 that since Alan Shepard had served as backup on the 
last Mercury mission and was the most capable pilot in the corps, Shepard should 
command the first Gemini mission.  He also observed the training of the “Next Nine” 
and recalled, “By this time I had a pretty good idea as to who was more equal in the new 
group.”  On this basis, he decided on Tom Stafford as Shepard’s crewmate.  But Shepard 
fell ill with an inner ear disorder called Ménière’s disease, and when the diagnosis was 
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confirmed in October 1963, he was disqualified from flying.  Thus Slayton decided to 
make Gus Grissom the Commander of the first piloted Gemini mission and John Young 
his crewmate.1              
Grissom and Young each brought reputations as talented pilots and astronauts 
who were unafraid to speak their minds if they saw a shortcoming.  One NASA medical 
officer remembered, “It may be imagination, but he (Young) seems to walk like Gus, 
talk like Gus, and sometimes, he can be just as obstinate as Gus.  I think they named this 
program right when they called it Gemini and selected these two for the first flight.”2  
The two also had proven they could work together effectively during their jungle 
survival training in Panama.  Deke Slayton therefore felt confident enough to forward 
his selection to Bob Gilruth, who made the assignment official on April 13, 1964.  The 
Gemini III crew knew that an unmanned test of the spacecraft and booster remained a 
hurdle to be cleared, while their own vehicle needed to be tested and checked out.  When 
Young asked Grissom when he thought they would launch, the Commander immediately 
responded with remarkable prescience, “March 1965.”  “We had an incredible amount to 
learn, and only eleven months to do it,” Young recalled.3     
 The two of them demonstrated more convincingly than ever before that NASA 
and McDonnell personnel valued the contribution of users.  Based on his experience 
during the Mercury program, Grissom believed he and Young should participate in the 
test and checkout of the ship he eventually named the Molly Brown.  The McDonnell 
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contractors accepted this request, so the Gemini III crew commuted to St. Louis about 
forty-five times during their training, mostly using the T-38 aircraft they flew to keep 
their piloting skills sharp.  “The final report on Gemini III would indicate that Gus and I 
spent on the order of 40 hours in spacecraft tests for our flight, but if the truth be told, it 
was more like 300 or 400 hours,” Young remembered.  “There were plenty of times at 
McDonnell when we stayed in the spacecraft all day and all night.  The way they 
checked out the first manned Gemini spacecraft, they’d put in a system, check it out, 
take it out again, put in another system, check it out, and take it out again…The attention 
to detail was truly extraordinary.”  The commitment to participate in every test allowed 
the two men to share their input with the contractors and to learn every idiosyncrasy of 
the vehicle, which they considered necessary in case the simulator did not capture every 
unique aspect of the Molly Brown.4  As husbands and fathers, Grissom and Young also 
learned that their training routine left them with precious little time for their families.  
The two spent days sleeping at the Chase-Plaza Park Hotel in St. Louis and could only 
return to their homes in Houston at the end of each week.5  When Grissom died, his wife 
remarked that she would “miss the phone calls,” because this was her only hope of 
maintaining reliable contact with him.”6                 
 By the time March 1965 arrived, the statistics indicated the staggering amount of 
preparation Grissom and Young underwent for such a short mission (three orbits in 
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about five hours).  The men first spent time in an early version of the Gemini Mission 
Simulator in St. Louis, to learn general operations.  Link then constructed a simulator 
updated to exactly match the Gemini III spacecraft and shipped it to Cape Kennedy 
(President Lyndon Johnson had issued an executive order renaming Cape Canaveral in 
honor of his fallen predecessor in 1963.  The Canaveral name was restored in 1973).  
Beginning in November 1964, Grissom spent over 77 hours and Young over 85 hours at 
the Cape in this simulator.  Simulator time thus outpaced the time of the actual flight by 
about a 17:1 ratio.  Though he would only launch once, Grissom made 20 normal and 46 
aborted launches to give him the confidence he would need to handle any contingency as 
he soared to 17,500 miles per hour.  He also made 107 retrofires and 64 reentries.  He 
went through the entire flight plan nine times so that his tasks would feel as close to 
second nature as possible.  By the time he stepped into the actual vehicle on launch day, 
he had responded to 211 systems malfunctions aboard the simulator.  The simulator time 
combined with DCPS runs during the previous July and August, egresses from the 
spacecraft in October, centrifuge runs in November and December, 25 hours per month 
flying time, and the litany of tests aboard the actual spacecraft desensitized Grissom and 
Young to the experiences of piloting and spaceflight more than any astronauts before 
them.7   
 Gemini III succeeded as well as any engineer could have hoped.  On March 23, 
Grissom and Young tested every system of the Molly Brown, became the first astronauts 
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to alter a ship’s orbit, and proved the ship worthy of the high expectations placed upon 
it.  The brief flight also indicated the value of the training process.  A few minutes into 
the first orbit, the two men saw an indication that their cabin pressure had fallen to zero.  
Young lowered his helmet visor, but scanned the instrument panel just as he had over 
those 85 hours of simulated flight and saw unusual readings on several other meters.  He 
surmised that the problem was not a real loss of cabin pressure, but a loss of the 
electricity that powered the dials on the instrument panel.  He switched to the secondary 
electrical converter and the dials returned to normal.  In solving this problem in only 45 
seconds, Young proved the value of mentally rehearsing tasks in a technically complex 
vehicle where a life-threatening problem could emerge in seconds.8  The flight also 
proved the value of training during reentry, when the visual and auditory experience 
matched the simulations even to the plasma sheath that surrounded the vehicle.9   
Grissom had the first chance to control the spacecraft during reentry.  Some of 
the astronauts later compared the Gemini to a fighter plane, because the vehicle 
responded more crisply to the two hand controllers than Mercury before it or Apollo and 
the Space Shuttle after it.10  Grissom drew upon his experience in fighter planes and the 
GMS to manipulate the translation and attitude controllers, succeeding in lifting the 
spacecraft about 130 miles.  This was necessary because the retrofire burn set up the 
Molly Brown to splash down well short of its target.  Although the ship’s lift-to-drag  
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ratio proved 31 percent lower than expected, Grissom proved a well-trained astronaut 
could eliminate such an error to as great an extent as the vehicle allowed.11        
By this point, Jim McDivitt and Ed White were deep in training for a mission 
that would take a far greater leap forward than any in the past: Gemini IV.  Medical 
specialists wondered whether astronauts would be able to function for four days in a 
weightless environment, and this crew would provide the answer.  Engineers wondered 
whether astronauts would be able to rendezvous, and this crew would provide an initial 
answer by maneuvering toward the spent second stage of their Titan booster, then 
staying a short distance away from it in the same plane and at the same velocity.  
Engineers called this feat stationkeeping and considered it a precursor to a rendezvous 
and docking with another spacecraft.  Both engineers and medical specialists also 
wondered if an astronaut would be able to maneuver outside a spacecraft, and White 
would provide an answer by becoming the first American to perform an EVA.12  Of 
these three tasks, the last two were especially instructive in terms of lessons learned for 
training.         
 Bob Gilruth and fellow administrator George Low added the stationkeeping task 
late in the astronauts’ training process after receiving a positive response from the 
Gemini Project Office.  But the task contained two major problems.  First, the 
rendezvous radar that future crews wished to use to close in on other spacecraft was not 
yet available.  This meant McDivitt and White needed to track their booster stage by eye.  
                                                          
11  Young with Hansen, 80-82.  
12  Hacker and Grimwood, 239-245.    
136 
 
That requirement placed a premium on the astronauts’ skill level.  But the second 
problem was that the simulators at the Cape and Houston were not designed to train 
them for optical stationkeeping.  The results when Gemini IV launched on June 3 failed 
to meet expectations.  McDivitt thrusted toward the rocket stage from a few hundred feet 
away, but could not catch up with it.  His eyes and brain told him to thrust toward the 
stage, but in doing so he increased his own ship’s altitude, and placing the Gemini in a 
higher altitude meant it traveled slower than the stage.  While over Hawaii, McDivitt 
understood that he had expended almost half of his ship’s fuel and ended his futile 
effort.13  Langley engineer Paul Purser summarized the experience by stating, “no one 
was ‘adequately’ trained in that the differences between motions on Earth and motions in 
orbit were not intuitively realized or ‘second nature’ to anyone.”14  But as 
counterintuitive a concept as orbital mechanics was for a pilot accustomed to flying on 
Earth, McDivitt would have benefited from thorough simulator training. 
 No task during the Gemini era proved more confounding, or more instructive to 
the training process, than EVA.  As early as January 1964, engineers had considered 
making Gemini IV the first mission when an astronaut would leave his spacecraft.  But 
management at Houston and NASA Headquarters remained skeptical of the idea until 
engineers could develop realistic training methods.  MSC engineers tried to persuade 
management first by way of vacuum chamber simulations with Gus Grissom and John 
Young at the McDonnell plant in St. Louis.  This required NASA and McDonnell to put 
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“guys in vacuums with nothing between them but that little old lady from Worcester, 
Massachusetts, and her glue pot and that suit,” as Young recalled in his wry way.  But 
the vacuum chamber simulations, beginning in November 1964, gave the astronauts 
experience in depressurizing the Gemini spacecraft and opening and closing the hatch at 
a simulated altitude of 40,000 feet.  When Soviet Alexei Leonov became the first human 
to make an EVA the following March, his feat stirred the Gemini team to make an 
American EVA in the next few months.  By late April, the vacuum chamber at MSC was 
ready for full-scale simulations.15  But even as the Gemini IV crew gained experience 
with a vacuum environment, how could White feel confident about his ability to 
maneuver in a weightless environment? 
 The answer would come as a surprise to almost every astronaut who has ever 
walked in space, if he or she is not aware of the history of the corps.  White did not train 
to maneuver his body through the concept of neutral buoyancy.  Instead, he traveled to 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and flew aboard a KC-135 aircraft that made parabolic 
flights to produce weightlessness.  Inside the fuselage, he practiced climbing out of the 
hatch and maneuvering toward the adapter section of the Gemini.  This method had one 
advantage over the neutral buoyancy method, in that he could maneuver without the drag 
that water created.  But more importantly, KC-135 flights had a weakness: they could 
only produce 30 seconds of weightlessness at a time.16  This meant they could not 
replicate the fatigue that an astronaut would encounter on a long EVA.  This posed a  
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problem for the future, but White only planned to spend about 20 minutes outside.  Both  
he and McDivitt praised the KC-135 flights during their mission debriefing, with the 
Commander arguing, “Without this we wouldn’t have had the confidence in ourselves in 
getting in and out of the spacecraft and opening and closing the hatch that was required, 
so that we probably wouldn’t have even done it.”17                     
 White did have one other helpful but flawed method with which to prepare: the 
MSC’s Air Bearing Facility.  This room measured 21 by 24 feet and contained a smooth 
metal floor estimated to be flat within about 0.002 inches.  Engineers placed a circular 
platform on it and lifted the platform a fraction of an inch off the floor via gas jets.  The 
flat floor then allowed a suited astronaut mounted on the platform to maneuver his body 
with as little friction as possible.  White carried a Hand Held Maneuvering Unit 
(HHMU) and when he pressed the unit’s trigger, compressed oxygen gas propelled him 
up to 6 feet per second.  As he propelled himself, his body yawed to one side and he 
learned how to eliminate this motion and still arrive at his intended target.  He could also 
experiment with pitch motion by lying on his side and roll motion by lying on his back.  
White spent 12 hours in the Air Bearing Facility, but like the KC-135 flights, this means 
of preparing him contained a critical weakness.  He could only reproduce motion in one 
axis at a time, not the simultaneous pitch, roll, and yaw motions an astronaut might need 
to reach another spacecraft.  He also could not fly up or down, only back and forth in 
two dimensions.  This method did succeed in preparing White for a 20 minute EVA, but 
long-term success in the kind of work spacewalking astronauts eventually performed in  
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the Space Shuttle/International Space Station era called for improvement.18  
As Gemini IV flew over the Indian Ocean on June 3, White became the first 
American to drift out of his spacecraft into the vacuum.  His brief stay outside carried 
two major positives.  First, he turned his body and stopped easily with short bursts of the 
HHMU trigger.  Pulling the trigger felt natural to him thanks to his Air Bearing Facility 
experience.  Second, he did not feel disoriented in what later spacewalkers would call a 
“three dimensional ice skating rink.”  When he ran out of maneuvering fuel, he felt in 
such good spirits that he made his famous statement, “It’s the saddest moment of my 
life.”  He only encountered one major problem: closing the hatch after he returned to his 
seat.  But White’s EVA still carried signs of the trouble his successors would face.  
When he maneuvered himself, he felt the tendency to pitch, roll, and yaw simultaneously 
that the Air Bearing Facility could not reproduce.  By the time he returned to the 
spacecraft, even this West Point graduate who had nearly qualified as a U.S. Olympic 
runner felt physically exhausted.  Sweat fogged his faceplate.  The Ventilation Control 
Module did not have the capacity to cool his body.19  White’s training could not produce 
this sensation either, and this was after a 20 minute EVA.  Serious work in space would 
require several hours outside.  Yet these signs did not alter the training process as they 
probably should have in retrospect.  Only the more dramatic difficulties of the next three 
Gemini spacewalkers stirred the instructors to action.           
McDivitt and White were most successful in proving the ability of astronauts as  
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experimenters.  “Crew understanding is vital to achieve maximum benefit from man in 
space,” two authors wrote for the Gemini Summary Conference.20  Since Gemini 
instructors adhered to this philosophy, McDivitt and White went into space having 
stayed in close touch with the PIs throughout training and knowing they would be 
available on the ground if needed during the flight.  The astronauts also possessed the 
understanding, honed through their briefings with the PIs, to make adjustments to 
experiments on their own.  The results of the experiments provided yet another 
justification for sending trained crews into orbit, especially for those involving 
photography.  As the PI for the Synoptic Terrain Photography experiment, Paul Lowman 
argued, “Despite the fact that many of the planned terrain target areas were not covered 
for various reasons, the gaps were more than compensated for by coverage of unplanned 
areas or features.”  For instance, McDivitt and White took photos of a circular structure 
in the African nation of Mauritania because although they were not briefed on this area, 
they still recognized it as an important feature to document.  The first photos of this 
structure from space sparked an investigation that expanded scientific knowledge about 
the geology of Mauritania.21  The Director of Manned Flight Experiments coauthored an 
article about the entire program stating, “Over half of the experiments were photographic 
in technique, indicating that the investigators wished to take advantage of the flight crew 
being available to guide and select the targets and to return the film for permanent  
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record.”22   
Astronauts capitalized on their training and on this faith in their abilities to take 
photos that returned useful data to the scientific community, beginning with McDivitt 
and White.  Their 100 photos of Earth terrain gave geologists a bird’s eye view of 
surface features that helped them understand continental drift, the structure of Earth’s 
mantle, and even draw a comparison between Earth terrain and the terrain of other 
planets or moons.  For instance, geologists compared rift valleys in the Middle East and 
Africa to rilles on the Earth’s Moon.  The two men also took about 200 photos of 
meteorological phenomena.  The Synoptic Terrain and Synoptic Weather Photography 
of Gemini crews established a precedent of utilizing the human mind’s ability to identify 
the most useful times to take photos of Earth.  This culminated in the Crew Earth 
Observations program that ISS astronauts carry out to this day.23     
 The physiological experiments fortunately revealed that extended stays in 
weightlessness would not prevent astronauts from carrying out such tasks.  Medical 
Director Chuck Berry recalled hearing the same comment from several physiologists in 
advance of Gemini IV: “Don’t you…know that these guys are going to…pass out and 
might, indeed, die from this flight?”  One experiment did find significant losses in the 
bone mass of the two men compared to bed rested patients over four days.  But McDivitt 
and White were well conditioned astronauts who exercised regularly before and during 
the flight with a pair of bungee cords.  The two defied the critics by walking on the 
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recovery carrier immediately after four days in weightlessness.  One day later, White 
even took part in a tug-of-war on the carrier.24                 
 Gordon Cooper and Pete Conrad pushed the envelope even further during the 
Gemini V mission in August: eight days.  One of the challenges of Gemini was to launch 
missions just two months apart, for the astronauts and instructors as well as the engineers 
building the rockets and spacecraft.  In the first half of 1965, 12 astronauts had to share 
the Gemini simulators.  This caused a delay in the Gemini V launch, but Cooper and 
Conrad worked 16 hour days, including weekends, to make up lost time and the launch 
only slipped 10 days.25  Chris Kraft remembered feeling during integrated simulations 
that the entire Gemini team reached a new level of professionalism at this point: “This 
was the longest spaceflight ever attempted by anyone, and the number of things that 
could go wrong grew incrementally with each day.  We couldn’t train for all of them.  
But my teams were so sharp and well-practiced at handling new situations that I 
developed a strong confidence in their ability to cope.”26   
Indeed, Gemini V continued the trend of solving problems unprecedented in any 
previous piloted flight.  The pressure in a fuel cell, which had replaced batteries as the 
means of providing electricity to the spacecraft, inadvertently dropped.  Cooper 
responded as he would in the simulator, carrying out an emergency power down of the 
ship’s electrical systems while out of contact with Earth.  The flight controllers then 
gave the crew instructions for a powering-up procedure, and the fuel cell pressure began 
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to build again.  Two of the ship’s sixteen maneuvering thrusters failed, but Cooper 
compensated by placing the spacecraft into a drifting mode.  An engineer had fed 
incorrect data into the computer, resulting in an off-target reentry at too steep an angle, 
but Cooper compensated by lifting the spacecraft to a more acceptable splashdown point 
despite 7.5 Gs pressing him down in his seat.  The mark of a successful training program 
was that he, Conrad, and the flight controllers did not let the mechanical glitches in a 
new and complex vehicle prevent them from fulfilling their jobs.  The crew carried out 
16 of 17 planned experiments and performed a “phantom rendezvous” with a moving 
point in space, which proved the value of Cooper’s flying skills and the Gemini 
maneuvering system by taking the ship to the exact point Chris Kraft wanted.27           
 But the most important objective of the program remained unfulfilled.  Thus 
Wally Schirra and Tom Stafford spent several months training to make the first ever 
rendezvous with another spacecraft on Gemini VI.  These men especially benefited from 
the contributions of MSC engineer Dean Grimm and Buzz Aldrin, the astronaut known 
as “Dr. Rendezvous” for his expertise in this subject dating back to his Ph.D. dissertation 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  Grimm and Aldrin developed the 
crew procedures that would allow Gemini VI to catch up with an Agena by flying in a 
lower orbit and then intercepting the Agena at the right moment.  Grimm remembered 
the sacrifices he made in doing so: “I’d work with the engineering people after the crews 
left at 6 p.m., and I’d be there until 4 a.m.  Then I’d go home and sleep for four or five 
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hours and then be there about 8:00 to 8:30, and then they’d come in about 9:00.  Then 
we’d start working with the procedures that I had developed overnight.  That’s the way 
we incrementally trained the crews.”28  Thanks to his persistence, Schirra and Stafford 
had a manual by their side which they consulted in making 50 rendezvous simulations.  
As they thrusted toward the Agena in the safety of a simulator, they could take notes and 
consult with Aldrin.29  
Gemini VI training once again demonstrated that ubiquitous point that dated back 
to Mercury: the trust placed in astronauts as users of new technology.  As an engineer 
who worked with Schirra, Stafford, and subsequent crews closely, Grimm recalled, “Of 
course the crews were always great, and they always had a lot of ideas.  Although they 
didn’t have a lot of time to spend on solutions, they could tell you what the problem was.  
Of course then it was our responsibility to figure out a solution to the problem and then 
we’d work it out and go fly the simulation ourselves to make sure it worked.  Then we’d 
bring the crew in and they’d tweak it however they wanted some procedure or something 
or other.  Then we’d put it in concrete and that would be it.”30  Grimm’s words indicate 
that rather than treating astronauts as “spam in a can,” engineers who developed 
procedures valued the input of astronauts.  The presence of an astronaut who had written 
a Ph.D. dissertation on rendezvous, the first in what eventually became a long line of 
Ph.D. astronauts, further emphasized the trust placed in users to contribute to this most 
                                                          
28  Dean F. Grimm, Interviewed by Carol Butler, August 17, 2000, Houston, Texas, http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/ 
oral_histories/GrimmDF/GrimmDF_8-17-00.htm (accessed May 28, 2016).    
29  Hacker and Grimwood, 267.    
30  Grimm.  
145 
 
important task of the whole program.  Astronauts were more than just “fighter jocks,” as 
Aldrin especially proved.  Chris Kraft spoke effusively of his importance in rendezvous: 
“In the early stages of the development of the Gemini rendezvous mission plan, Major 
Aldrin almost singlehandedly conceived and pressed through certain basic concepts 
which were incorporated in this operation, without which the probability of mission 
success would have unquestionably been considerably reduced.”31      
But before Schirra and Stafford could rendezvous, the more elementary task of 
launching into space bedeviled the Gemini team twice.  The two traveled to the launch 
pad and climbed into their spacecraft on October 25, while an Atlas rocket stood poised 
on a nearby launch pad carrying the Agena Target Vehicle.  But the Agena exploded into 
five pieces during the Atlas’s ascent, leaving the crew without a mission.  Walter Burke, 
a spacecraft manager at McDonnell, ingeniously suggested an alternative that kept the 
rendezvous objective alive: send Schirra and Stafford on a mission renamed Gemini VI-
A to maneuver to the Gemini VII spacecraft, carrying Frank Borman and Jim Lovell.32  
Gemini VII did launch safely on December 4.  But another miscue prevented Schirra and 
Stafford from lifting off on December 12, and this one dramatically proved a point about 
crew training.  At 9:54 a.m., the Titan roared to life.  But an electrical plug disconnected 
from the booster too soon and activated a clock in the spacecraft that was not supposed 
to start until the Titan left the pad.  The Malfunction Detection System sensed this 
problem and stopped the engines 1.2 seconds into the flight.  Schirra and Stafford  
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managed to climb out of the spacecraft and go back to their crew quarters at the Cape 
that day, and one could rightly argue that this was a tribute to the detection system.33    
 But this was also a tribute to Schirra, who proved the potential of highly trained 
humans in a crisis situation.  If Schirra had followed the mission rule established for 
him, he would have activated the ejection seats for him and his crewmate.  Ejection seat 
specialist Kenneth Hecht expected this, as did a nervous Flight Director Kraft watching 
on television.  But Schirra had flown in jets since shortly after World War II, he had 
launched atop a rocket once before, and he had taken part in hours of launch simulations 
aboard the DCPS.  He also paid close attention as the countdown reached zero and his 
trained mind told him that the vehicle had not left the pad.  If he was wrong, 150 tons of 
propellant would have come crashing back to the ground in a fireball and the whole 
world would have seen two astronauts killed on live television.  Yet Schirra refused to 
fire the ejection seats and stayed put, drawing on his instincts, the lack of any liftoff call 
he would have heard from fellow astronaut Alan Bean, and the knowledge that using the 
ejection seats would have ruined the mission and risked life threatening injuries to him 
and Stafford.  “Fuel pressure is lowering,” he reported calmly, and as the seconds passed 
the threat of an explosion passed.  Kraft recalled, “Two thoughts came quickly: Why the 
hell didn’t they eject and Thank God they didn’t eject.”34  Schirra simply recalled, 
shortly before his death in 2007, “I had my butt working for me.”35   
The incident emphasized a point that instructors have tried to teach student pilots  
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for decades.  One instructor made the point by writing, “You can be a whiz at 
aerodynamics and know your equipment like an engineer, but it’s how you react when 
everything goes wrong that shows what kind of pilot you really are.”  This point is not 
limited to pilots only, as “Business leaders face down everything from PR headaches to 
financial crises, and sometimes even threats to health and human life within their 
organizations.  You can bring your A game to the boardroom and know your industry 
inside and out, but if you’ve never handled a major emergency, it’s hard to know how 
well you’ll fare when your first one hits.”36  Schirra could have easily made the wrong 
decision in this emergency by judging that the Titan had left the pad, even by a few 
inches, and activating the ejection seats.  If he was an automaton who had operated 
strictly according to the mission rule, he would have done so.  But training and instincts 
told him to disobey the rule, and without this split-second decision the first space 
rendezvous would not have happened when it did.  
 He had another chance to prove himself when he and Tom Stafford finally did 
lift off on December 15.  The first joint space mission with astronauts was underway.  
Schirra and Stafford now had the task of making up the 1,237 miles that separated them 
at orbital insertion from Borman and Lovell, which they did by traveling in a lower orbit, 
firing thrusters to keep the vehicle in the same plane as their target, and firing thrusters 
to gradually raise their orbit.37  Their training for this unprecedented meeting benefited 
them in three ways.  First, the visual display in the GMS helped them recognize their 
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target and any potential errors in their approach.38  Second, their time in the GMS helped 
them hone their cockpit communication.  Stafford called out range and range rate to 
Gemini VII based on the onboard radar data while Schirra focused on the view out the 
window and the “8-ball” attitude indicator.  During long hours in the simulator, Gemini 
and Apollo astronauts learned to count on each other and even sense slight changes in 
tone of voice during critical mission phases.  Third, Schirra’s time operating the hand 
controllers in the GMS helped him fly the final approach to his target.  When he had 
flown in Mercury, he could only adjust attitude; now he could use two controllers to 
adjust attitude and translation.  Like airplane pilots, he found that the key to success was 
to make small adjustments and avoid overflying the vehicle.  “I did translation with my 
left hand, which is a very delicate maneuver—a bit like when the shuttle docks with the 
space station,” he remembered.  “I made tiny, tiny thrusts, and developed that technique 
to perfection.”39              
 When Schirra pulled to within about 130 feet of Gemini VII and eliminated all 
lateral motion between his vehicle and the target, he had pioneered the concept of 
rendezvous.  He then undertook stationkeeping with Gemini VII for more than three 
orbits, finding that his ship responded so crisply to his control that he pulled to within a 
few inches of his target and saw the faces of Borman and Lovell.40  This was the 
moment that, more than any other in the Gemini program, illustrated that the U.S. had 
pulled ahead of the Soviets in piloted spaceflight.  To this point, the Soviets had only 
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managed to fly two spacecraft within about three miles.  Those vehicles could not 
maneuver to stop relative motion between them.  “Jolly Wally” Schirra explained the 
difference between this and what he had just accomplished: “Did I tell you exactly what 
a rendezvous was?  When a man looks across a street and sees a pretty girl, and waves at 
her, that’s not a rendezvous, that’s a passing acquaintance.  When he walks across street 
through the traffic and nibbles on her ear, that’s a rendezvous!”41  Schirra had not only 
done this, he had done so with a precision that reflected his training.  “The only reason I 
can say that rendezvous looked easy is because we spent an exhaustive amount of time 
rehearsing this role,” he said at the mission debriefing.42  When astronauts of the next 
half century traveled to the Moon, the Hubble Space Telescope, the Mir space station, or 
the ISS, they continued a tradition of training and execution that the Gemini VI-A crew 
had begun. 
 The week proved doubly successful.  Schirra and Stafford pulled away and made 
a safe splashdown on December 16.  Frank Borman and Jim Lovell splashed down on 
December 18 after an astounding fourteen days aboard Gemini VII.  The latter mission 
bore more similarity to the work astronauts perform today in the ISS era than any other 
1960s flight, because it emphasized medical experimentation over a long duration in 
weightlessness.  Training for Borman and Lovell therefore involved not only learning 
how to operate their vehicle, but also preparing themselves physically and 
psychologically for the longest spaceflight ever.  Could they live in a cabin the size of 
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the front seat of a Volkswagen automobile for two weeks and eliminate as much as 
possible the fatigue that the Gemini IV and V crews had felt?  The two men prepared 
themselves as best they could for six months prior to launch by running and playing 
handball in Houston, until their move to the Cape for the final month.  In Florida, they 
intensified their routine by spending every day running at least one mile, lifting weights, 
and working out in the crew gymnasium.  Preparing for the flight also meant undertaking 
medical exams and limiting their diet for 10 days prior to launch so medical specialists 
could collect their body wastes.  After Borman and Lovell spent fourteen days in orbit, 
doctors compared their preflight results with their postflight results.43  The flight 
encouraged the doctors, as they found the astronauts slept well after the first night, 
reacted well to stress, and even lost less bone mass than the Gemini IV and V crews 
despite staying in orbit longer.44  The preparation of Borman and Lovell served  
them well in proving that humans could function in weightlessness for the time needed 
to travel to the Moon and back.                                         
As 1966 began, one task remained for Gemini astronauts to fulfill: docking.  
Gemini VIII crewmembers Neil Armstrong and Dave Scott planned to connect their 
spacecraft with an Agena for the first time.  Scott also planned to make an EVA much 
more ambitious than Ed White’s.  He spent 84 hours training for a two-hour outing that 
would take him to the Agena, where he would remove a micrometeorite package and test 
a power tool.  The scant 20 minutes in which White floated at the end of his tether paled 
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in comparison to these tasks Scott planned to pioneer.45  The combination of a 
rendezvous, docking, and EVA containing significant work made for the most 
challenging mission yet attempted.  This placed a thorough training regimen at a 
premium, but nobody could know that this was also the mission where the crew would 
place emergency training to the ultimate test.  Grissom had confronted catastrophe while 
in the ocean five years earlier, and so had Schirra and Stafford while on the launch pad 
one year earlier.  But no astronauts had ever come as close to death during a mission 
(Ted Freeman, Elliot See, and Charlie Bassett had already died in T-38 aircraft 
accidents) as Armstrong and Scott did on March 16, 1966. 
 The flight began as the most promising to date.  Armstrong carried a reputation 
as having one of the keenest analytical minds in the astronaut corps, due to his seven 
years as an NACA/NASA test pilot prior to joining the “Next Nine.”  His 125 hours in 
the GMS preparing for this mission reinforced this reputation.  “We achieved fifty to 
sixty rendezvous simulations on the ground, about two-thirds of which were with some 
sort of emergency,” he remembered.  “That means that some part of the equipment was 
either malfunctioning or inoperative during the rendezvous.  We completed the 
rendezvous in all of them but two.”46  He also passed the real test, maneuvering the 
Gemini to the Agena and then taking his spacecraft’s nose into the docking collar at just 
three inches per second.  “Flight, we are docked!” Armstrong reported.  “Yes, it’s really 
a smoothie.”  About half an hour after the flight controllers heard this message, they lost 
                                                          
45  Burgess and French, 79.  
46  Hansen, First Man, 248 and Gemini Mission Evaluation Team, Gemini Program Mission Report, Gemini VIII 
(Houston, TX: MSC-G-R-66-4, 1966), 7-12.  
152 
 
contact with the Gemini/Agena combination as it moved across the Indian Ocean and out 
of range of the tracking network.  The next words they heard, fifteen minutes after that, 
were from Scott: “We have serious problems here.  We’re…we’re tumbling end over 
end up here.  We’re disengaged from the Agena.47 
 Armstrong and Scott were thus on their own at the outset of a crisis, with only 
their training to guide them.  It began innocently enough, as Scott looked at the 
instrument panel and found the vehicle in a thirty-degree bank angle rather than level.  
Armstrong fired the Gemini thrusters to eliminate the bank, but was unsuccessful.  He 
thought the problem stemmed from the Agena, a natural reaction given the troubled 
development of this device.  But when he asked Scott to turn off the Agena attitude 
control system, the bank still did not stop.  Armstrong decided he had to undock with the 
Agena, which did not solve the problem either.  In fact, the spacecraft spun by an 
increasing amount until it reached a full circle (360 degrees) per second.  His vision 
blurred to the point that he knew time to solve the problem before losing consciousness, 
or before the spacecraft disintegrated, was running out.  He drew upon his training in 
realizing that he did not have time to find out which of the many thrusters was sending 
the Gemini into its spin.  He had no choice but to use the thrusters of the Reentry Control 
System to stabilize the vehicle.  Since this took up much of the fuel reserved for reentry, 
he and Scott splashed down about four hours later.48   
 Though both men felt depressed about cutting short a three day mission and  
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losing Scott’s EVA, Armstrong proved the value of having a highly trained astronaut 
accustomed to making split second decisions aboard Gemini VIII.  The events of his life 
had prepared him for this, from bailing out of a Panther jet while flying a Korean War 
mission in 1951, to his recovery from an overshoot of his landing site while aboard the 
X-15 aircraft in 1962.49  In this case, he took a step by step approach to solving the 
problem just as he had done during those 125 simulator hours.  Three factors made this 
difficult.  First, he faced the emotional moment of losing his mission and possibly his 
life.  Second, he had not trained for a Gemini thruster to stick in the “on” position while 
docked with the Agena.  The SimSups had not tested him on this point.  Third, he faced 
severe time pressure in solving whatever problem had emerged.  Despite all of this, he 
did just what his training had emphasized: mentally ask himself what options he had, 
narrow them until he had just one remaining, and carry out the option before it was too 
late.  The fact that this option required him to abruptly end the mission should not 
overshadow the analytical thinking, honed during training, that he did in solving the 
problem.  Most of Armstrong’s colleagues shared this judgment.50          
The problem solving kicked into even higher gear with Gemini IX-A.  With 
Scott’s EVA canceled, the task of proving an astronaut could perform useful work 
outside a spacecraft fell to Gene Cernan (he and Tom Stafford became the Gemini IX-A 
crew when scheduled crewmembers See and Bassett died in a T-38 aircraft accident on 
February 28, 1966).  The Gemini team had grown so ambitious that despite having just 
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20 minutes of EVA experience, they planned to have Cernan freely maneuver in space 
rather than dangle from a tether.  He planned to strap on a backpack provided by the Air 
Force called the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU), which contained two hand 
controllers he could use to maneuver away from the Gemini spacecraft.  As an Air Force 
Captain explained, the use of this backpack foreshadowed the tasks that visionaries 
imagined astronauts performing, but did not actually perform until the post-Apollo era: 
“Maintenance, repair, resupply, crew transfer, rescue, satellite inspection, and assembly 
of structures in space are all operations of potential space systems.  Many of these 
operations involve Extravehicular Activity and require men to maneuver in free space 
for short distances.  The Astronaut Maneuvering Unit experiment is a fundamental step 
toward determining the basic hardware and operational criteria for these extravehicular 
activities.”51  What this Air Force Captain did not know was that training and execution 
of the most basic EVA maneuvering tasks needed much improvement before the 
backpack could enter the equation. 
 Cernan and his backup Buzz Aldrin spent 140 hours training to use the backpack, 
though still without using the neutral buoyancy technique that has proven most useful to 
spacewalkers in the years since.  Their sessions in altitude chambers and the KC-135 
aircraft prepared them for the task of donning the AMU and using the hand controller to 
propel their bodies via short bursts of thrust.  They also took part in Air Bearing Facility 
simulations where they could maneuver their bodies in up to six degrees of freedom, 
                                                          
51  John W. Donahue, “Experiment D-12, Astronaut Maneuvering Unit,” in Manned Spaceflight Experiments Interim 
Report, Gemini IX-A Mission (Washington, D.C.: NASA N67-16027, 1966), 55.    
155 
 
while seeing visual projections of the Earth and a target they could thrust toward.  Each 
of these methods proved valuable both in preparing Cernan for the second Gemini EVA 
and instructing engineers in how they could help him.  The AMU contractor gave him 
one method of approaching a target, but he found during the ground simulations that an 
“over the shoulder” technique was easier to learn and required less fuel.52  He also found 
during the KC-135 flights that the restraints he used to position his body outside the 
Gemini spacecraft were insufficient, and this concern resulted in the addition of stirrups.  
Meanwhile, engineers found that the heat of the AMU thrusters might damage his 
pressure suit and added 11 layers of insulation to his suit.53  These developments 
demonstrated why NASA spent money on the construction of a training environment 
that could yield lessons without the risks of actual spaceflight.  Unfortunately, his actual 
EVA also yielded lessons at a much greater expense.   
 By the time Cernan managed to make his EVA, Gemini IX-A had already 
established itself as one of the most failure ridden flights of the program.  On May 17, he 
and Tom Stafford went to the launch pad only to learn that the Atlas rocket carrying their 
Agena Target Vehicle had nosedived into the Atlantic Ocean.  The Convair company 
furnished a backup Atlas that carried an Augmented Target Docking Adapter (ATDA) 
into orbit.  But when Stafford and Cernan made their rendezvous on June 3, they found 
that the shroud had not come loose from this vehicle.  “It looks like an angry alligator 
out here floating around,” Stafford reported, learning the frustrating news that he could 
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not undertake a docking.  The Atlas rocket failure and ATDA shroud failure, combined 
with the tragic deaths of the astronauts originally slated to make the flight, brought 
embarrassment to the space agency.  But the failures of Cernan on his June 5 EVA were 
easily the most glaring from a training standpoint.54                      
 Cernan opened the hatch and climbed outside just as he had done in the KC-135, 
but here the similarity between the training experience and the actual experience ended.  
On the aircraft, he had been able to rest after only brief intervals of weightlessness.  He 
did not have that luxury in space, which proved crucial because maneuvering his body 
proved more difficult than he or his instructors had expected.  “All of our work had been 
built around the fact that in zero g, you would stay there unless you perturb your body 
position with some external force or motion,” he pointed out in the mission debriefing.  
“This is not true.  It was a continuous work load just to stay put in zero g,” because every 
movement of an arm or leg exacted a force that set his body in motion.55  Given that 
simply staying put required him to exert energy, moving his body to the back of the 
spacecraft where the AMU backpack was located made him exhausted.  The flawed 
assumption about how much energy he would need to exert caused Cernan to make his 
bluntest assessment of Gemini IX-A in his 1999 memoir: “More than thirty years later, it 
can be safely said that we didn’t know diddly squat about walking in space.”56 
 When he moved to the spacecraft adapter and prepared the AMU for flight, he  
found that this flawed assumption conspired with other factors that made his work  
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fruitless.  First, the spacecraft did not contain a sufficient number of handholds and 
footholds to secure his body given the small forces that set his body in motion.  Second, 
his stiff suit did not provide him with the flexibility to move as a construction worker 
would on Earth.  Third, he did not have a defogging agent, so his faceplate fogged and 
restricted his visibility.  Knowing he could no longer see well and felt exhausted, he and 
Stafford decided to end the EVA early and Cernan climbed back inside the spacecraft 
without flying the AMU.57  Cernan’s exhaustion taught the Gemini team a critical lesson 
about maneuvering in space, but his training could have imparted that lesson less 
painfully and at lower cost.  Given that White had felt tired after only 20 minutes 
outside, the instructors should have recognized that producing 30 seconds of 
weightlessness at a time aboard a KC-135 would not adequately prepare an astronaut for 
an EVA.  In his memoir, Cernan asked, “Why is floating in space and turning a few dials 
so difficult?  Let me give you a couple of tests.  Connect two garden hoses and turn on 
the water.  Now, using only one hand, try to unscrew them.  Or, hold a bottle of soda or 
beer at arm’s length, and using a single hand, remove the twist-off top.  For extra reality, 
run a mile before you start so you’re nice and tired, do it while wearing two pairs of 
extra-thick gloves and close your eyes to simulate being unable to see.  Stand on your 
head while doing some of these things to resemble tumbling in space.”58  Neither the 30 
seconds of weightlessness at a time aboard the KC-135 or the Air Bearing Facility could  
capture these realities.  But what training method could capture them?       
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 The irony is that despite the large government effort to meet President John F. 
Kennedy’s lunar commitment by decade’s end, the answer emerged from a very small 
and little known company in the private sector.  In 1962, two entrepreneurs named 
Samuel Mattingly and Harry Loats had formed a company called Environmental 
Research Associates (ERA) in a northwest Baltimore suburb called Randallstown, 
Maryland.  The two managed to secure a contract from NASA’s LRC called “The Study 
of the Performance of an Astronaut During Ingress-Egress Maneuvers Through Airlocks 
and Passageways.”  When they built an airlock mockup for this contract, they did not 
have access to a zero-G aircraft and thought that taking it underwater might be a useful 
substitute to approximate maneuvering in weightlessness.  They rented a pool at 
McDonogh School in Randallstown, which enabled them to do this beginning on July 
18, 1964.  Over the next two years, they employed a team of scuba diving enthusiasts to 
go underwater while wearing suits and while being weighed down so that they did not 
rise or fall, instead remaining neutrally buoyant.  Mattingly and Loats made a KC-135 
flight as well and found that this standard method of simulating the weightlessness of 
space was both more expensive and less realistic than their method.59   
 Despite the success of the neutral buoyancy method at the ERA company and a 
few other aerospace firms, not until the aftermath of Gene Cernan’s EVA did an MSC 
employee take an interest in it.  Don Jacobs traveled to Maryland in June 1966 and felt 
sufficiently impressed by an ERA demonstration that he arranged to extend the firm’s 
NASA contract and shipped a Gemini spacecraft mockup to the firm.  In July, Cernan 
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became the first astronaut to make the trip to McDonogh School and undertake an 
underwater EVA simulation.  Mattingly recalled, “Harry (Loats) and I had him up in the 
stands, and we said, ‘First question we’ve got to ask you, how does this compare with 
orbit?’  And he said, ‘It’s at least 75 percent accurate.’  I loved it.”  Cernan then returned 
to Houston and spread the word to fellow astronauts and MSC management: 
maneuvering underwater was the best way to train to position one’s body and experience 
the fatigue of an EVA.  His underwater session gave him confidence that he had not 
“screwed up” in space, as some of his colleagues believed.  His difficulties could instead 
be traced to flawed assumptions about what spacewalking entailed and flawed training 
methods.  ERA divers also simulated the upcoming Gemini X EVA and passed films of 
the sessions to crewmembers John Young and Mike Collins.60  But Collins recalled, 
“Fortunately or unfortunately, John and I simply didn’t have enough time to drop what 
we were doing, with only a month left to go, and chase this red herring underwater.”61  
Future spacewalkers still needed convincing on this new method.        
The program became steadily more ambitious with each flight despite the 
numerous glitches, and Gemini X was no exception.  Young and Collins lifted off on 
July 18 to undertake another Agena rendezvous, but this time under unique 
circumstances that would test their training.  The crew had spent more than 100 hours in 
the GMS preparing to navigate to the Agena using only star sightings rather than data 
from Mission Control.  Collins used a sextant to measure the angle between selected 
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stars and the horizon, and entered the numbers into a computer program called Module 
VI that determined the vehicle’s orbit.  The crew would then have the data they needed 
to maneuver their spacecraft toward the Agena.  Unfortunately, he obtained erroneous 
data due to his difficulty in determining the horizon and operating the sextant.  The flight 
controllers found his data outside the range of acceptable deviation from the  
data collected in Mission Control, and the CapCom told Young and Collins to use the 
Mission Control data to navigate to the Agena.62  But like many of the setbacks in the 
Gemini program, this one carried a lesson learned for training.  Young remembered that 
he and Collins could not simulate this navigation technique “without bombing out a 
computer.  We never really had a real good time line on how long it was going to take us 
to do that.”  Future crews would benefit from a simulator that could more adequately 
support this mission task, which in turn would help them develop a time line that would 
help them avoid the Gemini X crew overload.63  By the time Apollo missions went to the 
Moon, crews had become adept at star navigation. 
 The mission contained still more developments that were instructive from a 
training standpoint.  Young and Collins made three burns to maneuver the Gemini 
toward the Agena, but at just one mile away Young suddenly yelled, “Whoa, whoa, 
whoa, you bum!”  The Gemini spacecraft had fallen off to the side of the target, as 
Young saw when his radar attitude indicator displayed an out-of-plane error of two and a 
half miles.  One of Newton’s laws of motion dictated the progress of Gemini X: an object 
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in motion will stay in motion unless acted upon by an external net force.  Unless Young 
imparted that net force by firing the Gemini’s thrusters, his ship would continue on its 
path swinging around the Agena.  He had no choice but to undertake a whifferdill to 
return to the proper plane, which worried him: “Mike and I had done whifferdills in the 
simulator, and we knew it was going to take a darn good one to get us into the right 
position for our rendezvous.”64  He nonetheless pulled off a whifferdill that placed the 
vehicle back in the proper plane.  Though he felt disappointed about consuming more 
fuel than any other Gemini Commander, his work performing this maneuver in the GMS 
had demonstrated the flexibility of a trained astronaut in correcting a mistake.  Young 
and Collins docked with the Agena, then undertook a first by firing the Agena’s engine 
while attached to enter a higher orbit.  In this way, they reached the old Agena with 
which Gemini VIII had docked.  The crew had achieved a dual rendezvous, and Young 
performed stationkeeping while at the old Agena so that Collins could maneuver to it 
and retrieve an experiment package during an EVA.65                             
 Unfortunately, the EVA offered more evidence that the current method of 
training spacewalkers needed improvement.  Collins pushed off the Gemini spacecraft 
and propelled himself eight feet to the Agena, grabbing hold of the docking adapter.  The 
time he spent strengthening his hands in training after hearing of the difficulty Cernan 
had experienced helped him to hold on.  But as he later wrote, he could not hold on for 
long: “I tried to stop, but the momentum in my lower body caused me to keep going and 
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peeled my hands right off the Agena!  First my right and then my left slipped free, and 
then I was turning lazy cartwheels somewhere above and to the left of everything that 
matters.”  He looped back on his umbilical toward the Gemini and pushed off it again, 
but this time his left boot snagged on the spacecraft and sent him into a spin.  He just 
barely managed to stick out his left arm and grab the Agena.  Collins did manage to 
retrieve the experiment package, but due to his difficulty and time constraints he had to 
abandon his plan to install a replacement package and return to the Gemini.  Once again, 
a well-conditioned astronaut had encountered trouble with seemingly simple tasks.  If 
Collins had this much difficulty retrieving a package from a vehicle a few feet away, 
how could future astronauts fix satellites or assemble a space station?  The root of his 
difficulty was body positioning, and this meant his successors needed a better training 
method than the KC-135 to prepare for this.  Looking back several decades later, Collins 
was as blunt as Cernan about the training and execution of EVAs: “We were just 
stupid…We had not really thought it through.”66 
 Only a few days after Young and Collins splashed down, the MSC director 
weighed in on the idea of underwater EVA training.  “I have given a great deal of 
thought recently to the subject of how best to simulate and train for extravehicular 
activities and have reached the conclusion that both zero g trajectories in the KC-135 
and underwater simulations should have a definite place in our training programs,” Bob 
Gilruth wrote to Deke Slayton on July 25.  He also explained that of these two methods, 
underwater training was “far better for the study of positioning, hand holds, and the 
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initiation and termination of all movements between points.”  In other words, he 
believed this would provide the means for future spacewalkers to avoid the problems 
that had most hampered Gene Cernan and Mike Collins.  Gilruth’s decision confirmed 
that a tiny company in Maryland had unleashed an idea that would substantially affect 
the national effort to send astronauts to space.  But two problems still needed to be 
overcome before astronauts could routinely train for EVAs underwater.  First, instructors 
needed to set aside time for them to take part in this.  In the fevered push to complete the 
Gemini program by the end of 1966 and therefore stay on track to meeting Kennedy’s 
end-of-the-decade lunar deadline, the instructors decided the Gemini XI crew of Pete 
Conrad and Dick Gordon did not have time to travel to Maryland prior to their flight.67  
Second, the astronaut corps and MSC management remained skeptical of the idea.  Some 
astronauts considered the idea of training underwater beneath their dignity.  Gilruth 
reported “mixed emotions” in Houston, because “some of our people didn’t think the 
neutral buoyancy work was any good.”68         
 But only two Gemini flights remained and the case against the current EVA 
training method was getting harder and harder to ignore.  Pete Conrad and Dick Gordon 
made a highly successful Gemini XI flight in September, with just one exception.  The 
effort to maneuver to an Agena using onboard calculations worked this time and Conrad 
docked with the target vehicle having minimized his fuel usage.  He also pulled this off 
just 85 minutes after liftoff, becoming the first astronaut to make a rendezvous and 
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docking on his first orbit of Earth.  The Agena engine later fired, taking the crew to a 
record altitude of 850 miles.69  But Gordon became the third consecutive astronaut to 
overexert himself during an EVA.  His objective was to tether the Gemini to the Agena, 
which required him to push off his spacecraft, remove the 30-meter tether and its clamp 
from a pouch, place the tether and clamp over the Agena docking bar, and then lock the 
clamp in place.  He would need to stabilize his body, the problem that had bedeviled 
Gene Cernan and Mike Collins, to do this.  In the KC-135, he stabilized himself by 
wedging his legs between an Agena model, which left both his hands free to deal with 
the tether.70  But as with his two predecessors, training in 30 second intervals of 
weightlessness gave him a false sense of the actual experience.  He could not stay 
stabilized by wedging his legs and had no choice but to hold onto the Agena with one 
hand while using his other hand to deal with the tether.  He did connect the tether, but 
not before his body overheated and perspiration stung his eyes, making it difficult for 
him for see.  Conrad decided to call off the rest of the EVA, canceling a planned test of a 
power tool at the back of the Gemini, and Gordon climbed back inside his spacecraft 
after just 33 minutes outside instead of the expected 107.  “When I go back now and 
listen to the tapes, it scares me just to hear them!” Gordon exclaimed decades later.71 
 Never before had astronauts struggled so mightily with a task on three 
consecutive missions, but training for that task entered a new era in the fall of 1966.  
Gemini XII’s Buzz Aldrin was the last hope to prove astronauts could perform useful 
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work without becoming exhausted before Gemini ended.  He continued to undertake 
KC-135 training to experience weightlessness.  But on September 12, he arrived at the 
McDonogh pool to undertake what Gene Cernan, Mike Collins, and Dick Gordon had 
not before their flights: underwater EVA simulations.  In the pool, he did not have to 
worry about performing his work in 30 second intervals.  He could practice positioning 
his body slowly and deliberately, which he knew would prove crucial in space in order 
to avoid the exhaustion that had plagued his predecessors.  His input on how long it took 
him to perform work underwater guided mission planners in estimating how long it 
would take him to perform work in space.  This method proved much more accurate than 
basing the estimate on KC-135 training.72  His time underwater also forced him to 
confront the same problem that had confronted his predecessors in space: lack of 
traction.  Fellow astronaut Scott Carpenter, an undersea researcher, explained, “Without 
weight, you don’t have traction.  And traction is important wherever you are if you want 
to do work: you have got to be stabilized.  And the buoyancy of the water or the absence 
of gravity in spaceflight makes that very difficult because you have no traction.”73  The 
time that Aldrin spent in neutral buoyancy therefore helped him understand his need for 
hand and foot restraints that would give him traction, both while in the pool and while in 
space.  His input, along with that of his predecessors, resulted in the number of restraints 
increasing from just nine on Gemini IX-A to 44 on Gemini XII.74                          
Gemini instructors made still greater efforts at ensuring that the McDonogh pool  
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represented a high fidelity training environment as the Gemini XII mission neared.  Over 
the four weeks prior to launch, Aldrin participated in five sessions.  During the last two, 
Gemini XII Commander Jim Lovell spoke to him via radio at the side of the pool as the 
two followed the flight plan established for their mission.  Each step on the checklist 
Aldrin performed in the pool matched what he would perform on an actual EVA.  
Doctors also used these last sessions to collect biomedical data on Aldrin, an important 
task given the exhaustion and overheating that his three predecessors had faced.  By the 
time he last stepped out of the pool on October 29, doctors had monitored his energy 
expenditure by measuring his heartbeat, breathing rate, and body temperature.  He 
learned to control his work rate so that his heartbeat would not exceed 120 beats per 
minute, resting when necessary, and mission planners gave him a timeline for the 
mission consistent with this work rate he practiced in the pool.  Instructors even filmed 
Aldrin underwater, so future spacewalkers would have a visual record of his EVA 
training.75           
Lovell and Aldrin made the most successful flight of the Gemini program when 
they placed their training to the test in November.  The first way that training enhanced 
their flight took place during their Agena rendezvous on November 11, the first day of 
the flight.  Slightly over an hour after launch, Aldrin reported that the Gemini radar had 
achieved a lock on the Agena.  But the radar reception grew so poor that the computer 
refused to accept any further readings for the last roughly 75 miles of the approach.  The 
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loss of radar meant the crew needed some other way to determine the range rate toward 
their target; in other words, how fast they were traveling relative to it.  But rather than 
derail the mission, this incident only provided a lesson that a well-trained crew could 
serve as a backup for malfunctioning equipment.  By chance, “Dr. Rendezvous” was 
sitting in the right-hand seat.  Not only did Aldrin know what to do in this situation, he 
had helped to develop the chart for use in making a manual rendezvous.  He made a 
sextant reading to determine the angle between the Gemini and Agena, consulted a chart, 
and fed the numbers that would take his ship to the target into the onboard computer.  
Lovell thrusted the Gemini based on these numbers and made an excellent rendezvous 
and docking, using only about 280 pounds of fuel.  Only seventeen months earlier, 
McDivitt had made a futile rendezvous attempt after undergoing inadequate training.  
One of the best indications of the value of Gemini training came with the effort of Lovell 
and Aldrin to prepare for an equipment failure and then successfully place their 
preparation to the ultimate test.76                            
The success of Aldrin’s three EVAs also reflected the greater attention to detail 
in training.  The original plan for this last mission had been for Aldrin to test the AMU 
backpack that Cernan had not managed to test during Gemini IX-A.  But mission 
planners nixed this idea so that he could focus on performing simple tasks without 
overexerting himself.  During his first and third excursions, he stood outside his hatch to 
set up an ultraviolet astronomical camera, fix a handrail, retrieve a micrometeorite 
collection package, and take photos.  But during his second excursion, he performed his 
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most important work by climbing outside the Gemini and moving hand over hand to the 
Agena.  To the relief of the medical specialists who monitored him, Aldrin did not feel 
exhausted as he placed his feet in restraints and went to work torquing bolts and cutting 
metal.  When he climbed back inside two hours later, he knew from his favorable 
physical condition that he had mastered EVA to a greater extent than Gene Cernan, Mike 
Collins, and Dick Gordon.  What accounted for this?  The knowledge that came from his 
three predecessors and the addition of hand and foot restraints helped Aldrin, but 
instructors also took careful note of the value of neutral buoyancy training when viewed 
in light of his actual EVAs.77  Only then could instructors feel confident about the value 
of this new method. 
 The evidence clearly favored the value of neutral buoyancy.  The McDonogh 
pool was not a perfect analog for space, because in the pool Aldrin maneuvered with 
additional weights he did not have in space and in water that created a drag on his 
motions he would not feel in space.  But the dynamics of his motions in space “were 
nearly the same in all cases” as in the pool, according to a report issued after the 
program ended.  As long as future astronauts moved as slowly and deliberately as Aldrin 
did, the hydrodynamic effects of the water would not hamper the fidelity of the pool as a 
training device.  The energy he expended while in the pool also closely matched what he 
expended in space.  This indicated that future astronauts could prepare to perform 
assigned tasks without exhausting themselves, and feel confident that this preparation 
would help them while on real EVAs.  He also managed to perform his tasks in space on 
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a timeline that matched the timeline he had used in the pool.  This provided a sense of 
relief for future mission planners, who could feel confident about astronauts’ abilities to 
avoid falling behind on busy missions.  Finally, he found that working with a full-scale 
mockup of the Gemini spacecraft and real EVA hardware while in the pool helped him 
prepare for the real experience.  This indicated that future instructors should place 
duplicates of actual flight hardware in a pool to build astronauts’ confidence that they 
could work with the equipment in space.  Aldrin confirmed these lessons learned when 
he made an underwater simulation on December 2, about two weeks after his 
splashdown with Lovell.78             
 A half century after Lovell and Aldrin brought the Gemini program to a close, 
training of Gemini crews offers valuable lessons in understanding the history of human 
spaceflight.  The training process for this program proved that astronauts could acquire 
the necessary skills to make groundbreaking flights on a regular basis.  Unlike the team 
at Langley at the outset of the Mercury program, the team at MSC attempted to meet a 
deadline to send men to the Moon.  The Gemini program thus sent 16 different 
astronauts (Tom Stafford, John Young, Pete Conrad, and Jim Lovell each flew twice) on 
10 missions that took place over just 20 months.  Could these men undergo sufficient 
training in such a fast-paced program?  The results from each flight indicated that they 
could.  Not every training related decision worked out for the best, as this chapter has 
indicated, but the Gemini mission reports consistently praised the level of training each 
crew received and the actions crews took in flight to help achieve Gemini objectives.  
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The lesson that crews could meet tight schedules and turn in quality performances boded 
well for the Apollo lunar voyages.  The Gemini program also further solidified the idea 
of procedures simulators as the most vital tool in astronaut training.  Each crewmember 
spent an average of 348 hours training in simulators, whether in the DCPS, the TDS, the 
rendezvous simulator at McDonnell, or the GMS.  This was an increase from the average 
of 190 hours for the Mercury astronauts.  The Gemini astronauts also spent a greater 
portion of their total training time in simulators (39 percent) than their Mercury 
predecessors (33 percent).  Other methods of training proved crucial, such as checkouts 
of the actual spacecraft, EVA preparation, and physical conditioning for long-duration 
crews, but simulators remained paramount.79             
 The rationale for human spaceflight remained strong with the end of Gemini, 
because training empowered astronauts to take actions that automated spacecraft would 
not have been able to perform.  Some of these actions fell into the category of 
responding to malfunctions.  An automated spacecraft would not have been able to take 
the corrective action that Neil Armstrong took aboard Gemini VIII or Jim Lovell and 
Buzz Aldrin took aboard Gemini XII.  As this chapter has indicated, every flight 
contained a surprise of some sort that tested the resolve of the crews, but through their 
training the astronauts still fulfilled every task asked of them by the end of the program.  
Some fell into the category of performing tasks on EVAs.  When Mike Collins retrieved 
a micrometeorite package during Gemini X, for instance, he had proven the physical 
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flexibility of an astronaut in performing tasks an automated spacecraft could not.  Some 
fell into the category of experiment operations.  The crews made real-time adjustments 
on experiments, especially during the last missions, to achieve the greatest possible 
return from them.  This would not have been possible aboard an automated vehicle.80  
Future astronauts would continue to carry out each of these actions through the ISS era.  
But for now, the Moon beckoned.  Astronauts had proven they could rendezvous and 
dock with other spacecraft, perform work outside a spacecraft, and stay in space for up 
to two weeks at a time.  The time had come to train them for the first voyages to another 
celestial body. 
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CHAPTER VI 
APOLLO: “IT’S LIKE YOUR CAR AFTER AWHILE” 
 
 Abe Silverstein found a name to capture the grandeur of his nation’s quest to 
reach the Moon.  When he flipped through a book on mythology in the summer of 1960, 
no person had yet flown in space but NASA officials had conceived a human spaceflight 
program to follow Mercury.  Their early plans called for a spacecraft that would carry 
three astronauts on Earth orbital missions and, by 1970, on circumlunar missions.  
Engineers were already at work on the Saturn I rocket, the first in a family of rockets 
they expected to carry these astronauts into space (the Saturn IB would launch crews on 
earth orbital missions and the Saturn V would propel crews to the Moon).  “I thought the 
image of the god Apollo riding his chariot across the Sun gave the best representation of 
the grand scale of the proposed program,” Silverstein mused, and his name stuck.1  After 
President John F. Kennedy breathed life into Apollo and gave it an end of the decade 
deadline to send men to the lunar surface, the program moved more quickly.  By 1962, 
NASA had selected a contractor for a Command/Service Module that would take three 
astronauts into lunar orbit (North American Aviation in California) and a Lunar Module 
that would take two of them to the surface (the Grumman Aerospace Corporation in 
New York).2  But what would the crew need to accomplish in their Apollo chariots?  The 
definition of tasks that began in the early 1960s determined whether astronauts would be  
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mere passengers or vital components on the way to the Moon.  This, in turn, would  
determine their training.          
In 1961, a NASA Statement of Work to prospective spacecraft contractors 
detailed the layout of the cockpit and the tasks of the three who would ride in it.  At this 
point, the three were known as the Pilot, Co-Pilot, and System Manager.  The Pilot 
would sit in the most prestigious left-hand seat, where he would determine the readiness 
of the spacecraft for launch, control the attitude and position of the spacecraft when 
necessary, assume responsibility for all decisions concerning the mission and crew 
safety, and direct all scientific studies on the lunar surface.  He would accordingly have a 
hand controller by his side and would see vital displays such as an “8-ball” attitude 
indicator and computer readouts on his side of the instrument panel.  In the center seat, 
the Co-Pilot would have the unique responsibility of navigating the spacecraft.  In the 
right-hand seat, the System Manager would have the responsibility of monitoring and 
repairing systems while also conducting scientific observations.  He would accordingly 
see displays on his side of the instrument panel that allowed him to quickly ascertain the 
health of the vehicle.3 
NASA Administrator Jim Webb announced in 1962 that Apollo crews would 
voyage to the Moon and back by way of the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous method, which 
complicated the program and the tasks astronauts would have to perform.  This method 
entailed crews traveling to lunar orbit aboard a Command/Service Module, before two of 
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the three astronauts transferred into a smaller Lunar Module to descend to the surface.  
The ascent stage of the LM would then lift off from the Moon, reunite with the CSM and 
the one astronaut left behind, and the three men would return to Earth in the mothership.4  
The Pilot, Co-Pilot, and System Manager thus became known as Commander, Command 
Module Pilot (CMP), and Lunar Module Pilot (LMP), respectively.  The Commander 
and LMP would have the added burden of operating a new vehicle and landing it on an 
alien world.  The CMP would have to pilot his spacecraft and monitor its systems alone 
until they returned.  Yet the other responsibilities outlined in 1961 stayed consistent.     
The assigned responsibilities and layout of the CM and LM confirmed that the 
astronauts would be much more than passengers, and that their training would need to 
reflect this.  The CM alone contained over 400 switches and displays, a drastic increase 
from Mercury and Gemini, and the astronauts would have to learn them in case of a 
malfunction that required their intervention.5  But even in a completely nominal mission, 
the crew would take several actions demonstrating the mental and physical flexibility of 
highly trained human operators.  Shortly after the Saturn V third stage fired to take the 
crew out of Earth orbit, the CMP would have to take the hand controller and dock his 
ship with the LM nestled inside the third stage.  After a journey to the Moon filled with 
star sightings for navigation purposes, midcourse correction maneuvers, and 
housekeeping chores, the crew would enter lunar orbit.  The Commander would then 
take the LM hand controller to guide the lander to a safe region on the lunar surface, 
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looking out the window while the LMP closely monitored systems.  After these two 
explored on the surface and lifted off in their ascent stage, the CMP would have to make 
a rendezvous with it.  Finally, the Commander needed to be ready to take the Command 
Module through a manual reentry back into Earth’s atmosphere.  This required placing 
the vehicle in the right attitude, lighting an engine at just the right time to slow the 
vehicle, jettisoning the Service Module, and then pointing the Command Module in just 
the right direction so its heat shield could protect it.6  The assignment of tasks once again 
reflected the organizational determination that astronauts had skills to offer that could set 
their missions apart from purely automated missions.  
The assignment of tasks also carried implications for the selection of crews.  As 
the Director of Flight Crew Operations at MSC (he had been promoted to this job in 
November 1963 and replaced as Chief of the Astronaut Office by Alan Shepard), Deke 
Slayton needed to find the right three men to send on each mission.  The astronauts most 
coveted the Commander’s seat, but Slayton only gave it to those with past spaceflight 
experience.  He also valued experience for the CMPs, especially in rendezvous.  Slayton 
valued this job so much that he established a pattern of grooming CMPs as future 
Commanders.  He proved most willing to break in astronauts with no experience by 
giving them the LMP position.  Although the LMPs would gain the prestige of landing 
and walking on the Moon, they would not have the flying or navigation responsibilities 
that their two crewmates would have.7  
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But most importantly from a training standpoint, the assignment of tasks carried 
 implications for the Apollo spacecraft simulators.  NASA had awarded North American 
Aviation with the contract for the CSM on November 7, 1961, and once again the 
responsibility for manufacturing simulators fell to Link.8  But the demands of simulation 
drastically increased from Mercury and Gemini to Apollo, because NASA officials 
called on Link and a few other companies to produce several types of simulators for the 
Moon program.  These included part-task trainers that would build the astronauts’ 
confidence in handling individual maneuvers from launch through reentry.  These 
became available as early as 1963, six years before the first lunar landing.  When crews 
had gained experience on these specialized devices, they would then tackle entire 
missions in a Command Module Simulator (CMS) and Lunar Module Simulator (LMS).9         
The first and most dangerous step in a spaceflight was launch, and each Apollo 
crew trained for the journey into space aboard a holdover from the Gemini era: the 
DCPS.  Three astronauts climbed inside this gondola and sat in front of a replica 
instrument panel containing all the displays they would see during a real Saturn V 
launch.  The gondola vibrated and pitched just as it would during a real launch.  The 
gondola also went through its motions in front of a spherical dome, so that astronauts 
could see an image of the Earth and a star field on a screen inside the dome.10  The 
DCPS sessions benefited the crews by giving them experience in feeling the motions and 
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seeing the displays first of a normal launch, and then in experiencing the cues that called 
for them to abort a launch.  If the Commander saw two cues indicating the Saturn V’s 
performance had left acceptable bounds, he would have to fire the Launch Escape 
System tower.  This tower contained a motor that would whisk the crew away from an 
exploding Saturn V during a real mission.  Though the spacecraft did have an 
Emergency Detection System that could automatically activate the tower in an extremely 
time critical situation, engineers still valued the ability of astronauts in making a manual 
abort.  The combination of instrument panel displays, window views, and physiological 
cues would give trained astronauts a chance to respond to what computer simulations 
had shown would be the most probable rocket failures.  If the Saturn inertial platform 
failed, Apollo astronauts could even do something their Mercury and Gemini 
predecessors could not: control the rocket manually.11  In addition to the DCPS, the men 
underwent sessions on a centrifuge in Houston to expose them to the G forces of a 
normal launch and launch abort.12      
The demands on crewmembers would vary as launches progressed.  The five 
engines of the first stage would fire for about two minutes and forty seconds, taking the 
Saturn from the launch pad to an altitude of 42 miles.  Crews needed to be prepared for 
the most time critical malfunctions during this earliest part of their flight, because 
aerodynamic loading was highest and therefore structural breakup was most likely 
during this time.  The Commander would only have a small window in which to 
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manually escape from 2,000 tons of TNT.  But after this, the vehicle left the atmosphere 
and breakup became less likely.  The window of time to deal with malfunctions would 
thus likely increase as the second stage propelled the crew to 109 miles and  
the third stage to an Earth parking orbit of about 118 miles.  If a malfunction required an 
abort after leaving the atmosphere, the crew would need to prepare for an abrupt 
separation of their spacecraft from the rocket, an orientation to entry attitude, and 
splashdown in the Atlantic Ocean.  If an emergency arose in the last two minutes of the 
launch, the crew would also need to prepare for separation but could call upon their 
spacecraft’s propulsion system to propel them to orbit.13  Apollo astronauts would need 
to adapt to these changing circumstances as the seconds passed, without feeling 
distracted by the noise and vibrations in the cabin, and felt the DCPS effectively gave 
them experience in doing this.  Crews also trained for reentry into Earth’s atmosphere 
aboard this vehicle, when engineers had configured it to replicate the motion and sights 
of the return home.  By the time Gene Cernan used this simulator in training for the last 
lunar mission, Apollo 17, he remembered, “I felt very comfortable in flying the aborts as 
well as manual takeovers on the booster.”14   
The astronauts also made use of part-task trainers to prepare for a feat no human 
had accomplished: the landing on the Moon.  After launch and orbital insertion, the plan 
called for the Saturn third stage to ignite and send a crew on a three-day journey to lunar 
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orbit.  But how could a Commander feel confident about making the first piloted landing 
on another world?  NASA researchers in California and Virginia each sought to give 
astronauts useful analogs for flight in a vacuum featuring one-sixth gravity.  The 
assistant director of research at the NASA Flight Research Center in California, Hubert 
“Jake” Drake, organized a group to study this issue in 1960.  The group even included 
Neil Armstrong, then a NASA test pilot, almost a decade before he made the first lunar 
landing.  This group recommended three methods of simulating flight in this novel 
environment and astronauts utilized each of them, with varying success.15    
The group initially felt a helicopter would be the most useful analog.  If an 
astronaut wanted to practice flying the LM horizontally in order to avoid a rough landing 
site, he could take a helicopter and pitch the vehicle across a landscape just as he would 
with the LM.  He could then hover above a landscape and make a vertical landing, just 
as he would with the LM.  Astronauts from the “Original Seven” and “Next Nine” 
therefore made helicopter flights as part of their training beginning in 1963.  These 
astronauts were experienced only in flying fixed-wing aircraft, so instructors gave them 
several hours of classroom work to introduce them to the aerodynamics of helicopters.  
There followed several hours of helicopter flight time in Pensacola, Florida with two 
astronauts and an instructor paired together.  Yet there were two problems with the idea 
of using helicopters as an aid for LM flight.  First, a helicopter could not simulate flight 
in one-sixth gravity unless engineers could exaggerate the vehicle’s pitch and yaw 
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angles by a factor of six.  Second, helicopter controls did not match the LM controls.16  
John Young recalled that he and his colleagues continued flying helicopters through the 
lunar landings but “only to understand the trajectories, visual fields, and rates of motion 
of the LM.  In a helicopter, you could pretty precisely duplicate the flight paths we 
wanted to make in the lunar descent, but the controls you used to do that were so 
different from the controls of the LM that it almost worked against your LM training to 
be flying helicopters at the same time.”17 
The Drake group also proposed tethering a simulated lunar lander to a gantry, so 
that it could maneuver beneath it to a landing on a cratered surface just as the LM would.  
This idea also came to fruition, but only due to the independent work of two NASA 
researchers at Langley: Donald Hewes and Hewitt Phillips.  These two conceived the 
idea in 1962.  Three years later, Langley engineers completed a 240-foot high, 400-foot 
long gantry called the Lunar Landing Research Facility (LLRF).  The engineers attached 
the lander to the gantry with two long cables, which provided the lander with a lifting 
force equal to five-sixths of its weight.  This meant that the vehicle’s thrusters had to lift 
the remaining one-sixth of its weight, simulating flight in lunar gravity.  The plan called 
for the cables to propel the vehicle downward at a speed of 35 miles per hour and for the 
pilot inside to decelerate until he had come to a safe landing.  A black screen and 
floodlights at the far end of the gantry simulated the lunar sky, while the dirt simulated 
the lunar surface.  24 Apollo astronauts made landings at the LLRF from 1965 to 1969.  
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This method of simulation did have some advantages over helicopter flight.  Since the 
vehicle was suspended to a tether, the risk of a crash was low.  The simulation of the 
lunar lighting and surface also proved highly realistic.  Neil Armstrong felt so impressed 
that he said the shadows on the Sea of Tranquility dust looked just like the shadows at 
the LLRF.  But the astronauts knew that a free-flying vehicle could simulate a landing 
on the Moon far more precisely than this tethered device.  Could such a free flyer be 
designed and built?18 
The Drake group answered yes, and their foresight eventually produced the most 
effective training aid for Apollo lunar landings.  Drake and Gene Matranga were both 
engineers who had worked on some of the most innovative flying machines, such as the 
X-15.  Their experience guided them in conceiving a Lunar Landing Research Vehicle 
(LLRV) in 1961.  Their vehicle featured a jet engine which would lift it to a desired 
altitude, at which point the pilot would throttle back the engine to support five-sixths of 
the vehicle’s weight.  The pilot would then make a landing by firing two hydrogen 
peroxide rockets to lift the remaining one-sixth of its weight.  This idea promised a 
remarkable fidelity to a real Moon landing.  Not only would the pilot simulate lunar 
gravity by throttling back the jet engine, he would throttle the rockets as he descended to 
move horizontally and slow the rate of descent.  As he moved to find a safe landing spot 
and slowed to a gentle vertical landing, while remaining aware of the fuel he had 
available, he would be taking the same actions as he would on the Moon.  NASA 
awarded a contract to build LLRVs to Bell Aerosystems of Buffalo, New York.  Flying 
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the machine posed a major risk, because it featured a fly-by-wire control system that 
could imperil the pilot if the analog computers onboard malfunctioned.  In case the 
computers, rockets, or jet engine suffered a failure, the vehicle had no wings and thus 
could not glide to a landing.  Several test pilots did make 200 research flights from 1964 
to 1966 without any serious accidents.  Still, NASA officials did not want astronauts 
flying an LLRV due to the risk.19 
 Yet the thinking changed on this matter because, as Neil Armstrong recalled, 
“Having no flying machines to simulate lunar control characteristics was frustrating the 
Astronaut Office.”  NASA awarded Bell a contract in 1966 to build an advanced version 
of the LLRV on which astronauts could train, called the Lunar Landing Training 
Vehicle.  The last major design decision on the actual LM had been made the previous 
year, so Bell contractors could build the LLTV with a high degree of fidelity to it.20  The 
control panel, visual displays, control stick, and even the lightweight components 
matched the real vehicle that would touch down on the Moon.  The LLTV also featured 
one other component that was not part of the real LM, but which would save lives in the 
years to come: a rocket ejection seat built by Weber Aircraft.  When three LLTVs 
arrived at Houston from the Bell factory in December 1967, all that remained was to 
devise a training program for the astronauts who would fly it.21 
 The training program reflected the risk associated with the “flying bedstead” and  
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the high degree of skill required to fly it.  By the beginning of 1968, Deke Slayton had a 
good idea of which astronauts he wanted to command lunar missions.  He assigned these 
men to again receive instruction in helicopter flying over three weeks, to make tethered 
landings at the LLRF in Virginia for one week, and then to log fifteen hours in a ground 
simulator.  Even then, the men received two months of instruction in LLTV flight from 
MSC test pilots Joe Algranti and Bud Ream before flying solo.  For eleven astronauts 
(Frank Borman, Bill Anders, Neil Armstrong, Pete Conrad, Jim Lovell, Alan Shepard, 
David Scott, John Young, Fred Haise, Gene Cernan, and Dick Gordon), this preparation 
culminated in solo LLTV flights at Houston’s Ellington Field that usually totaled 
twenty-two for Apollo Commanders and eleven for backup Commanders.22   
The LLTV benefited the Apollo program in two ways: it helped convince the 
entire Apollo team that a manual landing was feasible and gave the astronauts confidence 
for a landing on a literally alien landscape.  Would the Moon landings have to be 
completely automated?  The LLTV flights strongly suggested that the answer was no, 
because the astronauts took control themselves from altitudes of several hundred feet 
and maneuvered the vehicle to avoid dangerous obstructions.  An automated Moon 
landing might take the lander right into these obstructions, but trained humans could 
avoid them.  When those eleven men flew the vehicle, they gripped the hand controller 
and felt for themselves the large pitch and roll angles they needed to give the vehicle to 
maneuver.  They also knew when they were doing so that their lives depended on their 
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ability to make a safe landing, unlike in any ground simulator.23  Thus the eleven were 
unanimous in their praise of the vehicle as a tool for building confidence.  Among the 
many compliments they offered, David Scott probably made the most effusive 
statement: “It gave me confidence that I knew what I was doing on the Moon.  I didn’t 
have to think about things.  I didn’t have to consciously program myself to do things.  I 
was automatic.”24  In an environment as unforgiving as the Moon, on the first ever 
piloted attempts to land there, the men needed their flying tasks to feel as close to second 
nature as possible. 
But the irony was that an astronaut came closer to death flying the LLTV than 
while flying the actual LM nearly a quarter million miles from home.  Neil Armstrong 
took the vehicle to a height of several hundred feet on May 6, 1968, with the goal of 
making a landing before his twelve minutes of fuel ran out.  When he was less than 100 
feet above the ground at Ellington, he felt the ship turn into a thirty degree bank and lost 
control.  Unbeknownst to him, propellant was leaking out of the vehicle.  The propellant 
tanks lost helium pressure, which caused the rockets to shut down and meant Armstrong 
had no way to control the ship.  The only alternative left was to activate the ejection seat.  
When he did so, the rocket propelled him high enough (from about 50 feet to several 
hundred feet) that his parachute had time to open and let him drift to a landing in a patch 
of weeds.  By that time, the LLTV had already crashed and burst into flames.  When 
Chris Kraft saw the film of the incident, he estimated that Armstrong would have died if  
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he had waited two-fifths of a second longer to activate the ejection seat.25   
Thankfully, the first responders to the accident had procedures to follow that  
were written for such an emergency.  After undergoing training and drilling once a 
month, the responders were prepared to travel to Ellington in three vehicles.  A crash 
truck carried four men dressed in heat resistant protective clothing, and contained a set 
of nozzles that could discharge the truck’s 1,100 gallon water capacity to fight fires.  An 
ambulance carried a driver and a flight surgeon, and was equipped with a resuscitator 
and a stretcher.  Finally, a station wagon carried four more men and was equipped with a 
fire extinguisher, a first aid kit, and a de-arming tool for the ejection seat.  The crash 
truck traveled to the LLTV on this day, while the ambulance and station wagon went to 
assist Armstrong.26  Armstrong walked away from the weed patch with no injury more 
serious than a bitten tongue and spent the rest of the day in his office.27  Yet the creation 
of the emergency procedures and frequent drilling reflected the understanding that the 
LLTV was an experimental vehicle that, unlike most forms of astronaut training, could 
take lives.  A fraction of a second could have resulted in a different person taking the 
first steps on the Moon. 
 Yet another crash later that year cast the decision to continue flying the LLTV 
into serious doubt.  On December 8, 1968, test pilot Joe Algranti had to eject and land by 
parachute after a malfunction in the control system.  An accident investigation board 
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issued a report calling for design and management changes, but also calling for the 
program to continue.  Bob Gilruth and Chris Kraft wanted to stop before an astronaut 
was killed in the LLTV.  Yet in 1969, Armstrong was again flying the LLTV as the 
Apollo 11 Commander.  When Kraft exclaimed in his office, “It’s dangerous, damn it!” 
Armstrong coolly responded, “I know you’re worried, but I have to support it.  It’s just 
darned good training.”  If he had felt the trainer lacked value, he would have acceded to 
the wishes of Gilruth and Kraft.  But he successfully urged that flights continue.  One 
more crash was still ahead, as test pilot Stuart Present had to eject after an electrical 
system failure on January 29, 1971.  The loss of three vehicles, each of which cost $1.8 
million, caused dismay at MSC.  But any fair assessment of the LLTV must also 
mention that the vehicle landed safely hundreds of times.  The ratio of those successful 
flights to the three crashes was not out of the ordinary for an experimental aircraft.  
Since all three pilots had training in reacting to emergencies, the program also did not 
kill anyone.  Above all else, all six men who manually piloted a LM the last few hundred 
feet to the Moon felt a greater degree of comfort after flying the trainer.  Gene Cernan 
became the last to fly it on November 13, 1972, in advance of Apollo 17.28  
 The astronauts required still more part-task trainers for rendezvous and docking.  
Engineer John Houbolt had weathered tremendous criticism of his idea to send humans 
to the Moon via a lunar orbit rendezvous mission profile, due to the risk in trusting one 
spacecraft to find and link up with another while nearly a quarter million miles away 
from home.  The Gemini program proved that crews could maneuver to another vehicle 
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in Earth orbit.  This experience guided the Apollo team in forming requirements for the 
new program: the active vehicle should fly 15 miles below the target, use a transfer 
angle of 130 degrees to catch up with the target, and make the rendezvous with the sun 
behind it.  Rendezvous in lunar orbit did pose new challenges, however.  Crews would 
have to cope with mascons, meaning regions of the Moon’s crust that contained large 
gravitational anomalies and could alter a spacecraft’s flight path.  Crews would also 
have to fly behind the far side of the Moon for half of each orbit, when they would be 
out of contact with Mission Control.  Above all else, the two crewmembers in the LM 
would know that their vehicle could not return to Earth, because it did not have a heat 
shield.  Their only ticket home was to maneuver to the CSM.  Although the radars and 
computers in the two spacecraft would carry the greatest burden in making the meeting 
possible, what role could the crew play and how could they train for it?29 
 The two astronauts in the LM would have to monitor computer data, solve 
malfunctions, and manually brake their ship to make a successful rendezvous.  The plan 
called for the ascent engine to lift them off the Moon and propel them into an orbit 45 
miles high.  The engine would then shut down, but the Commander would use the hand 
controller to pulse the vehicle’s thrusters and refine velocity.  As was the case during 
Gemini, the astronauts would keep their eyes on the computer display during the long 
coast to their target so they would be prepared to intervene.  They might notice the need 
to make an engine burn to place their ship in the proper rendezvous plane, or the need to 
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use a chart to compute their position manually in case of a loss of radar data.  The latter 
had happened during Gemini XII, so the astronauts knew the importance of preparation 
in case their technology failed.  Two hours and forty minutes after entering orbit, the 
thrusters would fire on the lunar backside for the Terminal Phase Initiation maneuver.  
This burn would match the trajectories of the LM and CSM.  Forty-five minutes later, 
the most intense phase of crew participation would begin.  The Commander would have 
to make four burns to manually slow the LM by 30, 20, 10, and 5 feet per second, when 
less than two miles separated him from his target.  After making sure the trajectories and 
speeds of the two vehicles were perfectly matched, he would fly in formation with his 
crewmate in the CSM and take photos.  The astronaut in the mothership would then 
gently thrust forward, at less than a foot per second, until the CSM docking probe 
slipped into the LM drogue.30  Trained astronauts would provide the knowledge and 
flexibility to increase the chances of success, so they would need to train for this part of 
their flight as well. 
 The earliest part-task trainer for Apollo rendezvous came from Langley.  After 
the space agency selected Lunar Orbit Rendezvous as the method by which crews would 
travel to the Moon and back, an expert engineer in guidance and control named Arthur 
Vogeley designed a Rendezvous and Docking Simulator that was ready for use in 1963.  
This facility featured a mockup of an Apollo spacecraft hung from the roof of Langley’s 
West Area aircraft hangar.  Engineers attached the vehicle to a moving crane that moved 
hydraulically along a 210-foot track.  By strapping inside the cockpit and flying the 
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spacecraft along the track, several astronauts gained their first taste of the skills required 
to rendezvous.  With their hand-eye coordination and attention to detail, the men proved 
that Houbolt’s idea was not as outlandish as some NASA officials initially believed.  
“We trained an awful lot of astronauts,” Vogeley explained, “who all appreciated the 
realism of the simulator’s visual scene.  It gave us a lot of satisfaction to show that 
NASA could do that sort of thing in a unique piece of ground equipment that only cost 
about $300,000.  I think we got our money’s worth.”31        
 Another holdover from the Gemini era, the TDS, built Apollo astronauts’ 
confidence for this phase.  Gemini crews had trained for rendezvous by maneuvering 
their simulated ship across a rail assembly toward a simulated Agena.  Engineers 
replaced them for the Apollo era with a simulated LM to serve as the active vehicle and a 
simulated CSM to serve as the target.  When two men stepped inside the LM and began 
their pursuit, they especially benefited from a realistic presentation of the visual 
experience of rendezvous.  The astronauts looked up at the target through an overhead 
window, where they could look through the Crew Optical Alignment Sight.  This device 
contained a pattern of reticles which the Commander needed to make sure were aligned 
with the reticles on the target vehicle.  He needed to shift his attention from this sight to 
the “8-ball” attitude indicator on his instrument panel, all while he placed his hand-eye 
coordination to the test by using the hand controller to guide the LM during these last 
moments of the rendezvous. He saw the ship that would take him home bulge in his 
window, then felt the CSM probe slip into his vehicle’s drogue.  The astronaut standing 
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next to him called out range and range rate figures to assist him.  The simulation room 
was painted black so that while the two went through their tasks, the lighting conditions 
mimicked the space environment.  Since this phase of the flight required a busy 
balancing of tasks within a short time frame, especially for the Commander, the 
astronauts would not have felt confident without sessions on this simulator.  The 
astronauts thus built their confidence through 1.5 hour sessions that featured normal 
sequences as well as malfunctions.  The sights and sounds also heightened the fidelity of 
the training experience to a point that fixed base simulators could not match.32 
Although these part-task trainers prepared crews for the most dynamic phases of 
a mission (launch, lunar landing, rendezvous and docking, and reentry), the primary 
CMS manufactured by Link contractors provided what Mike Collins called “the heart 
and soul” of training.  Riley McCafferty remembered attending the first major mockup 
review of this simulator at Binghamton, New York in 1963, just two years after North 
American won the contract for the actual vehicle.  “As I remember that particular 
review, believe it or not, the consoles at that time were at least 75 percent like they are 
now,” he recalled.  The layout, height, and size of the instrument panel were thus largely 
consistent with the interior of the spacecraft that eventually took astronauts to the Moon.  
McCafferty became project engineer for the simulator in 1965, meaning he and his 
colleagues would inspect the three of them as they were shipped from the Link factory 
and ensure they remained consistent with the design of the real vehicles they were 
supposed to mimic.  Link delivered the first CMS to Houston near the end of that year, 
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then two more to Florida’s Kennedy Space Center (KSC) the following year.  By the 
summer of 1966, McCafferty had assigned a group of engineers to assist him in  
supporting these three simulators for the most complex machine in the history of flight.33   
Frank Hughes, who had just joined NASA as one of those engineers when Link 
made the first delivery to Florida, remembered the excitement of seeing the simulator for 
the first time: “We all walked up and looked at this box, what you call the CMS…That 
day, after a couple of hours, we walked around and talked.  This one guy was my boss, 
his name is John Mitchell.  He walked me around and introduced everybody—he was a 
great guy.  Then he said, ‘Okay, we’re going to have you guys start studying the Apollo 
systems.  Here’s the book.’  They just had one book for all these people, and we’re all in 
one room, one office room.”  After receiving this introduction to his new employer, 
Hughes recalled seeing the simulator powered for the first time in June 1966.  “It was 
just like the whole device, a piece at a time, came alive,” he reflected. With only three 
years remaining before Kennedy’s end-of-the-decade deadline and the first Apollo crew 
scheduled to launch the following year, Hughes and his colleagues learned the more than 
400 switches and displays as rapidly as possible.  “Every switch, you reach up and knew  
where it was, because it’s like your car after awhile,” Hughes said.34 
When Hughes first gazed at the simulator in 1966, he saw a machine that could 
simulate a half-million mile journey to the Moon and back by taking advantage of the 
digital era of computers.  About 175 contractors worked to develop the simulator 
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software, and simulating all the motions and possible malfunctions of the vehicle on a 
round trip to the Moon required them to create 750,000 words of memory in four large 
computers.  No technological development proved more important to astronaut training 
than the digital computer, because these units were the engines driving the most 
important tool in an astronaut’s arsenal.  With this foundation in place, the 200 Link 
contractors assigned to simulator hardware could focus on developing a machine that 
matched the Command Module and could prepare astronauts for a lunar mission.35  How 
could they do this? 
Their most important task was to reproduce controls, because this was how 
astronauts would interact with their spacecraft.  The Link contractors made sure that the 
force required for an astronaut to change the position of a switch was the same as in the 
real spacecraft.  They made sure the hand controller duplicated the genuine article in 
force profiles.  They also programmed a digital computer to accept, or “interpret,” the 
same program as the Guidance and Navigation computer that would be in the real 
spacecraft and respond to astronaut inputs the same way.  When a SimSup instituted a 
malfunction into the spacecraft, the simulator displays would alter just as they would in a 
real emergency.36  For instance, in turning around the CSM and docking it to the LM on 
the first day of a mission, the CMP had to manually activate his ship’s thrusters and 
align it optically with a sight in his ship and a target cross on the LM.  A SimSup could 
fail a thruster, and if the CMP could not work around the problem to achieve a safe 
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docking, the sequence would have to be repeated.  The SimSups could arrange this by 
reloading memory to match the state of computer software at the beginning of the 
docking sequence.37  The Command Module Simulator thus had both high fidelity and 
flexibility, two essential ingredients in giving crews the confidence to fly to the Moon 
and back.  
 The Link contractors also paid close attention to reproducing the aural and visual 
 experience of spaceflight.  Crews could hear the sounds of booster thrust, loss of cabin 
pressure, the firing of pyrotechnic devices, and the firing of thrusters via a loudspeaker 
in the simulator.  SimSups could even manually control the amplitude of the sound with 
a decibel control potentiometer.  Crews could also see simulated images out their 
windows, which accounted for 30 to 40 percent of the total simulator cost.  Since the 
CMPs would need to navigate the spacecraft by recognizing the positions of stars, the 
contractors simulated about 1,000 stars by using small steel balls set into the surface of a 
celestial sphere.  The balls even varied in brightness based on size and coating.  Apollo 
visual simulations of the Sun, Earth, and Moon also advanced in capability beyond those 
of Gemini.  The simulator engineers used arc lights, film, and large mirrors, supplied by 
the Farrand Optical Company, to project images of these bodies.  Astronauts could even 
see their positions, brightness, and size change as the simulator “moved” through space.  
When astronauts trained to rendezvous and dock with other vehicles, a cathode ray tube 
produced an image of a spacecraft out their windows with a position accuracy of plus or 
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minus one degree.38  Motion picture and video game developers had not yet introduced 
computer graphics into their industries, but the need to meet a major national goal  
provided the urgency to create compelling visual images in Apollo simulators. 
 The hardware used in the simulator also matched the real spacecraft to a 
remarkable degree.  In some cases, the Link contractors could not simulate hardware 
such as instrument panel displays and procured real parts from North American.  But in 
most cases, they produced their own parts from a “model shop” in Binghamton.  The 
parts did not require the sophisticated design of real spacecraft parts, so the contractors 
saved money by making parts from initial design sketches.  NASA did furnish some 
simulator parts in Houston as well, such as optical sights, suit hoses, backpacks, and 
stowed items.  This effort to produce realistic hardware enhanced fidelity because 
contractors assigned all 445 items of stowed equipment to a specific location and the 
astronauts could train to stow them.  The couches in the spacecraft provided proper body 
restraint and matched the reach pattern that astronauts would need to manipulate 
switches in the real vehicle.  The crewmembers could also wear fully pressurized suits, 
so they could train to do so while wearing rigid gloves.39 
 But most importantly, the simulator made landing on the Moon a more reachable 
goal because it increased the mental proficiency of astronauts (and flight controllers, in 
integrated simulations).  In the 1990s, a group of researchers estimated that 70 to 80 
percent of accidents in commercial and military aviation were directly related to human 
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error.  In 2007, one researcher estimated that nearly two-thirds of accidents at NASA 
were related to this as well.  The Apollo program did contain accidents, including one 
that took the lives of the Apollo 1 crew during a launch pad test and one that nearly took 
the lives of the Apollo 13 crew en route to the Moon.  But an astronaut never made a life 
threatening error as a result of inadequate training.  How can one account for this, given 
the prevalence of human error in fields like commercial aviation?  The astronauts were 
part of a program that cost about $20 billion, which the entire nation felt motivated to 
achieve to honor a late president’s memory.  The money and time spent in training them, 
and in supplying them with highly trained flight controllers who could communicate 
with them during missions, thus dwarfed other high tech fields.40 
Yet the method of training Apollo astronauts also deserves consideration as a 
reason for the lack of mistakes.  After the CMS entered operation in 1966, the astronauts 
learned Command Module systems through a combination of briefings and simulator 
sessions.  For one hour each, experts instructed them through briefings on the electrical 
system, the environmental system, the communication system, the propulsion system, 
the guidance system, Delta-V maneuvers, and the reentry of the Command Module.  The 
briefings let the astronauts knew what switches to throw or keyboard entries to make 
during a normal mission, but also how to analyze the malfunctions that were so likely 
with the most complex flying machine in history.  For instance, the men had to know 
how to switch to a backup or alternate mode.  The astronauts then went into the CMS 
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and placed their knowledge to the test for three hour sessions at a time.  With this first 
phase of training under their belts, each of them went back to the simulator to train for 
more intricate maneuvers.  These sessions especially tested their problem solving 
abilities.  They needed to know how to rescue the LM during the lunar orbit rendezvous 
by firing the service module engine, for instance.  The CMP even needed to know how 
to operate the spacecraft alone during the transearth flight, if tragedy had left his two 
crewmates unable to return.  The effort to familiarize astronauts in the Command 
Module ended with integrated simulations, where a crew and flight controllers 
undertook full dress rehearsals of a mission in five phases: launch, orbital activity, lunar 
descent and ascent, joint CSM-LM activity, and reentry.41     
This method successfully mitigated concern about crew error.  Two NASA 
researchers argued in a 2016 study that two factors mainly contribute to training 
deficiencies in high-tech fields: organizational issues and a mismatch between a person’s 
learning capacity and the demands of a task.42  But while training for an Apollo mission, 
astronauts were part of an organization containing high quality instructors who taught 
them how to operate the spacecraft.  These instructors mandated that each of them spend 
60 hours attending briefings and a minimum of 200 hours in the simulator, eliminating 
concern that training might not cover an event that could occur in flight.  The instructors 
were also flexible.  Because they knew astronauts had different learning rates, they did 
not mandate a number of hours to specific exercises.  They encouraged the astronauts to 
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train until they had achieved proficiency, not until they had simply checked off a box or 
earned a certain grade.  After each simulator session, the astronauts stepped outside for 
debriefings, where they could ask questions and speak about any problems with the 
simulator or their performance.  Astronauts also managed to eliminate any concern of a 
mismatch between their learning capacity and the demands of a task.  They had been 
selected in the first place because they had already proven themselves as among the best 
in operating complex aircraft at high speeds.  Their training on the specific procedures of 
a lunar flight lent itself to long-term retention, because they took part in briefings and 
simulator sessions over a span of several years and right until launch.43 
The most significant difference between training in Mercury and Gemini 
simulators and in the Apollo CMS was the proficiency required in the guidance and 
navigation system.  The MIT Instrumentation Laboratory had produced a guidance 
computer for each spacecraft that was less powerful than a 21st century handheld 
calculator.  The device contained only 36,000 words of memory and 2,000 words of 
RAM, and operated at a 12-microsecond clock speed.44  Yet the computer served its 
purpose by making thousands of calculations per second and thus directing the 
positioning of the vehicle on its voyage to the Moon and back.  The astronauts needed to 
augment that capability by serving as highly trained operators, however.  For each 
mission phase from launch to reentry, a crewmember needed to activate the 
corresponding computer program and select the right options within each program.  
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Crews would need to make 10,500 computer keystrokes to navigate to the Moon and 
back.  The CMP for each mission would also need to use a sextant to measure the angles 
between heavenly objects, such as stars, the Earth and the Moon.  The computer would 
more precisely compute the spacecraft position based on the sextant readings.  Gaining 
proficiency in understanding and operating the Apollo guidance system consumed 40 
percent of the astronauts’ training time, between briefings by MIT personnel and those 
hundreds of simulator hours.  This was one of the biggest reasons for the drastic increase 
in simulator time compared to Mercury and Gemini.45          
The grueling training load required still more hours in the Lunar Module 
Simulator.  In 1964, just a year and a half after Grumman had won the contract to 
manufacture the first vehicle to land humans on another world, Link began work on the 
LMS.  By the fall of 1966, one of these simulators had arrived in Houston and one at the 
Cape.46  This device only had to simulate the small fraction of the mission when two 
crewmembers separated the lander from the mothership, descended to the lunar surface, 
and lifted off to return to the mothership.  Even during this small fraction, the onboard 
computer would carry much of the responsibility in guiding the astronauts to a safe 
landing, liftoff, and rendezvous.  It would control the digital autopilot, the descent 
engine, the Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters used to keep the vehicle in the 
proper attitude, the indicators the crew would see on the instrument panel, and even the 
astronauts’ inputs to the hand controller.  What, then, did the astronauts need to train to 
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accomplish?  The human brain was still the most advanced computer in existence and in 
this case, the brains of two crewmembers trained to recognize malfunctions could verify 
the computer programs and landing phases.  If necessary, they could troubleshoot any 
problem by flipping switches or even calling for an abort that would send them back to 
the mothership.  Even if all went according to plan, the LMP would still need to punch 
keys to issue commands to the computer.  The Commander would have the even greater 
responsibility of flying the vehicle.  Since he could not be sure the digital autopilot 
would guide the vehicle to a safe area on the crater filled Moon, he would grab the hand 
controller and fly the final few hundred feet himself (although he would send signals to 
the computer in moving the hand controller).  He would then stop the engine when the 
probes attached to the four landing legs touched the lunar surface.47   
 The astronauts thus had responsibilities that could make the difference between 
life and death, both during the landing sequence and aforementioned liftoff and 
rendezvous sequence, and this called for a simulator in which crews could prepare for 
them.  This placed another heavy burden on the Link contractors, because the digital 
requirements for the LMS were almost as intensive as for the CMS: 600,000 words of 
memory in three computers.48  The visual requirements were also demanding and 
unprecedented, because the astronauts needed a simulated view of the Moon as it grew 
closer and closer until landing.  To do this, NASA and Link once again turned to the 
Farrand Optical Company.  The contractors at this company manufactured an optical 
                                                          
47  Mindell, 190-191.     
48  Woodling, et al., 10.  
200 
 
probe and mounted it on a boom, which maneuvered across a sixteen foot diameter 
plaster of Paris model of the lunar surface.  As the lander made its simulated descent to 
the Moon, its motions sent signals to a computer that directed this optical probe 
accordingly.  Thus the probe zoomed in on the model, transmitting a view of it, until the 
Commander could look out of his triangular window and visualize being a few feet 
above a desolate landscape.  He would even be able to see the shadows that the lander 
cast on the surface, a vital cue near the end of the landing.  By the time the Apollo 11 
crew trained for their landing, craftsmen had images from the Lunar Orbiter, Surveyor, 
Apollo 8, and Apollo 10 spacecraft to guide them in creating a three dimensional lunar 
surface model.  Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin could train in the LMS while seeing 
broad features at the Sea of Tranquility represented to an accuracy of about 50 feet via 
this model.  As they descended close to the specific landing site on Tranquility’s 
southwest corner, the accuracy increased to 10 feet.49 
 This method of optically simulating lunar landings was highly advanced for the 
1960s and even inspired one of the most prominent engineers at Farrand in his later 
endeavors.  Al Nagler worked at Farrand from 1957 to 1973, where he designed the 
infinity optics displays that Gemini and Apollo crews saw outside their simulator 
windows.  When he saw the 110 degree wide view outside the LMS, this so inspired him 
that he went to work developing a wide angle lens for his Tele Vue Optics company in 
the 1970s.  He and his colleagues succeeded in developing television lenses and a Nagler 
                                                          
49  Woodling, et al., 27.   
201 
 
eyepiece that has aided astronomers around the world in observing outer space.50  
Nagler’s story indicates that the advanced technology used to simulate and fly missions 
benefited the world by inspiring spinoffs.  By making his lunar commitment, President 
Kennedy had required the brightest technological minds around the country to make 
advances that they probably would not have otherwise made until later than the 1960s.  
Many of these advances not only helped astronauts reach the Moon, but also diffused to 
the general public. 
 Astronauts learned to operate the Lunar Module in a series of steps which, like 
Command Module training, proved highly effective.  The men listened to briefings on 
the electrical system, the communication system, the environmental system, the RCS 
thrusters, the Descent Propulsion System, the Ascent Propulsion System, the 
Stabilization and Control System, the Abort Guidance System, and the Primary 
Guidance System.  Then they applied their knowledge in brief simulator sessions that 
covered one of those specific areas at a time.  Usually only one of them needed to sit 
inside the LMS during this first phase of training.  Two astronauts sat together for the 
more complex sessions of the second phase.  These sessions gave them experience not 
only in making a landing as planned, which would be complex enough, but also in 
recognizing when they would need to take over manually to find a safe landing site or 
make an abort that would send them back to lunar orbit.  The sessions also gave them 
experience in preparing the LM for its launch from the Moon and, if necessary, 
controlling it manually to a safe orbit.  From there, the astronauts graduated to the 
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integrated simulations.  During these full dress rehearsals, two members of the crew 
could sit inside the LMS while their one crewmate sat inside the CMS.  Wires enabled 
the two simulators to interact with one another and with Mission Control, just as  
the real spacecraft would have to interact with one another at the Moon.51   
Nearly fifty years after the Apollo Moon landings, one aspect of how astronauts 
trained for them and made them deserves special consideration: the two men in the 
cockpit depended on each other to make safe landings.  The Commander kept his eyes 
out the window during the last few hundred feet as he manually flew the vehicle, while 
the LMP kept his eyes on the numbers he saw on the instrument panel displaying the 
ship’s altitude, velocity, and fuel quantities.  He called out the numbers as the LM 
approached the Moon, so that the Commander could know them without taking his eyes 
away from the window, until he saw a blue light marked “Lunar Contact” illuminate.  
This meant that a probe attached to one of the landing legs had touched the surface, so 
he called out “Contact light” and the Commander knew to shut down the engine just 
then.52  More recently, airline companies have advocated strongly in favor of Cockpit 
Resource Management Training, meaning training to improve pilots’ interpersonal 
communication and teamwork skills.  After an incident in 1977, when two Boeing 
aircraft collided on a runway and killed hundreds of people, NASA researchers held a 
workshop in 1979 in which they endorsed this idea.  By the 1990s, it had become 
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standard in the airline industry.53  The Apollo astronauts did not have this specific 
training that more recent pilots have had, but over hundreds of simulator hours they 
learned to trust each other when their lives would be on the line nearly a quarter million 
miles from home.  Even though the Commanders were more experienced in spaceflight 
than the LMPs, all Commanders willingly accepted the input of their partners.  
While the astronauts focused on learning how to operate their two spacecraft, the 
SimSups and flight controllers had their hands full preparing for and conducting 
integrated simulations.   Dick Koos knew that the precedent from Mercury still applied, 
that flight controllers would have access to more information than the astronauts, and the 
volume of information would increase drastically from Mercury to Apollo.  This called 
for a series of simulations designed to test the controllers’ ability to interpret the wealth 
of telemetry and make decisions.  Koos, the SimSup hired by NASA on the basis of his 
experience with computers, thus went to work on the computers required to make these 
simulations possible.  “When the Saturn flights began, to get that telemetry into the 
control center, you had to simulate that with a computer in the control center called the 
Ground Support Simulation Computer (GSSC),” he remembers today.  “The interface 
(between the GSSC and the Apollo simulators at Houston and the Cape) became much 
more complex and we had to develop that.  The trajectory the flight controllers saw was 
both from the Apollo guidance computer and from the Saturn computer.  They compared 
them.  Those were their two sources of information for the launch trajectory.  We had to 
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make all that synchronized.  Working that interface out and getting those telemetry 
requirements from the Apollo simulator was basically what I worked on.  We had to get 
IBM, who developed computers for us, and Link, which developed the simulators for us, 
together to develop that interface.  We simulation guys really owed a lot to IBM.”54 
 When the equipment became available, the flight controllers worked twelve hour 
days in carrying out integrated simulations.  They spent some of these days with math 
models and a simulated astronaut.  But when the prime and backup crews of an Apollo 
mission had reached that last phase of their training, the controllers responded to 
telemetry and made recommendations to the real astronauts they would have to support 
in flight.  The Apollo 7 astronauts began this procedure by taking part in 18 days of 
simulations in which their CMS was wired to Mission Control.  The Apollo 9 astronauts 
took part in the first simulations in which the CMS, LMS, and Mission Control were all 
wired together, since this was the first piloted mission to carry a Lunar Module.  The 
total number of days devoted to integrated simulations gradually increased until reaching 
a high of 35 for the Apollo 14 mission.55  During the first few days of training for each 
mission, the simulations went according to plan, without any glitches.  This allowed the 
astronauts and controllers to learn to work together and perfect carrying out procedures.  
But a team of SimSups had been busy for several months writing scripts of malfunctions.  
When those peaceful first few days ended, the SimSups began programming them into 
the simulators.  The astronauts saw them as readouts on an instrument panel, the 
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controllers as telemetry on their computer screens.  “Nothing is sacred; no quarter is 
given and none asked,” wrote Flight Director Gene Kranz about the SimSups relentlessly 
trying to test his controllers.56        
The roster of SimSups expanded from Mercury and Gemini to Apollo, reflecting  
the far greater complexity of simulations needed for the moon program.  Jay Honeycutt 
remembered that he was one of about forty of them, working out of the MSC Flight 
Operations division, by the time Apollo began.  These forty split up into those who 
focused on the trajectory of spacecraft, the tracking of spacecraft, CSM systems, and LM 
systems.  When an integrated simulation began, about ten of them sat in Mission Control 
behind a glass partition from the flight controllers they were trying to train.  Thus there 
were four teams of SimSups, who worked together in devising as many as twelve cases 
of malfunctions per day.  There were also multiple teams of flight controllers assigned to 
each mission.57             
 The SimSups developed an understanding of the qualities that made for a good 
flight controller.  Harold Miller, one of the original members of the simulation task 
group at Langley, cited four qualities.  First, the best controllers had intelligence and a 
great memory.  The average age of Apollo 11 flight controllers was only 28 years.  When 
they supported the first Moon landing, only a handful of years had passed since most of 
them had earned their college bachelor’s degrees.58  Yet after their classroom instruction, 
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they knew their assigned jobs and could recall what the mission rules called for them to 
do at any point in the mission.  Second, the best could think very quickly on their feet.  
When the SimSups injected malfunctions into a simulation, the controllers would have a 
limited amount of time in which to respond to them.  In order to interpret the information 
they saw on their computer screens, consult with a team of engineers in the Staff Support 
Room (SSR) if necessary, and then express themselves quickly and precisely to the 
Flight Director and CapCom, they needed this quality.  Third, the best had tremendous 
confidence in their abilities.  Like the astronauts, they had no qualms about taking 
actions with potentially life or death consequences.  Fourth, the best had a sense of 
humor.  If a controller made a wrong response to a malfunction and the entire team heard 
about his mistake during the subsequent debriefing, his sense of humor helped him to 
take the news good naturedly while assuring himself that he would never let it happen 
again.  The onus of determining who possessed those qualities and was ready to support 
a mission fell to the Flight Directors.59 
 The greatest burden during the simulations fell to the Flight Director, because he 
had to understand the assignments of each of his nearly 20 controllers, listen to them, 
and make a decision.  The Flight Directors had access to communication loops for each 
of his controllers, as well as his own Flight Director loop and the air to ground loop.  
Kranz believed that the many simulations were crucial to allow him and his colleagues 
to learn to focus amid the information overload.  “The training process really allows you 
to remain focused on one or two loops, and you’re listening for key words,” he argued.  
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“The training process alerts you to the tone of the crew’s voices and the tone of the 
controllers’ voices.  In addition to that, you’ve got key words that you’ve used 
throughout the training process that will get additional attention.”60  Among Apollo 
Flight Directors, Kranz, Cliff Charlesworth, and Glynn Lunney already had experience 
in the job from Gemini.  But Gerry Griffin, Milt Windler, Pete Frank, Phil Shaffer, Don 
Puddy, Neil Hutchinson, and Charles Lewis all needed an indoctrination to the job 
through the training SimSups could give them.  “I felt like an idiot and looked like an 
idiot,” Frank remembered about one of his first simulations.  “There’s these guys that 
someday you’re supposed to be down there running this thing telling them what to do.  
Here they’re seeing you do this and you don’t know what you’re doing.”61  Yet each of 
the aforementioned Flight Directors gradually proved themselves under the mental strain 
of simulations.            
Despite the thousands of hours astronauts and controllers spent preparing for a 
round trip to the Moon that would cover nearly a half million miles, the trip would not 
have been worthwhile without a focus on the destination.  Here was where Apollo 
training differed from Mercury and Gemini training: the need to train for a visit to 
another heavenly body.  Although President Kennedy had only challenged the nation to 
land a man on the Moon by decade’s end and had said nothing about what an astronaut 
should accomplish once on the lunar surface, MSC personnel gave thought to the 
exploration and scientific discovery such an astronaut could accomplish just one year 
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after the challenge.  Eugene Shoemaker, one of the pioneers of astrogeology who was 
then working for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in Flagstaff, Arizona, credited 
Max Faget (MSC Director of Engineering) as the key figure in Houston who envisioned 
an emphasis on lunar science during Apollo.  Shoemaker traveled to Houston in the 
summer of 1962 to meet with Faget.  “Max wanted me to come and work for him, 
straight out, to build up a geology group, to do research, to train the astronauts, and to 
build up the whole thing for science on the Moon,” he remembered.  Shoemaker actually 
went to work at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., but while there he proposed 
the training program that the space agency eventually adopted, whereby Ph.D. geologists 
from the USGS and MSC would instruct the astronauts in their discipline.62     
Shoemaker knew that all members of the astronaut corps at this time were pilots, 
and that the only way to make the most of their exploration skills was to cross train them 
in geology.  The most dangerous task of a lunar mission was the landing on the surface, 
which would require the astronauts to exercise the piloting skills they had honed for their 
entire adult lives.  But if they also possessed the skills to undertake the less dangerous 
but complex surface exploration through cross training, they would aid the efficiency of 
Apollo through their ability to thrive in all aspects of missions.63  Past explorers on Earth 
had developed multidisciplinary skill sets as well.  For instance, Meriwether Lewis had a 
background as an Army soldier when he embarked on his 1803 expedition to the 
American West with William Clark.  Yet he received private tutoring as a field  
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naturalist, biologist, botanist, and navigator prior to his journey.64    
 A USGS document from 1950 makes clear the value of education and training in  
becoming an effective field geologist.  The USGS required a minimum of 30 semester 
hours in geology for those who wished to study the landscape and natural resources of 
the United States in a professional capacity.  But the geologists who wrote the report 
argued that undergraduate work alone “is rarely adequate…the intellectual discipline, the 
intensive training, and the research habits instilled by the graduate school environment 
are of paramount importance to a Survey geologist.”  The authors believed that the best 
geologists of the future would hold advanced degrees and become well rounded through 
knowledge of diverse subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, minerology, and 
biology.65  The Apollo astronauts were in a different situation, because they would only 
spend a maximum of three days at their field site and only a maximum of about 22 hours 
outside their spacecraft.  They would then haul their rocks back to Earth, where 
professional geologists could study them for the rest of their lives in the comfort of a 
laboratory environment.  At least one astronaut wondered why, given that this was the 
case, the space agency needed to place such a heavy emphasis on the astronauts’ skills as 
field geologists.  Yet the geologists who instructed them advanced a compelling 
argument that making a substantial contribution to lunar geology required more than 
simply filling a container with rocks.  It required the astronauts to observe the context in 
which they found their samples, because the rocks had sat undisturbed for up to 4.5 
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billion years.66  If astronauts brought trained minds to process the information they were 
seeing at the site of exploration, they could help unravel the mysteries of cosmic history 
dating back that far.      
Geologists thus began instructing astronauts in January 1963, shortly after the  
“Next Nine” astronauts joined the “Original Seven.”  The geologists lectured to both 
groups and accompanied them on a trip that month to Flagstaff, where the astronauts 
studied Meteor Crater and observed the Moon by telescope.  Gene Shoemaker received 
encouraging comments about the field trip.  He felt persuaded to set up an arrangement 
whereby personnel from the USGS and MSC would split astronaut training duties.  The 
USGS geologists such as Al Chidester, Dale Jackson, and Donald Wilhelms would give 
astronauts an introduction to the subject through lectures in Houston.  MSC geologists 
such as Uel Clanton, Ted Foss, Elbert King, and Wendell Mitchell would also give them 
classroom instruction, but focus on the more specific subjects of mineralogy and 
petrology.  Personnel from both organizations would then work together to arrange field 
trips.  Slayton required all of his astronauts to attend the trips unless flight preparations 
or unavoidable commitments excused them.67  Although the two groups clashed on who 
should have ultimate authority, their members did develop a syllabus for future astronaut 
groups.  Series I training would require 58 hours of classroom instruction and four field 
trips.  Having received an introduction to the subject, the astronauts would undergo 
training more specific to lunar exploration through still more classroom work and field  
                                                          
66  Andrew Chaikin, A Man on the Moon: The Voyages of the Apollo Astronauts (New York: Viking, 1994), 406.    
67  Phinney, 3, 22, and 54.  
211 
 
trips during Series II and III.68   
 The first attempt to implement the syllabus, in February 1964 after the selection 
of the third group, provided one critical lesson learned.  All 29 of the astronauts who 
took part in geology training had dreamed since childhood of becoming aviators.  Their 
education and work reflected their desire to work with flight machinery, not rocks.  At 
the first meeting in the classroom set up at Ellington Air Force Base, an instructor asked, 
“Who has, at some time in their education, taken at least an introductory course in 
geology?”  None of the 29 raised their hands.69  Their interest in this new subject varied 
widely, but in general the astronauts found the classroom instruction the least productive 
form of training.  The astronauts simply wanted the information they needed to make 
intelligent observations of the lunar surface, and sitting through two hour sessions on 
general subjects such as the “law of uniformity,” the “law of superposition,” and the 
“law of original horizontality” did not appear necessary to them.70  The instructors 
understood the astronauts’ criticism of classroom instruction.  Elbert King wrote, “The 
quality of the lectures was uneven—some were good, some were awful…We could not 
afford to waste their (the astronauts’) time with poorly prepared or badly presented 
material—this was made abundantly clear.”71          
 The astronauts and instructors each learned the lesson that field trips were a  
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much more productive form of training.  The first one sent them to Arizona’s Grand 
Canyon in March.  After arriving at the rim, a USGS instructor described the geological 
features of the magnificent vista, the processes that formed them, and the rocks the 
astronauts could expect to find.  The men then split up into groups of two or three 
astronauts and one instructor and set off on a 6.5 mile hike to the bottom of the canyon.  
The groups traveled back up the next morning, but this time the instructors required the 
astronauts to place their knowledge to the test by identifying the units of rocks on the 
trail they followed.  In April, another trip took the men to the Marathon Basin in 
southwest Texas.  This outing gave the astronauts experience in observing the volcanic 
flows that had shaped the rocks in this location, just as volcanism had shaped the Moon 
for billions of years.  The third trip took them to Flagstaff in May, where the men 
undertook additional field work in a region shaped by both impact craters and volcanic 
flows and flew in a light aircraft to study the stratigraphy of the region from a bird’s eye 
view.  The final trip took them to New Mexico’s Philmont Ranch in June.72  The 
instructors ramped up the intensity of the training for this outing, as the astronauts had to 
sketch, describe, take notes, and make strike and dip measurements of more complex 
geological features than at the previous locations.73   
The field trips contained several advantages that set them apart from classroom  
instruction.  First, they gave the astronauts practical experience in the type of work those  
fortunate enough to land on the Moon would perform, as opposed to simply sitting in a  
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classroom.  The classroom work did not include tests, and even if they did the instructors 
could not really know if their students had become proficient geologists until they could 
prove their worth in the field.  As a second advantage, each instructor spent time with 
only two or three astronauts so that they could easily evaluate the strengths of each one 
and encourage each of them to ask questions about geology.  As a third advantage, sites 
such as the Grand Canyon impressed upon the astronauts the grandeur of field geology.74  
The field trips also served as a case study in the coordination between several agencies 
needed for hands-on, practical training of astronauts.  Geologists from the USGS and 
MSC worked together to instruct them, while the National Park Service allowed both 
instructors and astronauts to use desired field sites.75  The campsites where the men 
spent the nights contained “all the amenities of home,” according to lunar scientist 
Richard Allenby.76        
 The astronauts graduated from Series I of their geology training after their 
Philmont Ranch trip, and with this under their belts they could learn more specifically 
about the Moon from their instructors.  Their classroom instruction during Series II 
emphasized the debates on how lunar features formed, which they hoped to solve by 
taking informed minds to make close-up observations.  For hundreds of years, scientists 
who had observed the Moon via telescope had wondered whether it had been shaped 
more by ancient volcanism or by impacts.  The instructors thus required the astronauts to 
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study lunar features as seen in photos from telescopes and the first successful Ranger 
lunar probe so their students could understand the state of scientific thinking about the 
regions they hoped to explore.  The Series II field trips expanded on this goal by sending 
astronauts to a combination of sites, some shaped by volcanism and some by impacts.  In 
October 1964, a group traveled to Oregon’s Newberry Crater and made traverses across 
it with the goal of finding enough data to determine by which of the two methods the 
crater formed.  Trips to New Mexico’s Jemez Mountains and Hawaii gave the astronauts 
experience exploring diverse volcanic phenomena such as rhyolite domes, welded tuffs, 
ash flows, gas and lava vents, and lava tubes.77  Buzz Aldrin consequently remembered, 
“Of all the places on Earth where we trained, the Big Island (Hawaii) felt most like the 
Moon.78  Series II ended with trips to the Nevada Test Site and Meteor Crater in early 
1965, where the astronauts trained to observe the impact craters that scientists knew also 
accounted for much of the Moon’s surface.79 
 The training grew still more specific and practical with Series III.  Classroom 
instruction this time taught the astronauts how to probe the lunar surface through 
physical methods (such as seismic, gravitational, or magnetic) to measure its properties.  
Some of the men in the classroom eventually carried out these methods on the Moon, 
when time was at a premium and they needed the informed minds that training gave 
them to guide their work.  Another advantage of Series III was that the instructors took 
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the astronauts to more distant field sites that were also more analogous to the Moon.  A 
trip to the Katmai Peninsula in Alaska allowed them to observe volcanic landforms so 
fresh that they were in nearly pristine condition.  A trip to the Askja Caldera in Iceland 
took them to one of the most Moon-like sites on Earth, due to the lack of vegetation 
cover.  The instructors were so intent on giving these Series III trips practical value that 
they told the astronauts to play the “Moon Game.”  This meant that the instructors 
dropped two astronauts in a deserted location and asked them to pretend they had just 
left their Lunar Module.  The two had to plan their traverses, operate geophysical 
instruments, and collect samples, while making observations of the context in which 
they found their samples via a radio-microphone.  The instructors recorded their words 
so they could evaluate the astronauts’ observational skills.  When a group returned from 
a trip to Zuni Salt Lake, New Mexico and Pinacates, Mexico in December 1965, the 
geology training for the first three groups of astronauts had ended until they were 
assigned to missions.80       
Earlier that year, the corps entered a new era as NASA selected a new group 
comprised of professional scientists.  NASA personnel had considered this controversial 
question for the past few years: did the space agency need to focus solely on cross 
training pilots, or should professional scientists have seats on Apollo spacecraft?  On 
July 6, 1962, an Ad Hoc Working Group on Apollo Experiments and Training 
recommended that at least one member of the lunar landing missions “should be a 
professional scientist and that the other members should have had extensive training in 
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suitable scientific subjects.  The scientific objectives of the program require a scientist 
with education at the Ph.D. level and with from 5 to 10 years of experience.”  The group 
explained that scientists with strong backgrounds in field geology would benefit the 
Apollo program because, “The investigation of the Moon’s surface, and with it the origin 
of the solar system, cannot be done competently except by people who have a very good  
grasp of all that is known and understood in these fields.”81   
But there was one problem with this reasoning: in order for the crews to reach the 
lunar surface and return safely, they would need piloting skills.  The pilots in the 
astronaut corps had experience making decisions where a mistake could have meant 
death, whereas scientists had never operated with this kind of pressure.  “If an alarm 
came on, there would be no time to ask some professor to carry his share of the load,” 
Gene Cernan explained.82  One professional scientist who became an astronaut in 1967 
remembered Frank Borman’s more blunt declaration at a meeting: “To hell with the 
scientific community!”83  Cernan and Borman were both typical among the pilots in the 
astronaut corps in expressing their dislike of the idea of taking scientists on lunar 
missions or into the astronaut corps at all.      
 The space agency resolved the controversy by selecting scientists into the corps, 
but placing them at the back of the flight line so that the pilots would occupy the seats on 
the first lunar missions.  After the selection of the third astronaut group in 1963, Robert 
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Voas held discussions with Bob Gilruth and other top MSC officials and concluded that 
the agency should select professional scientists.  Administrator Jim Webb approved the 
plan, then the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science and the head of the 
Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences devised a set of criteria by 
which to consider and select them.  On October 19, 1964, the announcement went out 
that NASA would select scientists the following year.84  Of the more than 1,300 who 
applied, the selection boards at NASA and the National Academy of Sciences whittled 
the names to six in June 1965: Owen Garriott, Ed Gibson, Duane Graveline, Joe Kerwin, 
Curtis Michel, and Harrison “Jack” Schmitt.  Only Kerwin and Michel had piloted jets, 
so the other four spent slightly more than a full year learning to fly planes at Williams 
Air Force Base in Arizona.85  When asked today if his experience piloting jets proved to 
be an asset once selected as an astronaut, Kerwin answers yes.  “The thinking was, you 
had to be willing to put yourself at risk in a real flight situation, no panic,” he explains.  
“The actual physical skills were not as important.”86   
The space agency went through with yet another selection of scientists in 1967.  
During this era when NASA consumed up to 4.5 percent of the national GDP, 
headquarters personnel had conceived an ambitious agenda beyond the initial Apollo 
lunar landings.  A program called Apollo Applications would use the Apollo hardware to 
send crews to an Earth orbiting space station and to the lunar surface for stays of up to 
two weeks.  Given this optimistic atmosphere, the first landing of astronauts on Mars 
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appeared likely by the 1980s.  Headquarters personnel made the mistake of thinking that 
lawmakers would keep the NASA budget at mid-1960s levels and that the MSC 
therefore needed new infusions of astronauts.  They projected that six crews would 
launch each year through the mid-1970s.87  Each crew would require pilots to make 
rendezvous maneuvers and lunar landings, so NASA selected 19 more pilots in 1966.  
Each crew would also benefit from the expertise of scientists in performing microgravity 
experiments, making geological observations, and even undertaking laboratory analysis 
on lunar rocks during two week missions, so NASA selected eleven additional scientists 
the following year.  None of them had pilots’ licenses, but all had doctoral degrees in 
areas ranging from nuclear physics, to geochemistry, to astronomy, to medicine, to 
electrical engineering, to chemical engineering.88      
Despite the willingness of the space agency to accept the demand for scientific 
representation in the astronaut corps, three factors worked against the scientists in 
receiving seats on missions.  First, the astronauts from the first three groups who had 
stuck around for Apollo were ahead of them in line.  Second, Deke Slayton clearly 
favored selecting astronauts with pilot pedigrees for the most important seats.  He wrote, 
“I didn’t have anything against scientists, or doctors, but I wasn’t quite sure what I was 
supposed to do with them on flight crews…People don’t realize it takes two or three 
people to make sure the spacecraft gets where it’s supposed to go, performs all the 
planned maneuvers, then return safely.”89  But third and most importantly, the grandiose 
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projections at NASA Headquarters did not match the reality of the late 1960s.  The bold 
political environment of President Kennedy’s 1961 speech had given way to an 
environment in which President Lyndon Johnson and the majority of legislators felt 
comfortable reducing NASA’s budget given the fiscal challenges of the Vietnam War 
and social programs.  The budget cuts shut down the Saturn IB and Saturn V production 
lines in 1967.  The remaining rockets would be able to support ten Apollo lunar landings 
and a few missions to an earth orbiting space station, but otherwise the future of human 
spaceflight was murky by the time the group of eleven scientists reported to MSC on 
September 18.  Slayton had to tell them “they just weren’t needed” on that first day, but 
five of them eventually earned assignments to Apollo support crews (a job that required 
standing in for flight crews during meetings and tests and serving as CapComs).  None 
of the members of this group flew in space until the 1980s.  Even among the first group 
of scientists, only Jack Schmitt managed to walk on the Moon.90      
 Schmitt did have an influence on Apollo beyond his flight, because as the only 
Ph.D. geologist in the astronaut corps he provided his input into geology training.  The 
scientists in his group and the group of 19 pilots underwent their own indoctrination to 
geology through classroom instruction and field trips from May 1966 to September 
1967.  He felt that the process needed improvement, because the geologists teaching the 
astronauts tried to inundate them with arcane concepts rather than simply making sure 
they could do their jobs.  “The guys were bored,” he observed of his fellow students.  
The USGS and MSC geologists boasted that they would give the astronauts the 
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equivalent of a master’s degree in geology by the time they launched, but Schmitt 
countered, “That wasn’t the point.  The point was to get the maximum of good 
information, good samples and good documentation as you could in a very short amount 
of time and to get them interested to learn the things that would be helpful in that whole 
process.  And so I went to Al Shepard and suggested that the astronauts ought to take 
more control of the training program in science with the primary purpose to make it 
mission-relevant.”  By the time Apollo crews were ready for mission specific training, 
Schmitt had organized a revised program.  He picked geologists who had reputations as 
enthusiastic teachers to give lectures to the astronauts, and recalled, “My memory is that 
the astronauts started not only to enjoy the sessions more but also began to see some 
relevance to them.91  Schmitt understood a point that the first field trips had illustrated: 
that as the effort to cross train pilots in geology became more practical, it became more 
effective.  The pilots were more doers than thinkers, and as such they derived more 
benefit from instruction in specific mission tasks than from trying to learn arcane 
geological terms in a classroom. 
 While the astronauts underwent geology training throughout the mid-1960s, 
MSC engineers also considered how to replicate the lunar surface environment in 
Houston.  By 1963, the engineers had constructed a “Moon Room” in one of the 
buildings at Ellington Air Force Base.  This 20 by 40 foot room contained a floor 
covered with dark volcanic rock from craters in California and walls painted black.  An 
adjustable light in one corner of the room simulated the Sun.  Astronauts donned their 
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suits and visited this facility so they could test their ability to perform work under 
projected lunar lighting conditions.  By 1964, engineers had constructed an even more 
useful analog for a lunar environment: an outdoor rock pile 328 feet in diameter, which 
contained a mock LM set up around two large craters, several smaller craters, and a 
concrete ridge.  Visits to the rock pile gave the suited astronauts a chance to test their 
ability to climb down the ladder from the LM hatch to the surface, their boots in 
walking, their bulky gloves in grasping objects, and their hand tools in performing 
geological work.  The plan called for each crew to set up an Apollo Lunar Surface 
Experiments Package (ALSEP), so the astronauts also trained here to set up 
experiments.92             
 The rock pile became a more high fidelity training tool when the Ranger, Lunar 
Orbiter, and Surveyor probes returned the first close-up lunar photos.  After a Surveyor 
achieved the first landing of an American spacecraft on the Moon in 1966, the vehicle 
returned photos indicating that the dust was finer grained and the surface was more 
heavily cratered than previously believed.  Geologist Mike McEwen thus planned a 
revised rock pile containing 188 craters ranging from 3 to 60 feet in diameter and blast 
furnace slag that could simulate the fine dust.  Engineers also constructed large arc lights 
that would shine during the night to simulate the Sun.  By early 1968, astronauts could 
train on this new moonscape.  Uel Clanton, one of the instructors, summarized the value 
of this tool when he remembered, “That was one of the more popular training areas.  We 
worked it, the astronauts, the people involved in manufacturing and testing the 
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spacesuits, all worked the rock pile.  It was not like the Moon, but it was about as a good 
a simulation as you could get for the Houston area.”93  When Apollo crews moved closer 
to launch, they could train at yet another high fidelity facility at KSC, dubbed the sand  
pile.94                
Despite the presence of these creative outdoor sites, crews spent the bulk of their 
time training for their lunar surface stays indoors at MSC Building 9.  The suited 
astronauts walked through all of the tasks they planned to perform here, with the 
instructors observing them to make sure mission planners had developed a realistic 
timeline.  The walkthroughs in Building 9 built the confidence of astronauts, mission 
planners, and geologists that the Apollo missions could meet the lofty expectations 
placed upon them.  “I don’t see any way of getting away from that,” Armstrong said 
during his debriefing.  “You’re going to do a number of those one-G walkthroughs, and 
you’re going to develop your timeline and the procedures.  There isn’t another way to do 
it right now that’s a good way.”95  Prior to the last Apollo mission, Gene Cernan and 
Jack Schmitt trained in this building for a mission that would include about 22 hours 
outside their LM.  Their mission dwarfed Apollo 11 in complexity, as it featured three 
EVAs and a Lunar Rover journey to the base of a mountain, but Schmitt praised the 
walkthroughs as “extremely useful” just as Armstrong had.96 
 Astronauts on the lunar surface would each experience one condition that these  
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sessions could not simulate, however: one-sixth gravity.  Common sense told them that 
they would have an easier time working in reduced gravity than zero gravity.  If they 
dropped an object in one-sixth gravity, the object would fall to the ground as it would on 
Earth.  They also would not have to worry about the task of restraining themselves to a 
spacecraft that had proven so problematic during Gemini, because they would be 
walking (and eventually driving a rover) on solid ground.  But the instructors understood 
that the program would benefit from their desensitizing the astronauts to reduced gravity, 
and testing their ability to use geologic tools, so crews could feel confident about making 
the most of each minute of their work.  Three methods could simulate this condition on 
Earth: parabolic flights using the KC-135 aircraft, neutral buoyancy pools, and a harness 
arrangement that would support five-sixths of a person’s weight.97   
 The MSC and USGS geology instructors were the first to simulate lunar gravity 
aboard the KC-135.  A loud buzzer sounded in the aircraft as the pilot flew over the top 
of a parabola, creating zero gravity for 15 to 20 seconds.  But the pilot then changed the 
shape of the parabola to create one-sixth gravity for another 15 to 20 seconds.98  During 
this time, the geology instructors tested the loping gait required to walk and the 
equipment the astronauts would have with them.  Uel Clanton remembered flying about 
400 parabolas, probably the most of any instructor.  The sessions aboard the KC-135 
combined with the sessions on ground training facilities informed the design of Apollo 
suits and equipment.  The suit contractors at the ILC Dover company in Frederica, 
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Delaware already had to worry about offering the astronauts protection from the 
temperatures of lunar daytime, cuts from jagged rocks, and micrometeoroid impacts.  
But the instructors’ experiences maneuvering in one-sixth gravity demonstrated that they 
also needed to worry about the suit’s mobility.  An astronaut could not hope to do useful 
geological work without stooping and bending, so the contractors added rubber joints at 
the shoulders, elbows, hips, and knees.  Clanton also monitored a contract with Martin 
Marietta in Denver, Colorado for the development of hand tools.  If he had trouble 
bending over to use a drill, for instance, the contractors modified the drill.99       
 Each lunar landing crew then performed hundreds of parabolas prior to their 
missions and the astronauts generally concluded that this was the best method of 
simulating one-sixth gravity.  Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin both made this argument 
during their Apollo 11 debriefing.  The two each noted drawbacks of this method, such 
as the lack of realistic lunar surface characteristics in the KC-135 cabin and the expense 
required to make just one flight.  The lesson from the Gemini program, that aircraft 
flights could only replicate reduced gravity for less than a minute at a time and therefore 
could not simulate the fatigue that longer tasks created, also still applied.  But the flights 
eliminated the uncertainty about how to maneuver in reduced gravity in all six degrees 
of freedom, and the astronauts thus considered the training essential.  “One-sixth G is 
relatively easy to operate in,” Aldrin said after Apollo 11, but this did not stop all future 
crews from making KC-135 flights of their own.100  The astronauts of all later lunar  
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missions made only positive comments about the experience in their debriefings.101          
 The astronauts also trained for this sensation in a neutral buoyancy pool at MSC,  
where the instructors weighed them down in such a way as to simulate one-sixth gravity.  
Yet this method did not work nearly as well in training for lunar surface EVAs as it did 
for EVAs in flight.  Lunar surface EVAs would require a motion more like walking, and 
the drag created by the water meant that astronauts could not adequately replicate this 
motion in a pool.  Ken Mattingly, one of the 19 selected in the class of 1966, wrote a 
memo the following year in which he described this experience as more like “swimming 
in scuba than walking in the KC-135 during one-sixth G parabolas.”  He also 
commented that the weight placed on his suit “resulted in an uncontrolled center of 
gravity and moments of inertia.”102  Pete Conrad responded to a question about water 
immersion training during his Apollo 12 debriefing by stating, “I think that’s a waste of 
time, and it doesn’t do the job."103  Thus the question remained: how could crews train to 
maneuver in one-sixth gravity without the limitations of drag in a pool or time in an 
aircraft?    
 MSC instructors devised an ingenious answer by hooking astronauts to harnesses 
that they adjusted to support five-sixths of their weight.  The first type of harness was a 
vertically suspended system, meaning that a suspension system over their heads 
supported the harnessed astronauts as they moved across a test surface in six degrees of 
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freedom and jumped to heights of 12 feet and more.  The second type of harness was an 
inclined plane, pioneered at the LRC near the LLRF facility.  This device contained a 
suspension system that supported astronauts on their sides in an inclined attitude about 
9.5 degrees from horizontal.  The harness method had the advantage of simulating 
movements in all axes over long periods, but contained limitations as well.  The system 
restraints limited the astronauts’ maneuverability, forced an unnatural body posture, and 
provided so much stability that they did not fall as often as they would on the lunar 
surface.104  Although no method of simulating one-sixth gravity was perfect, the various 
devices built the astronauts’ confidence in maneuvering on the lunar surface.  Alan Bean 
observed after Apollo 12, “I noticed that I got on a nominal walking pace very rapidly 
once I got on the Moon.”105  Even an alien landscape could breed familiarity for well-
trained astronauts, and this was exactly what the entire Apollo team wanted given the 
amount of taxpayer money each minute on the lunar surface would cost.  The path to that 
surface proved arduous, with tragedy mixed in along the way.           
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CHAPTER VII 
APOLLO: “WITH THE HUMAN EYE, IT’S A PIECE OF CAKE” 
 
The NASA team could not set their sights on the Moon immediately.  A series of 
unpiloted flights paved the way for the first flight of Apollo astronauts.  The plan then 
called for a three man crew to verify the performance of the spacecraft over up to 14 
days in Earth orbit, hopefully in early 1967.106  Deke Slayton found the choice of who 
should command this first mission an easy one.  Knowing the job that Gus Grissom had 
done in the development of the Gemini spacecraft and in flying the first mission, he 
picked Grissom to also command the first Apollo mission.  He also picked two rookies, 
Donn Eisele and Roger Chaffee, to round out the crew.  But Eisele injured his shoulder 
during a KC-135 flight, placing him behind the training curve, so the nation’s first 
spacewalker Ed White replaced him.107   
 Excitement reached a crescendo in 1966 for several reasons.  Grissom, White, 
and Chaffee received their introduction as the Apollo 1 crew, North American delivered 
their CSM to the Cape, the Command Module Simulator entered operation, and the 
Gemini program came to a triumphant conclusion.  The crew proved themselves worthy 
of the excitement.  As North American contractors tested every spacecraft system in 
Downey, California, Grissom impressed his colleagues with his meticulous approach to 
monitoring the work.  He encouraged his crewmates to share their ideas at any time.  
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Chaffee also impressed with his willingness to study glitches and even confront 
contractors on the factory floor with design sketches to solve them.  But the crew 
quickly became frustrated.  Their spacecraft suffered from myriad problems, ranging 
from wiring, to communications, to propulsion, to the environmental system, to the RCS 
thrusters.  Grissom had ideas on how to solve the problems, but could not go to the top 
of the chain of command and push for design changes as he could at McDonnell during 
the Gemini program.108  The other source of frustration stemmed from training and 
taught the Apollo team a critical lesson about simulating missions. 
 By all accounts, the CMS did not meet expectations during its first year of 
operation.  Riley McCafferty is the best authority on this matter, because he served as 
the project engineer for the simulator.  As mentioned previously, the four digital 
computers were the most important element driving the simulator.  But when 
McCafferty and his team of engineers tried to operate the software on those Digital Data 
Processor (DDP)-224 computers, “It just wouldn’t run all the time; it wouldn’t run 
right.”  The simulator often stalled with the Apollo 1 crew inside.109  Frank Hughes and 
Stanley Faber have similarly negative recollections of the state of the simulator during 
the latter months of 1966.110       
 But the greatest frustration with the simulator stemmed from the need to modify 
it in a timely manner.  The need to make sure a simulator kept up with the updates to a 
spacecraft was not new, but proved much more difficult in Apollo than Mercury or 
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Gemini.  Since the CSM contained many more parts than those previous vehicles and 
testing had revealed numerous problems, the modifications totaled as many as 75 to 100 
per week.  When these happened, the plan called for a contractor to submit a 
modification request to a Simulator Control Panel.  The request listed the change to the 
actual spacecraft, the simulator change required to match the spacecraft, the effect on 
training if the change was not implemented, and the effectiveness of the spacecraft and 
simulator.  The Simulator Control Panel evaluated the request and approved it.  The Link 
contractors supplied more information: how the hardware or software needed to be 
modified, an estimate of what the requested parts would cost, the man-hours required to 
implement the modification, and a schedule of all pertinent milestones.  This long 
process meant the spacecraft could undergo changes more quickly than the simulator.111  
During the last months of 1966, Grissom felt the simulator had fallen so far behind the 
spacecraft that it could not usefully train him.  “I always had 150-200 mods outstanding, 
just not getting to them,” Riley McCafferty remembered.  “And Grissom would come 
down and just tear my heart out, you know…I’d be looking at it and I’d say, okay, this 
change will be so and so and such and such, and by the time I got that change 
designed…the spacecraft changed again.”112  The need for more time to update the 
simulator should have provided a lesson for the entire Apollo team, but for the time  
being it did not.  The launch date of February 21, 1967 went unchanged.   
 After the new year began, Grissom expressed his frustration in a way no other  
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astronaut has ever done.  On January 22, the Apollo 1 crew traveled from California to  
spend time with their families in Texas.  Unfortunately their stay only lasted one day, 
because on January 23 they had to fly to the Cape for a week of launch countdown 
simulations.  But on the morning he left home, Grissom walked into a courtyard and 
pulled a large Texas lemon from a tree.  When he made it to Florida, he hung the lemon 
on one of the simulators located at the Kennedy Space Center.  The moment symbolized 
the inadequacy of the training sequence.  Yet Grissom’s increasing disgust did not 
prompt a reconsideration of that sequence.  His spacecraft was waiting for him, sitting 
atop a Saturn IB booster at Launch Pad 34.  His crew climbed inside for simulated 
countdowns throughout the following week, which culminated in a “plugs out” test on 
Friday, January 27.  This would test the ability of the spacecraft to operate on internal 
power, rather than power supplied by cables, throughout the countdown until T-0.  After 
that, the crew would train for an emergency evacuation from the spacecraft.  Grissom, 
White, and Chaffee looked forward to the end of the day, because they would then return 
to Houston.113 
 When the crew climbed inside the vehicle that afternoon, none of their colleagues  
doubted their ability.  For almost a year, the three had studied their particular spacecraft 
as it had evolved in Downey, monitored the exhaustive systems checks, read the 
discrepancy reports, and had even sat inside the vehicle while suited up in altitude 
chambers and at the launch pad.  Despite the frustration concerning the simulator, the 
crew had spent enough time inside to know the locations and proper positions of the 
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more than 400 switches and displays.114  Of the many books that their fellow astronauts 
have written, none has argued that Grissom, White, and Chaffee were less than worthy 
choices to make the first piloted Apollo mission.  In retrospect, the three should have 
decided to scrub the test when communications troubles stopped the simulated 
countdown at T-10 minutes.  Some of the test conductors at the Cape argued for this, but 
to no avail.  The crew waited for the hold to end until 6:31 p.m., when Grissom noticed 
fire spreading underneath his couch.  One of his colleagues promptly made a startling 
transmission: “Fire!  We’ve got a fire in the cockpit!”115             
 In the horrifying seconds that followed, the three men implemented their 
spacecraft egress training.  Rather than panicking, the men recalled what they had been 
taught to do and set to work in the manner of the experienced test pilots they were.  
There were no fire extinguishers aboard the vehicle.  Grissom instead tried to fight the 
fire by dumping the cabin pressure.  He reached his gloved hand through flames and at 
least made an effort to activate the valves, according to engineers who examined the 
cabin afterwards.  He also removed the headrest on White’s couch so that his crewmate 
could grab a torque wrench and begin to ratchet open the inner hatch.  White did make 
some progress in retracting the locking bars, with Grissom’s assistance, but the hatch did 
not allow for quick escape.  The most difficult job belonged to Chaffee in the right-hand 
seat.  Instinct would have told him to leave a burning spacecraft as soon as possible.  Yet 
he stayed in his seat, as he had been trained, to maintain communications with the 
                                                          
114  Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, 214. 
115  Leopold, 249-250.  
232 
 
CapCom until his two crewmates could finish opening the hatch.  “We’re burning up!” 
he exclaimed, eighteen seconds after the first report.  Those listening at the Cape and 
Houston heard a brief shout of pain, then only silence.  Thick smoke and carbon 
monoxide had quickly entered the cabin and caused the astronauts to breathe toxic 
fumes.  When Pad Leader Don Babbitt finally opened the hatch at 6:36 and said, “I can’t 
tell you what I see,” the realization dawned on everybody listening that the crew was 
dead.116 
 Fifty years later, what lessons do the deaths of Grissom, White, and Chaffee 
carry?  The one consoling lesson is that the crew reacted to the emergency as they had 
been trained.  All accidents involve human limitations in some way, and the ensuing 
investigation revealed that several limitations applied in this case: frayed wiring prone to 
electrical arcs, a pure oxygen atmosphere that quickly spread flames, and a hatch that 
could not be opened in less than 90 seconds.  But there is a difference between 
limitations in terms of design failures and those in terms of operator failures, as when a 
pilot makes a controlled flight into terrain.  The astronauts had trained for spacecraft 
egress eight times in the past, and did so perfectly while facing death.  Thus they do not 
belong to the statistic cited earlier about direct human error causing a high percentage of 
accidents.117  But the tragedy also carried a lesson for the future training of astronauts.  
The Apollo team sought to demonstrate the resolve needed to meet the end of the decade 
deadline to land men on the Moon, now less than three years away.  But an excessive 
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focus on meeting the deadline would compromise safety.  Future crews needed 
assurance that their simulators had been updated to match their spacecraft.  This required 
engineers to eliminate the sense of “go fever” that had caused the Apollo 1 launch to be 
scheduled for February 1967, despite the disappointing state of both the spacecraft and 
simulator, and take the time to make sure future crews would receive high fidelity 
training. 
As the head of the Simulation Branch at MSC, Stanley Faber remembered well 
what the gift of time meant for Apollo.  The fire caused all flights to be delayed until an 
investigation board could release a report and North American contractors could modify 
the spacecraft to repeat any future accidents.  Personnel in Houston and the Cape thus 
had the time to improve the simulator without the pressure of more flights.  Faber 
explained, “When we had…the major accident there, the program management…got a 
little more logical and set a much more logical target date for the launch of the 101 
spacecraft (the production number of the CSM that the Apollo 7 crew rode on the first 
piloted flight after the fire)…In that break between the fire and the 101 flight, we 
completed the mandatory portions of the simulator.”  This included the successful 
installation of the DDP-224 computers that controlled the simulator.118  Nothing proved 
more crucial than this, because the instructors now knew they could place astronauts 
inside without fear of the simulator stalling and reset it to allow them to train repeatedly 
for their most critical tasks.  “The simulations settled down; the flight software got a lot 
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better,” confirmed Hughes of the months following the fire.119  The comments of Faber 
and Hughes bring to mind Chris Kraft’s observation about the significance of the Apollo 
1 tragedy.  “I hesitate to say this, but I have to say it,” he said decades later.  “I don’t 
think that we would have gotten to the Moon in the Sixties if we had not had the fire.  
That’s a terrible thing to say, but I think it is true.”120  The logic behind this observation 
was that the aftermath of the tragedy gave the Apollo team time to reevaluate and 
improve their work before risking any more lives.    
 The improvement came not only with the simulations involving astronauts, but 
also the simulations involving the flight controllers who would have to support them.  
The sequence of Apollo missions devised by Owen Maynard called for two unmanned 
Saturn V test launches over the upcoming year, so the controllers needed training to 
support the maiden flights of the mightiest rocket ever flown successfully.  Dick Koos 
remembers using the GSSC to simulate Saturn V launches.  “Not all of the things we 
wanted to do had been programmed yet,” he explains.  “But we did have the capability 
of doing engine outs and creating whifferdills in launch trajectories when we did 
simulations.”  The controllers learned the correct responses to any foreseeable 
malfunctions from the hours they spent in the control center, whether it was to burn an 
engine longer than planned to compensate for the loss of another engine or even to set 
off charges to detonate the vehicle if the Saturn V veered off target and threatened 
people below.121  On November 9, the rocket made its first launch on the Apollo 4 
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mission.  The Saturn’s 7.5 million pounds of thrust sent a CSM more than 11,000 miles 
away from Earth, before the spacecraft plunged back to the Pacific Ocean at almost 
25,000 miles per hour.  This flight proceeded almost flawlessly, but during the Apollo 6 
mission the controllers especially learned the benefit of Koos’s simulations.  On April 4, 
1968, the Saturn suffered a severe pogo effect during first stage flight, the loss of two 
out of five engines during second stage flight, and the failure of its one third stage engine 
to fire once in Earth orbit.122   
 Despite the disappointing Apollo 6 flight, Cliff Charlesworth’s flight control 
team delivered an exemplary performance in responding to the glitches.  “We simulated 
two engine outs and that was what happened during the real flight of Apollo 6,” Koos 
explains.  “The flight controllers had seen that so many times, they knew what to do.  
They knew to command the Apollo spacecraft’s Service Propulsion System (SPS) to 
complete the trajectory (to compensate for the failures of multiple Saturn engines).  
Charlesworth thought the Saturn would probably break up, because simulations gave it 
such a weird trajectory that it wouldn’t stay together.”  But the Saturn V survived the 
real flight intact and vindicated Koos’s decision to simulate the engine loss scenario for 
the controllers ahead of time.  “I came in the next day to Charlesworth’s office and he 
said, ‘I thought you were back in that sim room all the time (during Apollo 6),’” Koos  
remembers today.  “This shows the level of fidelity that the simulations had.”123            
In the meantime, the training of astronauts paused only briefly in the wake of the  
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tragedy.  Slayton decided in March 1967 to name Wally Schirra, Donn Eisele, and Walt 
Cunningham as the crew of Apollo 7.  This crew would finish the job of their deceased 
colleagues by taking the CSM on its first piloted flight.  These three also discovered 
what the gift of time meant for them: a much more thorough training regimen than 
would have been the case without the tragedy.  The astronauts spent one hour each 
weekday performing physical exercise.  The process of learning the spacecraft began 
with systems briefings, as Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham (as well the backup crew of 
Tom Stafford, John Young, and Gene Cernan) listened to North American instructors 
explain every aspect of their ship for five hours every weekday.  The sessions were so 
lengthy because the instructors believed this provided for “maximum retention and 
learning.”124  Among the most notable briefings covered the possibility of a fire in the 
spacecraft.  In the aftermath of Apollo 1, the crew learned from an MSC engineer about 
the new fire suppression equipment in the CSM.  They also reviewed “burn test” films 
and the procedures they would utilize to egress where Grissom, White, and Chaffee had 
been unable.  Another notable briefing concerned a first in American spaceflight: the use 
of a television camera to broadcast from a spacecraft.125  The RCA company provided a 
slow-scan, black and white camera that the crew learned to operate, and the three went 
on to win an Emmy for their Apollo 7 telecasts.126     
Training entered a new phase in April, as the crew logged their first simulator  
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time.  Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham logged hundreds of hours in the CMS over the 
following year and a half, about one-third of their total training time.  The SimSups were 
so exacting that they logged each malfunction that they threw at the astronauts.  They 
did not expect the astronauts to have all the answers, especially for the glitches they 
inserted for study purposes.  Schirra had to become the guinea pig who responded to the 
Saturn IB colliding with the tower right after liftoff or the first stage of the rocket failing 
to separate from the upper stage.  The SimSups kept a long list of all the problems he 
solved, watching his prompt and correct responses to everything from fuel cell leaks, to 
oxygen tank leaks, to computer display failures, to RCS failures, to the main parachute 
failing to deploy automatically.  The list of malfunctions he did not discover totaled only 
six.  Eisele and Cunningham had similarly strong records.127  Every session took three to 
four hours out of their days, but after this they often headed from Houston to Downey 
aboard their T-38 jets.128  The duration of systems briefings, simulator sessions, and 
cross country flights confirmed that Apollo training would leave less time at home for 
the astronauts than ever.   
The men spent time with families, made hunting and fishing trips, and attended 
sporting events on weekends, but even this narrow opportunity dwindled as the crew 
moved closer to flight.  The astronauts were aware of the string of troubling news that 
came prior to the first piloted Apollo flight, from the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, to the 
assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Bobby Kennedy, to riots in inner cities and 
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universities (some of the astronauts even considered volunteering as pilots in Vietnam 
after the fire put Apollo flights on hold).  They were also aware that amid all this 
troubling news, the NASA budget dwindled in fiscal 1968 to its lowest point in five 
years.  This eventually meant that many astronauts would be denied their trips to the 
Moon.  But they could not fixate on these issues, because training required them to live a 
largely sheltered existence in Houston, Downey, and the Cape.  Nobody put it better than 
Cernan in his memoir: “The immense and growing pressures for us to succeed left little 
time to read a newspaper or listen to a television news broadcast.  Bedtime reading was a 
mission plan.  Stealing time to see our families on a weekend made us feel like 
thieves.”129                            
Yet the trips to Downey proved useful in continuing a paradigm that began in 
Mercury: providing astronaut input into spacecraft design.  Beginning in May 1967, 
Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham regularly observed a North American contractor team 
that looked far different than it did before the tragedy.  The team had replaced 
flammable materials in the cabin, implemented an oxygen/nitrogen atmosphere when the 
spacecraft was on the launch pad instead of pure oxygen, and redesigned the hatch so 
that astronauts could exit in five seconds.  Besides eliminating the conditions that had 
led to the fire, the team improved its overall attention to detail just as the investigation 
board had recommended.  Contractors supervised subcontractors more closely with an 
eye toward receiving components on time.  A Configuration Control Board had been 
formed to approve proposed changes to the CSM, so that manufacture of the ships could 
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proceed in a more orderly manner.  A Crew Safety Review Board had also been formed 
to evaluate the ships from an astronaut’s point of view.130   
But the team at Downey also entrusted the Apollo 7 prime, backup, and support 
crews to support them.  The astronauts combined to spend several hundred hours there, 
so they could attend major systems tests and climb inside the spacecraft cockpit.  The 
most critical occasion to sit inside came when the engineers placed the vehicle in an 
altitude chamber that could reproduce most of the hostile conditions of space.  The time 
spent in Downey proved worthwhile, because it allowed the astronauts to make 
suggestions for improvement.  For instance, John Young wrote a report in which he 
praised the crew checklist but also argued that computers, inverters, pumps, fans, and 
radios operated longer than necessary.  Reports also circulated that water from the 
environmental control system leaked on the cabin floor, some headsets did not work 
well, and the quality of the drinking water suffered from chlorination.  These reports 
were hardly surprising for such a new and sophisticated spacecraft, but the important 
change from before the fire was that engineers at North American Rockwell (the 
company had merged with Rockwell Standard in September 1967) valued astronaut 
input and had an orderly process by which to heed suggestions concerning such 
inadequacies.  The astronauts also shared their messages with their peers by circulating 
reports and attending weekly pilots’ meetings.  Young concluded his report with the 
opinion “that S/C 101 is a pretty clean machine,” a far cry from the vehicle in which 
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Grissom, White, and Chaffee had died.  North American Rockwell cleared up the 13 
problem areas that a customer acceptance review had revealed and shipped the 
spacecraft to Cape Kennedy on May 30, 1968.131 
 After this, the astronauts’ travels took them far beyond Downey.  The crew went 
to Morehead Planetarium in North Carolina and the Griffith Planetarium in California to 
observe and learn all of the stars they would sight to align the CSM guidance 
computer.132  Another trip concerned the end of the mission, as the crew needed to 
prepare for their egress from the spacecraft and ocean recovery.  Schirra, Eisele, and 
Cunningham practiced egress in an MSC water tank in August, then traveled to the Gulf 
of Mexico for a higher fidelity egress simulation a few days later.133  The first question 
they wanted to answer concerned their ability to right the ship if it flipped over after 
splashdown into a nose down position.  These three and their peers found they could 
quickly reach the switch that signaled air bags to inflate and bring the vehicle right side 
up.  The astronauts also prepared for an emergency wait of up to 48 hours for their 
recovery.  Although some of their Mercury and Gemini predecessors had become seasick 
while their ships bobbed in the ocean, the first Apollo astronauts to go to the Gulf found 
they could remain healthy for that entire wait.  They did this by relying on a three man 
life raft with sun bonnets, water, a first aid kit, two desalting kits, a beacon for 
communications, and a dye marker with which to mark their position.  If water splashed 
into the spacecraft, they could use the urine collection hose to vacuum the water and 
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dump it overboard.  After the simulations, a Billy Pugh net lifted the astronauts from 
their life raft to a helicopter circling overhead.134              
 In August and September, the crew made it to the Cape for emergency 
evacuation training.  The newly redesigned hatch allowed Schirra, Eisele, and 
Cunningham to escape from the vehicle in five seconds in case of an Apollo 1-like 
emergency.  This fact and the evacuation drills the crew undertook at the Cape made a 
repeat of the tragedy highly unlikely.  But what if a catastrophe forced them to leave the 
entire pad immediately?  The primary method of doing this was to scramble across the 
Saturn IB swing arm, climb into the elevator, and descend the 218 feet from the crew 
access level to the ground.  This would take about half a minute.  If the crew needed a 
faster escape method, they could scramble into baskets that could take them via slide 
wires to a bunker over 1,000 feet away.  If a Saturn IB explosion threatened them, the 
astronauts would have no time to think, only time to implement the correct procedure.  
Thus Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham placed their knowledge to the test at their launch 
site (Pad 34).  They could take comfort in the knowledge that since the fire, the pad 
featured structural improvements, improved firefighting equipment, and improved 
access to the spacecraft and escape routes.135       
 During the few weeks remaining before launch, the crew stayed in the loop for 
the most critical decisions affecting the flight.  The three men suited up and climbed 
inside their spacecraft for a countdown demonstration test on September 17.  After 
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returning to Houston, they shared their input concerning the spacecraft, the Saturn IB, 
the launch pad, Mission Control, and their training at an October 3 Flight Readiness 
Review.136  Occasions such as these illustrated that the job of astronaut still involved 
much more than climbing inside a cockpit and flipping switches.  Engineers at NASA 
and North American Rockwell valued their opinions on technical issues.  Thus this crew 
had spent the past year and a half not only preparing for spaceflight, but also 
participating in design reviews of their vehicle, the development of the checklist they 
would follow, and the development of the flight rules they would follow.  On the 
morning of October 11, the time had come for Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham to 
finally place the memory of the fire to rest and demonstrate what a well-trained trio of 
astronauts could accomplish.        
 The Apollo 7 crew indicated the value of training through the teamwork they 
exercised during eleven days in orbit.  Whereas Gemini missions had only required two 
astronauts to work together, this one required three.  These three were highly diverse.  
Schirra was a naval aviator who had flown in space twice before and viewed Apollo 7 as 
a test flight of the spacecraft.  He believed that any exotic scientific experiments would 
only detract from that goal.  Eisele was an Air Force aviator who had not flown in space 
before.  Cunningham was a civilian who had not flown either, but had worked for the 
RAND Corporation while pursuing a doctorate in physics.  But after their simulator 
hours, the three learned each other’s strengths and proved compatible when placed to the 
ultimate test.  The two younger astronauts confirmed this in recalling the flight.  Eisele 
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explained, referring to Schirra, “We both checked each other and we did it on a 
simulator.  One or the other would start to do something, start the wrong way or forget to 
do it when you should, and we’ve always just kind of overlapped each other that 
way.”137  Cunningham explained, “We could do the job regardless of who we were 
flying with.  Nobody did any psychological evaluations before they put us together.  The 
media thought that somehow there was some big fancy selection process that matched 
crews psychologically.  We didn’t have time for that nonsense.”138  The duration and 
intensity of the training sequence made crew compatibility in flight a realistic possibility. 
 The most important phase of the flight came during the first two days, when the 
crew rendezvoused with their Saturn IB upper stage.  Right after insertion into orbit, the 
spacecraft separated from the Saturn IB upper stage and Schirra fired the RCS thrusters 
to move back toward it.  This was not an especially easy task for Schirra, because he was 
used to flying sleek fighter planes as a naval aviator.  The control stick felt differently in 
his hands while flying the CSM, because “Apollo was a big, unwieldy vehicle, like 
flying a big transport plane, which fighter pilots don’t really revere.”  But like all skilled 
test pilots who trained extensively on simulators, his senses were attuned to the 
movement of the vehicle.  This allowed him to pulse the thrusters while staying in plane 
with the rocket stage, until his ship was just four feet away from it.  He had just 
simulated one of the most critical maneuvers in a voyage to the Moon: the CSM 
extracting the LM from its housing in a spent rocket stage and then docking with it.   
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Without this, a Moon landing could not happen.139   
 The crew then moved into a slightly different orbit than the rocket and tested 
their ability to make a rendezvous using the large SPS engine at the back of their ship.  
The SPS fired successfully, as it did eight times during the mission, which gave 
engineers confidence that it could send future astronauts into and out of lunar orbit.  But 
the crew needed to place their training to the test as well.  The long hours in the 
simulator proved useful when the crew activated the proper program in their guidance 
computer and computed the maneuver that would be needed to reach the rocket in just a 
few minutes.  The three men thus proved they could compute the maneuver onboard just 
as the flight controllers could from the ground.  They also proved they could take 
corrective action in case their judgments disagreed with the computer.  The computer 
sent a signal to place the spacecraft in an attitude about 10 degrees out of plane in yaw.  
Schirra considered this excessive, so he reduced the yaw angle by about a half before the 
computer executed the Terminal Phase Initiation program that would send them to a 
rendezvous.  Meanwhile, Eisele used a sextant to track the target as his ship moved 
toward it.  About 30 hours into the flight, the crew had made a safe rendezvous within 
their propellant limits.  From a training standpoint, the point here was that a skilled crew 
offered benefits to a mission beyond that of an unmanned mission.  The Apollo 7 crew 
had demonstrated this by making corrective movements in attitude and translation and 
tracking their target.  As in Mercury and Gemini, launching a crew highly trained in  
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these actions increased the chances of mission success.140    
 As the eleven days continued, Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham continued to 
prove the benefits of their presence.  When the astronauts carried out their tests of the 
environmental, electrical, thermal control, and guidance systems, they did what no 
purely automated vehicle could do: observe the tests with trained eyes and provide 
detailed verbal feedback, both at the time and in postflight debriefings.  For instance, 
Eisele navigated the spacecraft by making star sightings.  He found this more difficult 
than expected, because wastewater dumps produced frost particles that made star 
identification difficult and the Earth’s horizon was too indistinct an object with which to 
gauge the star sightings.  But he still learned what he could accomplish and offered 
suggestions for future improvement.  The crew’s presence was also useful because the 
tracking stations on the ground did not allow flight controllers continuous contact with 
them.  “It was the first time that we ever had this spacecraft up and we were in contact 
with the ground 5 percent of the time,” Cunningham pointed out.141  This left the crew 
often on their own in solving problems; although there were no major ones, they could 
notice easily correctable ones like moisture forming on coolant lines and fuel cells with 
high temperatures.  Schirra also praised Eisele in recalling, “He saved the computer a 
couple of times, when the ground screwed it up.  One time the computer went down, he 
fixed it between ground stations.  I love that!”142  When historians write about Apollo 7, 
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they usually fixate on the crew’s ill-tempered interactions with Mission Control.  But far 
more important is that Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham splashed down on October 22 
having proven the value of the human element in an Apollo spacecraft.   
 This came just in time for one of the boldest actions in the history of spaceflight.  
The original plan called for Jim McDivitt, Dave Scott, and Rusty Schweickart to fly 
Apollo 8, during which they would become the first crew to test the Lunar Module in 
space.  Frank Borman, Mike Collins, and Bill Anders would then become the first crew 
to ride the Saturn V, ascend to an altitude of four thousand miles, and test the LM again.  
Collins learned in July 1968 that he needed neck surgery, so Jim Lovell replaced him on 
this crew.143  But the technical hurdles of preparing the LM to fly by the end of 1968 
proved too much to overcome.  When the Grumman team shipped McDivitt’s LM to the 
Cape that summer, inspectors had found over 100 defects.  It quickly became clear that if 
Apollo 8 was going to fly by the end of the year, it would have to do so without a LM.  
What could the Apollo 8 crew do with only a CSM at their disposal?  As manager of the 
Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, George Low had a courageous answer: fly nearly a 
quarter million miles from Earth to the Moon, make ten lunar orbits, and return.  This 
would give the Apollo team experience in navigating to the Moon and back, firing the 
SPS engine to send a spacecraft into and out of lunar orbit, and sending it back to Earth 
to reenter the atmosphere at over 24,000 miles per hour.  By 1969, the LM would 
hopefully be ready to land another crew on the Moon.  Low decided to tout this idea in 
early August and quickly won the acceptance of the highest NASA officials from 
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Houston, Huntsville, the Cape, and Washington D.C.  A December launch date to send 
Apollo 8 to the Moon appeared feasible from a hardware standpoint, all of these people 
believed, but could a crew adequately train for this challenge in time?144        
 The answer was yes, although with a change of plans in store.  When the  
conversations began, Deke Slayton immediately thought a crew could be ready by 
December.  But he knew that of the upcoming crews, McDivitt, Scott, and Schweickart 
had the greatest familiarity with the LM and there would be no LM on Apollo 8.  Thus 
he called McDivitt into his office on August 10 and explained that he wanted him to 
stick with the LM mission he had been training for, which would now become Apollo 9.  
McDivitt agreed, which cleared the way for Borman to accept the Apollo 8 mission 
instead two days later.  The first astronauts to voyage to the Moon would be Borman, 
Lovell, and Anders, if all went according to plan.145  The three men had already spent 
about one year logging a tremendous amount of simulator time, meaning neither they 
nor Slayton had concerns about their knowledge of the CSM.  But the new mission 
required the three to attend a new series of briefings while also preparing for new 
maneuvers in the simulator in just four months.  The speedy pace stands in stark contrast 
to the training of astronauts in the nearly fifty years since. 
 Borman, Lovell, and Anders could not have met the December deadline alone.  
The first key to their training was to develop a flight plan, which required the best minds 
in Kraft’s Flight Operations branch to design the mission.  These people met in Kraft’s 
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office on August 19 and determined the basic details: the Saturn V would launch on 
December 21, sending the spacecraft to a 66-hour voyage to the Moon.  The vehicle 
would slip in front of the Moon’s leading edge and, after an SPS engine burn, move into 
orbit at an altitude of 69 miles.  The vehicle would make 10 orbits over 20 hours, then 
the engine would hopefully fire again to take the crew to a December 27 splashdown.146  
The flight operations personnel quickly gave the crew a flight plan which detailed every 
action they would have to take, from sleeping, to eating, to housekeeping chores, to star 
sightings, to engine firings, to the unprecedented observations of the Moon.  Meanwhile, 
support crew astronauts Ken Mattingly, Jerry Carr, and Vance Brand coordinated the 
checklists that the prime crew would follow and worked out the details of spacecraft 
stowage.  With all of this in place, the instructors set to work reproducing the mission on 
the simulator at the Cape.  The software specialists reconfigured the simulator 
computers, while the SimSups devised new malfunctions by which to test the crew.  This 
teamwork allowed Borman, Lovell, and Anders to begin simulations for their new 
mission on September 9.147     
 No crew had ever trained as relentlessly as these three did over the next three 
months.  They spent 10 hours a day in the simulator, six days a week.  Even aside from 
this, they flew their T-38 jets from the Cape to Houston for meetings.  The workload 
proved so strenuous that they did not have time for as much physical conditioning as 
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they would have liked.148  Yet all crew members agreed that the time proved worthwhile.  
Borman noted at the mission debriefing that the crew did not need to spend nearly as 
much time with the actual spacecraft as their predecessors, because the money poured 
into the simulator made it the primary learning tool.  “The visual was a problem 
throughout most of our training cycle but, nevertheless, the CMS was adequate for 
providing the proper training,” he argued.  “The instructors here in Houston and at the 
Cape were good.”149   
Those instructors subjected the crew to a series of malfunctions broken into 
stages: launch, translunar injection, midcourse corrections, lunar orbit insertion, 
transearth injection, reentry, and splashdown.150  If Borman noticed that he had lost one 
of his ship’s fuel cells during the coast to the Moon, for instance, he would have to 
remember the mission rule and call off the insertion into lunar orbit.  For some 
malfunctions, he could go around the Moon instead and return to Earth on a free return 
trajectory (where the spacecraft utilizes the gravity of the Moon as a slingshot effect to 
return it to Earth without its own propulsion).  For others, he would have to fire the SPS 
engine to turn around and come home.  In still other cases, he might notice a malfunction 
after his ship had passed around the far side of the Moon and out of radio contact with 
Earth.  In this case, he would have no immediate help from Mission Control and would 
have to “initiate such inflight action as he deems essential for crew safety.”  One 
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situation he did not have to face in simulations was a catastrophic engine failure that left 
his crew stranded in lunar orbit.  Although the SimSups knew this was a realistic 
possibility, this would not have been a helpful simulation.  The astronauts only faced 
emergencies they could solve through the knowledge and moxie they gained during 
those 10 hour workdays.151   
 The crew spent several days studying the Moon as well.  No human had ever 
seen the Moon from 69 miles away, which meant the three men had the potential to 
contribute to lunar geology through their words and photos.  They could also determine 
if certain sites were suitable landing areas for future Apollo crews.  This prompted them 
to “schedule as much refresher and supplemental training in lunar geology as the test-
flight nature of Apollo 8 would allow,” and indeed their training summary shows over a 
dozen days devoted to these sessions.  Anders had the primary responsibility for taking 
photos, so he attended the most sessions.  When December arrived, he had a “critical 
item checklist” of landmarks to find and the geological knowledge to describe them 
intelligently.  Five Lunar Orbiter spacecraft had already returned thousands of photos, 
so the astronauts studied them but also looked forward to the much higher quality photos 
they would take.152  On December 10, the three flew to the Cape for the last time and 
isolated themselves in their crew quarters.  This limited their exposure to people who 
might carry illnesses.  After several simulator sessions, briefings on their spacecraft and 
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Saturn V, and jogs on the beach, Borman, Lovell, and Anders were ready for the 
Moon.153    
 All three believed that the first voyage of humans to the Moon matched their 
training to a high degree, although their trip did provide lessons learned for future crews.  
When the Saturn V first stage engines ignited on the morning of December 21, the 
astronauts felt a greater degree of noise and especially motion than they had in the 
DCPS.  Their dominant sensation was of the sudden movements of the vehicle that 
jerked them side to side in their harnesses.  Anders briefly felt that he would be 
catapulted against the instrument panel, while thinking that the simulations had not 
prepared him for the violence of this ride.  The three also felt the noise from the engines 
increase in their headsets.  They heard the “tower clear” call, but could not communicate 
for about 35 seconds thereafter.  If the CapCom had called for an abort, the crew would 
not have heard him.154  Thus the first launch of humans on the Saturn V strongly 
suggested the need for more realistic simulations.  The more that future astronauts would 
feel prepared for the noise and motion of the experience, the less prone they would be to 
make a mistake.  Borman mentioned the shortcomings of his launch training in the 
mission debriefing and paved the way for future crews to receive more realistic 
simulations.155 
 The outbound voyage matched the simulations much more closely.  Just short of  
three hours after launch, the single third stage engine fired to send the spacecraft beyond  
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Earth orbit.  This translunar injection burn did feel like the simulator, because the engine 
only pushed the men back in their couches with slightly more than 1 G and all felt 
comfortable taking on their roles they had rehearsed so heavily.  Borman fixed his eyes 
on the “8-ball” attitude indicator and grabbed the hand controller in case he needed to 
manually control the rocket’s steering.  Lovell looked at the computer readout and called 
out the increasing speed.  Anders fixed his eyes on the health of the fuel tanks.  The 
presence of three skilled crewmembers ready to respond to any malfunction indicated 
the flexibility of a human mission to the Moon rather than a completely automated 
one.156  For the next three days, Lovell managed to make 27 sets of star sightings.  
Because he encountered many of the same difficulties as his predecessors, his simulator 
time was an asset without which he may not have been successful.  “When the sextant 
optics were working, we were able to develop techniques that were required in flight,” 
he said of his preparation.  Sure enough, on the way to the Moon he measured the angle 
between stars and the Earth’s horizon within a few thousandths of a degree of perfection.  
Shortly after midnight on Christmas Eve, the SPS engine came to life to slow down the 
ship enough that it could enter orbit around the Moon.  Anders went to work taking 
photos, while Lovell took navigation sightings on landmarks.  The simulator could not 
prepare Lovell for landmark tracking, he lamented.  This task proved especially difficult 
when he was on the far side, the side that always faces away from Earth, because maps 
of that side were very uncertain.  Yet like the explorer he was, he eventually managed to 
locate his  
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assigned landmarks.157       
 But the larger issue with Apollo 8 concerns the question of why it was 
worthwhile to have a trained crew observe it from 69 miles high.  Why had these three 
sat in geology lectures since 1963, and then made a frenzied push to learn about the 
Moon over the last few months?  Why not just continue sending probes like the Rangers, 
Lunar Orbiters, and Surveyors that had already returned photos of the Moon?  The first 
reason was the power of the human eye.  The human eye possessed a dynamic range and 
ability to discriminate colors that no camera could match.  The three men had an average 
eye resolution of about 100 feet from their altitude and could also use a telescope that 
magnified objects ten times.  The second reason was the power of the human mind.  
Thanks to the understanding of geology they had received through training, the men 
could look at a mountain, valley, or crater and make an assessment of its importance.  If 
a feature looked surprising, for instance, they could make an immediate judgment to 
follow up with more study.  They could also use words to describe these features to 
scientists back on Earth.  Because Borman, Lovell, and Anders could do this, their 
ability surpassed an automated vehicle that simply carried out preprogrammed 
instructions.  Even aside from this, Apollo 8 photos contained a resolution one to four 
times better than Lunar Orbiter photos.158           
 The results from Apollo 8 reinforced these points.  Although frustrated by the 
 smears that covered three of their five windows, the crew achieved about 90 percent of  
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their photographic objectives while also describing their visual observations in just 20 
hours.  The astronauts’ eyes told them that the smooth maria in the southern Sea of 
Tranquility, where a future crew planned to land, contained numerous craters but did not 
pose any showstoppers for a landing vehicle.  The men did see many more craters than 
expected based on Lunar Orbiter photos, so they made the judgment to follow up on this 
unexpected development by studying their colors, textures, and possible origins, and 
even naming several of them.  Since debate still swirled in this era about how the Moon 
and its craters had formed, this work made a step toward providing scientists with data 
that would take the debate in one direction or another.  Several of the Moon’s features 
reminded them of the sites on Earth they had studied during training, especially in the 
western United States where vegetation was so scarce, indicating that their geological 
preparation there had assisted them in their efforts to help these scientists.  After taking 
their legendary Earthrise photo and reading from the Book of Genesis for about one 
billion television viewers, the astronauts returned to a safe splashdown on December 27.  
Their mission was still not over, because their spacecraft had just become the first to 
return photos and film of the Moon to Earth (which permitted more uniform processing 
and a better dynamic range than images transmitted by unmanned vehicles) and 
scientists went to work writing essays about their findings.  Apollo 8 thus showed that 
there were compelling reasons to send people to study the Moon at close range.  The  
more training these people received, the more compelling those reasons became.159       
 But as 1969 began, one question still needed an answer: could the LM take a  
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crew to the lunar surface?  Of all major Apollo components, the LM had proven to be the 
most innovative and the most plagued by problems in manufacturing.  Grumman 
engineers had grappled with propulsion system leaks, engine instability, stress corrosion, 
cracked batteries, and even ruptured tanks.160  Even when it had flown on the unmanned 
Apollo 5 mission in January 1968, a programming error resulted in the guidance 
computer aborting a descent engine burn.  The plan now called for Apollo 9 astronauts 
Jim McDivitt and Rusty Schweickart to climb inside a LM while in Earth orbit, separate 
from Scott in the CSM, and make the first piloted test flight of this ungainly ship 
containing walls one-eighth of an inch thick.  The two men knew that the ship contained 
no heat shield and therefore they would not be able to return to Earth if they could not 
redock with the CSM.  What was the best way to prepare for such a hazardous mission, 
more so from a hardware point of view than even Apollo 8?       
 The best way was to meet the contractors entrusted with developing that 
hardware on which their lives would depend and monitor their progress.  McDivitt and 
Schweickart learned of their assignment to fly aboard the LM in 1966.  Since then, they 
had made regular visits to the Grumman plant as engineers assembled their ship (LM-3) 
and then tested its systems as astronauts operated the controls in the cockpit.  The 
contractors even set up trailers in the parking lot near the Assembly and Test clean room 
so the astronauts could live on site.  This meant that if McDivitt and Schweickart 
questioned any aspect of the LM design, they could easily ask or argue with the 
engineers who had built it.  They could also observe firsthand any issues that arose 
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during testing that might endanger their flight.  Tom Kelly, the chief engineer for the 
LM, expressed his admiration for the dedication of the Apollo 9 crew in understanding 
the vehicle.  “Their curiosity, persistence, and endurance knew no bounds,” he wrote.161  
This reflected the test pilot’s classic mentality to not simply climb aboard a vehicle, but 
to understand it before flight so as to evaluate it as thoroughly as possible.  McDivitt and 
Schweickart were in the astronaut corps because they had backgrounds as pilots who did 
just that, and their long flights from Texas to New York in advance of Apollo 9 allowed 
them to continue that tradition.        
 The simulations for Apollo 9 were the most complex in the brief history of 
spaceflight, because for the first time astronauts would be flying in two vehicles.  Riley 
McCafferty is once again the best source in explaining the difficulty of readying both the 
CMS and LMS to support Apollo 9 training.  The LMS was supporting a crew for the 
first time, meaning the engineers who worked under McCafferty’s leadership especially 
struggled in solving the problems with this machine.  The software specialists needed to 
prove the simulator computers could support complex maneuvers, while the hardware 
specialists needed to prove they could modify the simulator to keep it consistent with 
LM-3.  On top of that, the engineers needed to wire both simulators to allow radio 
communication from Houston to the Command Module, from Houston to the Lunar 
Module, and from the Command Module to the Lunar Module.  “I guess my whole crew, 
during that period of time, averaged 50-55 hours a week across the board,” McCafferty 
recalled.  But he also argued, “Nobody really made mistakes because they got tired, or 
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made mistakes because they’d been working so long.  They stayed keyed up all the 
time.”  Yet he estimated that the crew lost two hours of simulator time per week due to 
technical difficulties during January and February 1969 and wanted to avoid repeating 
this for any future crews.162 
The value of the simulators was at a premium by this point, because each new 
flight contained new maneuvers that no previous crew had accomplished.  The Apollo 9 
crew needed to not only repeat the training that their predecessors had already received 
in launch, navigation, troubleshooting of systems, reentry, and splashdown, but also 
become trailblazers in two new tasks.  After launch, the CSM Gumdrop (crews named 
their ships for the rest of Apollo) would separate from the third stage of the Saturn V and 
move back around toward the LM Spider, nestled inside the rocket.  David Scott would 
grab the hand controller and guide his ship to a docking with Spider.  A tunnel linked the 
two ships together, so the crew could move back and forth between them.  All three men 
also trained for the first rendezvous of two spacecraft both containing astronauts.  
McDivitt and Schweickart would fly Spider to just over 100 miles away from Scott in 
Gumdrop, to a point below and behind it, then perform a series of maneuvers that moved 
the ship’s trajectory progressively higher and to the front of their target.  With Gumdrop 
growing larger and larger in their windows, the two men would slow their relative 
motion with it until hearing the clang of their ship’s drogue engaging with Gumdrop’s 
probe.163   
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But as with all aspects of Apollo, simulating the desired outcome was only the 
first step in preparing for a mission.  The men also simulated situations where Spider 
could not make these maneuvers.  If Spider could not do so within a minute of when it 
was scheduled, Scott would have to rescue his crewmates using Gumdrop propulsion.  
During the daytime portion of an orbit, he could clearly see the target he needed to 
chase.  But he also took part in nighttime simulations, when he could only see a flashing 
light to assist him.  Other simulations covered the possibility of the two ships being 
unable to dock with each other.  The lives of McDivitt and Schweickart would then 
depend on their ability to make an EVA in just forty-five minutes to rejoin Scott, so the 
two practiced donning their suits and making the transfer.  Finally, Scott took part in 
emergencies where he had to leave his crewmates behind and return to Earth alone.  This 
required him to quickly switch between the three seats, dividing his attention between all 
sides of the instrument panel, before settling into the left-hand seat for reentry and 
splashdown.164        
While admitting their frustration with the simulator breakdowns, the crew  
considered the last two months of their training the most beneficial because of the 
integrated simulations they were able to perform.165  The sessions were as high fidelity 
as possible, because they included flight controllers, tracking station personnel, and 
contractors who had built the hardware in two rooms across the hall from Mission 
Control: the Spacecraft Analysis Room (SPAN) and Mission Evaluation Room (MER).  
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From SPAN, chief engineer Tom Kelly saw data from Spider and tried to gather as many 
experts as possible to solve life threatening malfunctions.  When he had received enough 
advice, he made Grumman’s official recommendation to the senior NASA person in the 
room.  Given that two astronauts would have to depend for the first time on arguably the 
most hazardous component in the whole program, the people who had lived with the 
hardware for the past several years had become vital and needed this training in real-
time problem solving.  Kelly believed that by the last integrated simulation in mid-
February, he belonged to “a finely honed mission support team.”166             
 The Apollo 9 flight plan also called for Schweickart to step outside Spider and 
make an EVA.  He would wear a backpack attached to his suit called the Portable Life 
Support System (PLSS), which would protect astronauts on the lunar surface.  But since 
this backpack was a complex unit that provided oxygen, water, and radio 
communications, Schweickart planned to test it before the Apollo 11 crew went to the 
Sea of Tranquility.  Whereas Buzz Aldrin had trained for the last Gemini EVA at a pool 
in Baltimore, Schweickart became the first to train for an EVA at a pool in Houston 
called the Water Immersion Facility (WIF).  Engineers moved this pool from Ellington 
Air Force Base to Building 5 at MSC and equipped it with external viewing ports, a 
decompression chamber, a ladder, a hoist, lighting, and heating.  When NASA had hired 
six scuba personnel needed for operations, the pool opened in June 1967.167  Schweickart 
spent 12.5 hours in this facility, which prepared him to follow a timeline while 
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maneuvering from a LM mockup to a CSM mockup, and do so while minimizing 
fatigue.  He also made 71 parabolas aboard the KC-135 aircraft so he could feel true 
weightlessness prior to launch.  He tested the PLSS backpack in a vacuum chamber as 
well, so he could feel assured that it would protect him during his mission.  Finally, in 
February after he had accomplished all this, he took part in a one-G simulation of the 
EVA.  His thorough preparation illustrated that the space agency had quickly cast aside 
the unrealistic training methods and expectations that had characterized most of the 
Gemini EVAs.  The underwater method pioneered at a little known company in 
Maryland had become fully incorporated at a federal government agency, where it has 
remained ever since.168  
 The Apollo 9 flight succeeded as well as the most optimistic person could ever 
have hoped, and once again the crew provided reminders of what trained astronauts 
could accomplish to solve problems.  After liftoff on March 3, Scott tried to align 
Gumdrop with Spider for docking but found that he had lost translation capability to the 
left.  The crew needed to know enough to discover that propellant valves were closed.  
After opening them, Scott guided Gumdrop to a gentle docking and terminated all 
motion between the two ships in just ten seconds.  When McDivitt and Schweickart 
floated across the tunnel into Spider, they could put their test pilot skills to work on a 
new machine.  They reported on the smooth firing of the descent engine when docked 
with Gumdrop, an experiment which would unexpectedly prove useful when the lives of 
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the Apollo 13 crew depended on it.  The most critical moment came during day five, 
when Spider undocked and flew free of Gumdrop.  Scott visually inspected the ship 
carrying his two crewmates and found the landing gear had fully extended.  McDivitt 
and Schweickart grappled with roughness during the manual throttle-up of their engine, 
a guidance system that caused over control of the vehicle, and a computer that 
incorrectly calculated the maneuver to send them back to Gumdrop.  Yet as they had 
been trained, the astronauts reported on the first two issues and solved the third by 
retargeting the computer.  The two men jettisoned their descent stage, thrusted their 
ascent stage toward Gumdrop, achieved radar lock, and rejoined Scott after six hours 
away.  Given the groundbreaking nature of this flight and the complexity of the 
hardware involved, the need for problem solving came as no surprise.  Because these test 
pilots were there to respond and describe, future crews benefited from them.169       
When the Apollo 9 crew splashed down on March 13, only one hurdle remained  
before the first Moon landing.  Tom Stafford, John Young, and Gene Cernan now 
planned to take the CSM Charlie Brown and the LM Snoopy to lunar orbit on the Apollo 
10 mission.  The first astronauts to fly the LM above the Moon would be Stafford and 
Cernan, but they would descend to only about 47,000 feet before flying back to rejoin 
Young.  This crew provided a useful case study in the training of experienced astronauts.  
The three men had five Gemini flights between them and they had already served as the 
Apollo 7 backup crew.  Not only had they logged hundreds of hours on Gemini and 
Apollo simulators, they also had the camaraderie of having worked together for years.  
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While deficient interpersonal communication has factored into several aircraft accidents 
over the years, this crew made that possibility very unlikely.170  The experience also 
allowed for them to streamline their training.  These astronauts could do away with 
planetarium visits, centrifuge runs, and spacecraft fire briefings.  They also halted major 
simulation activity two weeks before their May launch, so they could relax and focus on 
physical conditioning at the Cape.  Stafford, Young, and Cernan all felt this approach 
placed them in a desirable physical and mental state before going to the Moon.171  “We 
weren’t starting at the bottom with these fellows, we were starting midway or 30 percent 
of the way up the ladder,” Riley McCafferty explained.  “The crews were progressively 
getting in better shape as we flew.  Apollo 10 was in better shape than Apollo 9, Apollo 9  
in better shape than 8, right on down the line.”172  
 Training for this mission made especially clear that the idea of integrated 
simulations had gathered tremendous momentum as the best way to prepare for flights 
with two piloted vehicles.  When Stafford and Cernan flew free in Snoopy, they would 
need to coordinate their actions with Young and Mission Control in achieving a lunar 
orbit rendezvous with Charlie Brown.  How could the men manage this task without 
being able to see each other?  Stafford and Cernan were adamant that the only effective 
way to prepare for this was to work together in separate simulators while also hearing 
the CapCom in their headsets.  Stafford called a flight with two different vehicles “a 
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completely different world” in this respect, and explained this was why “we pushed to 
have the simulators in Houston integrated.”  Cernan made an even more emphatic 
assessment: “Running rendezvous closed loop with one simulator and not tying into any 
other simulator became, after a period of time, to be almost negative training.  You don’t 
ever really get a feel for what the guy in the other spacecraft is doing and what his 
problems are or what his timeline is like until you start operating integrated.”  As the 
astronauts moved to the Cape shortly before launch, they decided to prepare for 
rendezvous in no other way.173  Yet the men had no way of knowing during their 
simulations that two incidents in space would test their judgment and training as much as 
any in the whole program. 
 The first came during the engine burn that sent them out of Earth orbit on May 
18.  For the first three minutes, Stafford, Young, Cernan felt the vehicle vibrate at the 20 
hertz level they had expected from simulations.  But the vibration then jumped to an 
estimated 50 to 70 hertz.  The instrument panel blurred to the point that Stafford could 
not read it.  About three and a half years earlier, he had sat atop a Titan rocket and 
observed Schirra make a judgment call that saved a Gemini mission.  Now the 
opportunity to make a judgment call fell to him.  He did not have a precise vibration 
figure on the panel, which he could not read anyway, and did not have a mission rule 
that called for him to twist the abort handle if the figure reached a certain level.  He also 
said during the mission debriefing, “We’d never seen it before and never heard about it.”  
Thus Stafford could not simply regurgitate what he had already done in a simulator.  He 
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had the more difficult job of judging whether the vibration imperiled the structural 
integrity of the vehicle and, if necessary, aborting before this could happen.  All three 
astronauts mentally prepared for an abort and even considered it likely at first.  But 
Stafford judged that the burn could continue and his instinct proved correct.  The engine 
shut down after three minutes of the unusually high vibration, he saw that the vehicle 
was on course, and engineers later determined that the vibration was within design 
limits.174  A less well trained and savvy astronaut might have chosen to end the flight, 
but Stafford and his crew continued to the Moon.   
 After entering lunar orbit on May 21, Stafford and Cernan climbed into Snoopy 
the next day and undocked with Charlie Brown.  The descent engine took the two men 
from 69 miles above the Moon to just 8.9 miles, where they took photos and described 
the features along the path to the southern Sea of Tranquility.  Since the Moon had no 
atmosphere, the astronauts could travel at this low altitude while traveling just 3,700 
miles per hour, compared to the 200 mile altitude and 17,500 mph speed of Earth orbit.  
This radically different experience called for a new training method, and the most useful 
analog appeared to be aircraft flight (commercial airplanes typically fly a few thousand 
feet below Snoopy’s lowest altitude).  Stafford and Cernan thus simulated the LM 
trajectory in T-38 flights, while describing geological features out their windows.  They 
also listened to briefings on lunar geology and spent hours studying maps.  The training 
proved beneficial, again due to the power of the human eye.  Since the two men knew 
what to look for and could see small details below them, they could report that 
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astronauts landing on the Sea of Tranquility could expect a smooth area on the near end 
of the targeted site but a much rougher far end.  Like those who had explored the Earth 
in generations past, they could pave the way for their successors by reporting 
observations.  Young said it best when he declared, “You can see down into the shadows 
of those craters in Earthshine on the Moon…Now, you’ve never seen a picture come 
back from the Moon that saw down into the shadows of the craters—not one.  With the  
human eye, it’s a piece of cake.”175   
 One of the scariest moments in Apollo came during Snoopy’s second pass around 
the Moon, when Stafford and Cernan were almost ready to jettison the descent stage and 
fire their ascent engine to return to Charlie Brown.  A few seconds before this was slated 
to happen, the LM went into a violent spin.  Pitch and yaw rates quickly increased until 
Snoopy tumbled at about sixty degrees per second.  Not since Gemini VIII had any 
astronaut needed to make a quick response to a tumbling spacecraft, and Stafford and 
Cernan were much lower than that crew had been.  If they could not eliminate the 
motion, the vehicle would drift into gimbal lock and their ability to navigate would be 
compromised.  Most ominously, only forty seconds remained until their ascent engine 
was scheduled to fire, and if the vehicle was aimed in the wrong direction at that time 
the engine might send them off target from Charlie Brown or plunge them right into the 
lunar surface.  “Son of a bitch!  What the hell happened?” Cernan blurted.  But like Neil 
Armstrong before him, Stafford had several factors working to his advantage: years of 
experience piloting new and occasionally temperamental flying machines, hundreds of 
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hours maneuvering the LM simulator, and the clarity of mind to understand what would 
be most helpful in alleviating a crisis.  First, he flipped the switch to jettison the descent 
stage.  “I blew off the descent stage because I knew we’d get a better torque-to-inertia 
ratio,” he explained.  “This was because all the thrusters were on the descent stage.”  He 
then took the hand controller and, using the RCS thrusters, damped out the unwanted 
motion.176  According to Cernan, only a few seconds remained before he and Stafford 
would have been unable to find their ticket home.177    
Stafford’s response became even more impressive when engineers traced the 
problem to a mundane issue that was not simulated in advance.  The abort guidance 
system the crew planned to test during their upcoming engine burn had two control 
modes: “attitude hold” and “automatic.”  Cernan knew the switch in the cockpit should 
be set to “attitude hold,” so he flipped the switch there.  Stafford did not realize his 
companion had done this, so he flipped the switch again, to the “automatic” mode that 
sent the ship into the violent gyrations.  The cause of this near disaster therefore 
connected to a training-related issue: cockpit communication.  In 1997, one researcher 
listed the barriers to pilot communication that had caused mishaps like Apollo 10’s: 
noise, multiple communications at the same time, fatigue, distractions, incomplete 
messages, ambiguous wording, lack of credibility, lack of rapport, use of jargon, and 
boredom.  Stafford was troubleshooting a minor problem when the snafu happened, so 
this emergency best fits into the category of distraction.  The point of training was to  
                                                          
176  Brooks, Grimwood, and Swenson, 310-311 and Burgess and French, 380-381. 
177  Cernan with Davis, 218.   
267 
 
eliminate all of these barriers, and indeed future crews did not make this mistake  
again.178   
The two easily correctable scares notwithstanding, the safe return of the Apollo 
10 crew meant the precursor missions could end.  This meant that the crew of Apollo 11 
would make the first Moon landing: Neil Armstrong, Mike Collins, and Buzz Aldrin.  
These astronauts set a new record for training time.  From their selection in January to 
launch in July, the men averaged 42 hours per week on specified training activities 
while averaging about 20 more hours per week on routine tasks such as reading, doing 
paperwork, and traveling.  Sundays were the only day of the week free from formal 
activity, and even then those routine tasks occupied much of their time.  Collins ended 
with 928 training hours weighted heavily toward time in the CMS, while Armstrong and 
Aldrin logged 1,298 and 1,297 because they needed to spend time in the CMS and LMS 
while also preparing to walk on the Moon.179  Yet as grueling as their preparation was, 
this crew only needed to train for three tasks that had never been done before: the 
descent from 47,000 feet to a complete stop on the lunar surface, the two and a half hour 
moonwalk, and liftoff to rejoin Collins.  Since the landing was the most technically 
difficult of these feats, training for this task proved the most vexing and the most  
remarkable.            
Armstrong and Aldrin worked with Flight Operations division personnel on the  
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most critical task affecting the landing: the formation of mission rules.  When the 
document was published in May, the men had their guidebook on what actions to take in 
the simulator and eventually above or on the Moon.  The rules covered the minimum 
capabilities that they would need to land in the electrical, environmental, guidance, and 
propulsion systems.  Some of the rules were simple and easy to remember; for instance, 
a propellant leak or a loss of radar data while the LM Eagle was descending meant the 
men would have to quickly jettison the descent stage and fire their ascent engine to 
return to the CSM Columbia.  Some of them were more complex, such as electrical 
system rules.  If Eagle lost one battery, the men should continue the landing.  If the 
vehicle lost three batteries, they should typically return to Columbia.  But if this 
happened during a late phase in the descent, after Eagle had dropped below 1,000 feet, 
they should continue the landing.  If this happened after landing, they should liftoff at 
the earliest opportunity.180  The complexity of the rules illustrated why astronauts 
needed to log hundreds of hours of simulator time.  A crew that went without it could 
not be trusted to take the proper course of action. 
 What is especially clear from the time Armstrong and Aldrin spent preparing for  
the landing is that their sessions were a learning process for all who supported them.   
Armstrong logged 383 hours in the LMS, while Aldrin logged 411.  Armstrong added 34 
hours in the LLRF at Langley and the LLTV in Houston, the two motion base simulators 
that allowed him to practice landings in one-sixth gravity.181  These sessions allowed the 
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two to learn how to respond when malfunctions arose and tested their knowledge of 
mission rules.  When the descent reached the last few hundred feet, Armstrong took over 
manual control and learned how to pilot Eagle away from hazards on the lunar surface.  
The training also honed their judgment.  For instance, Armstrong understood that an 
abort during the landing would be a risky proposition because it required shutting off 
one engine and igniting another while close to the lunar surface.  He later said that he 
might have been willing to override a mission rule and continue the landing with this 
knowledge in mind.182  Riley McCafferty remembered feeling impressed with the skills 
that these particular astronauts possessed, which made the jobs of the simulator 
personnel easier.  Armstrong had proven his skill as a test pilot and had even been 
involved in the development of the LLTV.  Aldrin and Collins already understood the 
spacecraft computers well.  Because he worked with such a skilled crew, “we could 
really make an hour in the simulator worth an hour in the simulator.”183     
 Armstrong and Aldrin also learned to work with each other.  The two needed to  
form the working relationship that all pilots and first officers on airplane flights need,  
except in this case to undertake one of the riskiest tasks in the history of flight.  These  
two men had somewhat different backgrounds, in that Armstrong was a test pilot who 
had flown planes for civilian research purposes and Aldrin was an Air Force test pilot 
and Ph.D. scientist.  The Commander maintained to the end of his life that the two 
trusted and worked well with each other, but one incident during training illustrated that 
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the two needed to learn each other’s traits.184  Armstrong reacted too slowly to an 
emergency and crashed onto the simulated lunar surface.  Aldrin confronted his 
Commander about the incident late that night, feeling that the crash had been a sign of 
weakness on their part.  Armstrong interpreted the situation differently.  He knew he 
could have aborted the landing, but since this was only a simulation he decided to test 
the flight controllers’ ability to respond to the emergency.  This fit with his general 
approach to simulator time, in which he “tried actively to encourage simulator problems 
so I could investigate and learn from them.”  Armstrong thus had an unusually analytical 
style of training to which Aldrin needed to adjust.185      
 But training for the landing affected far more than the astronauts.  The simulator 
personnel who worked under Riley McCafferty learned what they could accomplish in a 
short time period.  After the Apollo 10 crew returned their photos and film from the Sea 
of Tranquility, these engineers installed a new visual model of the landing site, 
completing it only about six weeks before the Apollo 11 launch.  These engineers also 
repaired malfunctions with their simulator in time to allow this launch to happen with a 
fully trained crew in July.  McCafferty remembered that this was a daunting task, 
because the crew could not delay their scheduled travel to wait for engineers to repair a 
simulator.  Yet he remembered that Armstrong remained patient and sympathetic.  If a 
simulator was down during a scheduled session, he switched to other training activities 
and returned whenever the CMS or LMS was ready.  “That’s really the thing that made 
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Apollo 11 for us on time,” McCafferty argued.  “Without his help and without his 
understanding, his flexibility, we couldn’t have done it.”186  Far fewer people today 
remember McCafferty’s name than Armstrong’s, but McCafferty and those who worked 
for him met the tight deadline that allowed the first Moon landing to succeed before 
decade’s end.    
 Flight controllers also went through a dramatic learning process.  In June, Gene 
Kranz and his flight control team began integrated simulations with Armstrong and 
Aldrin.  Although this idea dated back to Mercury, the controllers quickly learned that 
Moon landing simulations differed drastically from past simulations.  The sequence from 
the descent engine burn at 47,000 feet, where Stafford and Cernan had left off, to 
landing took only twelve minutes.  This left them with little time to make a decision 
whether to press ahead with a landing or to abort, and to make matters worse there was a 
communications delay of about three seconds to simulate speaking with the crew at the 
Moon.  Kranz devoted an entire chapter in his memoir to the many simulations when the 
LM crashed and he had to hear the dreaded words that the crew had been killed.  “By the 
final training run (of the first day of integrated sims) I felt like the coach of a sandlot ball 
club behind 21-0 in the third inning,” he recalled.  Chris Kraft even gave him a phone 
call because he felt concerned about the team’s performance.  But ten more days of this 
remained and Kranz’s team eventually improved their decision making.  Kranz could 
have recommended delaying the launch to allow his team more time to train, but 
recommended a July launch.  By then, controllers had gone through a learning process  
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that taught them mission rules and how to implement them in time.187   
In turn, flight operations personnel had learned from the simulations what rules 
should be changed or added.  The initial rule book went through revisions on June 20, 
July 3, and July 11.  As it turned out, one rule change saved the Apollo 11 mission.  As 
described in the introduction, Dick Koos decided to simulate a 1201 computer program 
alarm during the July 5 session.  This malfunction caught flight controller Steve Bales 
and the rest of the team off guard and resulted in a wrong decision to abort, so the rule 
book went through one last revision to reflect what program alarms a crew could 
encounter and still continue the landing.  In a remarkable coincidence, Koos had 
simulated this malfunction that would really happen on the first Moon landing during the 
last session for Kranz’s team.  Kranz inserted the revision on the day of launch, July 
16.188    
 Armstrong and Aldrin spent less than 14 percent of their training hours preparing 
for their moonwalk, because this was a much less technically demanding part of their 
mission than landing.  This was also because the two men had only about two and a half 
hours to spend outside on the Sea of Tranquility (mission planners did not know how 
long the supply of water for the cooling of their suits would last, resulting in the decision 
for a brief EVA).  Yet mission planners still had a plethora of tasks for them to 
accomplish: collect a contingency soil sample, inspect the LM from outside, test their 
bearing and locomotion in the one-sixth gravity, deploy three experiments and an 
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American flag, receive a phone call from President Richard Nixon (although this was not 
included during training sessions), and only then make their geological observations and 
collect rock samples.  Geologists wanted the astronauts to take numerous photos of the 
landscape and their equipment, so this would also have to factor into the mission 
timeline.  No previous exploration in history had included such a meticulously detailed 
timeline of tasks packed into such a short time, or had cost as much money, and 
Armstrong and Aldrin needed to train to make sure they could fulfill the planners’ 
expectations.189 
 This training took several forms.  In these days before any instructor could know 
with certainty the best way to maneuver in one-sixth gravity, Armstrong and Aldrin 
evaluated the Water Immersion Facility and KC-135 aircraft as means of simulating that 
motion.  Their suited walkthroughs with all the equipment they would have with them, 
either indoors, at the rock pile, or at the sand pile, prepared them best in following the 
packed timeline.  The June 18 walkthrough proved especially crucial because the 
geologists who would be supporting Apollo 11 sat in the backroom of Mission Control 
and heard the astronauts communicate with them on their science objectives.190  
Armstrong and Aldrin also received numerous briefings.  One covered their suits so they 
could understand the operation of the complex garment that would keep them alive: 
torso, helmet, gloves, outer boots, backpack, remote control, hoses, cables, and liquid 
cooling system.  Another covered the three experiments they would have to leave on the 
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surface: the Lunar Ranging Retroreflector, the Passive Seismic Experiment, and the 
Solar Wind Composition Experiment.  Besides understanding the idea behind the 
experiments, the astronauts learned how to carry and deploy them through thick gloves.  
Their training also took the form of one geology field trip, to the Quitman Mountains in 
western Texas on February 25.  The two communicated their findings and collected as 
many useful specimens as possible, then held a discussion with the MSC and USGS 
geologists mentioned earlier.  The geologists considered themselves lucky that 
Armstrong would take to the Moon his longstanding interest in geology.191     
 Yet another form of training concerned the possibility of life on the Moon.  
Though geologists considered this extremely remote based on observations from 
telescopes and unmanned vehicles, Armstrong, Collins, and Aldrin would be isolated 
from the rest of the public for three weeks after their return just in case they carried a 
lunar microbe with them.  A helicopter would lift them from their spacecraft in the 
Pacific Ocean to the USS Hornet, where the astronauts (dressed in their Biological 
Isolation Garments) would climb into a small trailer called the Mobile Quarantine 
Facility.  The trailer would house them on the flight back to Houston, where they would 
spend two more weeks isolated in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory while scientists 
determined they were free of lunar germs.192  The astronauts thus received a briefing on 
the possibility of back contamination and on the facilities they would live in while 
isolated, with an emphasis on communications, oxygen and decompression, sanitation,  
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emergency egress, and crew safety.193      
 The unprecedented training sequence contributed to the success of Apollo 11 in 
two major ways.  First, Armstrong demonstrated the flexibility that highly skilled and 
trained pilots could offer to a Moon landing on July 20.  He heard the two computer 
alarms during the powered descent, but knew from his training that this should not result 
in an abort if the rest of the vehicle appeared to be in good health.  Dick Koos’s 
simulation had taught the flight controllers that the alarms should not prevent the landing 
anyway, and CapCom Charlie Duke told him this.  But more dauntingly, the computer 
directed Eagle toward a crater the size of a football field that was surrounded by large 
boulders.  If this had been an unmanned mission, the vehicle would have been in serious 
trouble.  But Armstrong had the training to respond to this situation, most applicably in 
the LLTV.  He took over manual control at an altitude of 500 feet and translated forward 
by an unexpectedly large amount (1,500 feet), so he could fly past the crater.  As in his 
LLTV flights, he looked for a clear area until he found one, arrested forward and 
sideways motion so the vehicle descended straight down over that area, and shut the 
engine off after Aldrin called “Contact light.”  He heard Duke say during the last 
hundred feet that only thirty seconds of descent fuel remained, but he had landed in the 
LLTV with about fifteen seconds remaining and so did not feel overly concerned.  
Though it is impossible to know what would have happened if Armstrong had gone 
without LLTV or LMS training, he would have undoubtedly lacked the confidence to  
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take the actions that he did in responding to a crisis.194                        
 Second, he and Aldrin took the first step toward demonstrating the flexibility of 
astronauts as explorers.  The United States had not sent a pair of robots to the lunar 
surface, but two humans who had the skills that training gave them.  The two found that 
the training most helped them by giving them physical familiarity with one-sixth gravity 
and mental familiarity with the timeline.  These factors allowed them to make 
unprecedented contributions to exploration, though Soviet and American probes had 
already landed on the Moon.  About one hour after taking his “one small step” onto the 
Sea of Tranquility, Armstrong began the work of scooping 48 pounds of rock and soil 
into sample containers.  Even this total, by far the lightest of any Apollo mission, was 
over 66 times the amount ever returned from the Moon robotically.  The two also 
photographed rocks before and after lifting them, a geological technique no robot could 
match.  After the mission, geologists recognized most of the specimens as basaltic rocks, 
the kind found in areas on Earth where lava has solidified.  The rocks dated to 3.7 billion 
years old, suggesting volcanic activity at that point in Tranquility’s past.  Armstrong also 
proved a point when he observed a crater about sixty-five yards east of Eagle’s resting 
point.  He had the intuition to understand that this crater would interest the geology 
community, the mobility to stride there, and the intelligence to describe what he saw at 
close range.  Less than half an hour later, he had to climb back up the ladder into Eagle.  
But the ease with which he had performed this task whetted the appetite of geologists 
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who anticipated more ambitious missions.195  Armstrong really had taken just “one small 
step” in understanding the Moon. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
APOLLO: “I WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO SAY ENOUGH TO MY PEOPLE” 
 
The job of lunar geologist proved short-lived.  With the NASA budget in a steady 
decline, geologists understood that their opportunities to learn about the Moon through a 
trained human presence were limited.  Moon landing crews through Apollo 20, 
according to the current plan, thus needed much more thorough instruction in geologic 
exploration.  Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin did provide several lessons learned to 
guide future training.  One called for more field trips while controlling the news media 
to avoid a repeat of the incident where reporters had hounded Armstrong and Aldrin in 
the Quitman Mountains.  Another called for a more realistic simulation of lunar surface 
properties, which Armstrong had found remarkably fine grained.  Another called for a 
more realistic timeline of activities, because Armstrong needed more time to collect 
samples than anticipated.  Finally, the success of the first two moonwalkers in carrying 
out basic photo procedures called for more elaborate photo documentation of the Moon 
by future crews, who would have to train accordingly.1 
 The MSC and USGS geologists tasked with training crews implemented each of 
these lessons and more for Apollo 12 astronauts Pete Conrad, Dick Gordon, and Alan 
Bean.  Conrad and Bean made six field trips without any media coverage to distract 
them.  The trips proved more beneficial than the one their predecessors had taken, 
because these astronauts followed what they planned to accomplish on the Moon with 
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much more precision.  Conrad and Bean planned to make two outings in the Ocean of 
Storms, during which they would travel to a Surveyor spacecraft that had landed there 
two years earlier and follow a traverse route to several craters the geologists wanted 
them to sample.  The astronauts thus followed a specific traverse route during their trips.  
They did this along with the CapCom who would speak to them on the Moon and the 
geologists who would monitor their work from the backroom at Mission Control.  The 
crew also trained to spend much more time than their predecessors taking photos of 
rocks they collected and even landscape panoramas covering 360 degrees.  The high 
fidelity of these field trips helped the astronauts prepare, but MSC geologist Uel Clanton 
remembered that the process of debriefing crews on what they did well there and where 
they needed improvement proved the most helpful aspect.  The “time consuming and 
painful process” for the geology instructors to develop the photos the astronauts took, 
paste them together, and then spend several hours with the astronauts allowed the 
moonwalkers to learn from their mistakes.2   
The last few months before launch provided still more signs of the improvement 
made in training moonwalkers.  Conrad and Bean took time in August to examine the 
rocks just returned from the Sea of Tranquility.  An MSC geologist remembered this as 
helpful in allowing these astronauts to see and discuss textural features that they hoped 
to find at the Ocean of Storms.  The astronauts then made their last field trip, to the 
volcanic fields of Hawaii that geologists considered analogous to the Ocean of Storms, 
and the geologists felt the two handled every problem that confronted them, took 
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exemplary photos, and found the most useful rocks to return.3  Their last few weeks 
before launch took the crew to the Cape.  Conrad and Bean rehearsed the deployment of 
their ALSEP package, a much more advanced collection of experiments than the 
package their predecessors had deployed, in a sand pile modified to precisely simulate 
lunar surface properties.  During their evenings at the Cape, the two men reviewed 
traverse maps until they became second nature while geology instructors briefed them 
extensively on their planned activities.  This focus on lunar surface time dwarfed that of 
the Apollo 11 crew.4  Since that crew had succeeded in executing a lunar landing and 
return, training for all of the tasks associated with traveling there and back had become 
standardized.  This allowed Conrad, Gordon, and Bean to focus on the part of their flight 
that was new: making a precise landing next to the Surveyor, then making two outings 
that would take them to the western side of the Moon and further from their lander than 
their predecessors.5 
 Traveling to another world still contained surprises, however, and the launch of 
Apollo 12 provided some of the most compelling evidence yet in favor of the training 
that astronauts and flight controllers had received.  When the Saturn V sent the crew into 
a rainy Florida sky on November 14, two streaks of lightning flashed toward the launch 
tower.  The astronauts heard the master alarm sound in the cockpit and saw that the fuel 
cells had automatically disconnected.  Flight controllers saw that they had lost reliable 
data from the spacecraft.  The multibillion dollar trip to the Moon depended on solving 
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this conundrum, and training allowed controller John Aaron to do just this.  He 
recognized the random set of numbers he now saw on his console from a simulation 
about a year earlier and remembered the correct action to restore reliable data.  The 
spacecraft had a component called Signal Conditioning Equipment (SCE) that was 
responsible for converting signals from the vehicle’s sensors so that the information 
could be relayed to Mission Control.  The SCE was not working due to the sudden 
change in voltage caused by the streaks of lightning.  But he knew that if the crew 
switched to a backup (or auxiliary) power mode, the SCE would operate even with this 
change in voltage.  Thus Aaron made his suggestion, which CapCom Jerry Carr relayed 
to the crew: “Apollo 12, Houston, try SCE to Auxiliary, over.”  Everyone associated 
with this mission was lucky that this one controller had the memory to know how to 
respond to a dangerous crisis.6     
 Yet one of the astronauts also needed to know how to respond.  None of them 
flipped any switch immediately, because none knew what had happened or what to do.  
Conrad had his hand near the abort handle, however, and knew he might have to activate 
it within the next minute when he heard the call from Carr.  Neither he nor Gordon knew 
where to find this switch.  Only by chance did Bean remember from a simulation that it 
was located on the bottom right side of the instrument panel, in front of his seat.  He 
flipped the switch, which restored data to Mission Control.  Controllers could then tell 
him to reset the disconnected fuel cells, which restored power to the vehicle.  The Saturn 
                                                          
6  Alex Pasternack, “How Curiosity, Luck, and the Flip of a Switch Saved the Moon Program,” November 19, 2014, 
Motherboard, http://www.motherboard.vice.com/read/john-aaron-apollo-12-curiosity-luck-and-sce-to-aux (accessed 
September 21, 2016).   
282 
 
V safely reached space after all.  Luck played in a role in both Aaron and Bean correctly 
responding to this situation, because other controllers and astronauts may not have 
participated in the same simulations that these two remembered.  Yet their responses 
also vindicated the meticulous training sequence.7  
 Landing on the Ocean of Storms would have carried its own pitfalls if a trained 
operator had not been standing on the left side of the LM Intrepid’s cockpit.  Whereas 
Armstrong and Aldrin had landed four miles off target, Conrad needed to guide Intrepid 
to within walking distance of a spacecraft on the slopes of a crater.  But he could see that 
his target to the right of the crater looked too rough to support a landing.  Thus at a few 
hundred feet above the surface, he exercised his flexibility to slow the ship’s forward 
speed, look for and find a safe spot between two craters, and adjust the landing point.  
He also encountered an obstacle in the last hundred feet, because the engine kicked up so 
much dust that his view of the surface blurred.  This forced him to fly entirely by 
instruments, in the tradition of airplane pilots who have logged simulator time for just 
such a situation.  Bean called out “Contact light” in response to the blue light on the 
instrument panel and Conrad shut down the engine.  The vehicle touched down gently 
and later examination showed no translation and very low sink rates at the end of its 
flight.  Intrepid had also landed just 535 feet from the Surveyor.  Only a trained pilot 
could have accomplished this in the midst of the dust cloud that had obscured his 
vision.8  Although geologists wanted one of their own to explore the Moon, Conrad 
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made a telling statement during a post-mission press conference.  He said that landing 
Intrepid required all of his piloting skill.9  
 Conrad and Bean demonstrated their flexibility during their two moonwalks as 
well, although their experience did call for improvements in training.  The two men 
walked about 1,600 feet from Intrepid.  Their training in following their traverse route, 
along with the photo maps they carried on their suits, paid off when they reached all of 
their scientific targets.  Their physical training to strengthen their arms and hands paid 
off when they managed to carry their tool carrier without exhaustion, although they did 
deal with forearm ache and thirst by the time their second outing ended.10  Their training 
in making observations paid off when they found unusual specimens to study, inspected 
the Surveyor spacecraft to determine the effects of over two years on the dusty and 
irradiated Moon, and especially in digging a trench at Head Crater.  Lunar Orbiter 
photos had revealed a light colored streak on the Ocean of Storms that geologists 
suspected had originated at Copernicus Crater.  The thinking went that a meteor had 
struck the Moon and formed this crater, while throwing up ejecta that was now on the 
Ocean of Storms.  Bean noticed that when Conrad dug a trench, the color of the surface 
changed to a lighter gray and the geologists in Mission Control understood they had 
found that ejecta.  This was the kind of on-the-spot observation that vindicated the 
decision to send trained humans to the Moon.  Study of the material returned after the 
mission indicated that the Copernicus impact happened 810 million years ago, a crucial 
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event in recent geologic history.  Geologists also found that the Ocean of Storms rocks 
were 500 million years older than the Sea of Tranquility rocks, meaning the lunar maria 
were not formed by just one event.  The information in general went well beyond what 
any robotic vehicle had returned.11        
 Apollo 12 called for improvement in training in two areas.  Conrad and Bean 
found that this region of the lunar surface was rather unrevealing.  Geologists on Earth 
typically saw features that gave them clues as to the relative position of rock layers.  
This allowed them to observe and learn about the history of the Earth.  But Bean 
reported of the Moon, “That whole area has been acted on by these meteoroids or 
something else so that all these features that are normally neat clues to you on Earth are 
not available for observation.”  The two men also had shown a reluctance to make 
geologic commentary during their seven hours on the lunar surface.  Apollo 12 thus 
suggested the need for future astronauts to develop their skills in field observation and 
description by training on challenging landscapes more closely reflecting the Moon.12   
 The greatest breakthrough in this area took place in time for the Apollo 13 crew.  
As the only professional geologist in the astronaut corps, Jack Schmitt understood that 
this crew needed a compelling teacher to instill these skills in them.  He sought out Lee 
Silver, a professor at the California Institute of Technology, and arranged for him to 
meet with Apollo 13 astronauts Jim Lovell and Fred Haise.  When the astronauts traveled 
with him to California’s Orocopia Mountains for eight days in September 1969, they 
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discovered the difference between Silver and their previous instructors: he challenged 
them to a greater extent than the others.  He asked them to describe the layers of rocks 
they saw and constantly pushed for improvement from the time they went into the field 
after breakfast until supper time.  The astronauts then talked about geology around a 
campfire until retreating into their tents for the night.  Silver generally found that since 
these pilots already possessed years of experience flying airplanes, they had the skills of 
observation that could also advance lunar geology.  The astronauts were also competitive 
people who wanted their missions to stand out, and Lovell and Haise agreed that 
understanding geology was a worthwhile pursuit that would make Apollo 13 stand out.13  
The two thus made several more field trips with radios, the real equipment they would 
have with them on the lunar surface, and flight controllers there to watch them.  They 
also rehearsed their exact traverses at the Cape’s sand pile a few weeks before launch.  
They felt confident by this point that they could make a groundbreaking contribution to 
the Fra Mauro Formation, the first landing site in the lunar highlands (the lighter colored 
surface as seen from Earth).14 
 Training for this mission also marked a breakthrough for the CMPs who orbited 
the Moon while their crewmates landed on it.  On the first two Moon landings, Mike 
Collins and Dick Gordon had very limited training time for orbital observation.  Yet an 
Egyptian born geologist named Farouk El-Baz understood that with travel to and from 
the Moon already accomplished multiple times, Apollo 13’s Ken Mattingly should make 
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a much more concerted effort.  El-Baz had pored through every one of the thousands of 
photos already taken from orbit and listed every feature he could identify, from the 
tallest mountain to the smallest knob.  When he met Mattingly, he covered the walls of a 
conference room with photos marked to show Apollo 13’s orbital path and challenged 
his pupil to describe geological features from above with the kind of enthusiasm that 
Silver had for geology at ground level.15  The enthusiasm rubbed off on Mattingly 
enough that the astronaut met regularly with his instructor and even described the 
geology of Texas while passing over in an airplane (a training technique that he began 
and which all future Apollo CMPs continued).  Mattingly gradually bought into the 
importance of observation, as El-Baz attests: “He wanted to make absolutely certain that 
we get the absolute maximum return and he was very thoroughly convinced that that’s 
why we’re sending man to the Moon; or else we can send machines.  So we’d better 
prove that man is better than a machine.”16        
 Preparation for Apollo 13 did include one first in the history of training 
astronauts.  When backup crewmember Charlie Duke exposed his colleagues to the 
German measles a week before the April 11, 1970 launch, a doctor found that Mattingly 
had no immunity to this disease.  This resulted in Mattingly’s removal from the crew 
only two days prior to launch and the elevation of Jack Swigert from backup to prime 
CMP.  Since Mercury, the point of having a backup crew had been for an astronaut to 
step in during a situation like this.  But could Swigert do so in the record time of two 
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days?  Lovell admitted years later to feeling concerned about the switch, because in the 
integrated simulations he had grown used to hearing Mattingly’s voice during mission 
critical moments.17  The Commander of the backup crew, John Young, argued against 
the switch.  Yet Swigert was a highly experienced pilot who had also written the 
malfunction procedures for the Command Module.18  He had logged time in the 
simulator in late March and early April, so he did have recent training experience.  Riley 
McCafferty recalled that because of these factors, the simulator staff did not have to 
worry about teaching Swigert about the Command Module or the mission during those 
last two days.  The two days of simulations were more about making sure he 
communicated and worked well with Lovell and Haise, and his two crewmates felt 
confident that he did.19  When Ron Howard dramatized Apollo 13 in his 1995 movie, he 
portrayed fellow astronauts and flight controllers as uncertain that Swigert could do his 
job.  This portrayal gave a misleading impression of Swigert’s abilities.20 
 On the evening of April 13, Lovell, Swigert, Haise were about 205,000 miles 
away from Earth when the most famous emergency in human spaceflight placed their 
training to the ultimate test.  When Swigert stirred an oxygen tank in the CSM Odyssey, 
he did not know about an incident in a routine launch pad test a month earlier.  A drain 
tube in this tank had been knocked out of alignment, so engineers decided to use heaters 
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to force out the oxygen after the test.  Yet the heaters stayed on for about eight hours to 
do this, a thermostat switch mistakenly not equipped to handle the voltage welded shut, 
and the tank temperature climbed to 1,000 degrees.  This melted the insulation that 
protected the tank’s wiring.  Thus when Swigert started a fan to stir the tank, this acted 
as a trigger for a spark to fly from a naked wire and ignite the tank.21  The crew did not 
need much training to look at Odyssey’s instrument panel and see that pressure in one 
oxygen tank was gone and falling fast in the other.  Lovell looked out the window and 
saw oxygen venting into space, which confirmed the reality of the loss.  The crew could 
have reasoned at this point that they were doomed, destined to become the first 
Americans to die in space.  Yet these three had experience in responding to emergencies 
in aircraft flights and the simulators, which proved crucial in their attitudes during the 
first few hours.  According to Lovell, “The thought crossed our minds that we were in 
deep trouble.  But we never dwelled on it…We never admitted to ourselves that, ‘Hey, 
we’re not going to make it.’”22   
 But in order to make it back to Earth, the crew would have to implement a 
technique with which they had little familiarity from training: use the Lunar Module as a 
lifeboat.  The assumption until Apollo 13 was that a catastrophe severe enough to cripple 
the CSM would also kill the crew, meaning a simulation of the scenario would not have 
been useful.  “I don’t believe we ever got to the point where we simulated the 
configuration of the Lunar Module as a lifeboat,” Dick Koos recalls.  “I don’t remember 
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anything like that.  We created situations where you had to abort…But we didn’t 
simulate everything that really happened during Apollo 13.  The lifeboat was considered, 
but never really followed through with in terms of the reconfiguration that they had to do 
on the real mission.”  Lovell’s memory is similar to Koos’s on this point.  He 
remembered taking part in simulations where the CSM engine failed around the Moon 
and he had to use the LM engine instead.  But those instances covered only a brief time 
span.  His training had not taught him to operate the LM on a four day journey back to 
Earth, yet his life now depended on just that.23   
 The crew did reap the benefits of training on several elements of their return 
flight, however.  About two hours after the loss of the oxygen tank, Lovell and Haise 
were already powering up systems in the LM Aquarius.  The contractors from Grumman 
had participated in integrated simulations in case their experience from manufacturing 
the vehicle could help the flight controllers and astronauts, as Koos recalls.24  This 
proved useful on April 13, because the crew did not have enough time to power up 
Aquarius by the standard checklist before Odyssey lost power completely.  The LM 
experts pared down this checklist for Lovell and Haise, while Swigert scrambled to shut 
down Odyssey.  Swigert’s success in shutting down the vehicle and then joining his 
crewmates in Aquarius placed the crew out of immediate danger, but another hurdle lay 
about three hours ahead.  They would have to fire the LM engine to return their course to 
a free return trajectory, which would then take them around the Moon and on a journey 
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back toward Earth.  Without this burn, they would miss the Earth by 45,000 miles.  Once 
again their training assisted them in preparing for this.  Lovell had rehearsed the 
procedure for transferring the navigation platform from the CSM to the LM, a thorny 
task that required arithmetic, and this helped him to avoid any errors.  He had also 
rehearsed taking the LM hand controller and stabilizing the vehicle while it was attached 
to the CSM.  Though he called the experience “like learning to fly all over again,” he 
kept the unwieldy combination aligned in time for the burn.  The free return maneuver 
succeeded on the morning of April 14, which was partly a testament to the hardware but 
also to the efforts of a trained crew.25       
 The simulators designed to train crews became one of the most critical tools in 
saving the lives of Lovell, Swigert, and Haise.  Riley McCafferty said it best when he 
declared, “I guess I will never be able to say enough to my people.”  He made this 
comment because he and several of his fellow simulator engineers rushed to the space 
center within two hours of the crisis to simulate the conditions in Odyssey and Aquarius.  
Before he even left his house, he had already received phone calls from employees 
asking him if there was anything they could do to help.  He said yes, and these personnel 
spent about 20 hours operating the simulators during each of the four days that the 
Apollo 13 crew remained in space.  When they needed to sleep, they often used bunk 
beds in the space center.  McCafferty also sent four of his employees to the backroom at 
Mission Control, as he did for every mission, so these personnel could remain in close 
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contact with the Flight Activities Officer in the control center.26  About 17 astronauts 
participated in the simulations as well.  Even as Ken Mattingly received all of the credit 
for this in Hollywood’s version of the mission, Young remembered being “awake and 
either in meetings or in the Lunar Module Simulator for about 120” of the 145 hour 
flight.27         
In his book, Lovell recounted the key moments when the simulators aided the 
effort to rescue the crew.  John Young and Charlie Duke climbed into the LM simulator 
just a few hours into the crisis, as the crew abandoned Odyssey for Aquarius.  The first 
major problem that these two tried to solve concerned navigation.  Could a crew align 
the LM by the stars even when a debris cloud surrounded the ship, as it now did 
Aquarius?  Although these two rehearsed maneuvers to take them away from a simulated 
debris cloud, Lovell found he could not align his ship with the stars and instead had to 
transfer the navigation platform from the CSM.  Young and Duke did help confirm that 
the LM’s digital autopilot could maintain a proper attitude during the free return burn.28  
A day later, these two were back in the simulator.  The Apollo 13 crew needed to make 
another burn after passing around the far side of the Moon to speed their ship’s return 
home.  Without this push, Aquarius’s consumables might not last long enough.  But how 
could the crew check that their navigation platform remained sound?  Young and Duke 
rehearsed an idea to sight on the one star the crew could see to do that: the Sun.  Sure 
enough, the idea worked on the simulator and aboard Aquarius.  Lovell manually fired 
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the engine on the evening of April 14 and sent the vehicle on a speedier path home.  
Now the crew faced the challenge of surviving 62 more hours of cold and lack of sleep 
aboard Aquarius, before powering Odyssey back up for reentry into Earth’s 
atmosphere.29      
 Because the crew needed Odyssey to return home, the Command Module 
Simulator also served as a tool in saving their lives.  The flight controllers needed to 
send them a checklist to power the ship back up, which required testing all of the steps in 
the CMS.  Normally this took three months, but now the controllers had less than two 
days.  The flight controller who had been so instrumental in saving the last mission, John 
Aaron, teamed with Arnold Aldrich to devise the checklist and then called on a group of 
astronauts to implement each procedure in the simulator.  “Just wring it out,” Mattingly 
recalls the astronauts being told.  “See if there’s anything in the process that doesn’t 
work.”  After this essential work, he read every step to the crew on the evening of April 
16 and added, “We think we’ve got all the little surprises ironed out for you.”30  No 
SimSup had ever simulated powering up a Command Module after several days in cold 
soak, but Swigert did just this two and a half hours prior to reentry.  All three astronauts 
climbed back into Odyssey, cast aside Aquarius, and splashed down safely in the Pacific 
Ocean.    
 What lessons about training can one infer from the “successful failure” of April  
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1970?  One lesson concerns the progression of astronaut training as an institution.  The  
simulation staff had grown from a few people at the Space Task Group in Virginia to a 
group that McCafferty described as containing 43 civil service employees and 250 
contractor employees.  Although many of these people were only a few years removed 
from their college bachelor’s degrees, the group showed the tenacity to simulate the ad 
hoc procedures that Lovell, Swigert, and Haise needed to implement.31  Another lesson 
concerns the value of the simulations this group conducted.  Many historical tragedies, 
from the sinking of the Titanic, to the Pearl Harbor attack, to the 9/11 attacks, have been 
attributed to “failure of imagination.”  Apollo 13 falls into this category as well, in that 
the Apollo team failed to foresee that an action taken during a launch pad test would 
cripple an oxygen tank.  But since the tank catastrophe did not kill the crew immediately, 
astronauts and the simulator personnel had the gift of time to “imagine” and then test 
procedures.  They did not have to leave these key milestones to chance.  On top of this, 
they also had the reassurance that Lovell, Swigert, and Haise had already trained in 
simulators for many of the actions they had to take.  Decades later, Mattingly pointed to 
“the extraordinary role of the simulation program that put all of those tools in people’s 
toolboxes” as one of the elements that made Apollo 13 successful.32  The crew failed to 
land on the Moon, which meant much of their training had gone for naught.  Yet the 
emergency had tested the ability of the astronaut corps and simulator personnel more 
than a successful mission probably would have. 
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 The remainder of 1970 provided a pressing reminder that Apollo’s days were  
numbered and the few crews left would need to make their missions the most productive 
yet.  NASA Administrator Tom Paine announced that budget cuts had eliminated the last 
three moon missions, meaning the program would end with Apollo 17.33  The onus of 
expanding lunar surface capabilities in the wake of the near disaster fell to Apollo 14 
astronauts Alan Shepard (surgery had cured his inner ear ailment and allowed him to 
make his second spaceflight nearly a decade after his suborbital Mercury voyage), Stu 
Roosa, and Ed Mitchell.  Though Shepard and Mitchell planned to land in the same Fra 
Mauro Formation that their predecessors had failed to reach, training for this mission 
broke new ground in several areas.  First, the two trained in the operation of ambitious 
new experiments.  Mitchell rehearsed setting up a mortar in the proper location with the 
proper alignment and then firing explosive charges to study the Moon’s seismic activity.  
Another experiment called for readings of a magnetometer designed to study the Moon’s 
magnetic activity.  Second, the two trained to conduct geology observations while 
carrying along a Modularized Equipment Transporter (MET) that would carry 360 
pounds of equipment.  This would ease their task of carrying core tubes, sample bags, 
cameras, maps, and hand tools while on a tiring trek to the rim of Cone Crater.  Third, 
the two adjusted to a challenging new method of geology while on their field trips.  The 
instructors taught them to collect several walnut-sized rocks from varied localities rather 
than a few large rocks from the same locality, a technique known as a “comprehensive 
sample.”  The need for multitalented astronauts who could make observations in a 
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spacecraft and on a new world was becoming clearer and clearer, because the 
expectations for each mission only went up.34        
 The simulations grew more creative as launch approached.  Shepard and Mitchell  
planned to visit an excavation caused by a meteor impact on the Moon, so the geology 
instructors found numerous sites in the U.S. and overseas where meteors had blasted the 
Earth to send the astronauts.  These included the Ries Crater in Germany, where two 
men received instruction from foreign professor Wolf von Engelhardt.  This marked one 
of the early examples of American astronauts integrating foreign expertise into their 
training.  The arrival of the “rock star” astronauts also created much publicity for 
geology research in Europe.35  Shepard and Mitchell also visited the craters of the 
Nevada Test Site and a man-made Black Mesa Crater field near Cottonwood, Arizona.  
At the latter site, USGS personnel had used explosives to artificially create a 
pockmarked Earth.  At these ingeniously selected training sites, the instructors asked the 
two men to plan their own traverses to give them experience in thinking for themselves.  
The suited walkthroughs in Houston also grew more creative, because the astronauts 
made traverses that included simulated malfunctions.  On November 9, for instance, a 
fan in one astronaut’s life sustaining PLSS backpack malfunctioned and he had to 
consult with Mission Control on the proper solution.  This provided a reminder that 
simulations of moonwalks were continuing to mature, to the point that they more closely  
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resembled spacecraft simulations.36      
 Apollo 14 brought the program from the brink of disaster back to successful lunar 
exploration in February 1971, but not without the lessons learned that were natural in a 
program where each mission was more ambitious than the last.  The crew proved 
themselves well prepared for the surprises that cropped up on every Moon voyage.  
When a problem with the docking mechanism prevented the CSM Kitty Hawk from 
docking with the LM Antares, Roosa aligned the probe of his ship with the drogue of his 
target and held them there with Kitty Hawk’s thrusters.  This contact finally triggered the 
docking latches.  Landing Antares on Fra Mauro provided two more tense moments, but 
Shepard and Mitchell worked with controllers to bypass an abort signal in the ship’s 
computer and gain radar data by cycling a circuit breaker.  The astronauts remembered 
these problems as ordinary compared to the grim scenarios they had encountered in 
simulators, and they did not prevent Shepard from landing an unexpectedly close quarter 
of a mile from his target.37  The major lessons learned concerned the task that no 
astronauts had done before: walk thousands of feet from their lander in search of a 
spectacular crater rim.  Shepard and Mitchell knew that the closer they came to the rim 
of Cone Crater, the deeper the source of rocks they could uncover and the more 
knowledge they could glean from a critical point in the Moon’s history.  But the two had 
to stop climbing after coming within 65 feet of the rim, because they felt unsure about 
their location and time ran out.  This suggested two lessons for training: the need to 
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identify landmarks across a rolling terrain and the need to avoid falling behind the 
scheduled timeline (the two usually found themselves well ahead of the timeline in 
training but slightly behind on the Moon, finding that their actions took 25 to 30 percent 
longer there than in one-G conditions on Earth).38 
 Another lesson, at least according to several of the instructors, concerned the 
attitude of the Commander.  Shepard had worked hard to get himself back on flight 
status and up to speed on Apollo hardware, but numerous geologists who trained the 
crew argued that he lacked the interest in surface exploration that several of his 
colleagues had.  They also believed that since he was the Commander, his attitude 
rubbed off on his crewmates.  Given that he and Mitchell came up just short of the crater 
rim, the most telling comment came from Gordon Swann of the USGS.  Swann had 
offered the two a briefing on how to spot landmarks a few weeks before launch, 
 which would have helped them navigate to the rim, but he remembered the two as being  
unconcerned.  The instructors could not deny that they had worked hard, as evidenced by 
Shepard’s heart rate reaching 150 as he climbed by far the steepest lunar slope 
encountered to date, and also granted that the preflight photography the crew had studied 
during training did not adequately prepare them.  Yet several instructors have implied in 
their comments that Apollo 14 reinforced the need for a Commander who made 
maximizing science return a top priority.39  In fairness, the crew still set a new standard 
for productivity of trained humans on the lunar surface.  The men collected nearly 100 
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pounds of rocks and soil, from football sized fragments to “comprehensive samples,” 
and took enough photos so scientists could visually locate much of the material.  Most 
importantly, Shepard and Mitchell had used a hammer to chip at large boulders close to 
the crater rim.  This gave scientists ejecta kicked up by one of the largest meteor impacts 
in the history of the solar system: the one that had formed Mare Imbrium.40         
 But every crew needed to set a new standard for productivity, and the stakes 
grew much higher for Apollo 15.  Thanks to upgrades in the Saturn V booster, the crew 
of Dave Scott, Al Worden, and Jim Irwin could take to the Moon a heavier LM than ever 
before that carried enough water, oxygen, and electrical power to support three days of 
surface exploration.  This LM could also carry three times more scientific equipment 
than any of its predecessors, most remarkably the first car to be driven on another world.  
Contractors at Boeing had spent the last two years designing and manufacturing a Lunar 
Roving Vehicle (LRV, or “Rover”) that could take almost 1,000 pounds of equipment on 
a drive of several miles.  Instead of expending energy on a tiring uphill climb, astronauts 
could now sit back in the Rover and cruise at up to 11 miles per hour.  The Apollo 15 
landing site also intrigued geologists more than any other place astronauts had visited: a 
plain next to a 1,300 foot deep channel called Hadley Rille and a series of mountains 
several thousand feet tall called the Apennines.  The geologists’ fondest hope was that 
Scott and Irwin would collect material there dating back to the Moon’s creation 4.5 
billion years ago.  The expectations for Worden were also greater than any previous 
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CMP: operate a Scientific Instrument Module (SIM) on the exterior of his spacecraft 
containing cameras, spectrometers, and a laser altimeter, then deploy a satellite to 
measure the Moon’s magnetic field.41  All of this suggested the crew needed a stronger 
relationship with their geology instructors than any before, and two personalities meshed 
to produce just that. 
 Scott and Lee Silver came from different backgrounds, but shared the same goal 
and came to admire each other during a series of field trips lasting twenty months.  Scott 
had come to the astronaut corps from the test pilot community, but had shown interest in 
archaeology dating back to his time in the Air Force.  He already felt confident in his 
own ability to reach the Moon and return, based on his experience flying aboard Apollo 
9 and rehearsing lunar landings as backup Commander of Apollo 12.  Thus he felt 
willing to accept Silver as his geology instructor and set a new record by spending one-
third of his training time on lunar geology.  Once again, the attitude of this Commander 
rubbed off on his crewmates.42  Silver shared with him the goal oef achieving the 
maximum science return from Apollo 15, but he had to teach Scott to develop a 
geologist’s mental tools.  Scott praised Silver for his ability to do this, remarking in his 
memoir, “When asked to describe what I saw on one of the first trips to Orocopia, I got 
not much further than saying, ‘Boy, there’s a lot of stuff on the other side of the hill.’  
Lee Silver helped us tune in to the language of geology, and soon we were describing the 
composition of that ‘stuff’ as granite, basalt, sandstone, or conglomerate, and its shape as 
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angular, sub-angular, or rounded.”  Silver instilled these lessons on field trips at least 
once a month in 1970 and 1971, so that the astronauts would not miss glimpsing a piece 
of the Moon’s primordial crust and would know how to describe it in expert language.  
In turn, Silver praised Scott when he saw the Commander recognize geological problems 
and eventually try to solve them on his own initiative.43       
 Scott and Irwin began driving a training version of the Rover in November 1970.  
This training prepared them for the mechanical skills they would need on the Moon.  
First, they would have to operate a pair of lanyards that deployed the Rover from the 
side of the LM descent stage.  When Scott climbed into the driver’s seat, he would orient 
the Rover navigational gyroscope with the Sun and then drive by using a T-handle to 
control forward and reverse speed, braking, and steering.  He would also have a panel 
containing power monitors and controls, a navigational readout, and a speedometer.  
Throughout the drives, he would have to know the Rover’s ability to climb over rocks, 
climb and descend slopes, and park on slopes.44  Instructors first tried to give astronauts 
driving experience by stringing the vehicle from the side of an MSC building, but this 
did not create the desired fidelity.  Scott and Irwin drove a training version instead, 
structurally strengthened and featuring conventional tires rather than the real Rover’s 
wire mesh tires, and Scott and Irwin found the vehicle fairly easy to drive.45   
 More personnel than ever took part in these field trips, which highlighted the 
increasing emphasis on science in preparing for a mission.  Apollo 15 marked the first 
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mission in which Flight Directors traveled to the sites, so they could observe what the 
geology instructors wanted the astronauts to accomplish.  One of the geologists 
explained the reasoning behind this: “The operations folks began to have a much better 
appreciation for what the science folks were trying to do and at the same time the 
science folks began to get a real appreciation for what the real constraints were: the 
safety things and the like.”  Apollo 15 also marked the first mission when a flight 
controller in Houston would be able to control a Rover mounted TV camera on the 
Moon, so camera operator Ed Fendell made the field trips as well.  Yet another 
innovation for this mission concerning the flight controllers was the introduction of 
“math model” simulations of the moonwalks.  In these simulations, a group of geology 
instructors stood in for the astronauts and introduced problems to challenge the 
controllers.  Upon the loss of a film magazine or the failure of the Rover, the controllers 
would have to work with the scientists in the Mission Control backroom to find a 
solution without placing astronauts in harm’s way.46   
The final field trip that Scott and Irwin took, to Arizona on June 25, 1971, 
encompassed more personnel and contained a greater degree of fidelity than ever before.  
The two astronauts carried their PLSS backpacks and radios while driving their Rover to 
replicate exploring the Moon.  Nature had carved the Little Colorado River Gorge and 
Coconino Point into the landscape, so this site gave the men a sense of how to explore a 
fissure like Hadley Rille and mountains like the Apennines.  Well over 50 people made 
the trip, from the CapComs, to the Flight Director, to Principal Investigators, to the 
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scientists who sat in the Mission Control backroom sketching what the astronauts 
described, plotting the astronauts’ position, and collating samples.  The entire group 
stayed together for two days, so they could ask questions and make recommendations for 
the astronauts after each traverse just as they would when Scott and Irwin were on the 
Moon.47  Though the crew still spent time in simulators as launch day approached, Scott 
made a comment during the post-mission debriefing that drove home just how much 
Apollo training had evolved over the last few years: “I think the system has matured 
enough so that the crews can now concentrate on accomplishing the mission 
objectives…rather than spend a great amount of time, like we have in the past, on 
malfunctions.”48  The maturation of the hardware helped him shift his attention to 
science, and he was about to reward geologists’ faith in him.   
 Yet the Moon still had surprises in store for the fourth crew to land there and the 
simulator personnel who thought they had done an exemplary job preparing them.  On 
July 30, Scott found a major surprise when the LM Falcon descended through the last 
10,000 feet to the Hadley-Apennine site.  He explained the problem in his memoir: “The 
plaster of Paris model of the Moon’s surface we used during training was a relatively flat 
15 feet by 15 feet.  Mount Hadley Delta to our left loomed 11,000 feet high.”49  His time 
in the simulator thus did not prepare him very well for the experience of flying across 
tall mountains.  That plaster of Paris model also replicated the landing site based on 
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photos of relatively low resolution.  When he was in the simulator looking out his 
window at this model, he could easily see the series of craters he expected to see along 
his descent path.  But above the actual site, the fidelity of the model broke down as he 
saw many features he had not seen in training and initially felt disoriented.  Yet he 
overcame the training flaws and again demonstrated the value of a trained human 
presence above the Moon.  He set an Apollo record by redesignating the landing point 
eighteen times, stayed on a constant flight path all the way to the surface rather than 
leveling off high as previous crews had done, and descended the last fifty feet on 
instruments as dust obscured his view.  Because he knew the engine bell at the bottom of 
the lander was longer than on previous missions, he made sure to stop the engine as soon 
as possible and the Falcon plopped the last few feet onto the plain at Hadley.50  
 Only two hours after the landing, Lee Silver watched from Mission Control as 
Scott placed the training he had given them to use.  “One of the things that I had used in 
the training approach which the crews all seemed to appreciate was, first, stop and look,” 
Silver explained.51  Whether on Earth or the Moon, Silver wanted geologists to begin 
their work by making a general reconnaissance of their site.  This would place their work 
of hunting for individual rocks in a broader context.  Scott implemented this suggestion 
by climbing onto the ascent engine cover in Falcon’s cabin, opening the top hatch, and 
sticking his head out.  For half an hour, he aimed his telephoto lens at the features of his 
landing site and described for the scientists the extremely rounded mountains and  
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hummocky terrain.52     
 Scott and Irwin called the Moon their home the next three days, during which the 
mental and physical flexibility they had obtained during the twenty months of training 
made them far superior explorers than any robotic vehicle.  One example of their 
physical flexibility came when Scott drilled 10 feet into the soil, which allowed him to 
collect 42 layers of soil dating back millions of years.  Although the drill initially did not 
budge when he and Irwin tried to lift it back up, the men demonstrated their value by 
hooking their arms under the handles and removing it.53  The success in driving the 
Rover also attested to their physical flexibility, although this task proved to be more 
difficult on the Moon than on Earth.  Scott had to constantly pay attention to the terrain 
to avoid obstacles, while braking required twice the distance on the Moon as in the 
training vehicle on Earth.54  During their first two outings, they drove to the slopes of 
Mount Hadley Delta and placed their mental flexibility to work.  Scott knew from his 
training that especially large boulders would give geologists rare insight into lunar 
history, because they had probably sat in their present location for a long period.  Thus 
when he saw a knee-high boulder, he made sure to knock off a piece with his hammer, 
then roll it over and sample the soil underneath it.  This soil allowed geologists to know 
how long the boulder had sat there.  The following day, Irwin spotted a green coating on 
another rock.  His vision had allowed him to make a finding which proved crucial, 
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because geologists who studied this rock after its return to Earth found that it was made 
of tiny spheres of glass which implied volcanic activity.55                   
 But amid the numerous examples of mental flexibility one can cite, the most 
striking came at Spur Crater on the second day.  Irwin found a white rock that he 
encouraged Scott to lift with his tongs.  When Scott wiped off the coating, he could see 
its white crystals glinting in the sunlight and exulted, “Guess what we just found?  I 
think we found what we came for.”  While training in California’s San Gabriel 
Mountains, Lee Silver had shown him a piece of anorthosite and emphasized the 
scientists’ belief that this crystalline rock might represent part of the Moon’s primordial 
crust.56  Thus training had sent Scott and Irwin to the Moon with informed minds that 
encouraged them to pick up this sample and return it to Earth.  Geologists on Earth, he 
reflected in his memoir, have the luxury of doing this work for weeks or months in one 
place.  But on the Moon, “we would have to rely on instinct and training in picking a 
sample and would have only about five seconds to look at it, and maybe ten seconds to 
describe it, before bagging it and moving on.”  Given the time pressure, a less well 
trained astronaut might have missed this rock or its significance.  But Scott returned this 
one to Earth so scientists could study the “Genesis Rock,” as a reporter called it, in a 
laboratory environment and learn that it was almost as old as the entire solar system: 4.5 
billion years.57   
During the three days that Scott and Irwin spent at the Hadley-Apennine site,  
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Worden kept himself busier than any of his predecessors thanks to the new SIM bay 
outside his ship Endeavour.  He felt that his simulator training prepared him well for a 
challenging set of tasks: maintain the health of his spacecraft, deploy and monitor the 
science instruments as well as monitor glitches with their operation, and take photos.  
The demands on his time proved even greater than expected.  The mass spectrometer 
boom did not fully retract and the mapping camera extended and retracted slower than 
expected, which required his attention.  He also described the process of taking photos as 
“more detailed than anticipated,” meaning he could not precisely follow the flight plan.  
But these issues did not derail him.  Thanks to the combination of time in the simulator, 
flying over the mountains of the United States, and studying previous photos of the 
Moon, Worden went into lunar orbit proficient enough in target recognition that he did 
not require detailed flight plan times.  While his two crewmates utilized training to 
expand knowledge of the Moon on a micro level, Worden did so on a macro level.  His 
observations of Littrow Crater even paved the way for Apollo 17 to land in that region.58  
During the return flight to Earth, Worden also performed an EVA to retrieve film 
magazines from the SIM Bay.  He felt that his sessions in the KC-135 aircraft helped 
him to maneuver along handrails and bring himself down to a set of foot restraints next 
to the bay of science instruments.  The CMPs for the next two missions repeated this 
task successfully.59       
 Next came Apollo 16, a mission designed to shed light on one of the Moon’s  
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remaining mysteries: how volcanism had affected the highlands.  Scientists knew from 
studying the basalts collected at the Sea of Tranquility and Ocean of Storms that the 
Moon’s interior had once been molten.  But these rocks all came from maria, which 
covered just 17 percent of a lunar surface about the size of Africa.  If astronauts explored 
the highlands instead, they might add substantially to the body of knowledge about the 
Moon’s volcanic history.  Had the Moon been geologically alive as recently as one 
billion years ago?  The Apollo Site Selection Board directed Apollo 16’s John Young 
and Charlie Duke to the Descartes Highlands near the equator to answer that question, 
while Ken Mattingly stayed behind in orbit.60   
This decision affected their geology training.  Young and Duke had already 
visited mountains and craters from Colorado, to New Mexico, to Arizona, to Nevada, to 
California, to Ontario, Canada.  But the selection of the Descartes Highlands in June 
1971 spurred the instructors to send them to sites featuring recent volcanism.  A trip to 
the Long Valley Caldera in California allowed them to study a volcanic tableland that 
produced a flow of rhyolites into the ground, because some geologists believed they 
would find this rock.  Rhyolite was an especially hard, granular material that could teach 
geologists about the Moon’s history while also potentially serving as a building material 
for a lunar base.  Since no astronaut had brought home any rhyolite yet, the instructors 
and astronauts valued this trip to an analog site on Earth.  The instructors also adjusted 
the schedule of field trips to account for the prevalence of anorthosite that previous 
astronauts had found on the Moon.  As on Apollo 15, the discovery of anorthosite could 
                                                          
60  Chaikin, 452-456.  
308 
 
teach scientists about the earliest part of the Moon’s history.  Realizing that Young and 
Duke needed experience in prospecting for this type of rock, the instructors sent them to 
the San Gabriel Mountains and the Duluth Complex in northern Minnesota.61   
Training to work on the lunar surface continued to evolve even as the fifth lunar 
landing approached.  One of the MSC geology instructors, Fred Hörz, convened a 
meeting at which his colleagues decided that astronauts should train for several new 
sampling techniques.  Young and Duke learned about the new procedures and equipment 
to collect the uppermost film of lunar soil, split rocks, fillets, permanently shadowed 
soil, and radial samples.  They also learned about the ALSEP they would deploy, which 
contained two new experiments.  One would make them the first lunar astronomers.  The 
astronauts planned to place an ultraviolet telescope in the shadow of their LM, point it at 
different portions of the sky, and remove the film for return to Earth.  The other new 
experiment required them to slide open a plate containing sheets of mica, foil, and glass 
and hang it onto the LM to determine the effect of cosmic rays on these materials.  
Young and Duke felt prepared for all of these tasks, because of the time they spent in 
their suits.  Young recalled that he spent 350 hours training in his suit for this mission, 
because he had to know how to operate through thick gloves and a stiff torso that did not 
bend easily.  Sessions of several hours each at the rock pile allowed them to rehearse 
deploying the ALSEP 13 times.62 
 Geology instructor Bill Phinney kept a log of the astronauts’ training that  
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underscored how thoroughly Young and Duke could prepare given how experienced 
they already were in operating spacecraft.  They had each been backups on Apollo 13, 
while also participating in early reviews of the upgraded LM and Rover that gave them 
understanding of the new hardware they would have to operate on Apollo 16.  This 
allowed them to spend 40 percent of their training time preparing to solve the scientific 
mysteries of the Moon.63  Geology lectures took up 124 hours of their time.  Hörz 
directed a series of sessions to study Moon rocks returned by the four previous landing 
crews, which took up another 50 hours.  Suited sessions at the rock pile lasted about four 
hours each for a total of 142 hours.  Field trips took up another 36 days, with flight 
controllers preparing themselves during 12 additional days of “math model” simulations.  
Ken Mattingly had a less grueling schedule for his orbital duties, but did listen to 36 
hours of lectures by Farouk El-Baz and spent 18 days honing his observational skills by 
flying over the United States.64  Young summarized the experience by explaining, “It’s 
easy to look back and say you didn’t need this or you didn’t need that but I think the 
purpose of most training is to help you take what you learned and go on from there…It’s 
not the amount of training you do.  It’s just how it prepares you.  I think we were all well 
prepared.”65  Stated another way, he understood that his goal was not to memorize every 
detail from those hours but to develop a new way of thinking: that natural features could  
tell a story about geologic history. 
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 Young, Mattingly, and Duke first needed to reach the Moon, however, and the 
journey there provided a striking case study in the need for a trained crew that could 
overcome glitches with finicky equipment.  “I think we calculated once that we worked 
on about 99 things during the mission that we either solved in real time or that the 
ground had to solve,” Young explained afterwards.  “It was the most of anybody, I think.  
But we had been trained to do that.  That’s what our line of work is.”  The men had 
barely grown accustomed to zero gravity after their launch on April 16, 1972 when flight 
controllers noticed a possible leak in the primary coolant loop for the CSM Casper.  Yet 
the crew checked the ship’s settings and resolved the problem.  The controllers also 
found a helium leak in the Saturn rocket stage that would propel the astronauts beyond 
earth orbit.  Yet the crew had Casper’s thrusters ready to maintain a proper attitude if 
required.66  The greatest scares came on landing day, April 20.  When Young and Duke 
climbed into the LM Orion and prepared its systems for the undocking from Casper, 
they found they could not move the antenna used to communicate with Earth in the yaw 
axis.  This meant that flight controllers could not directly uplink the numbers that 
Orion’s computer needed to navigate the ship to the landing site.  Duke had no choice 
but to copy and insert a series of five-digit numbers into the computer, which he did with 
no mistakes.  Young then found that the RCS in the descent stage had overpressurized.  
Yet he vented pressure from this system into the propulsion system in Orion’s ascent 
stage, which would not affect the landing.  The need to diagnose these issues and take 
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corrective actions under time pressure helped to vindicate those many hours of simulator 
time.67        
 The most serious issue that day almost prevented Young and Duke from landing, 
but instead vindicated the value of integrated simulations.  After the two men overcame 
their problems and undocked in their ship Orion, Mattingly discovered an inexplicable 
shaking in his ship Casper when he used a set of thumbwheels to control the SPS 
engine’s gimbal motors.  Upon hearing his words, “I be a sorry bird,” the dejected 
Young and Duke assumed they would have to abort the landing.68  Yet they 
underestimated the network of Command Module experts across the United States, who 
had the experience of problem solving during integrated simulations for several lunar 
flights.  The simulator personnel fed the strip charts of telemetry from Casper into the 
computers that operated the Command Module simulator, where Gene Cernan tried to 
halt the unwanted shaking of the vehicle.  He could not do so, but the question remained: 
were the oscillations serious enough to abort the mission?  Engineers at North American 
Rockwell studied the same telemetry data and did not believe there was structural 
damage to the engine.  These engineers believed Casper could maintain its proper 
heading during all future burns.  Finally, former astronaut Jim McDivitt weighed in as 
manager of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office.  He remembered the shaking of a 
firing SPS engine on his Apollo 9 flight and recommended that the mission could still 
continue to new MSC Director Chris Kraft.  Four hours after Mattingly’s troubling 
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words, the CapCom gave Young and Duke the news that they could land after all.  This 
provided one of the best examples in the entire Apollo program of why astronauts trained 
in conjunction with engineers at NASA and contractor companies whose knowledge 
could save missions.69   
 The landing provided still another reminder of an Apollo 16 theme: that adversity 
could easily thwart the efforts of a crew that did not have the training to overcome it.  
Young relied on his experience in the Lunar Module Simulator and LLTV to make 
several landing point redesignations in a terrain far more heavily cratered than most of 
his predecessors had confronted.  A later discovery confirmed the danger of this task.  If 
he had landed about 80 feet in any direction from where he did, Orion would have 
touched down on a slope of six to ten degrees and thus placed their liftoff a few days 
later in serious jeopardy.  Yet he had the presence of mind and the luck, as he admitted 
in his memoir, to land in a clear and flat region.  He also landed more upright than any 
Apollo Commanders except Neil Armstrong and Pete Conrad, and those two did not 
have to deal with such a heavily cratered landing site.70  Young’s experience was a 
dramatic testament to one of the main themes of Apollo: that a trained aviator deserved a 
place on a lunar mission.  No robotic lander could have surveyed a landscape and made 
adjustments in real time to avoid an unfavorable site.     
 The first outing onto the Descartes Highlands provided still more adversity, as  
Young and Duke set up their ALSEP package.  Their experience doing this illustrated  
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why they had rehearsed so thoroughly for such a seemingly routine task.  As Duke 
carried a package containing the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) intended 
to power the experiments, the RTG inadvertently fell onto the surface.  This incident did 
not cause any damage, but Young made a mistake that curtailed the Heat Flow 
Experiment.  He tripped on a cable to the experiment and severed it, as he remembered 
doing a few times in training.  “It became clear to me once again that when you fail in 
simulations, you either need to fix the simulation or correct the situation, because if you 
can’t do it right in training, you won’t get it done correctly in the real world, especially 
not on the Moon,” he lamented.  This was one of the few examples in Apollo when 
nobody learned a lesson from the training experience and modified equipment or 
procedures for the real mission.71  Still, Young and Duke could have corrected the 
mistake with more time.  A team of engineers met over the night and devised a method 
by which to reattach the experiment cable into the Central Station connector.  The 
method entailed the astronauts stripping away the cable’s insulation and exposing its 
wires, using lunar rock as an abrasive, and then reconnecting the experiment into the 
Central Station.  This would have been one of the clearest indications yet of the value of 
sending trained humans to the Moon rather than robots only, and backup Commander 
Fred Haise demonstrated that it could work, but Apollo Program Director Rocco Petrone 
vetoed the idea as too time consuming.72        
 The other major lesson of Apollo 16 concerned that new way of thinking that  
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geology training had instilled in Young and Duke.  If these astronauts had tried to simply 
memorize what geology instructors had told them, they would have been led astray 
because they did not find what the geologists had expected them to find at Descartes.  
The point of picking this landing site had been to find volcanic rocks, yet Young and 
Duke sampled only breccias (a mixture of rock fragments welded together by a meteorite 
impact).  They needed the intuition to recognize what they actually found and adapt to 
this knowledge, and training had given them this ability.  During their field trips and 
studies of previously returned Moon rocks, they had come to quickly recognize breccias 
and basalts and knew they were not finding any of the latter.  Despite knowing that the 
two men were pilots and not professional scientists, the field trips had given the 
geologists in the Mission Control backroom confidence in their ability to observe and 
sample.73   
As it turned out, Young and Duke proved they could add usefully to knowledge 
of the Moon even if the prediction of what they would find had proven incorrect.  The 
idea of ancient meteorite impacts shaping the highlands also intrigued scientists, and the 
two men provided evidence for this by traveling to the highest vantage point ever 
reached on the Moon on the second day and to the rim of the deepest excavation ever 
explored on the third day.  The drive 500 feet up the slopes of Stone Mountain revealed 
rocks rounded by the cosmic bombardment of ancient meteorites.  The drive to the rim 
of 650 foot North Ray Crater revealed bedrock that had been ejected from the crater 
floor.  Duke convinced Young to walk to one rock that was forty-five feet high and chip 
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off samples with a hammer, which Duke described as “like trying to dismantle the 
Empire State Building with a crowbar.”  Here again, the men realized they were seeing 
material fused together by ancient impacts and not volcanism.74  Besides giving them the 
flexibility to interpret and describe their findings, training helped them overcome several 
glitches.  From the loss of the Rover’s pitch indicator, to the loss of the Rover’s right 
rear fender, to the loss of power to the Rover’s rear wheels, to the failure of the sample 
collection bags to stay tight, Young remembered “about thirty-five things that would 
have been anomalies while we were on the Moon.”  Yet he quickly added, “We were 
able to fix all of them in real time without bothering Mission Control.”  When Young 
and Duke lifted off from Descartes on April 24 and splashed down with Mattingly three 
days later, they could say that they had overcome more problems than almost any of 
their predecessors while suggesting a new hypothesis about the history of the Moon.75  
 Only one chance now remained for astronauts to explore the Moon, and the crew 
of Apollo 17 marked a major departure from all previous crews that had traveled into 
space.  For the first time, a professional scientist would voyage into space.  The normal 
selection pattern would have resulted in the Apollo 14 backup crew of Gene Cernan, Ron 
Evans, and Joe Engle flying the last mission.  But the Apollo 15 backup crew contained 
Harrison “Jack” Schmitt as LMP, which raised a crucial question.  Given that training 
now focused heavily on developing geological skills, why should geologists train a pilot 
like Engle when a Ph.D. geologist could voyage to the Moon instead?  Deke Slayton was 
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well aware of this argument, but considered Engle “a terrific stick and rudder guy” who 
was still the most qualified choice for LMP on Apollo 17.  He understood that Schmitt 
had become a jet pilot himself and had worked hard to understand Apollo hardware over 
his seven years in the astronaut corps, but submitted a crew of Cernan, Evans, and Engle 
to Washington, D.C.  The NASA Headquarters personnel promptly rejected Slayton’s 
choice.  The Director of Flight Crew Operations had no choice but to abide by their wish 
for a scientific presence on the last Apollo crew and submit a crew of Cernan, Evans, and 
Schmitt instead.76  This in turn raised a crucial question the crew would have to answer 
in training: how could Cernan and Schmitt overcome their differences in background 
and become an effective team on the lunar surface? 
 Schmitt answered the question by demonstrating his skill in the cockpits of 
aircraft and spacecraft simulators.  He needed to prove that a Ph.D. geologist would not 
be a liability while in flight and the evidence indicates that he did this.  Even Slayton and 
Cernan, who had indicated their dismay with the idea of sending scientists into space 
earlier in their memoirs, each had positive assessments of Schmitt’s performance on 
Apollo 17.77  Schmitt himself remembered that his time flying helicopters helped him 
improve his hand/eye coordination and build his confidence in the maneuvers he would 
experience in a spacecraft.  But the real test of his ability as a crewmember came in the 
Lunar Module Simulator.  Only Cernan piloted the vehicle, so his job was not about the 
stick and rudder skills Slayton had mentioned anyway.  He only needed to become 
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proficient in operating the ship’s computer, responding to any glitches that he saw on the 
instrument panel, and communicating effectively with Cernan during the landing and 
subsequent liftoff from the lunar surface.  He also needed to become knowledgeable in 
CSM systems on the right side of the vehicle, where he would fly for the remainder of 
the mission.  He argued, “I could fly, and I could do the simulations as well as, maybe, 
anybody,” and no fellow astronaut has disputed this.  He also impressed his colleagues 
with his work ethic in logging simulator hours.  At least in Schmitt’s case, cross training 
a geologist to operate a spacecraft did not pose any serious problems either in training or 
flight.78     
 Cernan needed to prove the opposite: that cross training a pilot to become a 
geologist would work and (the difference between Apollo 17 and previous flights) that 
he could interface well with a Ph.D. geologist.  He explained the difference in 
backgrounds between himself and Schmitt in blunt terms, saying that Schmitt was a 
scientific investigator who “could jump in with his colleagues back here on Earth and 
tear those rocks apart from now until hell freezes over,” whereas he was only a scientific 
observer who was content to describe his general geological surroundings.79  But the 14 
field trips that the two men took together from October 1971 to November 1972 helped 
build Cernan’s confidence to the point that he felt comfortable making detailed 
descriptions and interpretations of the geology he saw without deferring to his more 
                                                          
78  Harrison H. “Jack” Schmitt, Interviewed by Carol Butler, July 14, 1999, Houston, Texas, http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/ 
history/oral_histories/SchmittHH/SchmittHH_7-14-99.htm (accessed October 6, 2016) and Chaikin, 396-397 and 400-
401.     
79  [Interview with Eugene A. Cernan, Houston, Texas, April 6, 1984, Box APO-074-42, Apollo series], JSC History 
Collection, University of Houston-Clear Lake, Houston, Texas, 1-2.  
318 
 
experienced crewmate.  The geology instructors showed no bias toward Schmitt in 
giving the astronauts lectures and speaking to them during the field trips, instead giving 
Cernan equal treatment.  At the end of this process, none of them complained about 
Cernan’s ability or his working relationship with Schmitt.  “He is one of the most 
articulate astronauts, and he possesses an exceptional ability to describe what he is 
observing,” argued USGS instructor Don Wilhelms.80  Cernan remembered himself as a 
useful complement to Schmitt.  Despite lacking the knowledge of his crewmate, he did 
not feel intimidated by Schmitt because he felt he could make geological interpretations 
just as effectively.  Schmitt’s advantage in knowledge may have been more pronounced 
if the crew planned to stay several months on the Moon, but the two men only planned to 
explore for about 21 hours.81 
 The selection of the Valley of Taurus-Littrow as the last Apollo landing site 
especially affected the training of Cernan and Schmitt.  The two would visit a region that 
appeared in Al Worden’s Apollo 15 photos to contain volcanic cinder cones, some of the 
darkest and youngest lunar material on the valley floor, and some of the oldest lunar 
material in two mountains called the North and South Massifs.82  The detail in these 
photos meant instructors knew what analog sites Cernan and Schmitt should visit on 
Earth.  Thus the two made an August 1972 trip to the 430 foot Lunar Crater in Nevada, 
which contained cones formed around a volcanic vent.  In October, the astronauts, 
geology instructors, and scientists who would populate the backroom at Mission Control 
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visited the Blackhawk landslide in southern California.  The instructors knew that large 
boulders had fallen down the Moon’s North and South Massifs in landslides, so they 
directed the astronauts to investigate this 5 mile long landslide while driving the Rover 
and performing all the tasks of a 7 hour lunar exploration.  The last field trip ever made 
by Apollo astronauts took Cernan and Schmitt to Sunset Crater near Flagstaff, Arizona.  
On November 2 and 3, USGS instructor Hank Moore evaluated the astronauts and the 
backroom personnel in their joint efforts to investigate this site.  Even at this point, he 
managed to make criticisms that proved the value of training.  The backroom personnel 
directed the astronauts to follow a route that proved impassible, for instance, which 
forced them to re-plan the traverse and waste valuable time.  Yet Moore made a highly 
positive assessment of the astronauts’ performance in his memo.  The time had come to 
take one last crack at deciphering the Moon’s secrets.83 
 When Cernan, Evans, and Schmitt launched on December 7, they embarked on a 
mission that bore all the marks of an experienced team strengthened by training.  None 
of the lunar landings had fewer hardware glitches than the last, which according to the 
mission report “represents the culmination of continual advances in training.”  None 
returned more material from the lunar surface than Cernan and Schmitt did, at 243 
pounds.  These men proved that trained humans could not only return hundreds of times 
more material than any robotic vehicle, but had the flexibility to return large rocks, 
permanently shadowed soil, and core tube soil samples up to about 10 feet deep.84  
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Schmitt also proved that the descriptive ability of a geologist went beyond that of the 
pilots who had explored the Moon thus far.  He argued himself, “We got excellent 
sampling, we got excellent photography…but until Apollo 17 we did not get very much 
good, solid descriptive work.”85  The Apollo 17 air to ground transmissions show the 
difference that his presence made on the last mission.  When he told the CapCom, “Bob 
(Parker), I’m at the east-southeast rim of a thirty-meter crater, in the light mantle, up on 
the scarp and maybe two hundred meters from the rim of Lara,” he gave the backroom 
scientists a better idea of the setting and allowed them to more effectively plan traverses.  
Yet at the same time, the scientists acknowledged that Cernan made useful observations 
and proved, on the strength of his training, that he could be more than Schmitt’s caddy.86 
But most compellingly, the men proved that trained humans had the power of 
recognition that robots did not have.  During their second outing, Cernan decided to stop 
the Rover on the way to Shorty Crater even though the backroom personnel had advised 
against this.  This allowed Schmitt to reach down with a scoop and collect a light-
colored soil he had spotted.  Scientists later recognized this as ejecta from the crater 
Tycho that had sat in the valley for 109 million years.  Thus the two astronauts’ acuity of 
vision and thought allowed scientists to learn when one of the Moon’s most famous 
craters had formed.  About an hour later, Schmitt was walking near the rim of Shorty 
when he exclaimed, “There is orange soil!”  Again his acuity of vision had allowed him 
to make an unexpected finding, and immediately his thoughts turned to the volcanic sites 
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he had visited while training.  At these sites, he had seen chunks of lava that had been 
colored after being exposed to an eruption of hot gases.  He and Cernan collected a 3 
foot core sample of the material, allowing scientists to study it back on Earth and make a 
crucial discovery: an eruption of gases called a fire fountain had propelled these tiny 
beads of glass into the sky 3.5 billion years ago.  Some of the beads were orange because 
they were high in titanium content, while some were especially dark and explained the 
appearance of the valley floor in Worden’s photos.  More importantly, the scientists’ 
knowledge of the gases in the fire fountain caused them to rethink how the Moon had 
evolved.87  Both of these findings were classic examples of trained humans exercising 
their ability to make unexpected findings, a key advantage that humans have over robots 
in exploring space.                        
 No human has set foot on the Moon since Cernan made his last footprint in the 
Valley of Taurus-Littrow on December 13, 1972.  President John F. Kennedy had made 
the decision to send astronauts there in the first place on the basis of the Cold War 
competition with the Soviet Union, and with that competition won Richard Nixon’s 
administration shut down any hope of a permanent lunar base that would build on the 
achievements of Apollo.  But the meticulous training of the Apollo crews left no doubt 
that astronauts could contribute to the scientific understanding of the Moon.  Anybody 
could have filled a container with rocks, but training had given them the ability to 
instantly recognize where they should focus their attention and to communicate their 
knowledge to scientists listening on Earth.  Those who claim that all of this could have 
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been done by robotic vehicles are wrong.  The Soviet Union did launch three Luna 
probes that deployed rovers which returned lunar material to Earth in the 1970s, but 
hundreds of times less than that returned by the astronauts and collected 
indiscriminately.  These rovers did not have anything nearly as sophisticated as a human 
brain that people could train, and consequently scientists understand the geologic 
structure of the six Apollo landing sites much better than the Luna sites.  Another way to 
look at this issue is to consider how geologists attain knowledge on Earth.  Geologists do 
not send small rovers into field sites and hope for the best.  Geologists visit sites 
repeatedly and use their intelligence to make a determination about what is worthy of 
their attention and what is not.  Some sites still provide knowledge after being studied 
for more than 100 years.88  The Apollo astronauts trained to maximize their intelligence 
and as a result easily surpassed what robots could have done.                      
Because the astronauts had taken such informed minds to the Moon, scientists 
have been able to make informed studies of the 842 pounds of lunar material they 
returned.  For more than forty years, scientists have studied these rocks more thoroughly 
than almost any other collection of material in the history of science.  These studies have 
given scientists a clearer view of the history of a 4.5 billion year old object, which 
contains no erosion to wipe away that history as Earth does.89  Major findings continued 
even into the 1980s.  Scientists announced then what is still the leading theory for how 
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the Moon formed: shortly after the formation of Earth, an asteroid the size of Mars 
struck it and ejected part of Earth’s mantle into space, the remnants of which fused 
together to form the Moon.  Scientists also found a gas called helium-3 in lunar material, 
which could provide a clean energy source if future generations choose to mine it (the 
gas is highly rare on Earth).90                 
 The scientific rewards of the astronauts’ work run even deeper than this.  The 
knowledge of the Moon that they returned still guides scientists’ interpretations of the 
entire solar system.  Specifically, the timescale of lunar history that scientists now have 
has informed their estimates of the timescales of planets such as Mercury and Mars.  The 
knowledge gained from lunar samples has also shaped scientists’ understanding of 
impacts throughout the solar system.  Scientists now know the telltale signs of materials 
that have made hypervelocity impacts into planets, such as excess amounts of the 
element iridium.  Several years after Apollo ended, geologist Walter Alvarez found an 
excess amount of iridium in the clay layer that marks the end of the Cretaceous Era on 
Earth.  This provided crucial evidence for the idea that a meteorite had slammed into 
Earth 65 million years ago and accounted for the extinction of the dinosaurs.  “It was 
thought that we got some rocks and some ages for a few ancient events in the history of 
the Moon—but so what?  That ‘so what’ is now recognized as a revolutionary paradigm 
shift in our understanding of the significance of impact in Earth history,” explains Paul 
Spudis.  “We now view the process of the evolution of life on Earth from a new and 
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unexpected perspective.”91  The evidence is clear that though Apollo began for political 
reasons, the program produced an exceptional scientific legacy.  This is the best 
barometer of Apollo astronaut training.  
Training the next humans to set foot on the Moon will probably differ 
significantly from Apollo.  Whether the effort originates from NASA, a U.S. private 
company, or the Chinese National Space Agency, future crews will travel to the Moon 
aboard a vehicle with far fewer switches than the Apollo CSM and a computer with far 
more than Apollo’s 64 kilobytes of memory.  Simulator training will thus have to reflect 
21st century hardware and software.  These crews will likely spend much more than three 
days on the lunar surface and stay together for their entire journey, meaning the Apollo 
practice of keeping one astronaut in orbit will probably remain relegated to the past.  
Instructors will thus have to place a greater emphasis on evaluating these crews for 
compatibility over a long duration.  These crews will likely need to have a much more 
diverse skill set than their Apollo predecessors, to ensure that they can produce their own 
food, construct habitats, operate robotic equipment, and perform large-scale mining of 
resources such as helium-3.92  Training for many of these skills will more closely 
approximate the ISS era than Apollo, because the ISS supports crews for long duration 
missions, using present technology, with the intention of preparing for flights beyond 
Earth orbit.  Training technology itself will also reflect the improvements made since the 
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Apollo era, as seen in the virtual reality devices that college students now use to build 
their geology skills.93 
 Yet future instructors will have to bear in mind some of the lessons of Apollo 
training.  Bill Phinney has already cited several lessons in his history of the subject.  
Instructors should continue to prepare astronauts for lunar exploration by sending them 
to analog field sites on Earth, because this remains the best method to teach geological 
skills.  Classroom instruction should continue as well, but only on an introductory level 
before instructors move on to hands-on work in the field.  Phinney suggests a training 
site in Antarctica may be useful to acclimate crews to living for long periods in hostile 
conditions.  The other lessons he cites are similar to training for spacecraft operation.  
Mission Control personnel should closely monitor the field work, as they did during 
training for the last Apollo missions.  Simulations in the field should include 
contingencies designed to test the resolve of astronauts and controllers working together.  
At the end of the sessions, all personnel should take part in debriefings with the 
instructors.94  In addition to Phinney’s points, the Apollo experience makes clear that 
future lunar explorers should train to deal with the fine grained dust that clung to the 
astronauts’ suits and even hampered their driving.  Training to land a spacecraft in one-
sixth gravity should also remain a priority.  The challenge here will be to develop a 
vehicle that allows astronauts to rehearse controlling lateral motion and rate of descent in 
low gravity, but without the safety hazards of the LLTV.   
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 Almost a half century after the last human set foot on Earth’s neighbor in space, 
the words of one of the twelve men who walked there still have the ring of authenticity.  
After the splashdown of Apollo 15, the crew held a press conference at which Dave Scott 
said, “We went to the Moon as trained observers in order to gather data, not only with 
our instruments on board, but also with our minds.  Plutarch, a wise man who lived a 
long time ago, expressed the feelings of the crew of Apollo 15 when he wrote, ‘The mind 
is not a vessel to be filled, but a fire to be lighted.’”  This man whose life work revolved 
around airplanes and engineering had nonetheless helped to transform scientific 
knowledge of the Moon through a training process that had fired his curiosity.  The 
descent stage of his Lunar Module still sits next to the mountains he explored for three 
days in 1971, waiting to light a fire in the next wave of explorers.95  
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CHAPTER IX 
SKYLAB: “NO WEAKNESS WAS OVERLOOKED” 
 
 Edward Everett Hale authored the first known proposal of the idea.  In 1869, the 
Massachusetts writer published a short story in the Atlantic Monthly describing how 
thirty-seven people lived in a “brick moon” launched into Earth orbit.  The inhabitants of 
this space station enjoyed a high quality of life as they planted their own food and served 
as a navigational reference for sailing vessels on the Earth below them.  From this 
humble beginning, the futurists of the early twentieth century made the first technical 
designs for a space station.  Virtually all serious space enthusiasts proposed space 
stations as orbital “base camps” to more distant destinations, in the tradition of mountain 
climbing.  The idea of building a large structure that rotated to produce artificial gravity 
flowed from the writings of Russian Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and Germans Hermann 
Oberth and Wernher von Braun, to a major element in a NASA long-range plan prepared 
in 1959.  President John F. Kennedy’s declaration prompted the decision to send men to 
the Moon directly, without stopping at any “base camp.”  But space station advocates 
within NASA continued to study the concept, knowing the urgency of reaching the 
Moon would eventually fade and that an orbital outpost would mark one of the next 
steps in spaceflight.1 
 Advanced studies at the LRC and MSC helped to develop a strong rationale for  
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this by 1963.  The first visits of astronauts to a space station would determine whether 
they could function for several weeks in zero gravity or upon their sudden return to 
normal gravity.  The astronauts could perform biomedical experiments for this purpose, 
as well as investigations in astronomy and physics.  These first flights would verify the 
engineering and operational details of a more ambitious station, from where astronauts 
might embark to the Moon or Mars.  But the first station would derive from Apollo 
hardware, as a Saturn V rocket would launch it and astronauts would travel to it aboard a 
CSM launched by a Saturn IB rocket.  In 1965, George Mueller announced the 
formation of an Apollo Applications office designed to plan for future uses of this 
hardware.2  Though plans to continue using the hardware for a lunar base fell by the 
wayside in the wake of NASA budget cuts during the last years of Lyndon Johnson’s 
presidency and first years of Richard Nixon’s, Mueller’s advocacy managed to keep the 
space station idea alive.  The years of program definition finally ended in 1970, when a 
design review established the final form of a space station now named Skylab: an orbital 
workshop with room for three astronauts to eat, sleep, and perform research, surrounded 
by a solar observatory called the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), solar arrays, a 
micrometeoroid shield, and an adapter with which an Apollo CSM could dock.3  If the 
Apollo astronauts had been explorers analogous to Christopher Columbus and his crew 
in 1492, the Skylab astronauts would be settlers analogous to those at Jamestown, 
Virginia in 1607.  They would have to master living in this new environment over the  
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long haul. 
 The astronauts who would carry out this feat learned of their assignment to 
America’s first space station in 1970.  Deke Slayton announced at a Monday morning 
pilots’ meeting early that year that he had assigned Gemini and Apollo veteran Pete 
Conrad to the program and trusted him to supervise the tasks crews would perform in 
training.  Most of the others who had already flown in space decided to move on after 
the end of Apollo, but Alan Bean, Rusty Schweickart, and Walt Cunningham also joined 
the program.  A group of pilots from the 1966 class including Vance Brand, Jerry Carr, 
Don Lind, Jack Lousma, Bruce McCandless, Bill Pogue, and Paul Weitz joined in hopes 
of gaining their first spaceflights.  A group of scientists from the 1965 and 1967 classes 
including Owen Garriott, Ed Gibson, Karl Henize, Don Holmquest, Joe Kerwin, Bill 
Lenoir, Story Musgrave, Bob Parker, and Bill Thornton joined in hopes of contributing 
their research skills.  Finally, the program gained a few of the pilots who had worked on 
the Air Force’s canceled Manned Orbiting Laboratory before transferring to NASA in 
1969.  This group included Karol Bobko, Bob Crippen, Hank Hartsfield, and Dick 
Truly.4  All participated in the development of the program and support of the three 
flights, but the announcement of the three crews who would fly aboard Skylab came on 
January 18, 1972.  Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz would fly for 28 days on the first mission 
(doubling the previous duration record for an American human spaceflight).  Bean, 
Garriott, and Lousma would fly for 56 days on the second mission.  Carr, Gibson, and  
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Pogue also would fly for 56 days on the third mission.5 
 The three crews would need to follow an even more daunting training regimen 
than their Apollo predecessors.  Conrad had sent a memo to his colleagues in April 1971 
explaining that each crew would consist of three members: the Commander, Science 
Pilot, and Pilot.  The Commanders (Conrad, Bean, and Carr) would have responsibility 
for the success of the mission, the safety of the crew, the Apollo CSM systems, and any 
EVAs while at the orbital workshop.  Conrad expected this crewmember to train for 
1,411 hours.  The Science Pilots (Kerwin, Garriott, and Gibson) would have 
responsibility for most experiments, which would push this crewmember’s training load 
to 1,500 hours.  Thus for the first time in American spaceflight, one of the crew positions 
called for a background in science rather than piloting.  The Pilots (Weitz, Lousma, and 
Pogue) would specialize in the station’s hardware, including the airlock, docking 
adapter, and workshop systems, as well as Earth resources experiments.  Conrad 
expected 1,420 hours from this person.  The hours for all three crewmembers surpassed 
that of Apollo crews, because although Skylab crews did not have to confront the 
dynamic tasks of landing a spacecraft on another world or exploring it, they would have 
to develop their knowledge for a more complex spacecraft and a far greater number of 
scientific investigations.6  A NASA publication stressed that training time for Skylab 
astronauts would equal the classroom hours for a four-year college degree.  Add this to 
the time the men spent studying documents, exercising, and flying T-38 airplanes, and  
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Skylab crews found every day full except Sundays.7      
 The regimen began with lectures designed to give the astronauts basic familiarity 
in their hardware and tasks, following the tradition established during Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo.  This began in 1970, when an investigator for the ATM called for the 
astronauts to receive lectures on solar physics.  Richard Tousey, an astronomer who had 
been a pioneer in observing the Sun from unmanned space vehicles, knew that crews 
would benefit from an understanding of solar physics as they operated the telescope 
mount.  An informed crew would collect data more intelligently just as the Apollo 
moonwalkers had.  He sent a letter to Skylab Program Manager Robert Thompson in 
February complaining “that little has been done as yet to arrange for scientific training of 
the crew.”  This was largely because the aforementioned astronauts were still 
participating in design reviews, but a group of MSC managers decided at Tousey’s 
prodding that they should begin a 10-week, 60-hour course in October.  This took place 
under the direction of Dr. Frank Orrall, a University of Hawaii physicist.  Though 
several of the astronauts found the content unfamiliar and difficult to follow, the 
evidence indicates that the knowledge they accumulated made them more skilled and 
enthusiastic about studying the Sun from orbit.  The nine men who flew aboard Skylab 
operated the telescope mount past scheduled times and even into their sleep periods, 
because the knowledge attained during training sparked their curiosity.8   
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 Lectures continued into 1971, following a syllabus created by the MSC’s Robert  
Kohler.  Principal Investigators from various universities lectured the astronauts on the  
theories behind what became 82 experiments covering space science, Earth resources, 
life science, space technology, and student projects.  Two Principal Investigators, Henize 
and Thornton, even came from the astronaut corps.  Then came lectures from Martin 
Marietta instructors explaining the equipment and operational procedures behind each 
experiment.  As one example, the astronauts learned that the Human Vestibular Function 
experiment would be crucial to understanding their physiological response to long-term 
stays in zero gravity, because it would test for changes to the sensitivity of their 
semicircular canals.  Then they learned about the rotating chair they would have to sit in, 
which contained a motor that could whirl them around at speeds from 1 to 30 rpm to 
collect data.  Instructors from Martin Marietta and McDonnell Douglas, the contractor 
chosen to manufacture the orbital workshop, lectured the astronauts on Skylab systems.  
Finally, North American Rockwell instructors visited Houston to give the astronauts 130 
hours of lectures on Apollo CSM systems.  Though crews would only spend a handful of 
hours in these ships, most of the astronauts had not flown in one before and an error 
could have proven fatal. In evaluating the lectures as a whole, MSC training chief John 
Von Bockel praised the astronauts as eager to learn but believed instructors had too 
much difficulty in finding material.  He argued that future instructors should prepare 
training materials further in advance.9     
 The tradition of astronaut participation in hardware checkout continued through  
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the three years prior to Skylab’s 1973 launch.  Leland Belew, a Skylab manager at the 
Marshall Spaceflight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama decided to call upon 
astronauts and groups of engineers to take part in monthly crew station reviews.  These 
required them to travel to the McDonnell Douglas plant in St. Louis, walk through 
mockups of the 48 by 21 foot orbital workshop (about the size of a small three bedroom 
home) this company had manufactured and verify that the vehicle met operational 
requirements.  The astronauts could then send their input to a configuration control 
board, which made judgments on the benefits of proposed changes and effects on cost 
and schedule.  Since Skylab crews would have to live in this workshop rather than make 
the camping style trip of the Apollo era, their recommendations on crew comfort 
especially carried weight.10  The men who would fly on the station eventually spent 
about 200 hours observing tests of its hardware.  Joe Kerwin remembered traveling to St. 
Louis for a 1972 test and finding, “The spacecraft was clean, beautiful, and completely 
functional.  We felt that industry had finally learned how to build them and test them, 
and we partied that night at the motel with our contractor teammates.”11  When asked 
about the value of this experience today, he remarks, “The critical factor in our 
knowledge of the workshop was that we participated in design and testing, not just 
training.  We had several years of that and got really good at it.”12      
Like their predecessors, Skylab astronauts had multiple simulators in which to 
train prior to their flights.  The first step would be the launch, rendezvous, and docking 
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with the space station aboard an Apollo CSM.  Skylab crews thus continued to use the 
Dynamic Crew Procedures Simulator to become familiar with launch procedures.  The 
Command Module Simulator then prepared them to voyage to the station.  Most of these 
astronauts had not flown in space before, but they could still make use of the experience 
in piloting procedures from Gemini and Apollo.  They and the simulator instructors 
could draw on a vast knowledge base concerning the act of slowing to a fraction of a 
foot per second relative to a target and then using probe and drogue hardware to slip into 
a docking port.  This knowledge base contributed to a rendezvous procedure book which 
guided them in responding to computer, optics, and radar failures in the CSM, as well as 
failures in the Skylab tracking lights.  Some changes from Gemini and Apollo also helped 
these astronauts.  The spacecraft could now determine its range rate from a target using 
VHF tracking and display this data to a crew.  The introduction of the Minimum 
Keystroke program reduced crew workload in operating the computer.  Skylab also 
contained two docking ports, so a crew had two options in linking to the station.13  The 
innovations and the experience of simulator instructors allowed the last Skylab crew to 
write in their mission report, “Rendezvous techniques and the rendezvous phase have 
matured to the point that…rendezvous can best be described as being rather routine…the 
inflight stationkeeping and flyaround inspections were much easier to perform than was 
expected from training.”14 
When asked today, Joe Kerwin praises the Command Module Simulator and  
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notes that sessions there were essential in mastering the challenging learning curve for 
astronauts such as himself training to make their first flights.  “By the time our crew got 
there, the simulators had been honed and were excellent for learning and executing 
procedures,” he reflects.  “The apex was using them to conduct simulations with the 
entire flight control team, with malfunctions thrown in.  They could be tough.  Launch 
aborts were probably the hardest.  One of the Apollo Flight Directors, Phil Shaffer, tells 
a funny story about that.  He was in the MOCR preparing for a sim when a guy from 
NASA Headquarters came in and said, approximately, ‘Hello, I’m from Headquarters 
and I’ll be here to approve your decisions as Flight Director.’  Phil thought for a minute, 
then said, ‘you can sit over there.’  Then he went to his SimSup and said, ‘Put in the 
Apollo tape’ (a launch sim with all the worst failures).  They ran that sim.  Engines 
failed, computers went nuts, a cabin leak developed, and at the peak of confusion Phil 
walked over to the guy from HQ and said, ‘What shall I do now?’  HQ pulled the plug 
on his headset and left the room, never to reappear.’”15  The thorniest simulations had 
not lost their ability to awe those who were not familiar with the stress inherent in them.        
The astronauts would also have to perform EVAs outside Skylab, which took 
them to the Neutral Buoyancy Simulator in Huntsville, Alabama.  Personnel at MSC and 
MSFC had each developed pools for EVA training in the aftermath of the Gemini 
program, but since MSFC featured a far more advanced pool, Skylab crews used the 
facility in Huntsville.  At the suggestion of Jim Splawn, the manager of space simulation 
at the Process Engineering Laboratory, a group began experimenting with incrementally 
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more ambitious pools in the mid-1960s.  The first pool was just six feet in diameter and 
the second was 25 feet in diameter, based around an interstage for a Saturn rocket.  Alan 
Bean became the first astronaut to use this one, prior to his first spaceflight on Apollo 12.  
This experience prepared the team for the 1968 move to a pool that was 75 feet in 
diameter, 40 feet deep, and containing 1.3 million gallons of water (by comparison, the 
Water Immersion Facility at MSC was only 25 feet in diameter and 16 feet deep).  The 
depth and width allowed personnel to submerge a mockup of Skylab which crews could 
maneuver across to rehearse EVA tasks, while the underwater lighting and audio system 
made the simulations feasible.  The facility also featured a decompression chamber, 
which an astronaut could use if he surfaced too quickly and needed to purge his body of 
the nitrogen that had developed in his bloodstream (what divers call the “bends”).16  
Another critical feature was a test control trailer, where personnel monitored and 
controlled the video, communication, and instrumentation systems for the pool.17          
At a time when only a few Americans had ever performed an EVA in flight, the 
facility contributed several lessons learned for the benefit of the more than 100 who have 
now done so.  It set an impressive new standard for safety, given the master alarm, 
emergency power generator, fire extinguishing system, and several divers carrying air 
hoses who surrounded the astronauts on each run.  The use of color television with 
which the trailer personnel could monitor each run was a first and proved much more 
helpful than the black and white television of Gemini and Apollo training.  Daily 
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Operational Readiness Inspections worked well in eliminating technical issues and 
ensuring that astronauts could train in a timely manner.  The experience in training for 
Skylab missions did suggest room for improvement, however.  The Marshall personnel 
called for a clear set of rules concerning how long astronauts could stay underwater, a 
larger work space near the top deck from which to maintain underwater hardware, and a 
more powerful pneumatic hoist with which to raise or lower objects.  Though the long-
term future of EVA training was at Houston, upon the opening of a new neutral 
buoyancy facility in 1980, prior experience with the facility in Huntsville benefited those 
future astronauts and all who supported them.18     
        All of the fifteen astronauts who composed the Skylab prime and backup crews 
trained in this facility for a total of 543 hours.  The standard procedure was for two to go 
into the pool at a time, surrounded by at least nine divers, four personnel on the top deck 
qualified in operating the decompression chamber and working with pressure suits, and a 
control room containing a few people who communicated with the astronauts and 
monitored data.  This amounted to a total of 21 people supporting the astronauts for each 
run.  The standard Skylab EVA called for two men to maneuver to the ATM and install a 
new film canister, so EVA training began with this task.  The two donned their suits, 
went down the steps into the pool, received lead weights from divers which made them 
neutrally buoyant when placed in their suits, and went to the airlock of the Skylab 
mockup.  From there, the first astronaut stowed the film equipment at his workstation 
and sent it to the second astronaut by transfer boom for installation.  Though these were 
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rather simple tasks, the success of the astronauts’ underwater preparation convinced 
instructors that they could handle unexpected and much more difficult workshop repairs.  
As it turned out, Skylab would need just that.19  After a two or three hour session, the 
astronauts resurfaced for a debriefing.  The pattern of flying their T-38 jets from 
Houston to Huntsville for three days at a time of these sessions tested the astronauts’ 
stamina, but the men gained enough efficiency to reduce underwater time by as much as 
50 percent.  Joe Kerwin described the value of the training best when he said, “By the 
time we launched, each of us could don and zip his own suit unassisted and move around 
in it with the same familiarity as a football player in his helmet and pads.”20   
The other new element in Skylab training was the workshop simulator, where 
astronauts began working in February 1972.  When astronauts did not need to use 
complex display systems, they could train in a one-G mockup of Skylab located 
nearby.21  But it was the workshop simulator that built on the progress of electronic 
flight simulation.  This device, manufactured and delivered by McDonnell Douglas 
contractors to MSC Building 5 in October 1971, differed from Mercury, Gemini, and 
Apollo spacecraft simulators by training crews for more diverse tasks.  Skylab crews still 
needed to train in spacecraft operation, as the workshop contained displays concerning 
the health of the vehicle and multiple instrument panels that the astronauts could control.  
The hardware in the simulator still closely matched the actual vehicle, a lesson from 
previous programs.  SimSups still inserted malfunctions into this simulator.  But these 
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crews also needed to live for an extended period aboard the workshop, which contained 
a wardroom for eating, a private sleeping area the size of a walk-in closet, a shower, and 
a toilet.  Thus the simulator prepared crews for the challenges of habitability.  Astronauts 
would need to know how to respond if the shower or toilet malfunctioned, if the 
temperature climbed or dropped, or if a crewmember became sick.  Their training in this 
device thus marked a departure from the brief, dynamic tasks of Apollo to more open-
ended tasks.22   
 Training for these open-ended tasks proved successful in developing the 
astronauts’ ability to maintain their vehicle over the long haul.  Some of them were 
routine chores, such as vacuum cleaning inlet screens or replacing filters for the shower 
(scheduled for once every seven days), fecal collector, and urine separator (scheduled for 
once every 28 days).  But some of them were unscheduled tasks that tested the 
astronauts’ knowledge of tools and procedures.  For instance, a malfunction in the 
electrical system required them to replace a window heater control unit and cable, 
replace general illumination flood lights, and potentially install Skylab to a contingency 
power cable in the CSM docked to it.  The astronauts also participated in fire drills, 
which gave them crucial knowledge of the caution and warning system, fire sensors, fire 
extinguishers, and the flammability of materials.23  The experience solving these 
problems in the workshop simulator proved prescient, because the three crews that 
traveled to Skylab performed about 30 contingency maintenance tasks.  Especially given  
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the hardware glitches astronauts could expect, their job required them to become  
plumbers, electricians, and more.24 
 This also included the job of doctor.  Given the sicknesses that Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo crews had experienced, the fact that Skylab crews would shatter the 
American spaceflight duration record, and the medical experiments they would have to 
perform, the astronauts needed to hone their medical skills.  Thus the men traveled to the 
U.S. Air Force Dental Clinic at Brooks Air Force Base to gain experience in extracting 
teeth and the Ben Taub Hospital in Houston to observe and ask questions of emergency 
teams dealing with life-threatening trauma.  Back at MSC, consultants from the Houston 
medical community lectured the astronauts and produced a manual that explained for 
them the equipment they would have onboard (diagnostic equipment, minor surgical 
instruments, a laryngoscope and tracheostomy kit, intravenous fluids, and medications) 
and operating procedures.  Although most of the astronauts had backgrounds only as 
pilots, the combination of these training resources and the presence of experts with 
whom they would be in voice contact should any emergency arise in flight left them 
confident about their medical skills.  Their time in the workshop simulator allowed them 
to place their knowledge to the test by responding to mock emergencies while following 
a timeline.  The astronauts also built their confidence by rehearsing medical 
experiments, including the first blood draw of American space travelers.25        
They still needed to train for dynamic tasks such as observation of the Sun and  
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the Earth, however, which required simulator computers capable of supporting them.  
Stanley Faber, still the head of the MSC Simulation Branch, remembered that the 
workshop simulator benefited from a more advanced computer type than the DDP-224s 
that had controlled the Apollo simulators.  The Air Force had a surplus IBM 360/65 from 
a military space project that had been cancelled and when a Pentagon official offered it 
to Faber over the phone, he accepted.  A team of engineers at MSC and IBM then 
worked together to write the software for this computer and the others that would control 
the workshop simulator.  The computers allowed for an unprecedented quality of 
simulations.  When an astronaut flipped a switch, he received a more immediate 
response than in previous spacecraft simulators.  The computers also controlled readings 
on six instrument panels, more than any previous simulator, so SimSups could introduce 
malfunctions.  The computer simulation of images also made a crucial advance because 
Skylab astronauts needed to observe the Sun and the Earth.  Simulating a high-fidelity 
view of the Sun had been unthinkable during the Mercury era, but computer technology 
had progressed to the point that an IBM 360/65 could now simulate a view of this 
massive object as it appeared from 93 million miles away.26 
 Observation of the Sun was not only the most technically demanding task to 
simulate, but also the most intricate from the crew’s perspective.  The instrument panel 
for the ATM featured three times as many controls as the Apollo CSM.  Astronauts 
would operate these controls in response to displays revealing the health of the telescope 
mount, two that displayed an image of the Sun as seen through the H-alpha telescopes, 
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one that displayed the solar corona as seen through the coronagraph, and one that 
displayed an X-ray monitor.  A crewmember would need the hand-eye coordination to 
aim one of these instruments at a feature of scientific interest using a hand controller.  
He would also need the scientific knowledge to find and observe those features, from the 
Sun’s outer atmosphere (the corona and chromosphere), to the areas of reduced surface 
temperature (sunspots), to the brief eruptions of high energy radiation from the Sun 
(solar flares), to the times when the Sun was obscured by the Moon (solar eclipses).  
Astronauts thus spent 200 hours studying solar activity as generated on the workshop 
simulator video screens and manipulating the controls to make the desired observation.27  
Carr explained why this was such an intricate task: “I always thought of it (the ATM) 
being like a big Gatling gun or a gun turret, because it turned.  What you did is you 
would turn the drum inside there and you’d position one of the experiments to take solar 
data, and then when you finished with that, you would position another one and take 
data…The spacecraft had to be in exactly the right attitude, and then the drum had to be 
pointed…to within a tenth of a degree of accuracy, which is incredible accuracy.”28 
 Observation of the Earth was another intricate task that required precision by the  
astronauts over a short time span.  The Principal Investigators who had lectured them 
counted on them to take photos and make observations of Earth resources.  
Environmental awareness in the U.S. had risen dramatically since World War II as 
activists published books about the dangers of air and water pollution.  If astronauts  
                                                          
27  Compton and Benson, 174-175 and 228.  
28  Gerald P. Carr, Interviewed by Kevin M. Rusnak, October 25, 2000, Houston, Texas, http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/ 
history/oral_histories/CarrGP/CarrGP_10-25-00.htm (accessed October 21, 2016).  
343 
 
could monitor resources such as crops, minerals, and water supplies from orbit, and  
especially if they could identify shortages that could cripple future generations, they 
would contribute valuable knowledge to this cause.  Members of Congress and their 
constituents understood and supported this idea more easily than any other Skylab 
objective.29  The astronauts thus spent time in the workshop simulator preparing to 
maneuver the cameras and other instruments to a desired site, center the site in the cross 
hairs, and track it while the instruments obtained data.  Only an astronaut who had gone 
through the lectures would have been able to develop the knowledge to make intelligent 
observations of the Earth, and only one who had gone through the simulator sessions 
would have been able to make time sensitive observations and respond to any 
malfunctions.30 
 After individual astronauts had developed their expertise in tasks such as these, 
the first crew of Pete Conrad, Joe Kerwin, and Paul Weitz had made enough progress by 
September 1972 to begin integrated simulations.  This crew entered the workshop 
simulator at 6 a.m. and left at 10 p.m. during integrated simulation days.31  The 
astronauts learned that their relationship with Mission Control differed significantly 
from previous programs.  The Principal Investigators for experiments could speak to the 
astronauts directly and provide any assistance necessary, although only when the 
simulated flights brought the workshop over a ground station.  The relationship also 
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differed in that controllers sent the astronauts their daily activities via teleprinter, rather 
than preparing a completed plan ahead of time as on previous American spaceflights.  
The simulations thus allowed the controllers to rehearse coordinating tasks, from vehicle 
maintenance to experiments to any unexpected situations that SimSups introduced.  
Flight Director Shaffer remembered that during one real mission, he had to decide 
between having an astronaut eat a meal and having him operate Earth resources sensors 
while Skylab was above an erupting volcano.  The simulations prepared him for conflicts 
such as this one, when he overruled the man at the surgeon console and sent the 
astronaut to observe the volcano.  The controllers involved with the experiments also 
benefited from simulations reflecting the unprecedented complexity of their jobs.  For 
instance, the controller in charge of the Earth resources equipment coordinated with 
pilots flying aircraft over selected sites and weather experts to ensure that the crew could 
garner useful data.32        
Given that NASA envisioned a much more ambitious space station following 
Skylab, what lessons learned did the workshop simulator offer?  Astronauts identified a 
few shortcomings of the device for the benefit of future space station crews.  Compared 
to the Command Module Simulator, this simulator lacked the displays to provide 
SimSups with rapid indications of the operations that astronauts performed inside.  The 
simulator training underestimated the amount of time required to activate the workshop, 
which resulted in crews falling behind schedule and struggling to keep up the pace at the 
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beginning of their missions.33  According to Stanley Faber, the astronauts also 
complained that the images of the Sun did not closely match what they had seen in the 
workshop simulator.34  Training personnel in Houston also identified a few shortcomings 
in a 1974 document called Lessons Learned on the Skylab Program.  For instance, the 
intracommunication system in the simulator did not duplicate the system in the actual 
vehicle closely enough and drove home the need for high fidelity.35     
 Yet positive lessons abounded and outweighed the negatives.  As with Apollo, 
one of the main strengths of Skylab training was that the instructors evaluated the 
astronauts in terms of competence and not just how many hours they had filled.  A 
Commander could decide that the number of hours allocated to a task was not sufficient, 
as Conrad did when he had his crew spend 125 hours training to activate Skylab rather 
than the 20 hours initially allocated.  This resulted in a remarkably thorough experience, 
as the second Skylab crew recalled: “The best training protocol was a mixture of what 
the crew thought was needed and what the training coordinators and training instructors 
believed the crew needed.  Overtraining in some areas resulted from satisfying both 
groups, but no weakness was overlooked.”  None of the three members of this crew 
could remember any scheduled task for which he had not trained in the workshop 
simulator, which matched the vehicle well despite the rare exceptions noted above.36  
The document about lessons learned suggests that integrated simulations also proved 
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useful, in that they allowed the astronauts to rehearse communicating with Principal 
Investigators and allowed flight controllers to get a feel for the complexity of their jobs  
before a mission lifted off.37  
While the astronauts trained in this simulator, Skylab managers considered how 
to prepare for the psychological challenge of long-term habitation in space.  The closest 
analog for this on Earth appeared to be the work of Navy personnel on submarines, 
which prompted NASA to study a submarine mission in 1969.  An engineer from MSFC 
climbed aboard a six-person submarine called the Ben Franklin and voyaged from 
Florida to Nova Scotia on an oceanographic mission lasting 31 days.38  This experience 
mimicked a Skylab mission in subjecting the crew to psychological factors such as 
confinement, social isolation, deprivation, close quarters, a hostile environment, 
operational stress, a meaningful mission requiring the collection of scientific data, and 
data transmission difficulties.  Based on data obtained prior to the mission to establish a 
personality profile of the crewmembers, a daily questionnaire and log during the 
mission, and a series of questionnaires after the mission, NASA personnel drew the 
conclusion that the men showed an increased desire for withdrawal and privacy as the 
mission continued, with depression being the greatest at the midway point.  Yet none of 
them suffered significant deterioration in performance or physical deconditioning.  The 
crew also accomplished 96 percent of their unscheduled maintenance tasks.  The Ben 
Franklin mission indicated that long-term space missions were feasible from a  
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standpoint of psychology and habitability, but the data did suggest recommendations for 
Skylab.39    
A 1970 conference presentation explained the applicability of the submarine 
mission to Skylab.  The presenter argued that the Skylab design should mitigate the 
issues that caused frustration for the Ben Franklin crew by providing for private areas, 
adequate lighting and comfortable chairs, sleeping quarters isolated from the sound of 
the work areas, and simple food preparation devices and techniques.  One of the other 
major takeaways from the Ben Franklin mission was the need for highly skilled 
crewmembers who had been trained in maintaining the ship and could therefore ensure 
mission success.  This crew commented that their preparation in reviewing maintenance 
procedures, troubleshooting information, checklists, and equipment built their 
confidence and was instrumental in their impressive maintenance record.  The presenter 
ended by arguing, “Space stations will require many more highly complex subsystems, 
and mission duration will be measured in months and years rather than days.  Hence, it 
appears that sophisticated analysis, training, and automatic failure detection methods 
will be required.”40  Thus NASA’s study of the closest analog to space station flight 
reinforced the importance of the simulations astronauts were performing at the time.  
But the most ambitious and innovative training for long-term habitation in space 
was the Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test (SMEAT).  Astronauts Bob Crippen, 
Karol Bobko, and Bill Thornton lived for 56 days, from July 26-September 19, 1972, in 
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a vacuum chamber at MSC Building 7.  Engineers configured this chamber to simulate 
the orbital workshop, from the 380 square feet of floor area, to the toilet that Skylab 
crews planned to use, to the food they planned to eat, to the bunks on which they 
planned to sleep.  The use of the vacuum chamber allowed engineers to make the most 
critical configuration: lowering the atmospheric pressure to just one-third as high as 
Earth’s, mimicking the Skylab atmosphere.  From a medical point of view, 
weightlessness was the only major element of life on the space station that the chamber 
could not mimic.41  Placing a crew in this analog environment fulfilled six major 
objectives: to obtain and evaluate baseline medical data for the crew, evaluate Skylab 
hardware, evaluate data handling procedures, evaluate medical operations and 
equipment, and train the Skylab medical operations team for the flights.42       
 The results of the test built confidence in all of these areas.  The chamber 
contained the equipment for the medical experiments that Skylab crews would perform, 
and when the crew performed the experiments they returned data providing a 
comprehensive view of their day to day health.  Data on variables such as mineral 
balance and metabolism indicated no significant changes.  At the end of the 56 days, 
despite noticing issues such as increased flatulence and lower transmission of sound in 
the lower atmospheric pressure, Crippen, Bobko, and Thornton remained in strong 
health with no degradation in their performance.  Thus scientists concluded that although 
long stays in weightlessness would affect the health of Skylab crews, the atmosphere, 
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work, and social conditions would not create any bias in their medical data.  The test 
built confidence for scientists trusted to handle Skylab data as well.  Though the 
computer processing of data lagged during the initial days, by the end of the test data 
flowed smoothly.  This allowed scientists to form a trend chart displaying the health of 
the astronauts on a daily basis, a new technique in American human spaceflight that 
proved effective.  As for the last objective, the MSC Director of Life Sciences argued 
that the test built the confidence of the entire medical operations team.  “A number of 
new management concepts were used in SMEAT under which a diversified life sciences 
group, consisting of engineers, physicians, physiologists, biologists, psychologists, and 
others, became a cohesive program team,” he wrote.43     
Though Crippen, Bobko, and Thornton did not fly aboard Skylab and had to wait 
until the Space Shuttle era to reach orbit themselves, they did Skylab crews a major 
service by evaluating hardware and making suggestions for improvement.  Crippen felt 
that these crews especially benefited from the use of medical experiment equipment over 
56 days.  “If we’d flown those without running them in some sort of operational 
situation, I think there would have been a problem,” he said.  The crew did identify 
several problems so that they could be solved before Skylab launched.  The urine 
collection system burst, because the astronauts exceeded the 2,000 milliliters per day 
allocated for it, which forced engineers to redesign the system.  The bearings on the 
bicycle ergometer failed, which forced engineers to install a new shaft and bearings and 
restrict its power to 250 watts.  Thornton revealed another critical problem: the daily 
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caloric intake for the crew was too low to maintain his body mass, and this resulted in 
the decision to send extra food to Skylab.  Engineers also heeded the suggestions of the 
crew by redesigning the lower body negative pressure device, recalibrating the 
equipment used for measuring blood pressure, redesigning the metabolic analyzer unit, 
preventing the electrode cement used for a heart test from causing skin irritation, adding 
anticoagulants to prevent blood samples from changing to a solid state, and redesigning 
the centrifuge used for blood separation.44  When the astronauts stepped out of the 
chamber, three of their colleagues were just eight months away from placing their 
training to the ultimate test.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44  Hitt, Garriott, and Kerwin, 111-117.  
351 
 
CHAPTER X 
SKYLAB: “FATE HAD US RIGHT WHERE SHE WANTED US” 
 
Attention now turned to the first astronauts who would live aboard an American 
space station.  When May 1973 arrived, Pete Conrad, Joe Kerwin, and Paul Weitz had 
obliterated the amount of training time that Conrad had suggested in his memo two years 
earlier.  As the Commander, he tallied 2,151 hours and would have logged even more if 
not for his experience in training for three previous spaceflights.  The rookies Kerwin 
and Weitz surpassed him with 2,437 and 2,506 hours, respectively.1  As demanding a 
pace as the lunar landing crews had set, the first Skylab crew surpassed all of them in 
training time.  The task of learning all of the experiments, space station systems, CSM 
systems, emergency medical procedures, and EVA procedures would not have been 
possible without a division of labor that allowed astronauts to focus on their assigned 
fields.  Conrad specialized in the Command Module Simulator, logging 400 hours there 
(55 more than either of his crewmates) because the Commander had the responsibility of 
delivering the crew to and from the station.  Weitz spent far more time training for Earth 
resources experiments than either of his crewmates, while Kerwin far surpassed his 
crewmates by spending 181 hours training for medical experiments.  On April 26, 
eighteen days before launch, the crew entered quarantine at the Cape and began eating 
specially prepared flight diets.  Skylab sat inside a modified Saturn V booster at Pad 
39A, while their CSM sat atop a Saturn IB booster at Pad 39B.  Given how well trained  
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and confident the astronauts felt, Kerwin reflected, “You could say Fate had us right 
where she wanted us.2   
 The crew was one day from launch on May 14, when they watched the last 
Saturn V soar into space on the Skylab 1 mission.  Little did the astronauts know that this 
launch and its aftermath would prove the value of human intervention in space science 
better than arguably any previous event.  Flight controllers at the Johnson Space Center 
(the new name for the MSC adopted after the 1973 death of President Lyndon Johnson) 
received data about a minute into the launch indicating that Skylab’s micrometeoroid 
shield had deployed early.  This shield was supposed to provide thermal protection for 
the orbital workshop as well as shielding it from micrometeorite strikes.  When the 
workshop temperature climbed and did not fall to acceptable levels, controllers realized 
that the shield was gone, jarred loose during the period of maximum dynamic pressure 
on the Saturn V.  This event also caused the loss of one of two solar panels that provided 
Skylab’s electrical power.  The other generated just a trickle of current, indicating it was 
stuck shut.3  The launch could have been one of the greatest embarrassments in NASA 
history, given the more than $2 billion spent on this space station.  If Skylab had been 
designed as an unmanned scientific instrument with no human access, it would not have 
returned the data it did.  Only the flexibility of human operators trained to solve 
problems could save the outpost.     
But in order to train Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz to save Skylab, engineers first  
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needed to decide how to save it.  With their launch delayed from May 15 to 25,  
engineers in Houston and Huntsville worked 16 to 18 hour days trying to solve the 
problem of the lost shield.  Some other method would have to shield Skylab from the 
Sun’s rays and reduce the temperature of the workshop from over 100 degrees to 70.  
From Houston came a solution that would win the head of the JSC Technical Services 
Division, Dr. Jack Kinzler, the NASA Distinguished Service Medal: a large square of 
cloth called a parasol that the crew could deploy over the Scientific Airlock.  From 
Huntsville came a solution called the “Marshall Sail,” which was an aluminized mylar 
film that a pair of astronauts would have to deploy on an EVA.  Both sides had 
rationales as to why the competing solution was not ideal.  JSC engineers knew that the 
proposed EVA was more complex than any ever done before and argued for the 
deployment of a parasol that did not require going outside.  MSFC engineers argued 
against placing a parasol on the airlock, because they feared debris might block the 
airlock.  But engineers had a tool that could help them solve this argument: the neutral 
buoyancy facility in Huntsville.  Simulating EVAs at this facility would show engineers 
what astronauts could accomplish outside a spacecraft.4   
Just two days after the accident, Kerwin and Rusty Schweickart (a member of the 
backup crew for the first mission) were in Huntsville to work underwater with the 
“Marshall Sail.”   The astronauts assembled a mounting bracket to the Skylab mockup, 
installed two 55 foot poles (consisting of eleven interlocking segments) in the bracket, 
and attached the forward edge of the sail to the clothesline hooks on each pole.  Only 
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seven years and a handful of EVAs in the past, Gene Cernan could not even manage to 
maneuver his body to the back of a small Gemini spacecraft.  The difference now was 
that Skylab astronauts could draw upon not only the experience of past spacewalkers, but 
also a training environment realistic enough to provide them with neutral buoyancy and 
large enough to house a mockup of the hardware they would have to handle.  Engineers 
even modified hardware based on the astronauts’ inputs after trips to the pool, from 
tighter restraint around the top of the sail stowage bag, to the addition of tether devices 
to the mounting bracket, to teflon inserts that reduced friction on the poles.  75 engineers 
attended the first debriefing session when Kerwin and Schweickart made their 
recommendations, highlighting the importance placed on neutral buoyancy simulations.  
By May 22, after several astronauts had tried their hand at deploying the sail, Conrad 
and Kerwin finally made a nearly flawless simulation and did not have to make any 
recommendations.  With the top ranking Skylab managers in Huntsville to see the 
success for themselves, MSFC personnel packed the sail for shipment to the Cape that 
evening.5       
 One more Skylab repair task required simulation: freeing the stuck solar panel.  If 
the crew could not find a way to use this one remaining panel, they would have only the 
power generated by the ATM and the ambitious science program for them and the next 
two crews would have been conceived in vain.  Freeing the stuck panel required a 
standup EVA, where Weitz would stick his body outside the CSM hatch and remove 
debris via tools such as sheet metal cutters, cable cutters, a mushroom head, and 
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shepherd’s hook.  To simulate this, MSFC personnel built a support structure that could 
lift a 2,000 pound Command Module into the pool.  On May 22, Weitz stood up outside 
the submerged hatch and went to work on a Skylab mockup in the condition the real 
vehicle appeared to be in after the launch mishap, with loose wires, twisted bolts, and 
fragments of the lost micrometeoroid shield.  He had difficulty aligning his tools with 
the solar panel and surrounding debris, but with the launch three days away he had to 
return to the Cape.  With the results in from the neutral buoyancy sessions, top Skylab 
managers decided that the proposed EVA tasks were not impossible after all. They met 
at a design certification review in Huntsville on May 23 and decided that the first crew 
would take both the parasol and the “Marshall Sail” to combat Skylab’s rising 
temperatures.  Weitz would also make his standup EVA, though with an MSFC engineer 
ready to go into the pool to simulate any unexpected problems that arose while he was in 
space.6         
 Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz placed their troubleshooting training to the test on 
May 25, when a Saturn IB sent them into orbit.  The Skylab 2 crew found their station as 
crippled as expected from the CSM windows, but Conrad voiced his optimism that 
Weitz could free the panel.  The standup EVA began that evening, with Weitz holding 
his tools while standing out the open hatch, Kerwin holding his crewmate’s legs in place, 
and Conrad maneuvering the spacecraft.  Weitz found that the panel was stuck shut 
because a metal strap inadvertently wrapped itself across the panel beam after the launch 
mishap, but he could not free it.  The astronauts had to dock with Skylab without solving  
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the problem.7   
As if they did not already have enough to deal with, the astronauts ran into yet 
another snag when Conrad tried to dock.  The CSM probe did not engage the workshop 
drogue.  Kerwin recalls how training helped them utilize a backup procedure that solved 
this problem.  Prior to launch, “One afternoon, the three of us were in the room with the 
mockups and we’d finished that day’s activities when our instructor said, ‘Guys, we 
missed one earlier that I’d like to run through with you just so you’ll know where the 
equipment is.  It’s the third backup for a docking system failure; you have to don suits, 
depressurize the Command Module, crawl up in the tunnel and cut some wires.  Won’t 
take long.’  He showed us the switches to be configured and the wires to be cut, and we 
went home, never again to think of that procedure.  Until day one in flight, when after a 
long, difficult day, the docking latches failed to latch…If we couldn’t dock, we’d have to 
come home, with nothing accomplished.  So we wearily put on our helmets and gloves, 
dumped the air out of the Command Module, and I went up and cut those wires.  Back 
out of the tunnel, Command Module pressurized, Pete was ready to try it, and the main 
latches loudly latched, all twelve of them, a really wonderful sound.  That illustrates the 
value of training, and also the value of having procedures based on a very deep 
knowledge of the systems.  Kudos to the flight control team, which wrote them.”8          
Thus the crew surmounted this obstacle to reach the interior of the space station.  
They also did not have to give up on freeing the solar panel.  Weitz sent the information 
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he had gleaned from his EVA to the Huntsville personnel who could run more neutral 
buoyancy simulations to better understand how to do this.  The standup EVA had not 
worked, but a much more complex outing might pay off.  MSFC engineers had modified 
the Skylab mockup to match the real vehicle by May 27, so that astronauts could test a 
new procedure: exit the station airlock, move across the airlock trusses to a long antenna 
boom, use a pole as a handrail to reach the solar panel, remove the metal strap debris, 
and use a tether to break a frozen hydraulic damper on the panel.  The lack of footholds 
at this portion of the station hampered Rusty Schweickart and Ed Gibson as they 
rehearsed this, but the two men had developed enough skill underwater to accomplish 
the job on June 2 and 3.  Schweickart then briefed the Skylab 2 crew on the hardware he 
worked with and maneuvering methods he used in the pool.9                
 On June 7, Conrad and Kerwin performed the job for real and proved a critical 
point about the maturation of spaceflight operations.  The two men quickly found out 
that EVA still presented a formidable environment, especially in attempting to maneuver 
their bodies to the panel when every one of their actions produced an equal and opposite 
reaction.  Kerwin’s heart rate soared to 150.  Yet the two men managed to reach a 
position where Kerwin cut the metal strap debris with cable cutters and Conrad “heaved 
with all my might” along with him to break the frozen damper.  By the next day, the 
panel was extended and producing nearly 7 kilowatts of power.  This experience proved 
the point that if expensive hardware malfunctioned, and even if a first repair attempt 
failed, high fidelity training equipment could assist a crew in making the adjustments to 
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solve the problem.  Flights such as Apollo 13 had proved this point in the past, but now 
astronauts were making a transition toward living in space as they would have to do for a 
flight to another planet someday.  Developing the troubleshooting ability of a crew prior 
to their departure, and then having other astronauts on standby for real-time simulation 
during the flight if necessary, was a critical step along the path toward the continuous 
occupation of space aboard the ISS and the currently planned voyage to Mars.  The pool 
in Huntsville was not a perfect analog for space, but astronauts could feel comfortable 
that if one could simulate a task in a pool, one could usually do the same in space.  Thus 
astronauts and all who supported them had a vital tool that meant they did not have to 
leave a difficult chore to chance; they could simulate it and iron out difficulties ahead of 
time.10  Kerwin summarizes the point today by declaring, “We could not have erected 
the stuck solar panel without all that training.”11       
 The 28 days this crew spent in the workshop proved another point: that trained 
humans could benefit spaceflight operations of this unprecedented length.  No robot 
could have performed that delicate June 7 repair that restored power.  The same was true 
of the parasol deployment on the second day of the mission, which the crew needed to 
accomplish to cool the station to a livable temperature (flight controllers left the EVA to 
deploy the “Marshall Sail” to the second mission).  Conrad and Weitz inserted the 
parasol container into the Scientific Airlock, cranked open the outer door to expose the 
parasol to space, and inserted seven metal rods one at a time to carry the device into 
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place.  The operation was so intricate it took about two hours, but the temperature fell to 
under 80 degrees as a result.12  By solving the problems of thermal control and power, 
the astronauts saved Skylab.  But the question remained: could this crew collect 
scientific data on a day to day basis that proved the value of human flight as well? 
 The three men made a compelling demonstration of their flexibility here as well.  
Several experiments focused on their physiological response to the longest ever 
American spaceflight.  Not only did the crew prove their value by donating their bodies 
as test subjects for these experiments, which would hopefully pave the way toward 
extended flights to the Moon and Mars, but also by making needed adjustments to 
equipment or procedures.  For instance, the astronauts found the lap and shoulder 
harness on the bicycle ergometer restricted their movement.  Weitz found he was not 
using his leg muscles enough.  Thus the crew discarded the harness and stabilized 
themselves by locking triangular cleats into the pedals instead.  Based on medical data 
received, flight controllers decided to increase the number of runs for each astronaut on 
the ergometer as well.  The Velcro seatbelt on the rotating chair for the Human 
Vestibular Function experiment did not latch securely, but the crew made a modification 
and collected data.  The crew spent an unusual amount of time calibrating the Specimen 
and Body Mass Measurement experiment to ensure it would obtain accurate data.13  In 
each case, training helped the crew to surmount all difficulties and add to the database 
on the human body’s response to extended weightlessness.  One might criticize these  
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experiments as simply space research for the sake of more space research, but medical 
research on space stations has also benefited life on Earth through terrestrial applications 
of the technology used onboard.14   
 The crew also demonstrated their value in making solar observations, though 
with more difficulty.  On the fifth day of the mission, Kerwin became the first astronaut 
to observe the Sun through the four displays that the ATM provided.  He admitted to 
making several mistakes in operating the ATM, due to the many switches and monitors 
for the device and the precise timing needed to make observations.  When Skylab had 
been in the planning stages, some astronomers had doubted the value of a human 
operated solar observation facility.  But as Mission Control received the first results 
from the ATM observations, the Principal Investigators each agreed that a trained human 
operator could make a difference in solar science.  When Weitz observed a solar flare on 
June 15, for instance, he monitored the displays to confirm the eruption, initiated a 
computer program, and pinpointed the flare with the ATM instruments within a few 
seconds.  Thanks to the skill that training had given him, he tracked the flare through 
two minutes of its rise and fall and allowed scientists to collect data.15  Training gave 
crews the flexibility to not only immediately respond to events of scientific interest such 
as this, but also to make repairs.  By the end of the Skylab program, astronauts had 
replaced and modified ATM equipment inside the vehicle while also making EVAs to 
replace film, open experiment doors, replace a jammed camera, and remove debris from 
                                                          
14  See Julie Robinson, ed., International Space Station Benefits for Humanity (Houston: NASA NP-2015-01-001-
JSC, 2015). 
15  Compton and Benson, 290-291.  
361 
 
the ATM.  The fact that trained astronauts could operate and take care of the device 
helped make possible the hundreds of articles that scientists wrote about the results of 
the solar observations.16  
 The crew began Earth resources studies on the sixth day of the mission, 
demonstrating that trained operators could benefit the study of humanity’s home as well.  
Unmanned spacecraft had already taken many useful photos of specific sites on Earth, 
but Skylab crews could observe the Earth in ways not possible aboard automated 
vehicles.  Trained humans could quickly discriminate between the features they deemed 
important and those they deemed not important and respond to unexpected events.  For 
instance, an astronaut could follow and describe ocean currents for over 2,000 miles, 
recognize eddies of cold water, discover the same phenomenon in an unexpected 
location, and then wait for the best moment to take a photo of the phenomenon.  No 
robot could have duplicated this ability.17  While the astronauts utilized their 
observational skills based on the instruction they had received during briefings, they 
relied on remote sensing equipment to supplement their abilities.  This equipment 
recorded over 8 miles of magnetic tape of Earth observations, many of it in wavelengths 
beyond visible light.  The results made for a good start to the Skylab program, but the 
unexpected repairs to the station reduced the amount of time this crew could spend 
observing the Earth.  The crew could only perform 60 percent of the work they had 
expected in this area.  Thus the 28 days Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz spent in orbit only  
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whetted the appetites of scientists.18              
 The crew made a point of praising the time they had spent in the workshop 
simulator prior to the mission, even if it had not been a perfect analog.  When the 
astronauts activated the workshop at the beginning of the mission, they had to deal with 
chores such as handling small items and locating equipment that were more difficult in 
zero gravity than they had been in the simulator.  This contributed to their falling behind 
schedule.  But after they had become acclimated to life aboard the station, and after the 
excitement of saving it over the first two weeks had faded, they often found themselves 
ahead of schedule.  The simulation of their tasks ahead of time, especially when 
integrated with flight controllers who sent the astronauts a list of their daily activities, 
made this possible.  Conrad said near the end of the stay, “The things that are easy to do 
in the trainer are easy to do here, ninety-eight percent of the time.  And vice versa.”19  As 
the flight neared its end, the crew and the flight controllers did worry about the time lag 
between their training for reentry and splashdown and their actual performance of these 
tasks.  “But 28 days wasn’t long enough to make us rusty,” Kerwin explains.  “We 
scheduled a couple of entry run-throughs while on orbit, which were useful especially 
for the time everything took.”  He and his crewmates finally climbed into their CSM on 
June 22 and undocked.  After Conrad flew the CSM around the station for an inspection 
and photos, two deorbit burns sent the crew to a splashdown near the USS 
Ticonderoga.20 
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 The Skylab 3 crew set a new standard for amount of training and amount of data 
returned from orbit, but not without some disturbing drama concerning their ride to 
Skylab.  Alan Bean, Owen Garriott, and Jack Lousma each averaged about 2,800 hours 
of training and were emphatic in their mission report that the exhausting schedule paid 
off.21  But none could have guessed that the oldest hardware in the program would place 
their training to the test.  During launch on July 28, Lousma noticed what appeared to be 
a CSM thruster floating by the window.  The crew then realized that what they had seen 
was not an actual thruster, but leaking propellant from a thruster that froze into ice and 
floated by Lousma’s window.  Bean noticed a master alarm indicating that a thruster was 
at low temperature, supporting this idea.  After checking with Mission Control, he made 
a decision that was unprecedented in all the years of CSM flights: he turned off one of 
the four quads of thrusters that provided directional control to the spacecraft.  This posed 
a problem, because making a rendezvous and docking with Skylab required a series of 
thruster firings to match the CSM’s speed with Skylab.  What was Bean to do?22  
 He needed to isolate the thruster quad and adjust his spacecraft’s approach to 
Skylab accordingly.  “Back in the simulator, Owen, Jack, and I were really good at 
rendezvous,” Bean explained.  “We never missed a rendezvous in all our training time.  
They gave us failures by the zillions; we didn’t blink—we’d rendezvous.”  But in all of 
that time, he never had to isolate a thruster quad and not use it again.  Thus his real flight 
presented him with a new situation, in which the vehicle produced an asymmetric thrust 
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and did not brake as easily as it would have with all four quads available.  The crew still 
proved that well trained operators could handle the problem, however.  Garriott and 
Lousma estimated their vehicle’s range to Skylab as Bean focused on braking just 
enough to match the target’s speed.  If he closed too quickly, he might collide with 
Skylab; if too slow, he would have to use excess fuel and throw off the timing of the 
docking.  Garriott proved the value of having multiple astronauts onboard when he 
urgently told Bean that he was closing too quickly and needed to brake more.  Bean 
docked safely and credited his crewmate with providing that critical advice.  “Our best 
efforts and skills were tested,” he recalled, providing another timely reminder of why 
astronauts logged those long hours in simulators.  He said that his heart rate during the 
incident was even higher than when he had gone to the Moon aboard Apollo 12.23                                 
 The condition of the CSM worsened after the docking, which brought a new 
training issue into the realm of possibility.  The crew confirmed that another quad 
thruster had sprung a leak on August 2.  This raised three questions: whether the crew 
could maneuver their ship to a safe return with only two of four quads, whether another 
failure might further cripple the vehicle, and whether a rescue mission would be 
necessary.  JSC engineers answered those questions by sending astronauts Vance Brand 
and Don Lind to the Command Module simulator, who concluded that the vehicle could 
return safely with two quads or even one.  These engineers also concluded that the 
failures of the two quads were not related, which eased the crew’s worries.  Bean, 
Garriott, and Lousma did not need rescue, but their colleagues Brand and Lind did train  
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for this possibility and prove yet another point about the maturation of spaceflight 
operations by 1973.24 
 The rescue plans went into effect within hours of the troubling news on August 2.  
If the mission had been deemed necessary, engineers at the Cape could have mated 
another CSM to a Saturn IB within a week and made room for two additional couches on 
this vehicle.  By foregoing standard tests, Brand and Lind could have launched by early 
September.  They could have docked their ship with a spare port and returned to Earth 
with the Skylab 3 crew by making use of those two new couches behind the three 
standard couches.  Brand and Lind proved they could train for this emergency with just a 
month’s notice by spending long hours simulating this mission and providing crew 
inputs to engineers.  “We were involved in not only training but the planning, 
certification and verification, and stowage and that the couch (redesign) would work,” 
Brand remembered.  “We were just involved in a lot of the general planning on how you 
would do this, which made it especially interesting.”25  The ability to train astronauts and 
launch them to rescue another crew before that crew’s supplies ran out marked a critical 
step forward in spaceflight operations.  
 The rest of the mission provided further vindication to the training this crew had 
performed, especially when Garriott and Lousma performed their EVA to deploy the 
“Marshall Sail” on August 6.  The two men stayed outside for 6.5 hours, by far the 
longest EVA in history and a harbinger of the Space Shuttle and ISS eras.  Fatigue was 
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and still is one of the greatest problems on an EVA of this length, but Garriott and 
Lousma had logged more than 100 hours at the pool in Huntsville and knew how to 
maneuver their bodies to minimize the fatigue.  The two men had also worked 
underwater with the cumbersome hardware they would have to deploy to control 
Skylab’s temperature.  Garriott thus managed to connect the eleven segments of the two 
55 foot poles, before Lousma attached them to a base plate so that they formed a V.  
Lousma then fastened the sail to rope that ran the length of the poles and hoisted a 
sunshade.  This took three hours, then the men spent an additional three and a half hours 
replacing ATM film and pinpointing a Skylab coolant leak.  The deployment of the 
“Marshall Sail” marked another first in spaceflight, because two astronauts worked 
together on the most ambitious EVA yet and accomplished a task that they had not 
foreseen until the launch mishap in May.  Despite being rookie spacewalkers, Garriott 
and Lousma trained for and carried out a solution to Skylab’s thermal problem due to 
their preparation on short notice.26   
Training benefited the Skylab 3 crew for another task related to EVA: a test of a 
maneuvering unit inside the cabin.  This required the crew to don a backpack that 
contained nitrogen gas to propel them, a precursor to a more advanced backpack planned 
for use outside the Space Shuttle.  The Skylab 3 crew used an air bearing trainer, as the 
Gemini spacewalkers had, which gave the astronauts an understanding of the procedures 
required to operate the backpack but provided limited degrees of freedom.  “The 
maneuvering skills were much better learned on the 6-degree-of-freedom simulator,” the 
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crew concluded.27  Training helped them discover that over 75 hours of operation in 
flight, “The automatically stabilized maneuvering unit modes were operated in great 
precision.  Specific tasks included inspection, cargo transfer, rescue, retrieval, tracking, 
tumble recovery, rendezvous stationkeeping, and docking.”  The testing of the backpack 
aboard Skylab in turn benefited wearers of the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) a 
decade later.28           
 Bean, Garriott, and Lousma emphatically proved that well trained astronauts 
could steadily increase productivity aboard Skylab from flight to flight, though they did 
bring back suggestions for improvement in their mission report.  Despite being 
hampered by motion sickness at the beginning of their stay, the Skylab 3 crew increased 
their efficiency by taking steps such as eating meals separately (so that two of them were 
always working while one was eating) and moving items to and from storage during the 
day to reduce the amount of time they had to spend on housekeeping.  Bean remembered 
becoming so efficient that the crew had to convince flight controllers to give them more 
work.29  The crew not only increased productivity on maintaining the station, but also on 
obtaining scientific data.  Skylab program manager Ken Kleinknecht said that the crew 
achieved more than 150 percent of their scientific goals.  The number of man hours 
spent on solar activity increased from the first mission, which allowed the astronauts to 
view the first coronal mass ejection from space and the largest solar prominence ever 
viewed from space.  Scientists following from the ground felt thrilled by the realization 
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that this bright wisp of gas was nearly three quarters the size of the entire Sun.  The crew 
also gathered three times the amount of Earth resources data as their predecessors.  
Sensors recorded over 90,000 feet of magnetic tape data, which benefited the taxpayers 
who had invested in Skylab by adding knowledge of such subjects as Oklahoma’s soil 
moisture, Utah’s mineral formations, and Houston’s urban growth.30          
 By early September, the astronauts began to think about the ride back home 
aboard a CSM in less than top condition.  Bean received several changes to the reentry 
checklist that Vance Brand and Don Lind had perfected in the Command Module 
Simulator, due to the two failed thruster quads, and studied them thoroughly so he would 
feel ready to return home on September 25.  He had an unusual amount of difficulty 
holding the desired attitude with only two quads that day, but his study of the new 
checklist had taught him how to null unwanted attitudes with the hand controller.  Once 
again, the work done in the Command Module Simulator had benefited a crew 
confronted with a threatening situation.  Despite the unprecedented 56 days in 
weightlessness, the crew did not feel close to graying out and remained mentally alert as 
the Command Module splashed down next to the USS New Orleans.31              
 What complaints could such a productive crew have?  Bean, Garriott, and 
Lousma believed that they could have received more thorough training for their Earth 
resources studies, a statement that was consistent with that of the first Skylab crew.  
“Essentially all of the limited preflight training in this area was initiated by the crew, yet 
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numerous tasks were assigned in flight that required identification and photography of 
special areas of interest,” the astronauts explained.  “Additional training time should 
have been spent in understanding the objectives relating to geology, geography, 
meteorology, hydrology, fishing, etc.”  The crew felt that handheld photography training 
inside the simulator was similarly lacking.  Bean, Garriott, and Lousma also raised a 
point that was new to astronauts due to the transition toward living in space: inflight 
training.  Astronauts could not expect to take to space all the skills they would need 
during a mission as long as 56 days.  Thus this crew recommended setting aside time 
every week or two to study the changes to hardware operations.  The crew performed 
drills for a fire and a rapid loss of pressure during the first few days of the mission and 
took time to rehearse the revised reentry procedures, so this lengthy mission did 
accelerate a trend toward inflight training.32  But in the end, the complaints and 
suggestions were rather minor compared to the astronauts’ skill in maximizing output 
from such an expensive mission.  Over three decades later, Bean still proudly carried an 
article in his briefcase calling Skylab 3 a “supercrew.”33         
 The success of the “supercrew” encouraged flight planners to form and 
Kleinknecht to approve a schedule for the last Skylab mission that was arguably too 
ambitious.  Though Skylab 4 astronauts Jerry Carr, Ed Gibson, and Bill Pogue had 
originally planned to spend another 56 days on the station, the new plan called for 84 
days.  The crew would surpass their predecessors by working on experiments for 28 
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hours per day, which would test the astronauts’ stamina and ability to adjust to 
weightlessness.  Carr, Gibson, and Pogue had been last on the priority list to use the 
Skylab simulators and had only begun receiving uninterrupted use of the simulators after 
the previous crew launched in July.  Then the approval of a more ambitious flight 
schedule made training even more intensive, especially given that none of the three had 
flown in space before.  But these astronauts could still benefit from the experience of 
their predecessors.  This crew felt better prepared for their flight thanks to the knowledge 
that they should exercise more per day than previous crews to counteract the effects of 
weightlessness, for instance.  On November 16, a Saturn IB sent the astronauts to the last 
mission at Skylab.34   
 One mistake made the mission more frustrating than necessary and provided 
another lesson learned.  During training, the crew and flight controllers had not 
interacted as closely as on previous missions.  “Usually integrated training is done as 
much to train Mission Control as the crew, but they’d been through it all with the first 
two missions and weren’t eager to revisit that ‘demanding boredom’ more than 
absolutely necessary,” Carr explained.  Yet if the two groups had developed a closer 
rapport during the last few months before launch, both would have understood the need 
to limit the unrealistic workload planned for Skylab 4.  From the day they docked and 
activated the workshop, Carr, Gibson, and Pogue found themselves behind schedule and 
unable to meet the ambitious goal of 28 hours per day.  As with all crews, they only 
gradually made an adjustment to working in weightlessness.  Yet the schedule did not 
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allow them time to make the adjustment.  The men rushed around to complete 
experiments, which made them prone to making mistakes, and flight controllers tried to 
compensate for the mistakes by tightening the schedule even more.  This vicious cycle 
contributed to frustration on both ends.  It is not true, despite what authors have written 
in a few books, that the crew went on strike.  It is true that the crew complained about 
one month into the mission, with Carr calling the mission a “33-day fire drill.”  Flight 
controllers decided to cut back on the crew’s workload by about 15 percent, which 
improved crew morale dramatically.35         
The incident contained a couple of major lessons from a training perspective.  
First, the incident highlighted the value of integrated simulations, particularly for a crew 
that had never flown before but planned to take part in a mission nearly three months 
long in which they would have to develop a working relationship with flight controllers.  
Second, the incident emphasized that no matter how many hundreds or even thousands 
of hours a crew trained, astronauts and flight controllers needed to respect the fact that 
living in weightlessness required an adjustment period.  The only way to train for this on 
Earth was to experience it for a handful of seconds at a time aboard an aircraft, not for 
the nearly three months that Carr, Gibson, and Pogue needed to work in it.  Thus no 
matter how many sessions a crew had performed in a simulator, the crew still needed to 
avoid overconfidence while working in this condition that could not be part of the 
simulations.  The astronauts argued in their mission report that future crews should 
receive a 50 percent time cushion for the first inflight performance of tasks, even for 
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which they had received training.  In an interview decades later, Flight Director Neil 
Hutchinson admitted that the controllers in Houston were partly to blame for enforcing 
the overly heavy workload and said that they were careful not to repeat the mistake when 
the Space Shuttle era began in the 1980s.  “There was just no point in pushing them 
early on, because they weren’t going to get the job done,” he explained.  “We don’t do 
that these days on the Shuttle.  We let them get really organized first.”36    
ATM observations reached an especially exciting conclusion on this last Skylab 
mission, because the crew became the first to observe a comet in space.  Comet 
Kohoutek made a close approach to the Sun in 1973, not to return again for the next 
75,000 years.  The astronauts aimed the ATM instruments at what media outlets had 
dubbed “The Comet of the Century.”  These instruments measured the intrinsic 
brightness of this icy body as it heated up during its approach to the Sun, collected data 
on the composition of its coma and tail, and measured the radiation it emitted.  The crew 
also made their own visual observations of the size, orientation, and color of the tail and 
made sketches based on them.  During an EVA in December, Carr and Gibson even 
observed the comet from outside Skylab.37  The mission report that this crew wrote 
explains why astronauts needed extensive training in tasks such as these.  The astronauts 
could not see the comet at the time they pointed the ATM instruments toward it, so they 
pointed about 18 milliradians away from it, calculated the maneuver they needed to 
make to center the instruments, and centered them.  These steps had the potential to 
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introduce errors for an inadequately trained crew, given the low margin for error.  While 
examining the various features of the comet, the astronauts then had to adjust the 
instruments every one or two minutes to account for its drift.  The three men found that 
they were better at doing this on the 80th day of the mission than the 30th day, because of 
the “growth factor” in improving their mechanical and interpretive skills.38                    
 What difference did it make to have trained crewmembers onboard Skylab 
observing Comet Kohoutek?  Carr, Gibson, and Pogue admitted that the comet was less 
brilliant than expected, but ensured through their flexibility that they could return useful 
data for scientists.  Despite the intricacy of pointing the ATM instruments in the correct 
direction, the astronauts had trained in this task and scientists could feel assured they 
could accomplish this task.  The astronauts also had the chance to exercise human 
judgment in collecting more or different data than planned, which would not have been 
possible aboard a completely automated facility.  In making their sketches of the comet, 
the crew demonstrated another capability that a robot could not match, as Gibson 
explained: “In addition to what we could capture on film, we recorded on paper what our 
most sensitive and versatile optical instruments onboard could detect—the human 
eye.”39  Even if Comet Kohoutek failed to live up to the hype of the American media, the  
accomplishments of the astronauts in observing it and the Sun from the ATM console 
helped to illustrate what trained astronauts could contribute to astronomy.    
 The training and execution of Earth observations made a major leap from the first  
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two Skylab missions to the last.  The Skylab 4 crew reported that they spent about 30 
hours in preparation for this activity.  After the last crew had complained about the 
limited training time available to them, for this mission a team of 19 scientists developed 
a more thorough plan for Earth observations and briefed the astronauts on areas of 
interests ranging from ocean currents, to geology, to African drought regions.  The 
scientists even prepared a book detailing what the crew should look for and should 
expect to see.40  Thanks to this effort, Carr, Gibson, and Pogue arrived at Skylab 
prepared to observe 165 features and phenomena.  The three men did not let the 
scientists down, as they returned about 2,000 photos and what no robot could have 
made: 850 verbal descriptions.  The photos also contained a higher resolution than 
previous photos taken on Landsat satellites.41   
Results from the mission filled an entire book called Skylab Explores the Earth, 
which described how the astronauts’ contributions to science went well beyond that of 
the first two crews.  Thanks to Skylab 4, scientists had a better understanding of how 
deserts formed around the world, major fault zones in California and Mexico, the 
harvesting and subsequent replanting of crops, dust storms, flood conditions, sea-ice 
formation, and pollution.  The most exciting observation came when a Japanese volcano 
erupted and the crew managed to obtain photos of the entire sequence.  Carr and JSC 
scientist Verl Wilmarth admitted that the training for these tasks was still too limited, 
even if it had been increased from the first two missions.  The astronauts would have 
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benefited from much more than the 30 hours they received in rapid site recognition.  But 
scientists could feel assured that Skylab 4 was not their last chance to obtain data.  Given 
the success of crews in returning data thus far and the quickly evolving conditions   
on Earth, Carr explained, “Looking forward to the Space Shuttle, which will have better 
equipment and more sophisticated training, space observers can capitalize on this 
multimission Earth-orbiting platform to seek answers to many problems about the Earth 
and its processes.”42    
 The crew trained for and conducted student experiments as well.  As a way to 
spark the interest of young people in science and engineering, a few officials from 
NASA Headquarters, JSC, and MSFC formed a nationwide contest in which seventh 
through twelfth grade students submitted experiment requests.  Out of 3,409 proposals, 
Skylab astronauts managed to perform 22.  The lack of adequate training for some of 
these experiments, due to their late entry into the program, frustrated the three crews.  
Carr, Gibson, and Pogue argued that student experiments should continue, but that the 
experiments should do more to take advantage of crew initiative and judgment and that 
astronauts should devote more time to train on their operation.  Although some of the 
experiments failed, those that succeeded fired the imaginations of the students.  Among 
the 22 Principal Investigators who were in junior high or high school during the early 
1970s, six of them went on to become science teachers, seven became engineers and/or 
scientists, and three became medical doctors.  To this day, astronauts aboard the ISS  
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seek to inspire students by conducting their experiments.43      
 As the mission neared its end, the crew felt satisfied with their abilities but 
experienced one more incident that was instructive for training purposes.  In addition to 
logging more training hours than any previous crew, Carr, Gibson, and Pogue benefited 
from more time to develop their skillset in space than any of their predecessors.  Their 
increased proficiency in operating equipment and exercising scientific judgment 
combined with the resolution of their arguments with Mission Control meant all three 
men enjoyed high morale as February 1974 began.44  On the morning of February 8, the 
crew climbed into their CSM, undocked from Skylab, and fired their SPS engine to 
return home.  Nine minutes later, Carr tried to maneuver the vehicle with his hand 
controller but found it did not respond to yaw and pitch commands.  He switched to a 
backup system and regained control.  The crew found out later that they had mistakenly 
opened four circuit breakers and disabled the yaw and pitch thrusters.  This incident 
suggested that during a long duration mission of several months, astronauts needed to 
maintain proficiency in spacecraft operations.  The skills needed to perform research on 
space stations differed dramatically from the skills needed to operate a spacecraft 
through the dynamic phases of reentry and splashdown, but astronauts needed to make 
sure the latter skills did not deteriorate after nearly three months of concentrating on the 
former.  Fortunately, the mistake did not affect the return of the Skylab 4 crew and Carr, 
Gibson, and Pogue splashed down safely.45             
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These men were the last to visit Skylab, because NASA squandered the 
opportunity to save it.  The plan in 1974 was that the Skylab 4 crew would be the last to 
visit the station using an Apollo spacecraft, but that a Space Shuttle crew could visit in 
the future (President Richard Nixon had approved this vehicle two years earlier).  Just 
before that last undocking, Carr fired the CSM thrusters to nudge Skylab into a higher 
orbit of 269 by 282 miles.  Calculations based on expected solar activity and 
atmospheric density showed that from this orbit, Skylab would fall into Earth’s 
atmosphere in 1983.  NASA envisioned a shuttle crew attaching a propulsion module to 
the station that would boost it to a higher orbit in the late 1970s, but this did not happen 
for two reasons.  Delays in shuttle development meant the vehicle did not reach space 
until 1981.  The predictions of Skylab’s orbital decay also proved inaccurate, because 
increased solar activity heated the Earth’s upper atmosphere and dragged the station 
down faster than expected.  On July 11, 1979, Skylab reentered and splattered a sparsely 
settled region of Australia with debris.  Especially in retrospect, the failure to save 
Skylab appears to be a mistake.  No American flew on a space station again until 1995, 
meaning NASA lost many personnel who had developed expertise in training for and 
executing long duration missions.  The Soviet Union instead took the lead in long 
duration flight with their series of Salyut space stations that hosted crews beginning in 
1971 and Mir beginning in 1986.46                   
 The training of Skylab astronauts carried a positive legacy by proving astronauts 
could utilize their trained judgment to make scientific and operational contributions 
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impossible aboard a fully automated vehicle.  All previous astronauts who had flown in 
space had focused on achieving the goal of a Moon landing.  During Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo, Earth orbit was only a steppingstone toward the lunar goal.  But through 
briefings by highly qualified instructors and an unprecedented amount of simulator time, 
Skylab astronauts prepared themselves to prove the intrinsic scientific value of having 
humans in Earth orbit.  Thus the three crews succeeded in advancing knowledge about 
the medical effects of weightlessness, materials processing, the Sun, and the Earth.  In 
the category of operations, the astronauts succeeded in performing the most complex 
EVA tasks yet on the strength of the new pool in Huntsville.  They also proved that 
given adequate training in hardware, they could make repairs to keep a space station in 
operation.  “The Russians were over here about that time, and they were impressed at 
how we could do on-orbit repairs, some of these kinds of things,” Bob Crippen said.  
After over two thousand hours of training time each, astronauts also proved they could 
adapt to the psychological challenge of spending up to 84 days in a tightly confined 
space with two colleagues.  Pilots and scientists worked together effectively.47   
The success of the three Skylab crews in these respects shaped the future of 
human spaceflight.  If these astronauts had proven unable to function after several weeks 
or months of weightlessness, or if PIs had not expressed intrigue with the experiments 
they conducted and the questions they raised, this would have placed a damper on the 
recently approved Space Shuttle program.  But in the wake of the promising results from 
Skylab, shuttle astronauts expanded on the scientific research, complex EVA tasks, and 
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equipment repair pioneered aboard Skylab.  Pilots and scientists formed a close working 
relationship on every flight.  The proficiency of Skylab crews also meant that NASA 
Administrator Jim Beggs could point to a track record of success when he proposed a 
new space station as the “next logical step” for human spaceflight in the early 1980s.  
Unfortunately, 21 years passed from the splashdown of the Skylab 4 crew until Norm 
Thagard became the next American to live on a space station and 26 years until an 
American lived on the ISS.  Crippen remembered his disappointment about this gap, 
stating, “I thought we learned a lot of lessons, and it wasn’t obvious when you get that 
big of a gap that you can transfer a lot of knowledge.  That’s the only disappointment I 
felt.”  Still, ISS astronauts have carried on the Skylab legacy by receiving detailed 
briefings on scientific experiments, rehearsing experiment operations in simulators, 
rehearsing EVA tasks in a neutral buoyancy pool, and utilizing their trained judgment in 
performing experiments once in space.48     
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CHAPTER XI 
APOLLO-SOYUZ: “SOYUZ, EHTO APOLLON” 
 
 The first meeting happened in spring 1962.  The original American astronauts 
and Soviet cosmonauts had heard about each other from afar over the last two years, but 
on this occasion the second and third humans to orbit Earth met.  John Glenn hosted 
Gherman Titov on a tour of Washington, D.C., including a meeting with President John 
F. Kennedy at the White House.  Titov felt convinced of the superiority of his Vostok 
spacecraft over the American Mercury spacecraft, Soviet Communism over American 
democracy, and even Soviet buildings over the landmarks he saw in Washington, D.C., 
but still found common ground in speaking with Glenn on subjects like training and the 
feeling of weightlessness.1  In the years to come, space travelers on both sides of the 
Cold War followed each other’s flights and a few shook hands with each other.  They 
knew that they shared similar lives by immersing themselves in the technical challenges 
of flight, but primarily isolated themselves from any matter outside their own jobs.  “I 
never cared much about keeping up with news about the Russians,” remembered John 
Young.  “I don’t think any of the astronauts did.”2  The astronauts considered traveling 
overseas to train for a joint mission and orbiting Earth alongside Russians as anathema 
throughout the 1960s.                       
 Politics ensured that astronauts and cosmonauts would have to accept what they 
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once considered anathema.  President Kennedy had briefly considered cooperating with 
the Soviets on a project to send men to the Moon before his assassination, but not until 
Apollo achieved that goal did cooperation become a serious possibility.  President 
Richard Nixon had appointed Tom Paine as NASA Administrator in 1969, and Paine 
believed the space agency should “stop waving the Russian flag and begin to justify our 
programs on a more fundamental basis than competition with the Soviets.”  On an Air 
Force One flight to greet the Apollo 11 crew after their Pacific Ocean splashdown, he 
told Nixon that he considered international cooperation an excellent way to do this and 
began corresponding with Mstislav Keldysh, the President of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences.  Paine and Keldysh agreed that the U.S. and Soviets would benefit from 
developing a common docking mechanism that could facilitate the docking of an Apollo 
and Soyuz spacecraft, because this would advance technological progress in both nations 
and even allow either spacecraft to rescue another.  More broadly, cooperation between 
the two nations would foster the kind of Cold War détente for which the Nixon 
administration became famous.  Keldysh invited NASA personnel to visit the cosmonaut 
training center in Star City (just northeast of Moscow) for a technical discussion of the 
new idea.3        
 This visit in October 1970 provided five Americans with their first close up view 
of how space travelers from another nation trained.  MSC Director Bob Gilruth headed 
the delegation and traveled with MSC engineer Caldwell Johnson, MSC Flight Director 
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Glynn Lunney, MSFC engineer George Hardy, and a director of international programs 
at NASA headquarters named Arnold Frutkin.  The Americans found the Soyuz 
simulators arranged like those in Houston and saw the training specialists sitting outside 
to monitor spacecraft data just as in Houston.  The difference going back to Yuri 
Gagarin’s Vostok spacecraft still applied, in that Soviet vehicles contained remarkably 
fewer controls and instruments.  When the Americans climbed inside and received 
briefings from cosmonauts Georgy Beregovoy and Vladimir Shatalov, Lunney 
remembered, “the very strong impression was one of simplicity—no circuit breaker 
panels, no large number of switches, not many displays.”  But cosmonauts could still 
exercise manual control of the Soyuz via a hand controller, particularly when making a 
docking as in this proposed joint mission.  Lunney remarked on the way out that the 
vehicle appeared intuitive and comfortable, and that he had seen no obstacles to a joint 
docking mechanism.  Representatives of both nations signed an agreement to work 
together on this device.4 
 The project received official approval at a U.S./Soviet summit in May 1972.  
Nixon furthered his legacy as a president who wanted to pursue a thaw in the Cold War 
by meeting with Premier Alexei Kosygin and jointly agreeing to arms limitations, 
protection of the environment, and the expansion of trade.  Nixon and Kosygin also 
agreed that a three man Apollo crew would dock with a two man Soyuz crew in 1975.  
The development of the new docking mechanism had already advanced each nation 
technologically.  On all space missions to this point, each spacecraft docking ring had a 
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unique design (“male” or “female”) and had a specific role to play in the docking 
process (one had to be active and one had to be passive).  But the new device was 
androgynous, meaning any spacecraft docking ring containing the device could dock 
with any other spacecraft.  Thus two vehicles could reverse their roles as active or 
passive targets, which allowed for a more flexible mission design.  The Nixon/Kosygin 
agreement paved the way for an American crew to not only test this device in docking an 
Apollo to a Soyuz, but also to visit the Soyuz and perform joint experiments in orbit.  Just 
making the fifteenth piloted flight of an Apollo spacecraft, the most complex machine 
ever built, would have called for an intense training regimen for the three crewmembers.  
But now Nixon and Kosygin had added the complexity of training in another nation, 
using a Soyuz simulator, and working alongside aviators on the other side of the Cold 
War divide who spoke another language.  The two sides accepted a list of 17 points of 
agreement in 1972, which stipulated that each nation would train with the other 
country’s vehicle “for safety of flight assurance” and learn the other country’s language 
“well enough to understand it.”5          
 Who would comprise the first American crew to train in the Soviet Union?  
Several astronauts had taken lessons in the Russian language after the 1972 summit with 
an eye toward earning the assignment, including Director of Flight Crew Operations 
Deke Slayton.  Slayton had made a trip to the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, where a doctor 
had found no recurrence of the heart fibrillation that had grounded him back in the 
Mercury era.  NASA doctor Chuck Berry announced that he was cleared for flight status 
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in March 1972.  Slayton thus handed the crew selection for Apollo-Soyuz to center 
director Chris Kraft, who had to choose among dozens of candidates for America’s last 
piloted spaceflight until the Space Shuttle era.  Tom Stafford had flown three times 
during Gemini and Apollo and had met several cosmonauts while serving as pallbearer 
for a Soyuz crew that had been killed during a 1971 mission.  He had the experience both 
to fulfill the technical and diplomatic tasks of the mission, so Kraft chose him as 
Commander.  Vance Brand had impressed during his time as a backup for Apollo 15, so 
he earned the job of Command Module Pilot.  Slayton rounded out the crew as Docking 
Module Pilot, meaning he would reach space sixteen years after becoming one of 
America’s original seven astronauts.  At the Paris Air Show in May 1973, the three met 
the two cosmonauts they would meet in orbit aboard the Soyuz: Alexei Leonov and 
Valery Kubasov.6 
 Stafford, Brand, and Slayton needed to concentrate first on Russian language 
proficiency, because the mission protocol called for the American crew to speak Russian 
and the Soviet crew to speak English.  In case a crew from one nation needed to rescue 
the crew of another nation someday, both parties would benefit from prompt and 
accurate communication with each other.  According to a Foreign Service Institute chart, 
Russian is one of the most difficult languages for English speakers to learn.  On a scale 
from I to V, it is in Category IV and only a notch below Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and 
Korean.7  To mount this daunting obstacle, American and Russian officials met in the 
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fall of 1972 to consider three options: enroll the astronauts in a formal class, contract 
with a university for their instruction, or bring instructors to Houston to work with them.  
The last option worked best, because it cost the least amount of time and money.  NASA 
thus hired Nicholas Timacheff to fill the new civil service position of Russian Language 
Officer and Timacheff selected four teachers to come to Houston on the basis of their 
knowledge in contemporary vernacular Russian.  Nina Horner taught the astronauts the 
Russian aerospace jargon they would need to know using a textbook from the Defense 
Language Institute in Monterey, California.  Anatole Forostenko, Vasil Kiostun, and 
James Flannery accompanied the astronauts on their trips to Russia to help them instill 
knowledge of everyday Russian and even accompanied them to the gym to help attune 
their minds to the language.8     
The Apollo-Soyuz experience taught all NASA personnel that language training 
needed to be a time consuming and intensive part of mission preparation.  Stafford, 
Brand, and Slayton received close to 1,000 hours of instruction from early 1973 through 
the summer of 1975, which marked one-third of their training time.  This ranked just 
below the 1,100 hours that the Foreign Service Institute recommends to reach general 
professional proficiency in speaking and reading, an impressive figure given the 
demanding schedule all astronauts confronted.  As with geology training a decade 
earlier, these astronauts had to master a task in which they had taken no classes as 
college students and did not envision themselves doing even a few years earlier.  This, 
                                                          
8  Ezell and Ezell, 255-260 and Apollo Mission Evaluation Team, Apollo Program Mission Evaluation Report, Apollo-
Soyuz (Houston, TX: JSC-10607, 1975), 10-6 to 10-7.  
386 
 
combined with the immense cultural and linguistic differences between English and 
Russian, resulted in the crew arguing in their mission report that they “needed every 
hour of Russian training that was received—and would not have wanted less.”  Stafford, 
Brand, and Slayton recommended based on their ordeal that future crews should begin 
language training at least two years before launch.  They did compliment the in-house 
instructors and Defense Language Institute textbooks as worthwhile solutions to the 
problem.9  
The astronauts had to take a break from their roughly fifteen hours per week of 
language training to meet Leonov and Kubasov on their trips to the United States and 
travel themselves to the Soviet Union.  The first trip came in July 1973, when Leonov 
and Kubasov traveled to Houston for a taste of American spaceflight operations.  
Leonov had never visited the U.S. before and felt overwhelmed by the American 
skyscrapers, luxury cars, and museums.  He also remembered a cultural shock from his 
first visit to JSC: the lack of supervision astronauts received compared to cosmonauts.  
Soviet instructors had closely supervised his physical exercise and diet, “but the 
American astronauts seemed to do what they wanted, with nobody paying attention to 
what they ate or what physical shape they were in.”10  Another cultural shock came 
when he and Kubasov entered the Command Module Simulator and witnessed the array 
of switches and displays that Americans needed to learn prior to a flight.  The number of 
systems an Apollo crewmember needed to learn dwarfed the number a Soyuz 
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crewmember needed to learn, meaning more briefings, more simulator sessions on each 
flight phase, and in general more knowledge to keep accessible in one’s mind.  But after 
all the hours of studying came a greater reward for an Apollo astronaut than a Soyuz 
cosmonaut: the ability to exert more control over a flight, which all self-respecting pilots 
wanted.11     
The men who agreed to the training regimen, cosmonaut Vladimir Shatalov and 
astronaut Bob Overmyer, believed crews of both nations would benefit from learning 
each other’s hardware.  One day, a stranded crew might depend on the crew of another 
nation understanding their hardware well enough to perform a rescue.  So Leonov and 
Kubasov watched videotaped presentations on the CSM and new Docking Module (DM) 
that a Russian speaking engineer from the North American Rockwell company narrated.  
They listened to tape recordings of air to ground transmissions from previous missions 
so they could understand how astronauts worked with flight controllers to execute 
procedures.  The two also flew to the North American Rockwell plant in Downey, 
California, so they could participate in an American tradition dating back to Mercury: 
observe the work engineers were performing on the spacecraft to which they would 
entrust their lives in space.  Lunney recalled that this marked another of the key 
differences in training between the two nations.  Instructors encouraged the cosmonauts 
to ask questions at any time to make sure they absorbed a far more complex vehicle than 
any they had studied before.  The instructors felt confident in Leonov and Kubasov by  
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the time the two returned to their homeland.12     
 The American and Russian crews also put to rest any worries that aviators from 
opposing sides of the Cold War could not get along.  Leonov was a Soviet Air Force 
veteran who had flown MiG aircraft, the kind that American pilots had shot down in 
Korea and Vietnam.  All three Americans had also flown military aircraft, with Stafford 
and Slayton being stationed in West Germany, across a wall from where pilots like 
Leonov flew.  When Leonov made his first trip to the U.S. and visited astronaut Dave 
Scott’s home, he was shocked to find a book with a Nazi swastika on the cover that 
would have been banned in his home country.  When he had his first conversation with 
Scott, he expressed his dismay that the U.S. had sent troops to wage war in Vietnam.  
Scott countered that the Soviets had also sent troops to Vietnam.  But despite the 
occasional uncomfortable conversation such as this one, both understood that they had 
flown similar planes and confronted similar challenges in their professional careers, 
meaning they were promising candidates to unite around a common mission.  The 
amount of time that training required crews to spend together had long united Apollo 
crews.  At the end of Apollo-Soyuz training, Leonov and Kubasov had grown so close to 
their American colleagues that they formed affectionate nicknames for Stafford and 
Brand: “Granddad” and “Vanya.”  Slayton described the two Soviets as “basically a lot 
like us” and Leonov particularly as “jolly and friendly.”13                                  
 The American crew visited Star City for the first time in November 1973.   
                                                          
12  Ibid and Lunney, 270.  
13  Scott and Leonov with Toomey, 336-353 and Slayton with Cassutt, 286.   
389 
 
Stafford, Brand, Slayton, and the Americans who accompanied them received their own 
cultural shocks, partly from the massive amounts of vodka the Soviets consumed but  
especially from the heavy surveillance of their activities.  During one conference, Bob 
Overmyer (a member of the support crew) moved his chair and saw a hidden 
microphone come loose.  Incidents such as these fostered a sense of paranoia for 
Americans aimed at the KGB.14  But the astronauts did relish the grand respect shown 
them in Star City.  After leaving the plane that took them there, they went to the VIP 
lounge for drinks of vodka with the airport staff.  Then they stayed at the prestigious 
Intourist Hotel, located right next to the Kremlin, and rode to Star City via a large bus 
with two police escorts who waved admiring peasants off the road.  Training gave them 
a sense of the “rock star” status that transcended borders.15  The crew also benefited 
from watching nine videotaped lectures on the Soyuz controls and displays for the flight 
control, environmental, and communications systems.  They listened to tapes of air to 
ground transmissions from an earlier Soyuz mission just as the Soviets had for an earlier 
Apollo mission.  The three men placed their knowledge to the test by climbing aboard 
the Soyuz general purpose and docking simulators.  They also learned that the Soviets 
placed a greater emphasis on physical training than the Americans, meaning long hours 
of jogging, swimming and even a snowball fight before relaxing together in a steam 
bath, a Russian tradition.16                
 By the spring of 1974, the development of flight procedures allowed Stafford,  
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Brand, and Slayton to rehearse the specific actions they would have to take on the 
mission.  The three men needed to climb into the simulator and learn the array of 
switches and displays that all Apollo astronauts had needed to know, over 400 hours per 
man, but instructors placed the main emphasis on teaching the astronauts about the 
element that would fly for the first time: the DM.  This cylindrical pressure vessel, about 
10 feet in length, connected to the nose of the CSM and enabled the ship to link up with 
the Soyuz while also serving as an airlock between the different atmospheres of the two 
ships.  Stafford used the simulator to place his flying skills to the test, first in linking the 
CSM to the DM as it was stored in the Saturn IB rocket after launch and then in 
maneuvering the linked combination to a precise docking with the Soyuz.  Then the 
astronauts trained for their transfer through the DM and into the Soyuz.  This required 
working through hundreds of instructions, from establishing the integrity of seals and 
latches to equalizing the tunnel pressure so the crew could make their way to the Soyuz.  
“The second day we tried it, we did it in about one-third the time that we did the first 
day,” Stafford told the media.17  The simulator served an excellent purpose in alerting 
the crew to how they should handle the “what if” questions about this piece of hardware, 
from fire, to rapid pressure loss, to abnormal vehicle dynamics (as in Gemini 8), to the 
failure of an RCS thruster (as in Skylab 3).  As the database of knowledge from past 
missions grew greater and greater, the instructors and astronauts could feel more 
comfortable that simulations could prepare them for emergencies.18 
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 One training issue did become a source of controversy, however.  The Soviets 
worried that as the CSM approached the Soyuz for docking, the plume generated by the 
RCS thrusters might hit the Soyuz and burn its thermal insulating blanket.  The onus fell 
upon the astronauts to shut off the thrusters at just the right moment and the Soviets 
preferred to have the engines controlled by an automated system instead.  The astronauts 
expressed their dismay that the Soviets would question their abilities and the simulator 
proved to be a valuable tool in proving they could dock without impinging on the Soyuz.  
When the DM captured Soyuz, an indicator light appeared in the CSM cockpit.  Brand 
called out “contact” to Stafford, who reached up and turned off the four RCS switches 
that controlled the forward firing thrusters.  Two skeptics from the Soviet side, engineer 
Boris Petrov and Flight Director Alexei Yeliseyev, climbed into the simulator and saw 
the procedure for themselves, upon which the controversy flagged.  The episode 
illustrated the differences between the two nations.  Americans believed in a pilot 
controlled approach to flight to a greater extent than the Soviets, which meant more 
simulator time and produced the flexibility of a trained human operator.  In case a 
controversy emerged over a procedure, the beauty of the simulator was also that 
astronauts could place it to the test there and not leave the procedure to chance in 
flight.19   
 The flight controllers for the two nations also took part in simulations during 
1974.  Soviet controllers traveled to Houston to gain a taste of American Mission 
Control operations and American controllers traveled to Kaliningrad to gain their first 
                                                          
19  Ezell and Ezell, 274-278.  
392 
 
taste of Soviet Mission Control operations.  The Americans felt impressed with the 
Soviet facility, especially because the Soviets had replaced the old center and spent 
several million dollars in building this new one over the past few years.  This facility 
featured 24 consoles, clocks, a world map, a television picture of the spacecraft, and a 
typewriter keyboard, meaning the Americans immediately felt reminded of Houston.20  
American flight directors Pete Frank and Neil Hutchinson both recalled that the Soviets’ 
computer hardware was archaic compared to the Americans’.  Yet Frank did feel struck 
by the Soviets’ talent in science, physics, and mathematics, including the fundamentals 
of orbital mechanics.  The talent of the people gave him confidence in the mission.21  
The flight controllers benefited from visiting this center because control of the mission 
would be integrated between both participating nations, not just one.  The Flight 
Directors in each center would converse with each other through Joint Flight Directors 
and their interpreters.  Each side also appointed a group of visiting specialists who would 
travel to the other side’s center and resolve any technical issues during the flight.  
American controllers thus familiarized themselves with the Russian center over ten day 
sessions and took part in simulations where controllers of both sides received 
malfunctions to solve.22   
With the specific flight procedures in place and the flight controllers selected and 
trained for the mission, the astronauts and cosmonauts could now work together more 
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productively on their overseas trips.  Leonov and Kubasov made their last visit in 
February 1975.  After receiving a briefing on launch operations at KSC, the cosmonauts 
flew to Houston to rehearse their joint activities.  This training now included a script 
prepared by the two crews and their language instructors.  For instance, Stafford called 
out, “Soyuz, ehto Apollon.  Stuikovka na pyat minut…” and Leonov replied, “Apollo, 
this is Soyuz.  I understand; docking is in five minutes.”23  The crews could also now 
rehearse their joint activities.  When the astronauts and cosmonauts climbed into one 
another’s spacecraft, they would speak with heads of state, exchange gifts, and perform 
experiments on biological interaction, microbial exchange, use of a multi-purpose 
furnace, creation of an artificial solar eclipse, and ultraviolet absorption.  Given the 
number of people who would watch the first handshake between astronauts and 
cosmonauts in space, both crews needed to feel comfortable with this phase of the flight 
and agreed that simulations helped them to “know what to expect from each other and 
work together in a relaxed manner.”  The crews needed to feel comfortable performing 
the experiments also, because $16 million went into them.  Simulations taught them the 
teamwork required to collect data.  For instance, the Apollo crew planned to undock their 
vehicle from the Soyuz and direct the nozzle of their SPS engine toward the Sun so as to 
create an artificial solar eclipse.  The Soyuz crew would then use highly sensitive film to 
observe the solar corona.24             
Stafford, Brand, and Slayton reciprocated by making a 16 day trip to the Soviet  
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Union in April.  This allowed them to rehearse the joint phase of the flight aboard a 
mockup of the Soyuz spacecraft and solve contingencies aboard a Soyuz simulator.  The 
astronauts especially benefited from seeing the Mission Control Center in Kaliningrad 
and the Baikonur Cosmodrome launch facility for the first time.  The objective of the 
mission was to demonstrate that two superpowers could cooperate and seeing Soviet 
space operations in action built confidence for the Apollo crew.  They knew that the 
Soviets prepared for missions differently than the Americans, as in the horizontal 
assembly of rockets and fewer rocket tests at the launch pad.  They knew that cosmonaut 
Vladimir Komarov had perished due to a parachute failure on the Soyuz 1 mission in 
1967, that the Soyuz 11 crew had perished in a reentry failure in 1971, and that the Soyuz 
18 crew had just undergone 21 Gs in a launch abort earlier that month.  They also knew 
that U.S. Senator William Proxmire was making headlines with his criticism of the 
Soyuz program, arguing that a joint mission would be dangerous and even calling for a 
CIA investigation.  Yet after seeing Soviet training and flight hardware up close, 
Stafford and Brand each told reporters that they felt satisfied with the reliability of the 
Soyuz.  The cultural training these men received was an element that differed from all 
previous American space crews.25            
 By May, the Americans and Russians had reached the home stretch of the 
training sequence.  This meant it was time for the crews to begin integrated simulations 
involving crews and flight controllers from both nations, each more ambitious than the 
last.  On May 13, Leonov and Kubasov began a 25 hour session in the Soyuz simulator, 
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in which they simulated launch and the maneuvers that would take them toward Apollo.  
Stafford, Brand, and Slayton spent this time in the Apollo simulator, while interpreters 
sent messages back and forth between the two control centers.  On May 15, the two sides 
performed a 56 hour simulation that allowed the crews to simulate rendezvous, docking, 
joint activities, and undocking.  A May 20 session allowed them to prepare for this phase 
as well, but this time with emergencies instituted by SimSups.  The grand finale of 
integrated simulations came from June 29-July 1.26  By the time Stafford, Brand, and 
Slayton flew their T-38 jets to Florida on July 13, their training had surpassed that of any 
previous crew thanks largely to the language requirement.  This was easily the most time 
consuming task, followed by rehearsals for joint crew activities, Command Module 
Simulator sessions, briefings and rehearsals for the scientific experiments, inspections of 
their actual spacecraft, and briefings for the mission techniques and rules.  Slayton made 
up for his long absence from flight status by becoming the first astronaut to rack up more 
than 3,000 training hours for a flight.  Stafford and Brand each finished with over 
2,600.27  The time had come for two nations to join forces beyond planet Earth.          
 The first day of the flight provided convincing evidence of the value of the most 
grueling training regimen yet.  Leonov and Kubasov launched aboard their Soyuz on July 
15.  About seven hours later, the Saturn IB soared into space one last time with the 
words from an “Original Seven” astronaut: “Man, I tell you, this is worth waiting 16 
years for.”  The responsibility then fell to Stafford to separate the CSM from the upper 
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stage of the booster, move around to face the DM stored inside, and dock with it.  He 
peered through the alignment sight, only to see the glare from the sunlit Earth.  Yet he 
improvised by moving about 30 feet away from the booster and stationkeeping with it 
until his target appeared to move toward Earth’s horizon.  He lined up the reticle on the 
alignment sight with the DM so accurately that the spacecraft were aligned to within a 
hundredth of degree when he achieved docking.  On the last Apollo flight, he had set the  
record for most accurate Apollo docking.28  
 The docking on July 17 placed the communication and teamwork of the two 
crews to the test.  Over the years, communication problems have caused several 
accidents in which two aircraft were in close proximity.  Yet when the Apollo crew saw 
the Soyuz, first as a green speck against the velvet black sky and then as it grew larger 
and larger, the astronauts and cosmonauts clearly communicated in each other’s 
language on the strength of their training.  Most critically, Stafford gave Leonov the 
prompt to perform a 60 degree roll maneuver that gave Soyuz the proper attitude relative 
to Apollo.  Leonov did so, before adding a lighthearted message in reference to the 
controversy during their training: “Tom, please don’t forget about your engine.”  But he 
did not have to worry, because Stafford knew just what to expect from the simulations.  
Stafford began the final closing maneuver by precisely aligning the alignment sight with 
the cross on the Soyuz docking ring, slowing his velocity relative to the Soyuz to just 
over 0.3 feet per second, and making a graceful docking without impinging on his target.  
Then he retracted the guide ring, actuated the structural latches, and compressed the 
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seals.  The point here was that Stafford demonstrated the success of manual spacecraft 
control, which the Americans had always valued more heavily than the Soviets, and 
which depended on instilling the right habits in crewmembers through training.  “We 
have capture,” Leonov declared.29          
 Amid the hoopla of the next two days, including conversations with President 
Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the five men together in orbit 
performed experiments that placed their training to the test.  This allowed the astronauts 
and cosmonauts to demonstrate the value of having trained experiment operators in 
space and that Apollo-Soyuz was more than a political mission.  Stafford, Brand, and 
Slayton conducted an electrophoresis experiment, meaning the separation of human cells 
with electric current so as to examine them at a genetic level.  The crew improved the 
techniques used to accomplish the insertion of the cell samples based on the experience 
of past Apollo crews and their knowledge helped to produce exciting data on kidney 
cells.  The astronauts also exercised their knowledge in the use of a multi-purpose 
electric furnace.  Thanks to their training in the operation of the furnace, they had the 
flexibility to manipulate the processing of materials in this device such as alloys or 
crystals.    Two other experiments placed their flight training to the test.  The astronauts 
undocked their CSM from the Soyuz on July 19 to direct the nozzle of their engine 
toward the Sun and create an eclipse.  This required them to exercise the precise control 
honed in the simulator.  The crew fired thrusters at just the right time for just the right 
number of seconds and maintained attitude hold long enough for Leonov and Kubasov to 
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obtain 125 photo frames of the eclipse.  Stafford, Brand, and Slayton also flew away 
from the Soyuz for an ultraviolet absorption experiment.  Once again following the 
reticle on the alignment sight, the crew projected beams of light onto a set of 
retroreflectors on the Soyuz, which reflected them back so a spectrometer on the CSM 
could yield data on the amount of atomic oxygen and atomic nitrogen in orbit.  All three 
astronauts were busy, as Slayton operated the hand controller, Brand operated the 
computer, and Stafford went the lower equipment bay to turn on sensors.30          
 Despite the hundreds of hours in the simulator, the crew made one of their two 
notable mistakes at this point.  Slayton flew the vehicle to dock with the Soyuz again, but 
he fired thrusters to roll the CSM for about three seconds after contact.  This produced a 
sideways force that caused Soyuz to oscillate and made flight controllers in Houston and 
Kaliningrad nervous.  Yet the Soyuz quickly aligned the two vehicles and neither was 
damaged.  The brief scare proved that even highly trained astronauts were not immune to 
mistakes, but also the reliability of the new docking system.  Slayton did not dwell on 
the incident in his memoir, arguing instead, “I think the exercise taught us something 
about possible future space rescue.”  The astronauts undocked from the Soyuz again late 
on the evening of July 19.  Leonov and Kubasov landed two days later, but the Apollo 
crew had five more days to spend in orbit: the last chance to obtain scientific data from 
astronauts until the Space Shuttle era.31        
 Most relevant from a training perspective was the collection of Earth observation  
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data, following up on the exciting results from Skylab.  Many of the scientists who had 
trained astronauts during the moon missions, such as Lee Silver, Farouk El-Baz, and Bill 
Muehlberger, trained this last Apollo crew to make the most of their observational skills.  
These men gave them 60 hours of classroom instruction on the phenomena they would 
see across 1974 and 1975, while the crew made flyovers of geologic features from 
California to Florida.  This crew thus trained in a similar way as the lunar crews had, 
only in this case to observe a much more varied celestial body in which billions of 
humans lived.  The fact that scientists doubled the amount of time devoted to training 
astronauts in Earth observations from Skylab 4 to Apollo-Soyuz (30 hours to 60) 
suggested the intrigue of the results.  Sure enough, Stafford, Brand, and Slayton made 
several significant findings in fields ranging from geology, to oceanography, to deserts, 
to hydrology, to meteorology, to the environment.  The preliminary science report for 
the mission attested to the value of having people making these findings rather than 
robots.  The case for humans in space remained strong because trained astronauts could 
study features of only transient visibility and unknown features much more effectively 
than automated machines.32   
 The crew’s other notable mistake came during the reentry on July 24.  Stafford 
called off the steps on the checklist to Brand so the latter could throw the correct 
switches.  One of the steps called for arming two Earth Landing System switches at an 
altitude of 30,000 feet, which would shut off the vehicle’s thrusters.  But Brand did not 
hear Stafford make this call, probably because of the noise in the cockpit due to thrusters 
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and the flight of the vehicle through the atmosphere.  He did not arm the switches until 
30 seconds after he was supposed to, meaning propellant from the thrusters had 30 
seconds to flood the cabin through a pressure relief valve that had just opened.  All three 
astronauts noticed they were now breathing toxic chemicals from that propellant and 
started coughing.  Brand worked through the rest of the checklist, including the manual 
deployment of the main parachutes, until the ship splashed down in the Pacific Ocean.  
But the three now needed to place their emergency training to the test.  Though they 
were hanging upside down in a vehicle that had just flipped over, Stafford still managed 
to crawl to the oxygen masks while grunting to keep just enough pressure in his lungs.  
He and Slayton donned masks and held one over the face of an unconscious Brand.  
Brand rallied and threw a switch to bring the vehicle upright, then Stafford opened a 
vent valve and fresh sea air poured into the ship.  The crew had just inhaled nitrogen 
tetroxide at three hundred parts per million, dangerously close to a lethal four hundred 
parts per million, but managed to recover after two weeks in a hospital in Honolulu.  
Without training in the splashdown sequence, Stafford, Brand, and Slayton would have 
been less likely to save their lives in time.33   
The Apollo-Soyuz mission marked the end of one era and the dawn of another.  
For the last time, an American crew rode an expendable vehicle into space atop a Saturn 
rocket and returned to a splashdown.  But for the first time, an American crew had 
undergone training in another nation for a space mission.  They had traveled overseas 
not only to understand a foreign spacecraft, but also to immerse themselves culturally 
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and linguistically in a foreign nation.  The question remained as to whether the two 
space superpowers would again unite in human spaceflight.  Glynn Lunney remembered 
that the Soviets expressed interest in another Apollo-Soyuz flight during 1974 and 1975, 
and even in 1977 he traveled to Moscow with several NASA personnel to discuss a 
Space Shuttle flight that would dock with a Salyut space station.  “But, there was no 
tentative proposal that looked like it would attract much or any support from NASA 
Headquarters,” he concluded.  Especially after a series of events soured American 
interest in Cold War détente, such as the Soviet military interventions in Angola in 1975 
and Afghanistan in 1980, interest in another joint flight fell by the wayside.34     
But after the Soviet Union dissolved, the time had finally come for American 
astronauts to travel to Russia again and tap into the expertise in long duration flight that 
carried over from the Soviet era.  “We were a little of a spark or a foot in the door that 
started better communications,” Brand reflected in 2000.35  By that time, astronauts had 
followed in his footsteps by devoting hundreds of hours to learning the Russian language 
and immersing themselves in Russian culture, only this time by spending years in Star 
City prior to visiting Mir or the ISS.  Flight controllers had followed in the footsteps of 
their Apollo-Soyuz predecessors by working together in joint simulations.  The personnel 
involved in the Shuttle-Mir and ISS programs, from managers to flight controllers to 
astronauts, also had a trusting relationship that had been strengthened by the Apollo-
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Soyuz experience.36  One of the Shuttle-Mir program managers, Frank Culbertson, 
remembered that his predecessor Tommy Holloway established a framework of working 
groups (another similarity between this program and Apollo-Soyuz) which resolved any 
issues in cooperating on the project.  He remarked that Holloway could do this partly 
because of “the Apollo-Soyuz experience which some of the people had been a part of, 
particularly on the Russian side.”37  Although the Soviet empire did not survive until the 
end of the 20th century, the methods of preparing for and conducting a joint flight did not 
die with it.  
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CHAPTER XII 
STS: “PEOPLE WERE REALLY AFRAID OF THE DOGGONE THING” 
 
 John Young stood on the surface of the Moon, peering through a gold plated 
visor at the American flag and a desolate landscape, when he heard the voice of Apollo 
16 CapCom Tony England.  “The House passed the space budget yesterday, 277 to 60, 
which includes the vote for the shuttle,” England told him.  Young had immersed 
himself in Gemini and Apollo for the past decade.  But during that moment on an alien 
world, at the height of American success in human spaceflight, he declared, “The 
country needs that shuttle mighty bad.  You’ll see.”1  He knew that the best way for the 
United States to establish a lasting foothold in space was not to launch a vehicle there 
and then discard it after one use.  Commercial airline companies did not throw away 747 
jets after one flight, so why should NASA throw away spacecraft?  The space agency 
could instead take a step toward making spaceflight more like air travel by launching a 
vehicle that would land on a runway at the end of its mission, then undergo refurbishing 
by a team of KSC engineers before launching again.  Engineers would not have to worry 
about constructing a new vehicle for each mission, only a few which would fly 
frequently and expose high numbers of astronauts, payloads, and scientific experiments 
to low Earth orbit.  “It will take the astronomical costs out of astronautics,” President 
Richard Nixon said on January 5, 1972 in announcing his decision to approve the Space 
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Transportation System (STS), or Space Shuttle.2  This potential was the vehicle’s main 
political appeal, but the vehicle appealed to astronauts because new types of people 
could ride aboard it and contribute to a flight.  This called for new training procedures 
that Young could not have foreseen during his Gemini and Apollo days. 
 The first step in forming new training procedures was to determine what types of  
crewmembers would fly aboard the Space Shuttle.  Since advanced studies on the 
vehicle had begun in 1968, most NASA managers and engineers wanted an entirely 
reusable two stage design.  Two pilots would ride in the first stage as it provided the 
initial thrust of launch, then detach and return to a runway landing.  Two pilots would 
also ride along with up to a dozen crewmembers in the second stage, which would then 
provide the thrust to reach orbit.  But this design would cost over $10 billion to develop 
and the Nixon administration did not want to make this investment.  The president 
approved instead a partly reusable vehicle, featuring a pair of twin Solid Rocket 
Boosters (SRBs) that would provide the initial thrust of launch before being jettisoned, 
an External Tank (ET) that would provide fuel to three main engines before being 
jettisoned to burn up in the atmosphere, and a winged orbiter in which up to a dozen 
crewmembers would ride (as it turned out, the largest shuttle crew consisted of eight 
people).  This design cut the development cost in half.3  This design also marked a major 
evolution in the history of the American astronaut, because all previous vehicles had 
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carried no more than three crewmembers.  All of them spent the dynamic phases of 
flight, such as launch, docking, or reentry, sitting in front of the displays and controls on 
an instrument panel.  But aboard the shuttle, only two members of a larger crew would 
sit in front of an instrument panel.  The rest would sit behind them in the flight deck or 
below in the middeck, meaning their contribution to a flight would come in an area other 
than piloting.4            
 When NASA Administrator Jim Fletcher flew to Los Angeles, California to meet 
with Nixon concerning the president’s announcement in January 1972, he took with him 
a “fact sheet” suggesting how astronaut selection and training would change.  The sheet 
read, “No special flight training would be required for passengers, making it possible to 
send scientists, doctors, artists, photographers—both men and women—into space.”5  By 
1975, with Rockwell International contractors having just begun constructing Space 
Shuttle Columbia, NASA managers had defined three types of astronauts who would fly 
on the shuttle.  Crews would include two pilots.  The Commander in the left-hand seat of 
the cockpit would perform the flying while having the traditional responsibilities of 
mission success and crew safety.  The Pilot sitting in the right-hand seat would provide 
assistance in flying the vehicle.  But crews would also include several Mission 
Specialists (MS) who would make EVAs, operate equipment, and perform experiments, 
and occasionally Payload Specialists (PS) who came from outside the astronaut office to 
operate a payload on one specific flight.  The projections of how often the shuttle would 
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fly at this time turned out to be nonsensical: 60 flights per year by 1984 and a total of 
572 flights by 1992, meaning pilots would fly six missions per year and Mission 
Specialists three missions per year.6  But the mission roles endured.  Each type of 
astronaut would need to be selected and require new materials to study and simulation 
facilities on the basis of their roles. 
 Since the Space Shuttle was the most complex machine ever built, the groups of 
astronauts selected for the program (1978, 1980, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2004) began their training by listening to classroom instruction 
and studying workbooks to learn the operation of the systems.  Today, the Apollo moon 
landings usually attract more attention as a feat that demonstrated American 
exceptionalism in carrying out a complex engineering task.  The Apollo CSM was 
indeed the most complex machine ever built during the 1960s, but Apollo 11’s Mike 
Collins made a telling statement when he returned to JSC years after his retirement to 
research a book.  He found that one shuttle orbiter was equivalent in complexity to about 
four Apollo CSMs.7  The orbiter contained more than 2.5 million parts, which included 
almost 230 miles of wire, more than 1,060 plumbing valves and connections, over 1,440 
circuit breakers, and more than 27,000 insulating tiles to protect it from the heat of 
reentry.8  Though the operation of many of those components would be automated, JSC 
training personnel (the office known as DT) expected astronauts to learn them.  Crews 
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would have checklists to work through in operating the systems (95 pounds of checklists 
flew on each mission), and knowledge of the systems would benefit them in carrying out 
these steps and especially in solving a malfunction.  Thus studying the workbooks 
created for each system, from electrical, to environmental, to propulsive, to guidance and 
navigation, to software, and more, marked the first step in an astronaut’s path toward 
flight readiness.9     
While moving through the workbooks, newly selected astronauts (called 
ASCANs during the shuttle era) began a training flow of classroom instruction that 
contained seven tiers.  A supervisor took them through these steps with an eye toward 
encouraging astronauts not to memorize shuttle systems, but to understand them “at a 
‘big picture’ level.”  For instance, the astronauts might have to configure an instrument 
panel without the Flight Data File (FDF) in front of them.  The supervisor could provide 
them with leads in performing these tasks if necessary.  After observing their 
performances, the supervisor rated their task completion level on a form as “easily, O.K., 
with difficulty, didn’t complete, or didn’t attempt” and noted the approximate time to 
complete the tasks.  The form also provided space for the supervisor to note whether the 
ASCAN seemed prepared, was cooperative during class, was open to suggestions from 
others, and worked well with a partner.  Like university professors, JSC personnel 
referred to this initial instruction as the 1000 and 2000 levels of courses.10  Astronaut 
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training had begun as a highly experimental task during the Mercury era, with a few 
techniques abandoned after that first program.  It became gradually less so during 
Gemini and Apollo, until taking on its most standardized form during the shuttle era.  
The development of tiers of instruction and evaluation forms reflected the many more 
years of experience that training personnel had with the shuttle program than its 
predecessors, and the far greater number of astronauts.  
Jim Voss and Susan Helms remember the challenge of that first indoctrination 
into the astronaut corps.  As the holder of a master’s degree in Aerospace Engineering, 
an Army Officer, a teacher at the U.S. Military Academy, and a JSC employee since 
1984, Voss had an impressive background when he became an ASCAN in 1987.11  He 
did not find any one topic especially difficult, “but when you put them all together it 
becomes a real challenge.  Being an astronaut is like becoming a jack of all trades in 
spacecraft and operations.”  For the ASCAN classes that followed his, Voss did manage 
to offer additional assistance as the Astronaut Office Training Officer.  “There was an 
astronaut who supervised the class, monitored the training, and was there to be an 
experienced voice that they needed,” he explains.  “They could ask questions that I could 
answer as an experienced astronaut.  This person also made evaluations, not only for 
training but for their interactions with others and things like that.”12  Helms, the Air 
Force officer with whom he eventually served on the ISS, found the computer systems 
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especially challenging as a 1990 ASCAN.  “The computer systems were confusing to 
me, because they were so old and the software was really machine language,” she  
recalls.13       
Also during this first year in the corps, ASCANs especially remembered 
traveling across the country to visit every NASA center from California to Maryland.  
“You need to know that every last NASA employee stands behind you,” explained Mike 
Massimino of the 1996 class.  “They also need to meet you so they can put a face to a 
name and know who they’re protecting up there.”  Unlike the original Mercury 
astronauts, the shuttle ASCANs had grown up witnessing the reality of space travel but 
still needed to sense the grandeur of the effort they were undertaking.  The best place to 
do this was at the Kennedy Space Center, where they could see one of the largest 
buildings in the world (the Vehicle Assembly Building [VAB]), the crawler-transporter, 
and the shuttle stack itself.14  
Astronauts needed to acclimate themselves to flying the T-38 aircraft during their 
first year as well.  Only a portion of the astronauts selected for the shuttle program were 
pilots, but the tradition since Mercury of requiring all astronauts to fly jets remained.  As 
with the 1960s astronauts, traveling around the country in jets required shuttle astronauts 
to maintain generic flying and crew coordination skills in an environment that (unlike a 
simulator on the ground) could take their lives.  Several also flew the T-38 as a chase 
plane during shuttle landings.  For this reason, NASA spent several million dollars per 
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year maintaining a T-38 fleet throughout the shuttle program and to this day.  Because of 
the risks that had claimed Ted Freeman, Elliot See, Charlie Bassett, and C.C. Williams 
during the 1960s, shuttle astronauts had to go through a long process to gain pilot 
certification.  Many Mission Specialists did not have a strong aviation background, 
meaning they went to a five day ground school during which they received instruction in 
basic aeronautical knowledge.  All astronauts went through three days for land survival 
training, three days for water survival training, five days at a more advanced ground 
school that familiarized them with the T-38 in particular, and ejection seat training that 
familiarized them with usage, parameters, and parachute landing falls.  Finally, the 
astronauts placed their knowledge to the test by carrying out a syllabus of T-38 flights 
covering navigation by instruments, aerobatics, formation flying, night flying, and low 
lift to drag flying.15     
 A few documents preserved by Sally Ride illustrate what the astronauts without 
an aviation background learned about flying.  Upon her selection in 1978, Ride was part 
of the new breed of astronauts.  Not only was she one of the first six women ever 
selected, she had spent her adult life working toward a Ph.D. in physics instead of flying 
aircraft.  At the age of just 26, she had to take a multiple choice exam that proved her 
proficiency in this new task and repeat it annually.  She even preserved her handwritten 
notes from ground school, containing tips such as, “Think your way through each 
maneuver before performing it.  During the maneuver, stay ahead of the airplane.  Be 
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alert to any hazardous condition that may develop and know how to get out of it 
safely.”16  As a Mission Specialist with no high performance flight experience, she was 
required to fly the T-38 for at least 100 hours per year.  Those who already had more 
than 200 hours of experience could get by with as little as 48 hours per year.  The 
requirement drastically increased for Shuttle Commanders and Pilots beginning six 
months prior to the launch of a mission, as they needed to average 20 hours per month 
until their mission began.  As a result of T-38 policy, astronauts who filled every seat on 
a shuttle mission had prior experience in the dynamic operations of an actual flight.  
Their use of this aircraft also afforded them the convenience of flying across the entire 
United States without waiting for a commercial airline.17 
 The first year in the corps for shuttle astronauts was not entirely about training 
for technical duties.  Shuttle astronauts were the first to receive formal training for 
speaking to the media and making public presentations (the Mercury, Gemini, and 
Apollo astronauts who were better known ironically did not receive this).  NASA hired 
Bill Wallisch to teach a class to the astronauts on this subject.  “Since retiring as a 
professor of English and Communication at the United States Air Force Academy in 
Colorado Springs, I now help business executives, astronauts, physicians, cops and 
government staffers put together tight messages that communicate complicated ideas in a 
flash,” he writes on his website.18  He knew that even though shuttle era astronauts 
                                                          
16  “NASA Aircrew Annual Instrument Refresher Exam,” March 1985, Box 5, Folder 10 and “Ride’s Handwritten 
Aerobatics Notes,” Box 6, Folder 3, Sally K. Ride Collection, Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, 
Chantilly, VA.    
17  “T-38 Operating Procedures.”  
18  Bill Wallisch, “Wallisch Session: A Quick Review,”Your Main Point, http://www.yourmainpoint.com/wallisch_ 
session.htm (accessed December 26, 2016).    
412 
 
lacked the iconic status of John Glenn or Neil Armstrong, they still held one of the most 
exciting and unusual jobs in the world.  Thus they would give televised interviews and 
travel to schools across the country with the goal of inspiring both children and adults.  
Each astronaut rehearsed his or her presentation skills in Wallisch’s class and gave 
interviews with mock reporters.19   
 The astronauts also learned several examples of common mistakes when 
speaking to reporters that they should avoid.  The most common mistakes included not 
remembering what was in their media briefing books, forgetting their key messages, 
talking too long or too briefly, talking too technically, talking too defensively, placing 
blame, and not taking seriously enough the necessity of proper preparation.  Wallisch 
told his students to never say “no comment,” to never fake knowledge, to never repeat 
the negatives of a question in their answers, and to never show anger.  He also instructed 
them to beware of hypothetical questions, which they need not answer, and reporters’ 
false facts, which they should correct before answering a question.  Astronauts did 
receive specific instructions about dealing with the media after being assigned to a 
mission in some cases.  One of the most notable examples of this came after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  The STS-107 crew received instructions not to speculate 
to the media about how the United States should respond to the incident and to assure 
reporters that NASA had taken proper security precautions to protect astronauts at 
Houston and the Cape.  Astronauts throughout the shuttle program generally succeeded  
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in enhancing the image of the government agency that employed them.20      
With the completion of the classroom instruction, KC-135 aircraft flights to 
experience an initial taste of weightlessness, T-38 flights, media training, and technical 
training at the 1000 and 2000 levels, the ASCANs moved onto more advanced courses 
for specific systems.  Each course had a different supervisor.  First came the Crew 
Systems Training course, which called on the ASCANs to learn how to use the 
equipment responsible for maintaining a living environment on the orbiter, operate 
experiments, perform inflight maintenance, and make an emergency egress.  This took 
place in a classroom and a replica of the orbiter crew compartment.  The ASCANs began 
using the Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS) for courses on ascent, orbit, and reentry 
operations.  Next came trips to additional simulators that familiarized them with EVA, 
robotic arm operation, rendezvous with another spacecraft, and several common shuttle 
payloads such as the Spacelab and Spacehab modules.  These courses all led to the 
course on integrated simulations, when the ASCANs began working in the SMS with 
flight controllers.  A year or two after their selection, the ASCANs graduated and 
became fully fledged astronauts eligible for flight assignment.21 
Thus the training personnel introduced several devices during this advanced 
phase that each deserve individual consideration.  One was a new innovation when the 
program began in the 1970s: a computer called a Regency trainer.  This computer 
featured a programmable 64 by 64 spot touch screen.  Astronauts could view detailed 
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graphics of controls and displays on this screen and interact with them by touching the 
screen.  The software would respond accordingly.  The presence of this tool at JSC 
reflected a useful development in teaching throughout the United States: computer-
assisted instruction.  University of Illinois scientists had produced the Illinois Automatic 
Computer in 1952, the first computer built and owned entirely by a U.S. educational 
institution.  In 1960, the scientists began running a program on it called Programmed 
Logic for Automatic Teaching Operations (PLATO).  PLATO could assist students with 
coursework through then novel features such as text overlaying graphics and feedback 
for user input.  By the late 1970s, with the program running on several networked 
mainframe computers throughout the U.S., JSC instructors decided to teach shuttle 
systems to astronauts using software based on PLATO.  This system demonstrated just 
how far training had come since the Mercury era, because the “Original Seven” had 
worked in a far less electronically advanced world without such a convenient teaching 
tool.  It also demonstrated that astronaut training was not an isolated field; developments 
in teaching at institutions like the University of Illinois could influence it.22                          
Another of the devices that ASCANs began using after graduation from the 2000 
level was the Single System Trainers (SSTs).  Contractors at Ford Aerospace in Newport 
Beach, California provided these $1.5 million facilities, which were medium fidelity 
recreations of a single orbiter system powered by a minicomputer.  The rise of 
minicomputers throughout the U.S. in the 1960s had reflected the smaller units that had 
become feasible with the advance of transistors and core memory technology.  They 
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would be largely replaced by personal computers that took advantage of microprocessors 
during the 1980s, but when the shuttle program began minicomputers were still in 
vogue.  The minicomputers in the SSTs allowed ASCANs their first chance to actually 
touch the hardware they had been studying, see its operation for themselves, and 
eventually learn to respond to malfunctions.  “You can read books and ask questions 
about a system, and nobody has the answers yet,” John Young recalled about the 
importance of the SST.  “But then you get in the Single Systems Trainer, turn on the 
switch and it will tell you what the answer is.  The learning curve when you first get into 
the training goes straight up.”23  
 Having completed the most rudimentary forms of training, astronauts then 
tackled the most high-fidelity devices designed to simulate the individual tasks of a 
mission.  After ASCANs completed the 2000 level, one of the first devices they 
encountered was the Crew Compartment Trainer (CCT), weighing in at over 23,000 
pounds and built by Rockwell International in 1979.  The CCT featured a replica of the 
flight deck and middeck so that training personnel could familiarize astronauts with the 
basic tasks of living and working on the orbiter.  The vehicle could tilt straight up to 
simulate launch, when the astronauts would have to strap into their seats and monitor 
instruments while lying on their backs.  It would then return to a level position so they 
could rehearse procedures in the middeck for waste collection, dining, personal hygiene, 
sleep, trash management, and the many experiments they would have to perform.  The 
instructors could even install a treadmill and place biomedical sensors on the astronauts 
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for this purpose.  Instructors could also force a crew to respond to a sudden loss of cabin 
pressure, fire, or contaminated atmosphere.  An emergency like this might require them 
to make a quick egress through the side hatch and then onto the ground via an inflatable 
slide.  One astronaut estimated spending nearly 500 hours in the CCT in training for two 
missions.24     
Crews would also need to rendezvous and dock the orbiter with other vehicles, 
which called for a device that could simulate dynamics between two spacecraft.  Though 
successful rendezvous dated back to the Gemini program, shuttle rendezvous carried 
important technical differences that astronauts needed to account for in their training.  
The plan upon the creation of the program called for the orbiters to rendezvous with 
satellites so that astronauts could service them, which did happen several times during 
the 1980s.  By the 1990s, the orbiters made some of their most significant 
accomplishments by rendezvousing with the Hubble Space Telescope, the Russian space 
station Mir, and the ISS.  Many of the satellites had not been designed to support this 
servicing, so they did not have the transponders or lights that Gemini and Apollo crews 
had counted on.  Some satellites were also smaller than the orbiter chasing them, another 
change from rendezvous in previous programs.25  Crews thus needed to maximize their 
knowledge of the resources available to them to find their target and minimize those 
disadvantages.  Their resources included star trackers that provided optical tracking of 
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their position in space, radar that provided data on their distance to the target, a Crew 
Alignment Optical Sight and CCTV cameras through which the Commander could view 
a target, and a hand controller by which to control translation and attitude.  The 
Commander would have to make use of these resources to approach a target at the 
proper velocity and time.26  What device could allow an astronaut to build confidence in 
doing this prior to a mission?     
The Systems Engineering Simulator (SES) became that device.  The SES 
featured a dome into which engineers inserted the orbiter cockpit.  Astronauts could then 
climb inside, sit in front of a replica instrument panel, and watch a scene generator 
project images onto the dome’s interior.  Few developments in astronaut training better 
reflected the progression of technology than this simulator.  As previous chapters have 
indicated, engineers grappled with the problem of scene generation in Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo simulators.  But by 1968, an innovation had improved computer generated 
imagery by providing for the addition of three-dimensional objects onto a two 
dimensional textured surface.  The SES entered operation that year with a set of two 
Object Generating Units, each capable of generating 20 such objects.  This capability 
increased until, in 1976, the computers could gather as many as 900 polygons to form 
these objects.27  Thus an engineer or astronaut could watch a three-dimensional 
representation of the Earth or another spacecraft move across the dome, over an expanse 
as great as 240 horizontal degrees and 180 vertical degrees.  Engineers were the first to 
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benefit from this, because they could analyze the Space Shuttle’s flying characteristics as 
it rendezvoused and docked with another spacecraft.  What if a thruster plume from the 
orbiter impinged on the vehicle it approached?  What if the orbiter approached too fast 
and collided with it?  The SES allowed engineers to place these questions to the test and 
validate procedures, then allowed astronauts to place their knowledge and flying skills to 
the test through the end of the Space Shuttle program.  Astronauts are still using this 
device to train for the upcoming flights of the Orion spacecraft.28     
 Astronauts first used this facility as ASCANs, but then had a certain number of 
hours to fulfill once assigned to a crew.  For a mission that rendezvoused with the 
Hubble Space Telescope, Mir, or the ISS, the training time required for the Commander, 
Pilot, and one Mission Specialist assigned to rendezvous support varied according to 
whether they had received any training in the past.  If they had not, they needed to 
receive eight hours of briefings, 28 hours of simulation in the SST devoted to 
rendezvous, 72 hours in the SES, and 28 hours in the SMS.  If they had received 
previous training, those respective numbers fell to 1, 12, 20, and 20.29  Crewmembers 
needed to rehearse rendezvous even if they had previous experience because new 
missions brought new maneuvers and, as Training Team Lead and Simulation 
Supervisor Lisa Martignetti reflects, they had to perform the necessary maneuvers within 
a strict timeline.  Failure to make the maneuvers within a short timeframe could have 
meant missing a target or a catastrophic collision with a target.  This is why rendezvous  
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remains a more challenging aspect of mission training than experiment operation, for  
instance.30          
 The Remote Manipulator System (RMS), or robotic arm, also called for high-
fidelity simulation.  In 1975, NASA and the Canadian National Research Council agreed 
that Canadian engineers would develop this unprecedented device: a 50-foot arm that 
could maneuver along six joints and grasp objects weighing several thousand pounds 
with an end effector.  The arm would serve three functions that each increased the 
flexibility of shuttle operations: grasp other spacecraft, anchor and carry an astronaut on 
an EVA to a distant work station, and inspect the orbiter through the television camera 
on the arm.  But making use of this robotics capacity would require precise human 
operation by a Mission Specialist.  This person would stand in the aft flight deck 
maneuvering the six joints of the arm via rotational and translational hand controllers, 
while entering commands on a keyboard and monitoring a panel displaying arm status 
data.  Since operating the arm required knowledge of this human interface, and since no 
Mercury, Gemini, or Apollo astronaut had ever operated anything like it on a past 
mission, shuttle astronauts required an ambitious new training facility.  Beginning in 
1977, engineers verified the performance of the arm in the Real-Time Simulation 
Facility (SIMFAC).  This contained a replica of the aft flight deck and several computers 
to replicate the precise motions of the arm and produce visual displays for the operator.31 
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 But when the 1980s arrived, ASCANs and astronauts selected to missions trained  
in two even more ambitious locations: the SES and the Manipulator Development 
Facility (MDF).  The SES contained a dynamic model of the arm along with that 
impressive visual simulation, but could only simulate a limited number of malfunctions.  
The MDF had a major strength of its own, as it contained a mockup of the orbiter’s 
payload bay, the massive 60 by 15 feet enclosure behind the crew compartment where 
the arm was located.  Mission Specialists stood in a replica of the aft flight deck, 
grabbed the hand controllers, and maneuvered the arm to grasp large helium-filled 
balloons that replicated payloads.  Three time flyer Mike Mullane remembered that this 
was not as easy as it sounded, which was why the MDF was so necessary: “Using these 
hand controls while tracking a moving target on a display screen (how we would grapple 
a free-flying satellite) was like patting your head and rubbing your stomach at the same 
time.  It required lots of practice.”32   
 The facility did have limitations to its fidelity.  In the one-G environment of the 
ground, the replica arm needed to be thick to lift itself and not slender like the real one.  
The replica arm was also more erratic than the real one, as it shimmied back and forth 
after the operator stopped its motion.  But the MDF allowed astronauts to rehearse their 
hand-eye coordination until they could feel assured of operating the arm without causing 
damage to a payload.  If they made a mistake and dented a payload, they would pop a 
balloon, giving them an emphatic indication of their error.  Though the astronauts could 
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also train to operate a computer generated arm in the SMS, the MDF had that advantage 
over the SMS as a physical training tool.  Missions often called for two crewmembers to 
share tasks in operating the arm, so astronauts could rehearse their teamwork here as 
well.33  Susan Helms compliments the facility when asked today, remembering, “I 
thought the MDF did a fantastic job of preparing us for the real job on orbit.”34 
 When ASCANs operated the robotic arm for the first time, two training 
personnel and one astronaut already experienced in arm operation watched them.  The 
instructors gave them a rating from 1 (unsatisfactory) to 5 (outstanding) in several 
categories.  The categories given the most weight were the student’s smoothness in 
maneuvering the arm, situational awareness, and hand controller techniques.  Instructors 
also evaluated the student’s attitude, systems knowledge, ability to follow procedures, 
target usage, ability to follow flight rules, and camera configuration.  On the basis of 
these ratings, instructors assigned an overall rating that they immediately gave the 
student and within a few days gave the student a written evaluation form.  ASCANs 
needed to receive a 3 or greater to participate in simulations as a robotic arm operator.  
Even after proving their ability as ASCANs, astronauts still needed to take part in an 
annual proficiency evaluation in order to be considered as a robotic arm operator on a 
crew.  Knowing that Canadian engineers had supplied an arm for each orbiter at a cost of 
over $100 million each, the training personnel wanted proof that an astronaut’s skills in 
operating it had not degraded.  The rating system and rubric offered further evidence that  
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astronaut training had become more standardized during the shuttle era.35             
 Shuttle astronauts would also need to make EVAs, which called for a much more  
ambitious training facility than any used before in Houston.  Spacewalkers did continue 
to train in the KC-135 aircraft and Air Bearing Table.  But pool training for EVAs still 
reigned supreme, so engineers removed the Water Immersion Facility and replaced it 
with the Weightless Environment Training Facility (WETF) that was more similar in 
size to the pool in Huntsville where Skylab astronauts had trained: 75 feet long, 50 feet 
wide, and 25 feet deep.  This allowed engineers to submerge a replica of the orbiter’s 
payload bay and the equipment with which the astronauts would have to work.  Upon its 
completion in 1980, the WETF contained several features that ensured the safety of 
astronauts and offered them high-fidelity training, building on the experience of Gemini, 
Apollo, and Skylab.  Astronauts went on each session with heavy lead weights stuffed in 
their suits to produce neutral buoyancy.  Television footage of the astronauts allowed 
engineers in the control area to easily monitor their performances and give them 
feedback, including the person with a microphone who could speak to the astronauts as a 
CapCom.  A fellow astronaut who would serve as an Intravehicular Activity (IVA) 
officer during a mission, choreographing the movements his or her colleagues would 
have to make, could also monitor the sessions.  Five divers went underwater for each 
session: two to attend to the astronauts, one to serve as a gofer, and two to operate 
television cameras.  The presence of the divers, along with an ambulance parked by the 
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pool, meant no astronaut had to fear for his or her safety and there were no serious 
accidents.  When a close call happened, such as James Van Hoften’s oxygen hose 
pulling out of his suit, the divers pulled him out of the water and pulled his helmet off in 
thirty seconds.36   
ASCANs received their introduction to EVA training shortly after their selection.  
After the neutral buoyancy personnel observed the ASCANs in the pool, they assigned 
each student a rating from 1 to 5.  A rating of 1 meant the training personnel 
recommended the astronaut for lead on a scheduled EVA (every EVA in the shuttle 
program called for multiple astronauts to step outside), because the astronaut had a 
cooperative attitude, good technique, was well prepared, and attentive.  Astronauts could 
still feel good about receiving a 2 or 3, because this meant the instructors considered 
them competent enough to make an EVA.  But a 4 or 5 meant the instructors could not 
recommend them for an EVA, either because they were difficult to work with, had an 
awkward technique, had difficulty working with the suit, or struggled with physical 
endurance.  “I think Paul told us if we get a 3, we are doing well,” wrote one astronaut.  
“The scoring process is shrouded in mystery,” he admitted, but urged his colleagues “to 
have a very clear mental picture of what you need to do.  This is like many activities that 
involve lengthy sequences of psycho-motor skills, like precision skydiving, karate, 
ballet, ice skating, surgery, etc...You only get your four runs.  ASCAN EVA training is a 
once per career experience, and you probably won’t get another chance to prove yourself  
                                                          
36  Cooper, Before Liftoff, 101-106.  
424 
 
if you perform poorly.”37           
 Until the WETF closed in 1998, astronauts and training personnel learned 
numerous lessons for the benefit of their successors.  Before heading into the pool, 
astronauts learned that they should increase the strength of their hands, wrists, and 
forearms because these were the muscles that gave them the most fatigue in the pool and 
in space.  In the pool, they learned that the greatest training benefit they could derive 
was to rehearse techniques that would give them a stable body position.  This was “the 
most significant part of every task,” according to a 1994 document on lessons learned.  
While keeping in mind that general idea, astronauts could increase their proficiency in 
several ways: translating to and from worksites (best done through slow, deliberate 
movements) handling large masses (best done by using only light forces and moving  
objects in one degree of freedom at a time), and coordinating their movements with the 
IVA crewmember and robotic arm operator (best done by developing unambiguous 
communication protocol).  Astronauts also learned general rules of thumb that would 
increase the fidelity of training, such as accept aid from divers only when “absolutely 
necessary,” do not kick or swim, do not use water drag in moving, and never hurry in 
moving.  The rookie spacewalkers on each mission learned to seek the opinions of more 
experienced astronauts and training personnel and be candid in sharing any problems in 
maneuvering or operating hardware.38  As long as astronauts followed these lessons, 
                                                          
37  “EVA Training Ratings Scale and Definitions” and “General Observations on ASCAN EVA Training,” in “Extra-
Vehicular Activity Training and Notes, 1988-1997,” Box 10, Folder 16, Rick Husband Collection, Texas Tech 
University, Lubbock, TX.    
38  “EVA Lessons Learned,” October 1994, Box 12, Folder 4, David M. Brown Collection, Smithsonian National Air 
and Space Museum, Chantilly, VA, 1-5 to 1-13.     
425 
 
working in neutral buoyancy “allows you to be pretty prepared by the time you actually 
perform a spacewalk,” Jim Voss remembers.39  The following chapters will summarize 
the spectacular and unprecedented results of this training during shuttle missions.     
 Astronauts still needed to keep in mind the ways that real EVAs differed from 
the WETF, however, and experience taught them many examples of this.  Working 
underwater reversed the physics of motion in that astronauts found it difficult to initiate 
motion and easy to stop in the pool, whereas they found it easy to initiate motion but 
difficult to stop in space.  Astronauts had different situational awareness in the pool than 
in space, due to the panoramic visual environment of the latter.  Training for some of the 
most complex operations in the pool, such as coordinating one’s actions with the robotic 
arm operator, also had shortcomings in replicating the real experience.  “EVA/RMS ops 
is another area where training falls short because there is no easy way to fully integrate 
all orbiter, RMS, and EV operations except on orbit,” the 1994 document stated.  The 
pool only contained a limited amount of room in which to integrate all of those 
activities.  Training personnel could mitigate this problem by having astronauts train in a 
larger pool or in virtual reality simulations, both of which happened beginning in the 
1990s.  But especially during the first decade of the Space Shuttle era, spacewalkers 
needed to recognize the differences between training and flight, speak to more 
experienced crewmembers about the differences, and rehearse tasks while in orbit if 
necessary.40           
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 The shortcomings of the WETF resulted in the decision to replace it with the 
Sonny Carter Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL, named after the astronaut who died 
in a 1991 civil aviation accident) in which astronauts train today.  Astronauts and 
training personnel had each recognized that the WETF could not hold the large modules 
planned for the upcoming ISS.  Even during the shuttle era, the insufficiently small size 
of the facility required astronauts to make multiple runs to simulate an EVA.  They 
could not simulate all of their tasks in one underwater session, so they had to rely on this 
less efficient idea called “part-task training.”  This resulted in “high reconfiguration 
overhead and excessive EMU suited events.”  Astronauts had also complained that the 
lack of a functional robotic arm had hurt the fidelity of sessions in the WETF.  Thus 
groundbreaking began in 1995 on the NBL, which solved both of these problems.  Not 
only is this pool 202 feet in length, 102 feet in width, and 40 feet in depth, it featured a 
full-scale working model of the shuttle robotic arm and still features a working model of 
the ISS robotic arm.  Today, NASA officials proudly proclaim the ways that EVA 
training has improved from the 1960s to the present on the agency website.  Astronauts 
who have trained in the NBL since the 1990s have benefited from “reduced part-task 
training, increased integrated training, increased training quality, better timeline fidelity, 
and improvement in facility loading.”41  Thus astronauts who train for EVAs today can 
thank their predecessors who contributed the lessons learned that spurred the creation of 
the NBL.                
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Astronauts also needed to train for the operation of shuttle payloads, because this 
was the benefit of the program.  Payloads for the first operational shuttle flights, from 
1982 to 1986, were often satellites since the vehicle was then intended to launch all 
civilian and military payloads.  After the Challenger accident and the realization that the 
shuttle could not fly more than a few missions per year, expendable launch vehicles 
began lifting satellites again and the shuttle lifted more unique payloads (science 
laboratories, the Wake Shield Facility, the Spartan astronomical spacecraft, the Tethered 
Satellite System, etc.) that benefited from a trained crew that could operate them.  About 
one year before a mission launched, the Payloads Section of the JSC Training Division 
submitted a form defining the payload, the payload’s code name, and the template to be 
used for crew training.  The crew would then go through a lesson flow for payloads 
requiring their interaction, from familiarization, to normal and contingency operations, 
to a review.  This provided yet another indication of how standardized training became 
in the shuttle era.  Whereas mission objectives and payloads changed so quickly and 
dramatically during the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo eras, the shuttle era extended so 
long that instructors could develop a template for subsequent crews to follow.42  The 
next chapters will describe the benefits of the flexibility that trained crews brought to the 
operation of shuttle payloads.   
This especially applied to the science laboratories.  The Spacelab and Spacehab 
modules fit inside the orbiter payload bay on over twenty missions, allowing astronauts 
to utilize their knowledge in making discoveries from STS-9 in 1983 to STS-107 in 2003.  
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Crews for these missions needed to train by listening to briefings by Principal 
Investigators on the experiments they would perform, but also by familiarizing 
themselves with the laboratories.  Astronauts gained much experience with this in the 
course of their careers.  As ASCANs, they gained their initial taste of laboratory work by 
attending classroom briefings, studying workbooks, using an SST, and even using a 
Personal Computer called the Spacehab Intelligent Familiarization Trainer (SHIFT) 
when Spacehab began flying in the 1990s.  But the best test of their skills came when 
they stepped inside the full-scale Spacelab and Spacehab simulators.  These simulators 
gave crews experience in operating a diverse collection of instruments: the Electrical 
Power and Distribution System, the Environmental Control System, the Command and 
Data Management System, the High Rate Data Assembly, the Instrument Pointing 
System, the caution and warning system, and the viewport.  Instructors especially 
watched to see how quickly astronauts could follow checklists, either in collection of 
data or in reacting to caution and warning alarms.43   
The last aspect of shuttle missions that called for a new training device was the 
landing.  All previous astronauts had returned to Earth by falling toward the sea in a 
small conical vehicle underneath parachutes.  But Commanders could exert control over 
a returning orbiter, because the ship converted from being a spacecraft reentering the 
atmosphere to an airplane descending toward a runway landing.  While in orbit, the ship 
flew at about 23 times the speed of sound and 190 to 330 miles high, depending on the 
mission.  On landing day, the twin Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) engines fired to 
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send it toward reentry.  During the long deceleration that followed, the onboard 
computers controlled the ship’s pitch, roll, and yaw in such a way that most of the heat 
of reentry was directed toward the belly where the thermal protection tiles offered the 
most protection.  RCS engine firings did this at first, but as the atmosphere thickened the 
ship converted into an airplane in that elevons, a rudder, and body flap exerted control.  
When the ship slowed to below Mach 1, at 9.5 miles high, the Commander finally took 
the hand controller and flew the ship for the next four minutes until the two main landing 
gear kissed the runway at about 215 miles per hour.  In this respect, the job of astronaut 
was more applicable to that of test pilot than ever before.  But the test pilots who joined 
the astronaut corps to fly these landings still needed training to acclimate themselves to 
three critical ways the orbiter differed from strictly Earthbound airplanes.  First, the 
orbiter approached the runway several times steeper and faster.  Second, the orbiter did 
not use engines during the approach.  This meant the ship glided toward a landing and 
the Commander had only one chance to make an accurate touchdown.  Third, the orbiter 
had a lift to drag ratio of only 4.5:1 and thus did not have a great gliding capability.  The 
vehicle became iconic as a “flying brick,” despite the best efforts of the delta wings.44   
 The need to train shuttle Commanders for these flying characteristics prompted 
the decision to jury rig an aircraft so it would mimic them.  Aerospace engineers did 
have experience with this idea.  Since the 1950s, the Lockheed NT-33 had made use of 
flight controls to mimic vehicles from bombers, to stealth fighters, to even the X-15.   
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The LLTV had successfully emulated the Apollo LM.  Finding an aircraft that could 
emulate the Space Shuttle required finding one with several features that narrowed down 
the choices: a spacious cockpit, a robust structure, delta wings, an ability to deploy 
reverse thrust in flight so as to reproduce the drag of the orbiter, and an affordable price 
for NASA to acquire it.  The T-38 that astronauts traditionally flew had too slim a 
cockpit.  John Young and Joe Engle traveled to Seattle, Washington to fly the Boeing 
737 and found it an attractive choice, but it was out of NASA’s price range.  The 
Gulfstream G-II, a ten seat business jet, met all the criteria.  In 1974, pilots flew two of 
these jets from the Gulfstream factory in Savannah, Georgia to the Grumman factory in 
Long Island, New York for conversion into the Shuttle Training Aircraft.45 
 The modification process produced its share of challenges, enough so that the 
program was six months behind and 50 percent over budget by 1976.  Grumman 
engineers made several modifications to the cockpit, fitting it with orbiter instruments 
including the hand controller and speed brake.  They also bolted two large vertical fins 
underneath the vehicle to mimic the sideways forces of the orbiter.  They engineered the 
wing flaps to hinge up, instead of the usual backward and down, to mimic the high drag 
and low lift of the orbiter.  They also placed a computer in the rear of the plane that 
controlled its reverse thrust at 90 percent power.  Finally, the engineers strengthened the 
airframe so it could handle the wind shears and turbulence it would encounter on 
repeated dives.  Though the Grumman team completed these tasks successfully, several 
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problems hampered them.  One was the effort to install a digital autopilot that precisely 
reproduced the handling qualities of the orbiter.46  Dick Koos, one of NASA’s original 
Simulation Supervisors who ended up staying with the space agency until 1998, still 
remembers this and other issues: “People were really afraid of the doggone thing.  It was 
difficult to get that to work the way it was supposed to in the flight control system.  We 
did get the system to work.  It was a struggle, but we did get it accepted.  Then we found 
out we had a control switch problem.  It was used in the system beyond the electrical 
rating of that switch.  A couple of contacts burned and closed that switch.  Some of the 
control surfaces in the wings went hard over, thankfully in the hangar.  There was a 
black box that controlled the surfaces of the wings…After a time, the performance of the 
box degraded.  This had to be corrected.”47        
One other problem especially connected to the astronauts was a phenomenon 
called pilot-induced oscillation.  This meant that the STA pilots often made an input to 
the hand controller and then, without feeling its immediate effect, made the input again.  
The pilots thus overcorrected in flying the vehicle, a problem that was exacerbated by 
the fly-by-wire technology of the STA and the orbiter it emulated.  Since pilots sent 
inputs to the plane via electronic signals rather than the old fashioned method of sending 
them directly to a mechanical actuator, pilots were more likely to feel a delay in their 
actions that prompted this problem.  One pilot at Edwards Air Force Base called this the 
“JC maneuver,” because pilots tended to shout “Jesus Christ!” when this happened.48     
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 John Young remembered that the problem of pilot control especially manifested 
itself during the early STA flights.  He made his first flight in February 1977, sitting in 
the left-hand seat with instructor Ted Mendenhall in the right-hand seat.  But even 
America’s most prolific astronaut—a man who had test flown Navy jets, set world time-
to-climb records, and made four spaceflights including an Apollo Moon landing—
initially struggled to make approaches in the STA.  After the instructor flew the plane to 
35,000 feet and activated the hand controller on the left side of the cockpit, Young tried 
to hold the ship’s airspeed at about 320 miles per hour and make an unusually steep 
glide to replicate a returning orbiter.  He quickly found that orienting himself in making 
these steep glides had been easier while looking out the cockpit of a T-38.  Doing so in 
the spacious STA proved so difficult that he aborted nine times in his first fifty flights, 
forcing the instructor to take back control and climb out of the dive.  Since the orbiter 
would have no engines running and thus only one chance at a safe landing, this success 
rate of about 80 percent was not enough.  But the addition of new software into the STA 
computer allowed the vehicle to reproduce orbiter qualities much more precisely, while 
the astronauts benefited from more experience with the situational awareness required to 
make such a steep approach.  As a result, Young aborted in only three of his last 50 
flights prior to his command of the STS-1 mission.49       
 Young began a training routine that extended all the way until fellow naval 
aviator Chris Ferguson commanded the STS-135 mission in 2011.  Newly selected pilot 
ASCANs went through a basic syllabus in one year.  This began with classroom 
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briefings on shuttle systems pertinent to approach and landing, STA systems, simulation 
procedures, flight rules and safety requirements, and egress.  Then the astronauts trained 
to make simulated approaches in the SMS and real approaches in the T-38 before they 
were finally ready to tackle the STA.  The basic syllabus called for 20 STA flights, with 
12 approaches made for each flight.  Four of the flights needed to be at night, with a 
night lighting system on the runway, because 26 of the 133 shuttle landings happened 
during nighttime.  After each session, the astronauts learned of their touchdown 
parameters and hand controller printout analysis and received comments on their energy 
management and any simulation anomalies from the instructor sitting next to them.  
After the pilot ASCANs graduated, they were required to make flights on a monthly 
basis.  This increased during the time they were assigned to a mission until by the time 
Commanders actually landed the orbiter, the requirement called for them to make at least 
1,000 STA approaches.50  But even after Mark Kelly had made at least 1,600 in advance 
of landing Discovery in 2008, he did not believe the training was excessive.  His belief 
stemmed from the knowledge that Commanders only had one chance at a landing, which 
happened successfully 133 times out of 133 on the strength of such a thorough regimen 
that gave them situational awareness.51  Adds Eileen Collins: “I think the fact that we 
had a Shuttle Training Aircraft was why we had so many safe shuttle landings, and why 
they were so accurate.”52      
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 Shuttle Commanders and Pilots also built their confidence in making landings by  
stepping inside a machine that still bears the distinction of having the greatest range of 
motion of any flight simulator in the world: the Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS).  In 
the 1970s, engineers at Ames Research Center in Mountain View, California constructed 
a simulator cabin and placed it within a 120 foot tower.  Two astronauts sat inside the 
cabin, looked at a visual display of the sky and runway with a field of view accurate to 
the orbiter windows, and made inputs to a hand controller to replicate an orbiter’s 
approach and landing on the runway.  But what made the simulator groundbreaking was 
that those inputs prompted the cabin to move 60 feet within the tower, at up to 16 feet 
per second.  The cabin could also move laterally and longitudinally to a lesser extent, as 
well as tilt in response to an astronaut’s inputs in pitch, roll, and yaw.  The magnitude of 
the motion underscored just how far flight simulation had progressed since Edwin  
Link’s efforts in the 1920s, or even since the dawn of the Mercury program.  Astronauts 
could now feel the sensation of motion to a greater extent than ever before.53   
Beginning with the first runs in 1980, astronauts followed an approach and 
landing sequence in the VMS that emphasized different elements than the STA did.  
Since the STA was smaller than the actual orbiter and gave the astronaut a lower eye 
point upon landing, the value of this vehicle came in training for a shuttle approach 
rather than an actual landing.  The astronauts completed their runs without actually 
touching down.  But the VMS could mimic what the touchdown would feel like and look 
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like out the windows, so simulations in this device emphasized this very last phase of a 
shuttle mission with more fidelity.  VMS simulations began at 10,000 feet, as opposed to 
35,000 feet in the STA.  The Commander had to make a descent while intercepting the 
heading alignment cone (the path that placed the orbiter in the correct position to make 
the final approach to the runway), following the correct glide slope, and dissipating just 
the right amount of energy.  The Pilot had the responsibility to arm the main landing 
gear, which deployed at 300 feet.  Then the Commander aimed for a touchdown 2,500 
feet down the runway, upon which the Pilot deployed a drag parachute and the 
Commander derotated the vehicle until bringing the nose gear to a touchdown.  The 
combination of tire brakes and the parachute then slowed the vehicle until the 
Commander could call out “wheels stop.”  The VMS thus had two advantages over the 
STA: it provided an accurate simulation of the touchdown and rollout and did so at less 
expense or risk than an actual flight in the STA.54      
 The Commanders and Pilots for every Shuttle mission therefore stepped inside 
this revolutionary machine before landing an orbiter, after a lengthy planning process.  
When Commanders and Pilots earned their assignments to a mission, the Astronaut 
Office had a list of training objectives that the crew should fulfill in the VMS.  These 
included sessions where tires failed, the drag chute failed, the nose wheel steering failed, 
high crosswinds hampered a landing, or a launch abort forced an emergency landing at 
an alternative runway.  On the basis of this list, engineers developed a training matrix 
that contained all the information needed for the VMS personnel to equip the simulator 
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so it could replicate the performance of the vehicle and visual scenes under these 
anomalous conditions.  The VMS staff received the matrix two weeks prior to a crew’s 
arrival at Ames, which allowed them time to prepare.  For instance, the staff could 
configure the simulator to account for different mass properties, wind profile, and 
landing performance predictions.  The staff also took on the labor intensive task of 
creating a visual database for over 20 landing sites for day, night, and dusk conditions.  
This allowed astronauts to simulate emergency landings at locations from North 
Carolina, to New York, to Delaware, to Canada, to France, to Spain, to Bermuda, to 
West Africa.55 
 Once the device was ready, Commanders and Pilots who made the trip to Ames 
benefited not only from the remarkable capability of the VMS itself but also the 
feedback the staff provided them.  Their training for each mission consisted of 25 to 30 
runs, each of which lasted four hours.  The crew could ask questions and make 
comments throughout this time, which helped to eliminate any confusion and boost their 
confidence.  After finishing, the crew received graphs of their performance that let them 
know critical details such as their rate of descent, touchdown speed, and lateral distance 
at touchdown and during rollout.  The graphs also included these results for the entire 
astronaut pilot corps who had already flown missions, so the astronauts in training could 
compare their performance against their peers.  A week later, the VMS staff sent to JSC 
a wealth of data on the astronauts’ runs: 941 time history data points, 782 static variable 
data points, and video of every run.  In return, Commanders gave their feedback to the 
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VMS staff after returning from a real shuttle landing that helped the instructors improve 
the fidelity of the simulator.  The end result was an operation so efficient that the VMS 
facilitated 65,000 runs from 1980 to 2011, which helped every shuttle crew train as well 
as engineers evaluate changes in landing procedures (the device remains in use today, 
ready to support a crew of a future vehicle).56  Chris Ferguson remembered how much 
his first real shuttle landing reminded him of the VMS: “At that exact moment in time, I 
was back in the VMS and I knew what I had to do in order to get the shuttle stopped in 
the remaining runway.  It was an instantaneous flashback and that’s exactly what you 
want in a good training tool.”57 
 But the SMS was the one simulator that had the greatest utility in preparing a 
shuttle crew for flight.  The aforementioned simulators could prepare crews for phases of 
flights from rendezvous and docking, to robotic arm operation, to EVAs, to payload 
operation, to landing, and many of them offered higher fidelity than the SMS in their one 
specific area.  But only the SMS could prepare crews to rehearse cockpit procedures 
across an entire mission from launch to landing.  NASA managers were already thinking 
about this quintessential tool of shuttle training in 1970, when the space agency sent out 
a request for proposal to build the machine and program director Robert Thompson 
formed a committee to monitor its development.  The contractors who studied the RFP 
quickly found that this would be a daunting challenge, because it called for a simulator 
that was fully digitally generated rather than a hybrid between analog and digital as in 
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Apollo.  NASA did not even receive a response initially, but Singer-Link contractors 
eventually produced a detailed analysis of the problem and won the contract as they had 
for every primary spacecraft simulator since Mercury.  This contract came with two 
simulator versions: one fixed-base in which crews trained for on-orbit activities and one 
motion-base in which crews could train for dynamic events like launch, reentry, and 
landing.58  How could these contractors build on the experience of their decades in flight 
simulation to give shuttle crews the most realistic facsimile of the most complex 
machine ever built?   
The experience served them well in recreating the orbiter’s controls and displays, 
but the SMS also broke new ground by demonstrating the vast advance in electronics 
since the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo eras.  The orbiter carried 5 IBM computers called 
AP-101s.  Their average speed was 480,000 instructions per second, compared to 7,000 
per second for the Gemini computer.  The contractors decided these computers could not 
be interpretively simulated, as the Apollo guidance computer had been, so the SMS 
became the first simulator to employ the same type of computer as the spacecraft it 
simulated.  Along with the AP-101s, the simulator housed four Sperry 1100/40 
mainframe computers that hosted 15 Perkin-Elmer minicomputers.  These units 
generated digital images for the simulated views out the windows.  The Singer-Link 
company contained over 200 computer programmers out of 611 employees, indicating 
the labor-intensive nature of producing enough of these computers that could 
synchronize with each other on a 20 millisecond cycle.  As crews trained throughout the 
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1980s, several of the AP-101s reached 30,000 hours of operation, which was much 
greater than the design life of the computers for the real orbiter.  Thus computers did fail 
and cause training delays, but the simulator engineers always had 12 or 13 available and 
benefited from a contract to provide maintenance.59         
One day in September 1976, the years of contractor work in Binghamton, New 
York finally reached fruition in Houston.  John “Denny” Holt remembered standing in a 
frigid JSC Building 5 that day as NASA received the SMS from Singer-Link, the Lunar 
Module Simulator having just been discarded to make room for this: “I think I’ve never 
been in that building when it was that cold.  I know Singer-Link had it down as cold as 
they could get it just to make sure everything that had electronics in it was not going to 
overheat.  They were bound and determined they were going to sell that simulator.”  
This first SMS supported the training of the four astronauts who flew the 1977 Approach 
and Landing Tests in the Space Shuttle Enterprise: Fred Haise, Gordon Fullerton, Joe 
Engle, and Dick Truly.  In 1978, Singer-Link delivered to Building 5 the fixed base and 
motion base simulators that supported astronauts through 2011.60        
Experience and the speedy pace of computer technology served the contractors 
well in improving upon what had only been crudely simulated for earlier aircraft or the 
Mercury, Gemini, or Apollo vehicles.  Two decades after the Mercury astronauts had 
consistently complained about the visual scene outside the simulator window, shuttle 
astronauts benefited from computers that could generate real-time color images at thirty 
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frames per second and affix them to television screens mounted to the windows.  One 
historian describes them as “somewhat cartoonish in quality” during the 1970s, 
resembling early video games like Pong, but astronauts could see the curvature of Earth 
with continents and landforms as well as the Sun, Moon, stars, and the orbiter payload 
bay as viewed from the aft flight deck.  They could even see the payload bay doors open 
and close, a necessary procedure on every mission.  While seeing these sights, they 
heard sound synthesizers replicate the thunderous roar of the main engines, the whine of 
the OMS or RCS engines, the noise of reentry, and the thump of landing gear extension 
and touchdown.61         
Motion provided another vital sign that the world of “make believe” had become 
more consistent with reality.  Extendable pistons allowed the SMS to stand vertically 
during launch simulations.  The machine lurched forward and backward after main 
engine ignition at T-5 seconds, reproducing the orbiter’s famous twang, and then 
produced robust vibrations to simulate SRB ignition.  The Morton Thiokol company in 
Utah had produced ground firing data of their SRB rocket motors which allowed SMS 
personnel to simulate the rough ride.  An aerospace journalist who climbed into the SMS 
in 1980 described the launch as producing a “paint shaker” motion similar to what 
astronauts later felt on real missions.  The simulator could even yaw sharply to simulate 
the thrust imbalance between the two SRBs.  After the SRBs burned out and separated 
two minutes into the flight, at a height of 146,000 feet, the ride became smoother.  The 
SMS could then revert to horizontal to simulate the vehicle in orbit and pitch, roll, and 
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yaw to simulate an approach and landing.  The sight, sound, and motion meshed together 
to produce a sensation that Mercury astronauts could not have imagined, and with good 
reason.  The crew might need to perform an emergency abort amid the motion of launch 
and the 3 Gs they would feel, for instance, so the simulator did well to desensitize them 
to the feelings.62 
 The sheer number of malfunctions that SimSups could inject into shuttle 
hardware also would have overwhelmed the Mercury astronauts if they could have 
peered twenty years into the future.  A team of SimSups sat at their consoles in a room 
close to Building 5 with light pens that they could use to introduce up to 860 equipment 
problems to the crew.63  For each mission, the Training Team Lead and his or her 
colleagues met in a small conference room and developed a script of malfunctions for 
the crew to respond to in the SMS.  Each script contained the time and the altitude of the 
orbiter above Earth when the training team would inject a certain malfunction into the 
simulator, a short description of the malfunction, and what the team intended it to teach 
the astronauts.  Sometimes the malfunctions were intended to meet the syllabus of 
training tasks and sometimes to exploit the weaknesses of a crew.  For instance, the STS-
41G crew neglected to reengage the backup computer during one simulation and Ted 
Brower made sure to revisit this in the future.  The 860 malfunctions that the training 
team had at their disposal and the need to test the astronauts’ abilities in responding to 
them meant that astronauts spent far more time in the SMS than any other device.  When  
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operational missions began in 1982, crews spent as many as 12 hours per week there.64                 
 Launches were the most exciting and time critical phase of training in the SMS, 
because the orbiter accelerated from 0 to 17,500 miles per hour in only 8.5 minutes.  The 
vehicle made automated movements throughout this time, from the ignition of the 
engines, to the attitude adjustments, to the separation of the SRBs and ET, to the engine 
cutoff in orbit.  But crews still needed to train to carry out their checklists on the 
instrument panel prior to launch and monitor the panel during launch, knowing their 
lives could depend on their ability to make an abort before time ran out.  The 
Commanders trained to monitor trajectory, the computers, the flight control system, the 
environmental system, and vehicle control.  The Pilots kept their eyes on the 
performance of the main engines, the OMS and RCS engines, the Auxiliary Power Units 
(APU), and the fuel cells.  The two Mission Specialists sitting behind them in the flight 
deck trained in switch/item entry confirmation, failure recognition, and backing up their 
crewmates.  All astronauts learned the general techniques they should follow through all 
of this: use a two person rule to verify the correct position of switches, verify panel 
configuration before a critical event, make timely, clear, and informative calls to the 
CapCom, and use any lull time to review failure impacts, get all crewmembers back on 
an appropriate timeline, or pre-brief the next events.  If all went according to plan, the 
launch would not require any extraordinary crew action.65    
 But what if an emergency required their intervention?  Due to the high risk of a  
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malfunction, astronauts answered this question by going through a program called 
“Ascent Skills” during their ASCAN experience.  This allowed them to undergo generic 
training, then they performed mission specific training with the crew they were assigned 
with and the software for their mission.  According to the JSC training catalog, “The 
number of lessons to be repeated depends on the time elapsed since the crew’s last flight 
and on the time required for a new combination of experienced crewmembers to achieve 
an adequate level of cockpit coordination.”66  The lessons required them to respond to 
malfunctions and, if the malfunctions included a failure of at least one of the three main 
engines, abort the launch to make an emergency landing or bailout.  “It was not unusual 
for ascent simulations to include an average of one malfunction per minute for the 8.5 
minute ascent to orbit,” explains Pete Beauregard, who was part of the JSC training staff 
from 1979 to 2013.67          
There were four types of launch aborts that would result in the vehicle returning 
intact and additional contingency aborts that would result in the crew bailing out of the 
vehicle.  If a main engine failed during the first four minutes of flight, a crew could 
undertake a Return to Launch Site Abort (RTLS) by turning the vehicle around, pitching 
down so the tank could be safely jettisoned, and making a landing back at KSC.  After 
velocity, altitude, and distance downrange from KSC increased to the point that a return 
there was no longer possible, a crew would have to perform a Transoceanic Abort 
Landing (TAL) in case of an engine failure.  This required landing at a predesignated 
                                                          
66  “Shuttle Crew Training Catalog, Revision J,” 4-1.  
67  Pete Beauregard, E-Mail Correspondence with Author, November 19, 2016.    
444 
 
site across the Atlantic Ocean, which was why the VMS recreated images of overseas 
landing sites.  After this became impossible, a crew did have a brief chance to undertake 
an Abort Once Around (AOA), meaning circle the Earth once and land due to an 
inability to reach a stable orbit.  Finally, a crew could undertake an Abort to Orbit 
(ATO) by reaching a lower stable orbit when the shuttle could not reach its intended 
orbit.  If more than one main engine failed, the crew would have to make a riskier 
contingency abort.  This required making a pullout maneuver to bring the orbiter to a 
gliding flight so the astronauts could bail out.  Only one launch abort ever actually 
happened during a shuttle flight: Gordon Fullerton’s ATO, the least dramatic possibility, 
during STS-51F in 1985.  But right until the 135th mission, every crew rehearsed the 
aborts in the SMS with the knowledge that one might prove necessary.68                                 
 Andy Foster, a specialist in ascent abort procedures from 1984 to 1994, felt 
confident in the ability of crews to respond to these emergencies by the time missions 
actually happened.  “Understand that the intact aborts were automated and the crew tasks 
were more along the lines of systems management and performing a landing if there was 
one,” he explains today.  “We did teach the Commanders and Pilots how to fly a manual 
ascent and how to fly the aborts manually, though it was a very low probability you’d 
need it.  The aborts that held the most risk and the most doubt about successful 
completion were the contingency aborts.  These were often flown at the margins of 
controllability with brutal entry conditions and were all manual until they were 
automated in the post-Challenger timeframe.”  He adds, “Crew coordination was a 
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factor because the Commander controlled the vehicle attitude (via the Rotational Hand 
Controller) and the Pilot controlled the main engine throttles during the ascent and speed 
brake and landing gear during the return.”69  These aborts that would end in a bailout, 
then, epitomized why Singer-Link had built and NASA had invested in this expensive 
SMS.   Only skilled astronauts could exercise the teamwork and piloting skills amid 
narrow control margins to save themselves, and the SMS allowed them to become 
skilled on the ground with no risk to their lives.  Crews rehearsed abort procedures for 
launch more than any other phase of a mission, because serious malfunctions were most 
likely to occur during this most dangerous phase.70    
 The value of the SMS extended beyond launch simulations, however.  Crews 
worked together to rehearse orbital activities such as RCS engine maneuvers, computer 
operation, and star sightings for navigational purposes.  The number of sessions a crew 
needed to perform depended on how recently each crewmember had flown.  After crews 
gained proficiency in these basic tasks of life in orbit, later sessions in the SMS forced 
them to respond to malfunctions that tested their understanding of mission rules and the 
FDF.71  For instance, the training team could fail a sensor in an oxygen tank that fed a 
fuel cell.  The astronauts would have to identify the crewmember responsible for the fuel 
cells, who would check to see if the problem was real or only a faulty sensor reading.  If 
this person found the problem was real and insurmountable, the crew would have to 
prepare for an emergency deorbit and reentry.  While this person was troubleshooting, 
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the training team often decided to create another of those 860 possible malfunctions.  
The crew thus had to decide which problem had the greatest priority and how to divide 
the work in solving all of them.  The Training Team Lead had the authority to speed up 
or slow down the pace of the malfunctions.  The idea was to test the crew’s weaknesses 
until the Team Lead felt convinced that given several of them, the astronauts would not 
stand around in the SMS looking at each other but instead play off each other like a well-
trained unit.72   
 The one other mission phase that crews rehearsed in the SMS was deorbit and 
reentry.  During a normal session, the crewmembers had their unique responsibilities for 
the return home.  The Commander focused on the parameters of the OMS engine burn 
that sent the vehicle out of orbit and control of the vehicle, while the Pilot concentrated 
on the configuration of the two OMS engines and failure recognition.  The crew could 
then rehearse the flight back through the ionized gases of Earth’s atmosphere, which 
blocked communication with Mission Control for several minutes.  Here again, the 
Commander, Pilot, and Mission Specialists had their own mission events and section of 
the instrument panel that they were responsible for, from roll reversals, to deployment of 
the air data probe, to finally deployment of the landing gear and drag parachute.73  But 
SimSups also concocted elaborate malfunctions for this phase.  A cabin leak could force 
an emergency deorbit, for instance.  The crew had to respond by shutting the payload 
bay doors, setting up the seats in the cabin, finding out which of the several landing sites 
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around the world they could reach in this emergency situation, and firing the OMS 
engines before it was too late.  They would be on their own during the radio blackout 
that accompanied their subsequent trip through the atmosphere, which added to the 
challenge.  Henry Cooper alluded in his book about the STS-41G mission to the incidents 
in which the training team piled on so many malfunctions that the crew failed to reach a 
runway, landing on water instead.74            
No matter what phase of the mission they were rehearsing, the astronauts 
benefited from their sessions in the SMS by being taught one technique that derived 
from the aviation industry.  “In the late eighties or early nineties, NASA also started 
including their own versions of crew resource management training, which was adopted 
from the airlines,” Andy Foster explains.  As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the idea of 
teaching pilots to improve their teamwork skills had first taken hold within the 
aeronautics section of NASA in 1979.  After the Challenger accident, instructors sent 
astronauts into the SMS with the intention of teaching them an adaptation of this concept 
called Spaceflight Resource Management (SFRM) training.  Shuttle missions often 
carried seven people, which increased the need for teamwork and coordination of crew 
activities compared to earlier programs, and the SFRM concept reflected that.75      
Under SFRM, instructors taught crewmembers to embrace six general skills and 
the more specific sub-elements within each skill.  The first was called Command, which 
called on Commanders to exercise their authority in ensuring mission safety, ensure all 
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crewmembers understand assigned responsibilities, confess errors, establish an 
authority-assertiveness balance, and prioritize crew activities.  The second was called 
Leadership, which called on the astronauts to encourage crewmember interaction and 
discussion, demonstrate professional standards and best practices, and resolve any 
conflict among themselves.  The third was called Communication, which called for them 
to communicate information clearly before taking action and create an environment 
conducive to open discussion and participation.  The fourth was called Situational 
Awareness, which called for them to predetermine roles for high workload events, 
maintain vigilance during times of high workload, and recognize a colleague’s stress, 
fatigue, and complacency.  The fifth was called Decision Making, which called for them 
to select the most appropriate decision type, evaluate risk, time and expected outcomes, 
and implement the best course of action.  The sixth was called Workload Management, 
which called for them to maintain an awareness of mission status and timeline, anticipate 
upcoming tasks, identify task saturation, and reassign tasks to off-load over utilized crew 
members.  Crews of shuttle missions therefore had a formalized guide to becoming 
effective team members that Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab astronauts did not 
have.  Thus SFRM was yet another of the many examples of how training became more 
standardized in the shuttle era.76               
 Training in the SMS followed a general pattern as crews moved closer to launch.  
The astronauts typically received word of their assignment to a crew one to one and a 
half years prior to launch.  The Training Team Lead and a group of colleagues spent the 
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next several months leading crews through standalone simulations.  “The lesson 
objectives were either successfully met, or repeated in total or piecemeal,” Pete 
Beauregard remembers.  “For example, did the crew follow the correct checklist 
procedure and execute it correctly based on the malfunctions or scenarios presented?  
Each training lesson was debriefed (normally immediately) with individual astronauts or 
crew and the instructor or training team.”  But these sessions were different from real 
missions, because the small Training Team acted as the flight controllers.  A few months 
before launch, crews began working integrated simulations with the real controllers who 
would work their mission.  At this point, a team of SimSups (a higher level training 
position) worked closely with the flight directors to decide on how to test the astronauts’ 
abilities during these sessions.  “The SimSups would, however, have the final say as to 
the exact nature of the malfunctions to be introduced in the simulations,” Beauregard 
clarifies.  “Once again, the SimSups had training objectives required to be included in 
integrated training.  Some were considered standard and some were developed based on 
the mission’s unique activities and objectives.”  The rehearsals usually culminated in a 
long duration simulation which ranged from 24 to as much as 56 consecutive hours and 
required the four control teams for a mission to “hand off” to one another just as they 
would during the real flight.77   
Flight controllers thus remained an essential component of astronaut training, as 
they had been since Mercury, but like the astronauts their job evolved during the shuttle 
era.  The amount of data available to them increased from previous programs.  Many of 
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the numerical parameters from the vehicle were displayed on the controllers’ consoles 
but not on the instrument panel for the astronauts.  The controllers also had access to 
directions from NASA management, weather observations and forecasts, engineering 
test data, systems performance histories, and radar tracking data.  This meant that 
controllers could usually see a trend in their data before the crew heard an alarm and 
could advise the crew on the best course of action.  Controllers in the shuttle era could 
also electronically uplink information to the orbiter, commonly to send navigation 
updates, OMS burn targets, and alternate landing site information.  Finally, controllers 
could also communicate with a remote Payload Operations Control Center (POCC) that 
was in charge of a payload on a particular flight.78  NASA also hired many more 
controllers for the shuttle era than previous programs.  During the early 1980s, there 
were about seven hundred counting front and backroom personnel, and new hires 
frequently joined the cadre to account for the attrition rate of about 15 percent per year.  
Given the new forms of information available to them which they would have to 
decipher and report to the crew, and the fact that there were so many new additions to 
the cadre who would have to work very different missions, the controllers needed the 
training that integrated simulations offered them.  Some NASA managers wanted to do 
away with these sessions given their length, but Henry Cooper wrote, “Anyone who had 
ever been through them—astronauts, instructors, and flight controllers—was determined 
to keep them.”79   
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 By the 1990s, the JSC training catalog had standardized the objectives of 
integrated simulations.  Controllers began their careers by taking part in generic 
simulations designed to instill in them a set of qualities.  Some of them dealt with 
technical proficiency: demonstrate an awareness of a mission’s status under all 
situations, accurately and concisely convey system failures to other affected controllers 
and the Flight Director, define plans for resolving and managing problems, demonstrate 
the ability to work with all console tools, guide the crew through all actions required for 
mission success and crew safety, demonstrate a knowledge of the interactions of other 
systems with their own systems, and demonstrate confidence and ownership of their own 
systems.  But technical proficiency was not enough; the controllers also needed to have 
the right attitude.  They needed to demonstrate a positive attitude toward console 
operations and fellow controllers, demonstrate accurate and cordial team 
communication, demonstrate the ability to adjust to the capabilities and deficiencies of 
backroom personnel, demonstrate that they accept responsibility for all of the disciplines 
of the system, and willingly admit when they have erred.  The job defined during the 
Mercury era had thus evolved to take on a more clear definition of standards.  When 
controllers met all of them, they could progress (like the astronauts they would work 
with) to flight specific integrated simulations.80            
The objectives for these simulations shortly before flight also became more 
standardized during the shuttle era.  These sessions gave the controllers and astronauts a 
chance to gel as a team by exercising the prime mission objectives and timelines, but 
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also by preparing for anomalies.  These included alternative timelines brought upon by a 
launch slip or equipment failure that caused a minimum duration flight, scenarios that 
tested their ability to cope with the replanning of mission objectives, scenarios that 
stressed mission constraints such as water dumps or thermal attitudes, or tradeoffs 
between mission objectives and operational capabilities.  For instance, a controller might 
notice a degraded system in power generation, vehicle control, or navigation and decide 
whether a crew could complete their objective or needed to return home.  The 
communication between the controller responsible for the degraded system and the rest 
of the team, as everybody searched for the data that could help them make the right 
decision, helped to mold the team into a cohesive unit that astronauts could trust.  So 
much depended on the controllers making the right decision, from the satisfaction of a 
customer flying a payload on a flight, to America’s image as a human spaceflight 
superpower, to the astronauts’ lives, that it was easy to see why Henry Cooper reported 
on the strong desire to keep integrated simulations.81 
Wayne Hale, a Flight Director for forty-one missions from 1988 to 2003 and 
later Space Shuttle program manager, remembered the frustrations of these sessions.  
“On a busy day, the sim team had to make sure that multiple flight controllers saw 
multiple failures in each eight and a half minute shuttle launch profile,” he explained.  
“We generally did six launches in one day.  Or we did entry sims that simulated the last 
15 minutes of reentry; four of those cases filled up a day.”  The controllers had to deal 
with hundreds of possible malfunctions during these sessions and as they gained 
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confidence in doing this the SimSups raised the level of difficulty with dual 
combinations and even triple combinations of failures.  Then came debriefings, which 
sometimes took two hours to decipher what had happened and what the proper responses 
had been.  The SimSups even assigned action items that might take weeks of research to 
answer.  No person had a harder job at these times than the Flight Director, because this 
person was the nexus for all malfunctions.  “Sometimes it felt like the Flight Director 
was wading through a class of excited grade school students all calling for his attention 
at once,” Hale remembered.  “Flight Directors, usually this one, tended to get testy on 
days like that.  We would say, ‘Not realistic, SimSup,’ or ‘We will never have an ascent 
with that many failures, SimSup,’ or other brief communications that we cannot 
reproduce in a family oriented publication.”  But by the end of his time as Flight 
Director, experience on real missions taught him to complain less about failure filled 
simulations.82                    
While 135 shuttle crews trained for missions across three decades, the JSC DT 
expanded to teach them the skills they would need.  The office contained 164 members 
during the early 1980s.  There were always more training personnel than astronauts, 
meaning that unlike standard universities, JSC contained more faculty members than 
students.83  “The instructors were largely engineers and people with other technical 
degrees (math, physics, etc.) that learned a specially assigned portion of the spacecraft 
before themselves training astronauts,” Beauregard explains.  “Instructors that trained 
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astronaut crews were unlike many other areas of flight training in that they never 
actually did the job they were responsible for training.  In other words, astronauts are not 
assigned to later become instructors.  There were neither enough astronauts nor missions 
to provide that ability.  As the years progressed, more emphasis was placed on hiring 
people that would be good at teaching.  In general, if you wanted to do hard core 
engineering, astronaut training was not for you.  Using your engineering abilities to 
understand complex spacecraft operations and being able to explain that in a teaching 
environment where the students were highly motivated, was more the rule.”  He also 
explains that JSC benefited from the “NASA co-op program, where college students 
would work from two to five semesters within NASA disciplines across the board, 
including training.  This worked well as each co-op student had essentially an extended 
interview to see how well they fit the various jobs.  Then, after graduation, they would 
normally be hired as full time civil servants.”84  Lisa Martignetti, who worked in training 
from 1989 through the end of the shuttle program, also remembers the emphasis on 
teaching.  She explains that new additions to the training office gave teaching 
demonstrations when they were hired so the managers could feel confident in their 
ability.85    
 Women infiltrated what had been an entirely male JSC training office beginning 
early in the shuttle era, just as in the astronaut corps.  Anne Accola was one of the 
earliest additions.  Right after earning her B.S. in Mathematics at Colorado State 
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University, she traveled to Houston in 1967 to work in the Dispersion Analysis Section.  
She joined the Simulation and Training Branch in 1972 and trained flight controllers for 
the last few moon missions, the three Skylab missions, and one Apollo-Soyuz mission.  
But in 1978, she earned a more prestigious position as a Lead Instructor for the SMS.  
During her earlier years, she remembered some of her colleagues in the male dominated 
training office being very friendly to her, while “a couple went out of their way to be a 
problem.”86  But men had to adjust very quickly to working in a mixed gender 
environment as the late 1970s and early 1980s progressed, as in many other technical 
professions around the country.  “I was fortunate to be a young instructor on teams led 
by very competent women on more than one occasion, as well as having a female direct 
supervisor in one of the organization sections early in my career,” Beauregard recalls.  
“Some of these women went on to be senior NASA managers and even a flight 
director.”87        
Astronaut training became a more mature institution, with clearer guidelines for  
participants to follow, during the shuttle era.  But would the shuttle flights follow the 
pattern of the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab eras by demonstrating the mental 
and physical flexibility that trained humans could bring to missions?  America had 
retreated from the Moon, but had developed a more complex vehicle than the Apollo 
spacecraft that President Nixon had approved on the basis that it would revolutionize 
transportation from Earth to about 200 miles above it.  The onus fell to crewmembers to 
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draw on their training in performing the work on orbit that would make Nixon’s 
approval worthwhile.  Whether they could do this remained unclear as Denny Holt stood 
in that cold room in Houston in September 1976, waiting for a new generation to bear 
fruit. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
STS: “I DON’T KNOW HOW THEY DID IT, ACTUALLY” 
 
 Four years after President Richard Nixon approved the program, the day of 
fulfillment still appeared far in the future.  In America’s Bicentennial year of 1976, the 
country that had sent 12 men to the lunar surface could no longer even send astronauts 
into Earth orbit.  Rockwell contractors had only begun constructing the crew module of 
Space Shuttle Columbia that year, with the rest of the orbiter still awaiting assembly.  
Less than 30 astronauts remained on flight status.  But two events in the Bicentennial 
year gave hope that astronauts would someday take to orbit in a winged vehicle and 
return to a runway landing.  Singer-Link delivered the SMS to JSC Building 5, giving 
astronauts their most realistic flight simulator to date.  On September 17, a tractor pulled 
a Space Shuttle bearing the name Enterprise from the Rockwell facility in Palmdale, 
California.  This vehicle lacked the engines, thermal tiles, middeck amenities, and many 
of the instruments and displays that Columbia would need to reach orbit, but Enterprise 
did have the airframe and wings to take flight within the atmosphere and land after 
detaching from a 747 jet called a Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA).  Chief of the Astronaut 
Office John Young and Director of Flight Crew Operations George Abbey thus had to 
select crews of two to fly aboard Enterprise for its Approach and Landing Test program.  
They decided on Fred Haise and Gordon Fullerton as one crew and Joe Engle and Dick 
Truly as the other.  The selection of these four and the delivery of their simulator is the  
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best place to begin a chronology of Space Shuttle astronaut training.1      
Haise, Fullerton, Engle, and Truly had several methods by which to train.  The 
four traveled to the McDonnell Douglas plant in St. Louis to step inside two simulators 
that prepared them for the separation of Enterprise from the SCA.  One of the simulators 
mimicked the cockpit of the SCA that would carry Enterprise to altitudes as high as 
about 30,000 feet.  The other mimicked the cockpit of Enterprise itself and rested on 
movable supports that simulated the accelerations that astronauts would feel upon being 
launched free of the SCA.  The astronauts needed to feel prepared to climb to 120 feet 
above the SCA just three seconds after detachment.  When the four needed the 
experience of an actual flight to rehearse the steep, unpowered landing they would need 
to make aboard Enterprise, they climbed into the STA that had just been configured for 
this purpose.2  Meanwhile, Engle took the lead in preparing the new SMS to simulate 
approaches and landings.  Lead Simulation Instructor John “Denny” Holt remembered 
that the early SMS often developed computer glitches that caused simulations to be 
delayed.  With each new glitch, Engle and Truly waited patiently while crooning the 
lyrics to a new Kenny Rogers song: “You picked a fine time to leave me, Lucille.”  But 
amid the frustration, the four astronauts rehearsed in four hour blocks in the SMS.  The 
men succeeded in building their confidence for approaches and landings, especially 
because the simulator allowed them to land, take off, and land again in quick succession.  
Engle, who had already flown the X-15 aircraft from the edge of space to a landing in 
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the 1960s, especially impressed the instructors.  Jerry Mill believed he “could have 
brought a claw-foot bathtub to a safe landing” given his prowess ingiving the simulator  
just the right amount of hand controller input.3 
The first flights of Enterprise from the dry lake bed at Edwards Air Force Base 
improved the fidelity of the simulations.  In February and March 1977, SCA pilots 
Fitzhugh Fulton and Tom McMurtry took the vehicle on five flights that tested its 
handling qualities and airworthiness while strapped to its carrier.  The flight data created 
a benchmark for the SMS in replicating factors such as separation forces, flutter, and 
buffet.  The flights also gave the astronauts confidence that the combination of 
Enterprise and its carrier could handle several contingencies, from engine-out takeoffs, 
to aborted takeoffs, to loss of power in an engine during flight, to an emergency descent, 
to a missed approach, to a go-around following a refused landing, to a short-runway 
landing.  But those were only the “captive-inert” flights, with Enterprise unpowered and 
unpiloted.  The two crews did take turns sitting inside for three more “captive-active” 
flights in June and July, finding that Enterprise’s systems such as the APUs and fuel 
cells worked properly.  The main event finally came on August 12: the day that Haise 
and Fullerton separated from the SCA and brought Enterprise to its own landing.4                             
 This revolutionary flight provided evidence of how training could contribute to 
the success of flying and vice versa.  When Haise fired the explosive bolts that separated 
Enterprise from the SCA on August 12, he quickly heard a master alarm and found he 
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had lost a computer.  But having worked with the real computers in the SMS, he knew 
the vehicle could still function well with the remaining units working.  The flight 
controllers then gave him an erroneous message, stating that Enterprise remained steady 
in altitude during a practice landing flare and had a low lift-to-drag ratio, which meant 
he would have to land very soon.  But the vehicle had actually climbed several hundred 
feet and had more lift than expected.  Haise realized during his approach that Enterprise 
was too high and too fast and had no choice but to touch down two thousand feet beyond 
his aim point.  But the experience of flying under a variety of conditions in the SMS and 
STA prepared him for this anomaly and he even made the pleasant discovery that flying 
the real vehicle was easier than the SMS.  “It was tighter, crisper, in terms of control 
inputs and selecting a new attitude in any axis and being able to hold that attitude, it was 
just a better handling vehicle than we had seen in the simulations, although they were 
close,” Haise recalled.5  In turn, the two glitches on this flight held value by improving 
the training process for future crews.  Engineers used the SMS to trace the computer loss 
to a synchronization problem brought along by an improperly soldered circuit board.  
Thus the engineers knew to replace the circuit board for future crews.  Enterprise’s flight 
also benchmarked the shuttle’s true lift-to-drag ratio for the SMS.6          
The remaining four Enterprise flights provided even more much needed 
experience that aided the training of shuttle Commanders and Pilots.  Joe Engle, Dick 
Truly, Fred Haise, and Gordon Fullerton demonstrated the ability to land at a precise aim 
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point on the lake bed.  The last two flights presented a new challenge, as engineers 
removed the tail cone that had covered the three main engines and two OMS engines.  
This reduced the lift-to-drag ratio from 8.5:1 to 4.5:1.  The glideslope angle increased 
from 11 to 22 degrees, meaning the crew would have to glide toward the runway several 
times more steeply than in any other aircraft they had flown.  They would also only have 
about two and a half minutes from SCA separation to touchdown, which placed a greater 
premium on their reflexes and problem solving ability.  The astronauts utilized their 
training devices to overcome all of these challenges, albeit with one predicament on the 
last landing.  On October 26, Haise brought the ship within inches of Edwards’s Runway 
04 and then rose again while rolling from left to right.  Fullerton realized that his 
colleague was struggling with pilot induced oscillation and told Haise to relax his grip 
on the hand controller.  Enterprise ended up bouncing on the runway and then staying in 
the air for two thousand feet, but Haise benefited from Fullerton’s advice and brought 
the ship to a safe touchdown before hard braking brought Enterprise to a stop with a 
comfortable amount of runway in front of him.  This brief scare during a rehearsal for 
spaceflight taught future crews to overcome the problem of pilot induced oscillation and 
allowed engineers to modify the SMS to account for the lower than expected drag that 
caused Haise to land too fast and too long.  The next time a shuttle made a landing, the 
rehearsals would be over and Columbia would be returning from orbit.7  
As Columbia moved close to final assembly in Palmdale, the astronaut corps 
needed its first infusion of new personnel since 1969.  JSC Director Chris Kraft and 
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Director of the Office of Manned Spaceflight John Yardley were the two people most 
instrumental in forming the requirements for the new group, which would be the most 
revolutionary in altering the demographics of the astronaut corps.  Kraft’s letter to 
Yardley in March 1975 stated his belief that the current members of the corps were 
likely to retire within the next ten years and that a younger group of Pilots and Mission 
Specialists should replace them.  He set up an Astronaut Selection Board the following 
year.  The panel that would select the pilots consisted of ten members, including Deke 
Slayton and John Young.  The panel for mission specialists consisted of ten members, 
also including a few astronauts.  The possibility of selecting women, African-Americans, 
and Hispanics, first raised by Jim Fletcher with President Nixon in 1972, gradually 
earned acceptance among NASA managers including Kraft.  Twelve Air Force nurses 
rode a centrifuge at the Ames Research Center and easily handled 3 Gs of acceleration, 
providing evidence that women could be assets to the astronaut corps.  Thus Kraft made 
sure that both selection panels also included members of the JSC Equal Opportunity 
Program Office, Joseph Atkinson and Carolyn Huntoon.  The announcement that NASA 
was seeking new astronauts came in 1976, to ninety aerospace firms, nearly a thousand 
colleges and universities, and a hundred minority organizations.  Out of 8,000 
applicants, the panels selected 208 finalists who traveled to Houston for interviews and 
medical examinations.  Kraft made the final decision to select 35 new astronauts in 
January 1978.8   
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The addition of the “Thirty-Five New Guys” (TFNGs) affected training in 
several ways.  This included their backgrounds, which contained elements that helped 
them become proficient astronauts.  About half of the 35 were Vietnam War veterans, 
which meant experience in the high pressure flying of combat just as many of the Apollo 
astronauts had that experience from Korea.9  Many of the Mission Specialists had 
backgrounds in the experiments that Principal Investigators hoped to pursue on shuttle 
missions, such as chemistry, physics, and physiology, which eased the task of training 
them in science.  One new consideration in selection and training concerned the size of 
crews and amount of time they would be together.  Crews of up to seven (or eight, in one 
case) would spend a full year together in training, as opposed to just three in the Apollo 
era who typically spent no more than about six months in training.  Thus the selection 
board placed an emphasis on interpersonal skills in forwarding their recommendations to 
Kraft.  The panel members did this by considering the results of applicants’ psychiatric 
and psychological tests, their interview answers, the recollections of people who knew 
the applicants, and how the applicants interacted with each other.  After the successful 
applicants graduated from ASCAN status, interpersonal skills were one of their strongest 
assets in earning selection to a crew and becoming an effective team member over the 
following year.  “You don’t necessarily want the guy who’s the hyper-brilliant lab bench 
or computer guy if he does not even have the social connective tissue in mind,” 
explained Kathy Sullivan, one of the TFNGs.10     
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 But the new group mostly attracted attention by including the first six women 
astronauts, the first three African-American men, and the first Japanese-American man.  
The additions of Anna Fisher, Shannon Lucid, Judy Resnik, Sally Ride, Rhea Seddon, 
and Kathy Sullivan required alterations to the training process.  When the group traveled 
across the country during their time as ASCANs, they required separate sleeping and 
showering accommodations for the women.  The JSC gymnasium to which astronauts 
had priority access required a women’s dressing room and restroom.  Besides the 
physical modifications to JSC, the male astronauts needed to adjust to a culture in which 
they were training alongside women.  Most of the males still came from a military 
background, which did not prepare them for this.  But beginning in 1978, all astronauts 
would have to adjust to a mixed gender environment in classroom lectures, the WETF, 
the SMS, T-38 aircraft, and eventually the shuttle itself.  As the 1980s progressed, the 
men from the group agreed that women had earned their place in the corps just as much 
as they had and deserved to be remembered not as women astronauts, but simply as 
astronauts who did their jobs well.11  
The astronauts spent their time not only training for missions, but also continuing 
the tradition established during Mercury of providing astronaut input on spacecraft 
development.  Those who had joined the corps during the 1960s, some of whom were 
still waiting for their first taste of spaceflight, worked especially closely with engineers 
at NASA and Rockwell as the vehicle took shape.  Ken Mattingly was the first assigned 
to such a role, having been named to Astronaut Office support of the program in 1973.  
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This allowed him to attend meetings where engineers made decisions on cockpit controls 
and displays, a key bit of experience that aided him in training and flying the orbiter.  
Hank Hartsfield assisted with the development of wind tunnel models, Don Peterson 
with the computers, and Don Lind with the robotic arm.  Among the TFNGs, Terry Hart 
assisted with the main engines, George “Pinky” Nelson with the new EVA suits, and 
Bryan O’Connor with simulation.  Mattingly believed that the level of cooperation 
between engineers designing the vehicle and those in training to operate it was rare and 
highly beneficial for both groups.  Compared to Apollo, “Our involvement was far more 
extensive and pervasive, and a heck of a lot more fun,” he said.12  This involvement was 
especially crucial for the robotic arm, to the point where engineers in Toronto, Canada 
designed the hand controller for the arm to the physical dimensions of Lind’s hand.  
TFNGs John Fabian and Sally Ride then spent hundreds of days in Toronto performing 
simulations of arm motion, with Ride writing the procedures for the first use of the arm 
during STS-2 on the basis of her work.  The Space Shuttle era thus provided the clearest 
indication yet that astronauts needed to be more than passengers; their expertise helped 
to guide key engineering decisions.13      
In March 1978, the day all astronauts had waited for arrived: selection of a crew 
for the first mission.  George Abbey selected John Young as the Commander of 
Columbia’s maiden voyage: STS-1.  Young would fly the first mission alongside Bob 
Crippen, who had not yet flown in space but had worked on Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz 
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and then became one of the leading experts on shuttle computers in the Astronaut Office.  
Joe Engle, Dick Truly, Fred Haise, Gordon Fullerton, Ken Mattingly, Hank Hartsfield, 
Jack Lousma, and Vance Brand were also in line for the first test flights of Columbia 
before the ship would begin carrying payloads for paying customers and more vehicles 
would be added to the fleet.14  The first voyages would arguably surpass even the 
Mercury and Apollo flights in danger.  Columbia contained more than 2.5 million parts, 
a portion of which were Criticality 1 items that could cause a loss of life or vehicle if 
they failed, and would not make any unmanned test flights.  Young and Crippen would 
climb onboard and trust that both their training and the work of engineers was enough to 
send them into orbit and back again. Fred Haise explained, “There was…initially a 
planned unmanned flight.  But…with a crew aboard…to be there in a systems diagnostic 
and be able to handle the multitude of things that you could work around, just inherently 
made the success potential of a flight a lot greater.”15  Young and Crippen thus needed to 
train to develop their diagnostic skills and prove the truth in Haise’s words. 
 The early state of the SMS made this a daunting task.  Though astronauts had 
used the first version in preparing for the Enterprise flights and had returned data from 
those flights to improve its performance, Columbia’s upcoming flight would differ 
dramatically.  The vehicle would accelerate to 17,500 miles per hour, partly on the 
strength of SRBs, which had never been used before in a piloted launch.  Two days later, 
the ship would also have to reduce its speed from 17,500 miles per hour to a stop on an 
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Edwards Air Force Base runway, another unprecedented task.  When the second version 
of the SMS arrived in 1978 for Young and Crippen’s flight, none of this had happened 
yet.  Engineers had only data from the Enterprise flights, ground tests of shuttle 
hardware, and previous spaceflights to guide them in developing the SMS.  Bryan 
O’Connor, the astronaut from the TFNG group assigned to assist in simulator 
development, remembered the motion, visual, and oral cues as being especially difficult 
to simulate before the first launch.  “Nobody knew what it would sound like on shuttle, 
but if they could make it sound like what Apollo sounded like, they thought that was a 
good start,” he explained.  Thus the few Apollo veterans still in the astronaut corps such 
as Young and Mattingly worked with Roger Burke, the engineer in charge of developing 
the SMS, to draw on what had worked during the Apollo era to make the SMS as high 
fidelity as possible.16  Even so, the SMS was in its lowest fidelity state at this point.  In 
addition to the uncertainty about motion, sight, and sound, the SMS often crashed.  
“Then you’d have to start over again, try to get it restored,” remembered Anne Accola, a 
frustrating process that added to the length of training days.17                                           
 Training for STS-1 thus required a supreme work ethic and a desire to be the 
“guinea pigs” who would form the initial shuttle training procedures without any shuttle 
having launched before.  John “Denny” Holt, who became the first Lead SimSup for a 
shuttle mission, remembered that he and his colleagues spent eight hours per week 
writing scripts for ascent, orbit, and reentry.  This was a challenging process for several 
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reasons.  These SimSups did not have a track record of flight data to fall back on in 
choosing the list of malfunctions with which to challenge the crew.  They found that 
some switches in the cockpit were inaccessible to the crew during launch and reentry, 
which complicated the procedures the crew could implement.  On top of this, they had to 
deal with the frustrations of the SMS crashing and the need to modify the simulator to 
keep up with the hundreds of modifications to Columbia itself.  But the SimSups 
managed to develop their list and insert them into the SMS.  “I was the overall 
instructor, watching them, saying, “‘Oh, no, you can’t put that malfunction in, because 
they haven’t figured out this previous one, and it’s going to complicate things,’” Accola 
recalled.  After accounting for all potential pitfalls, the SimSups were able to spend 
about thirty hours per week working with Young and Crippen.  “After about six months, 
you started to see procedures coming together,” Holt explained.  “Rules were written, 
responsibilities were then aligned, and the team formation came through.”18 
 Accola recalled that by 1979, the SimSups were able to focus heavily on 
integrated simulations.  Many flight controllers had not worked a mission since Apollo 
17 in 1972 and many were new hires who had not worked any mission, so the onus fell 
upon the SimSups to hone their skills until they could make decisions in life or death 
circumstances.  This took place in sessions of increasing length, many of them thirty and 
even fifty-six hour marathons (roughly matching the length of STS-1).  The STS-1 
mission went through so many delays that the controllers had more of these sessions 
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than expected to analyze problems, communicate workarounds to Young and Crippen, 
and even plan for multiple day operations.  The SimSups developed ingenious ways to 
test the controllers, such as inserting a failure between the responsibilities of two of them 
so the two would have to decide who would solve the problem.  Thanks to the delays, 
the tandem of astronauts and controllers grew so proficient with situations like these that 
they taxed the SimSups in seeking new ways to challenge them.  Accola remembered 
inserting about 150 malfunctions over one 56 hour session, an indication of how much 
more complex training had become since the 1960s.  The Rockwell contractors and 
shuttle program managers observed all of these situations, offering their help when 
necessary just as they would during a real mission.19   
Young and Crippen prepared vigorously for the grimmest scenarios that could 
confront them, even if they doubted that the proposed method for overcoming them 
would succeed.  The two trained in the operation of the ejection seats, which engineers 
had lifted from the SR-71 Blackbird aircraft to give them a chance of survival in case of 
a catastrophic malfunction.  This required quick thinking and reflexes, because the 
astronauts would have to operate safety pins while wearing bulky suits to eject just 
before the range safety officer gave the order to detonate the vehicle.  Neither of them 
felt confident that the ejection seats would save their lives, with Young noting 
sarcastically in his memoir, “I was also thinking about what a grand time it would be if 
Crip and I used those ejection seats just to fly through the 5,000 degree plumes of the 
solid rocket motors!”  But they did build confidence in their actions during this potential 
                                                          
19  Interview with Holt and Interview with Accola.  
470 
 
contingency as well as a launch abort that ended in a bailout.  The two paddled in rafts 
inside JSC Building 29 to prepare for this.  Their integrated simulations came to an end 
with a run-through of the entire mission, complete with pressure suits.  Young 
remembered that this last one especially challenged him during reentry.  While traveling 
at nearly 8,000 miles per hour, he noticed a major malfunction with multiple computers.  
He went to the backup system, which required him to fly manually to an Edwards 
runway.  Although he remembered thinking that the simulations had grown too far-
fetched, an issue that SimSups would have to grapple with in the future, he and Crippen 
showed such skill in preparing for the worst that Accola described them as “overtrained” 
by the time the much delayed launch was imminent.20             
One other issue that would become a recurring problem during the shuttle 
program reared its head during STS-1 training.  After Columbia traveled from the 
Rockwell factory to KSC in 1979, engineers had to remove and densify more than 
24,000 thermal protection tiles.  Many had failed in tests at far below the dynamic 
pressure that would have to withstand during a launch.  This led to concern about what 
Young and Crippen could do in case they spotted damage to the tiles in orbit and 
determined they could not return safely (ironically, neither engineers nor astronauts 
worried about the issue that doomed Columbia over two decades later: damage to the 
Reinforced Carbon Carbon [RCC] on the leading edge of the wing).21  The two went to 
the Martin Marietta plant in Denver to test a repair method, donning suits and climbing 
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into a zero-gravity suspension system that was part of the company’s Manned 
Maneuvering Unit simulator.  The suspension system carried them to bottom of a 
simulated orbiter, where they tried to repair damaged or missing tiles.  But training 
provided a negative answer to this “what if” question.  Young and Crippen did not have 
a restraint system to hold them in place while they touched tiles in zero gravity, and one 
of the lessons of the Gemini program had been the need for well positioned restraints to 
perform tasks during EVAs.  Thus Young concluded that they would have damaged 
more tiles than they could have fixed and asked not to take the MMU on this mission.  
He and Crippen did train successfully for an emergency EVA to close and latch the 
payload bay doors.  They would have to open the doors in orbit to radiate heat, but could 
not return home without closing them.  If the doors did not shut automatically, they 
could have stepped outside to do so using an emergency latch tool, on the strength of 
their training in a large water tank using procedures developed by TFNG astronaut Jim 
Buchli.22 
Like astronauts of every new program dating back to Mercury, the first crew 
benefited from hardware checkout as well as simulation.  Young and Crippen, along 
with backups Joe Engle and Dick Truly, spent about 150 hours performing tests on 
Columbia at the Rockwell plant through 1979, and then at KSC through 1981.  Young 
remembered climbing into Columbia for a test of the ship’s three APUs in October 1979, 
when these hydraulically powered devices fired for 30 minutes while the crew moved 
the elevons, rudder, and speed brakes.  The crew sat inside the ship again for a series of 
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five simulated flights in December.  They ran through an entire mission, performing 
activities such as opening and closing the payload bay doors, deploying radiators, 
operating computers, purging fuel cells, and responding to emergencies.  Young 
remembered the tests as so thorough that they featured an end-to-end test of the primary 
and backup flight software, which was never done again on any other orbiter.  The KSC 
engineers knew that it was Young and Crippen’s lives that would be on the line and thus 
welcomed their input or questions.  The two asked plenty of questions about the tiles and 
main engines, the two most revolutionary piece of hardware that had been most 
responsible for the launch delays, until they felt satisfied they could trust their lives to 
them.  A tow vehicle pulled Columbia from the KSC Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) 
into the VAB in November 1980, then a crane hoisted it onto its ET and SRBs.  The 
crew climbed into the cockpit for another test in December, this time to simulate 
launches in a fully assembled and powered vehicle.  Columbia finally rolled out to 
Launch Pad 39A on December 29.  Young was adamant in his memoir about counting 
these experiences as training.  He estimated that by the following spring, he and Crippen 
finished with over 2,000 hours of training.23               
The two astronauts rode into a new era on April 12, 1981, undergoing an 
experience that would benefit the training of future crews.  Right until the last day of 
training, Young had mentally rehearsed the procedures he would have to follow to use 
the ejection seats, to abort back to KSC, to abort across the Atlantic Ocean to Rota, 
Spain, or to bail out of the vehicle.  Training had taught him that the highest risk would 
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come during those first 8.5 minutes of the mission.  But the combination of SRBs and 
main engines took Columbia into orbit with no grimscenario coming to fruition.24  Better  
yet, Young and Crippen made comments about the motion, sight, and sound so that 
engineers could modify the SMS based on reality and not a “best guess.”  For future 
crews, the SMS mimicked the sudden jolt of Columbia’s initial burst from the pad.  The 
shaking during SRB flight became more pronounced, to the point that the view of the 
instrument panel became blurry.  The visual scene included an accurate depiction of 
SRB separation out the windows.  The firing of RCS thrusters mimicked the shaking that 
had startled Young, reminding him of “muffled howitzers.”25                    
 Training helped Young, Crippen, and the flight controllers in several ways during 
the two-day mission that followed.  The astronauts reported that other than the 
weightlessness, moving around the flight deck and middeck and operating the equipment 
felt just like the simulations.  The extensive knowledge of systems instilled in them for 
several years helped them diagnose problems, just as Haise had predicted.  The crew 
reported on the loss of a few tiles on front of an OMS pod, a dual heater failure in one of 
the APUs, a few unexpected maneuvers caused by inadvertently bumping the hand 
controller, and inadequate flow in the toilet, then made recommendations in the mission 
debriefing on the strength of their knowledge.26  In the opinion of the crew, training 
helped the flight controllers improve substantially.  “I noticed when we first started out 
doing sims, it was just like we were working with three teams, like the teams weren’t 
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passing information to each other,” Crippen argued.  “And I didn’t see that during the 
flight.  As far as I could tell, we were all talking about the same thing at the same time.”  
The controllers even coordinated with the Department of Defense (DOD) to have a DOD 
satellite take classified photos of Columbia’s underside, in order to make sure tile loss 
had not damaged the ship irreparably.27            
Much anxiety remained concerning the reentry and landing, but Young and 
Crippen passed this last test with flying colors at Edwards on April 14.  Young switched 
from the autopilot to manual control several times starting when the ship slowed to 
Mach 7, making sure to precisely control all axes with his hand controller to minimize 
the possibility of any unwanted motion during the roll reversals that dissipated 
Columbia’s speed.  He also used the trim integrator to damp out a sideslip angle of 4 
degrees that otherwise would have killed the crew.  He took control for good at Mach 1 
and flew the ship so well from that point that Columbia touched down at a speed less 
than two miles per hour away from what he intended and at a miniscule sink rate of 1.5 
feet per second.  Given the trouble that Young had during his first experiences flying the 
STA in 1977, it is doubtful he could have done this without his hundreds of approaches 
in this vehicle and in the VMS at Ames.  Only the repetition of several years of training 
could give himself and the entire space agency confidence that he could pull off an 
unprecedented task in energy management.28  Training a Commander to do this helped 
to demonstrate the value of sending humans into space, because certifying the autopilot 
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to land the vehicle would have required much more cost and development time.  Even if 
this had happened, a trained Commander had the flexibility to respond to malfunctions 
that could have been crucial in bringing about a safe landing, such as eliminating the 
sideslip.29 
Training grew more ambitious for each subsequent mission, but the crews had 
advantages to draw upon that grew more pronounced as each returned safely.  Before Joe 
Engle and Dick Truly flew STS-2 in November, their mission appeared daunting.  In 
addition to learning all the systems and aborts their predecessors had to know, Truly had 
to learn how to operate Columbia’s robotic arm for the first time.  Engle had to learn 
how to fly the entire reentry and landing manually, in order to fly the thirty different 
maneuvers that were part of this test flight.  Both crewmembers trained for a new tile 
repair method that proved more successful than the futile method tested in Colorado: 
making an EVA to apply a rubber material that could fill a void between tiles.  Yet these 
two had an updated SMS and the recollections of Young and Crippen to draw upon as 
they trained.  The more astronauts who flew on the shuttle and spoke to rookie 
crewmembers, the more that the rookies knew what to expect.  As Chief of the Astronaut 
Office, John Young rode with crews in the SMS for hundreds of hours and often flew 
with Commanders and Pilots in the STA.  Although Truly would have to pioneer robotic 
arm operations, he could do so by working with the engineers who had designed the arm, 
who were eager to assist him as he trained to maneuver it in the SMS and MDF.  The 
training paid off, because Truly took the arm through its envelope and Engle overcame 
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the loss of a fuel cell, a lack of sleep, dehydration, and a 20-knot headwind to add 
considerably to the database on orbiter approach maneuvers.  “They were just like they  
were bred into me,” Engle said of the maneuvers, due to his training.30     
On July 4, 1982, the first era of the shuttle program ended when Columbia 
completed its fourth and final test flight.  John Young and Bob Crippen (STS-1), Joe 
Engle and Dick Truly (STS-2), Jack Lousma and Gordon Fullerton (STS-3), and Ken 
Mattingly and Hank Hartsfield (STS-4) occupy a unique spot in shuttle history because 
they had to perform thorough tests of Columbia’s systems with crews of two.  “It was a 
full-time job to keep that thing going with just two people and carry out some kind of a 
mission,” argued TFNG astronaut George “Pinky” Nelson.  “I don’t know how they did 
it, actually.”31  They could only do so with training, some of which was unique to the 
test phase and some of which set a precedent for the operational phase.  The unique parts 
were the two-person crew, the emphasis on systems testing rather than payloads, and the 
crewmembers attaining an enormous amount of engineering knowledge from 
Columbia’s development and testing in California and Florida.  But Mattingly and 
Hartsfield identified the best precedents in their mission report: hundreds of hours in the 
SMS throughout the flow, the desirability of in-flight maintenance training on shuttle 
equipment, the desirability of weekly STA flights during the last months before launch, 
the desirability of long integrated simulations at the end of the flow, and the desirability 
of Terminal Countdown Demonstration Tests at KSC to rehearse launch day procedures.  
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Mattingly and Hartsfield devoted about 75 percent of their training time to malfunction 
procedures they did not implement during the real mission.  Shuttle program managers 
still envisioned the vehicle making several launches per month at this time, which would 
have altered some of these precedents in the direction of airline pilot training: less 
ambitious and time intensive.  But since the vehicle never launched more than nine times 
in one year, the precedents stuck.32                           
Some of Mattingly and Hartsfield’s recommendations became unrealistic due to 
misguided flight rate projections.  For instance, the crew complained, “Until the number 
of FDF procedures is reduced, crew training time cannot be substantially reduced.”  But 
the number of missions remained much lower than expected at this time, the FDF 
remained long and complex, and the training time for each mission remained lengthy.  
The two men did make useful observations such as increasing the number of SMS reset 
points and simulating malfunctions for the prelaunch period.  One other observation 
became especially vital.  During the first four missions, “a considerable amount of the 
Commander’s time was occupied in defining training goals and mapping out a plan of 
study.  Certainly the mission Commander should have a voice in this process, but it 
should not be his task to develop a plan at the same time he is trying to execute it.  This 
condition was unavoidable in the early STS development, but the time has come to 
develop a core training program.  These program goals should be phrased in terms of 
skill and proficiency levels rather than number of hours or lessons.”33  Pete Beauregard 
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explains that this did happen: “Each lesson or training session that the astronauts or 
entire flight crew go through had specific training objectives…The lessons themselves 
are part of a training flow developed and continually updated by the training 
organization.”34  This allowed training to become more standardized for the crews that 
followed Mattingly and Hartsfield.                           
Another change benefited crews after the operational flights began.  The first few 
shuttle crews made their sessions in the SMS with randomly assigned instructors, 
meaning the astronauts saw a variety of training personnel.  But after the test flights 
ended, each crew worked a Training Team Lead and a group of colleagues specifically 
assigned to a mission.  This resulted in the astronauts seeing the same group of 
instructors over about a year, meaning the two groups could develop a rapport.  “The old 
way, we never got to know the crews so well,” instructor Ted Browder recalled for 
Henry Cooper’s book in the early 1980s.  “We see them on a daily basis now.  We see 
them personally—we go out for beers together on Friday evenings.  The crews always 
remember their roots—they are always the first to share their accomplishments with 
their instructors.”35  But more importantly, the instructors came to know the strengths 
and weaknesses that certain astronauts had in performing tasks and could design 
simulations accordingly.  The innovation of one training team following one crew thus 
gave the crew a resource that Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab crews did not ha
 Another change starting with STS-5 was the training of four person crews.  
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Mission Specialists would fly for the first time on this mission alongside a Commander 
and Pilot, so the astronauts needed to know who would be responsible for what tasks and 
train for them.  TFNG astronauts John Fabian and Judy Resnik helped to establish a 
system where MS 1 had the overall responsibility for payloads and experiments, MS 2 
had the responsibility of being a flight engineer who would help the Commander and 
Pilot during launch and reentry, and MS 3 had the responsibility for independent 
experiments and EVA.  This affected crew selection and training.  It meant that MS 1 
had the greatest burden in terms of achieving a mission and should be the most 
experienced of the Mission Specialists on the crew.  MS 2 had the greatest burden in 
terms of simulation time, due to the many malfunctions that could happen during launch 
and reentry.  MS 3 also had a great burden in terms of training for EVAs in the WETF, 
but this person was generally the least experienced.36  The training of all of these people 
became more streamlined due to two changes that reflected the confidence of shuttle 
managers in the vehicle’s operational status.  Crews starting with STS-5 did not have 
ejection seats or any other escape method to learn about prior to launch.  Crews also 
abandoned the full pressure suits that all previous American astronauts had worn, instead 
wearing light-blue coveralls with only a helmet to provide breathing air in case the cabin 
lost oxygen.37   
The STS-5 crew was the first to implement this procedure.  The crew consisted of 
Vance Brand as Commander, Bob Overmyer as Pilot, Joe Allen as MS 1, and Bill Lenoir 
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as MS 2 (Allen and Lenoir finally became the first from the group of 1967 scientist-
astronauts to fly, fifteen years later).  Thus Lenoir invented the job of flight engineer 
during launch.  He trained in the SMS seat behind Brand and Overmyer, looking over 
their shoulders at the instrument panel, making sure they avoided any mistakes, and 
assisting them with malfunction procedures.  Lenoir also took the lead in training for the 
first EVA in shuttle history, since there was no MS 3 on this mission.38  Allen trained to 
spend the launch in the middeck below his crewmates, which did not contain any 
window for him to look outside or any means for him to influence the launch.  On the 
thirty-sixth launch of American astronauts, this was a new reality: an astronaut who was 
only a passenger during launch.  "I've requested of my shipmates that they not send any 
radio transmissions or ask any questions on the intercom that end like, ‘What was 
that?,’” Allen joked of his passenger role.  But he did have two major responsibilities in 
orbit: photography and the primary payload for the mission, the first two satellites ever 
launched from a Space Shuttle.  Columbia’s payload bay carried two communications 
satellites called Satellite Business Systems (SBS) 3 and Anik C3.  Allen also went to the 
flight deck to serve as flight engineer during reentry, though for future missions the same 
crewmember would serve in this capacity during both launch and reentry.39                     
 Lenoir recalled that the deployment of the two satellites required unprecedented  
simulations.  First, “We had to look at the schematics, work up the procedures, work  
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with the customer for how it goes.”  With the shuttle then envisioned as the sole means 
of launching all satellites into orbit, executives at companies like SBS and Telesat  
Canada (responsible for the Anik C3) wanted assurance that crews could deploy their  
equipment safely.  The STS-5 crew became the first to work with customers for that 
purpose.  The two satellites would go into orbit mounted on a table.  Then the table 
would spin, the crew would point the orbiter in the right direction, and at the right point 
of the orbit the crew would release arms holding the satellites to the tabletop.  Springs 
would then release the satellites, which spun free to be propelled into a geosynchronous 
orbit (about 22,500 miles high) by a kick motor.  In this orbit, the satellites could remain 
in the same position in the sky as seen from Earth and allow people to communicate via 
signals from them.  Unmanned rockets had taken care of this for the past two decades.  
But with STS-5 came a new role for astronauts: what Lenoir called an “Orbital Launch 
Director.”  The crew would observe issues like the condition of the spinning table, the 
satellite, and solid rocket in the kick motor and would have the final say in whether to 
make a deployment or not.  In this era before the Tracking and Data Relay Satellites 
(TDRS) were launched, the crew was only in contact with Mission Control for a portion 
of each orbit and this made their trained judgment even more essential.  Lenoir 
remembered that an Air Force major named Chuck Shaw served as SimSup for the 
deployment simulations, inserting malfunctions that tested the crew’s knowledge of the 
mission rules.40                 
 The first operational mission of the shuttle era succeeded over five days in  
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November 1982, with one exception.  The fan in Allen’s suit failed, forcing a 
cancellation of the EVA that he and Lenoir had planned to make.  But the crew proved a 
point with the successful deployment of Columbia’s two satellites.  Training had given 
the astronauts the knowledge of the mission rules that guided the satellite deployments.  
They had spent numerous hours in the SMS rehearsing the procedures to deploy the 
satellites on the basis of this knowledge.  Thus when they reached orbit, Brand, 
Overmyer, Allen, and Lenoir had the mental and physical flexibility to make sure the 
satellites were in good condition to deploy safely or carry them back to Earth if they 
detected a malfunction and determined this was not possible.  Unmanned vehicles could  
carry satellites into orbit safely, as they had in the past and would in the future.  But 
unmanned vehicles did not have the trained judgment that astronauts brought to orbit 
beginning in 1982.41                   
 But could shuttle astronauts prove their flexibility during EVAs?  Answering this 
 question fell to Story Musgrave and Don Peterson on STS-6, the maiden voyage of 
Space Shuttle Challenger.  After Allen and Lenoir lost their chance due to the suit fan 
malfunction, Peterson received a call from NASA Associate Administrator Jim 
Abrahamson asking if he and Musgrave could pioneer this activity and accepted.  The 
late notice challenged the two astronauts to become proficient in time, but Musgrave had 
already spent about four hundred hours in the WETF as he worked to assist engineers in 
the development of EVA suits.  Peterson recalled making 15 to 20 pool sessions of his 
own.  When he stepped outside Challenger’s airlock on April 7, 1983, he remembered 
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vividly how the experience differed from the pool.  When he turned upside down in the 
WETF, he felt the weight of his body on his head and shoulders.  But when he did so in 
space, he experienced the more comfortable feeling of floating inside his suit.42  Despite 
the painful experience of training in a pool where his suit pressed on him, the WETF 
held great value as a tool for maneuvering around the orbiter’s massive payload bay.  No 
astronaut had ever translated across such a massive vehicle, as the orbiter exceeded 
Skylab in length (122 feet) and height (58 feet).  Over four hours and seventeen minutes, 
he and Musgrave translated to Challenger’s aft bulkhead using handrails, translated with 
a massive object, inspected the payload bay, tested their mobility in the suits, and tested 
their ability to use tools.  Peterson found that the gloves were rather stiff and 
recommended hand exercises as another form of training.  But by carrying out all of 
these tests, the men verified the ways by which trained humans could exercise physical 
flexibility in performing unprecedented work outside a  
spacecraft.  It was only a taste of the wonders to come in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.43                      
 The STS-7 mission presented another set of firsts.  Sally Ride became the object 
of worldwide attention as the first woman selected to an American space crew, but 
remained largely shielded from the media.  Except for a couple days of interviews, she 
stayed focused on her training.  She understood that even if outside attention focused 
almost entirely on her, she was part of the first crew of five and needed to integrate 
herself into this team as effectively as possible rather than fixate on herself.  As MS 2, 
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she had a busy schedule that demonstrated how this generation of astronaut needed to 
become a “jack of all trades.”  She spent many hours in ascent and reentry simulations 
with Commander Bob Crippen and Pilot Rick Hauck, to test her flight engineer skills.  
She then rotated to orbit simulations with fellow Mission Specialists John Fabian and 
Norm Thagard, to rehearse the main events of the mission: the deployment of two 
communications satellites and the first ever deployment and retrieval of a spacecraft 
from the orbiter: the Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS).  The crew would become the first to 
undertake “proximity operations,” meaning fly Challenger in formation with SPAS and 
then rendezvous with it so Ride could grapple it with the robotic arm and place it back in 
the payload bay.  Thus the Systems Engineering Simulator and Manipulator 
Development Facility became vital for the first time in shuttle training.  Throughout all 
of this, Crippen played a vital role as the first person to be assigned to a second shuttle 
mission, as he could share advice with the four TFNG rookies on his crew.44              
 Those training tools received vindication after Challenger soared to orbit on June 
18, 1983, though with one other first that was far less welcome.  “The simulators did a 
really good job of simulating the robot arm,” Ride explained.  “It felt very comfortable 
and familiar.”  Though the MDF and SMS cost money to build and maintain, these 
devices helped her grapple SPAS and avoid hitting a far more expensive satellite.  She 
did not need to make any major recommendations to the instructors about the arm.  
Meanwhile, Crippen and Hauck maneuvered about a thousand feet away from SPAS and 
                                                          
44  Sally K. Ride, Interviewed by Rebecca Wright, October 22, 2002, San Diego, California, http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/ 
history/oral_histories/RideSK/RideSK_10-22-02.htm (accessed January 7, 2017) and Interview with Crippen.    
485 
 
made a rendezvous without impinging on it with thruster fire.  On the strength of their 
SES training, they placed Challenger in position for Ride to operate the arm and made 
observations of the orbiter autopilot that they returned for engineers.45  The mission did 
include the first really notable mistake by a shuttle crew.  The two satellites in 
Challenger’s payload bay included boosters that would take them to a higher orbit.  But 
the crew threw the heater switches for the boosters out of sequence.  They had always 
done this in simulations, when the order did not matter.  But on the real ship, they did 
not realize that engineers had rewired these switches to perform a secondary function.  
Their switch throws caused the early extraction of several pins on the tabletop where the 
satellites were mounted.  Flight controllers commanded the pins back in, but the incident 
demonstrated that training teams needed to inform crews about situations like this one.  
A more serious mistake could be life threatening.46   
 STS-9 broke still new ground in training.  The last shuttle mission of 1983 was 
the first focused primarily on scientific research, the first to be international in scope, 
and the first to carry Payload Specialists.  In these ways, the effort to prepare for and 
execute this mission was a precursor to many shuttle voyages through the 21st century 
and then the ISS currently in use.  Columbia carried the Spacelab module in its payload 
bay.  In accord with a 1973 agreement, an 11-nation consortium headquartered in Paris, 
France called the European Space Agency (ESA) had responsibility for this facility.  
Spacelab gave the crew a shirtsleeve environment 13.5 feet in diameter, so that 
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astronauts could utilize their research skills to the greatest extent since the Skylab crews 
a decade later, only this time with improved technology and in more disciplines.47  The 
laboratory had gloveboxes, furnaces, and freezers with which to conduct 73 experiments 
in life sciences, technology, astronomy, solar physics, Earth observation, plasma 
physics, and materials processing.  The goal of conducting all of them in a 10-day 
mission proved so daunting that Abbey assigned the first six-person crew to STS-9 and 
split them into two groups.  Commander John Young (making the sixth and last flight of 
his legendary career), MS 2 Bob Parker and PS 1 Ulf Merbold would work on a 12-hour 
shift as the Red Team.  Then they would rest and be replaced with the Blue Team for the 
next 12 hours: Pilot Brewster Shaw, MS 1 Owen Garriott, and PS 2 Byron 
Lichtenberg.48  The training process thus had to answer some vital questions.  Could the 
astronauts adjust to working with Merbold and Lichtenberg?  Could they convince a 
group of Principal Investigators from around the world of their research abilities?  Could 
they adjust to working in separate shifts?    
 Merbold and Lichtenberg were a breed apart from the other four members of 
their crew, or anybody who had yet flown aboard an American spacecraft.  All of those 
people had been Americans, but Merbold was born in East Germany before defecting to 
West Germany just before the construction of the Berlin Wall and earning a Ph.D. at the 
University of Stuttgart.  ESA selected him as a candidate to fly as a PS aboard the shuttle 
in 1978, on the strength of his work at the Max Planck Institute for Metals Research in 
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Stuttgart.  Lichtenberg was an academic at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
who had been working on vestibular experiments for Spacelab since 1978.  Neither of 
these two had gone through the rigorous process to be selected into the astronaut corps 
or work full time at JSC.  One might assume that consternation would therefore develop 
between the two and their four crewmates, but Garriott confirmed that this was not the 
case.  “Are they really motivated to fly, can they hold their own, and so forth?” he asked.  
“And I very quickly found out that yes, indeed, they could.  They were on par with all of 
us…and after thirty years, they’re still some of my best friends.”49  The six formed a 
strong team during simulations from the fall of 1982 to launch in November 1983, while 
Merbold and Lichtenberg received the training they needed.  “The PSs were of course 
trained in the basics of the shuttle in terms of ingress, egress, personal hygiene, 
communications, photography equipment, and more,” Pete Beauregard explains.  “They 
would train with the entire crew less than the MSs, as PSs did not participate in training 
that largely involved flying the shuttle.  They would participate in training that covered 
several consecutive hours of the mission timeline in which they had responsibilities,” 
especially the Spacelab experiments for Merbold and Lichtenberg.50        
 The international training also marked a new departure in American human 
spaceflight.  When Garriott had trained to fly on Skylab, he had mainly stayed in Texas.  
But meeting with the Principal Investigators for much of the Spacelab materials 
processing work required traveling to Europe, while learning about an electron beam 
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emission experiment required traveling to Japan.  The crew also went to MIT for life 
science experiments and the Universities of Michigan and Utah for Earth observation 
studies.  This allowed the astronauts to see the researchers in their home laboratories, 
which contained the equipment the crew would use in space, and better understand the 
experiments by observing and asking questions.  The pattern of intense travel to become 
a “jack of all trades” in operating science experiments follows astronauts to this day.51    
 Simulations took another step forward during STS-9 training to reflect the plan 
for around the clock research.  The crew worked together in the SMS during training for 
dynamic flight phases, like all previous crews, but split up during training for Spacelab 
operations.  Young and Shaw operated the vehicle in the SMS while the other four went 
to the Payload Crew Training Complex at MSFC in Huntsville, complete with a mockup 
of Spacelab.  These sessions lasted up to twelve hours, so that Young and Shaw could 
solve complex malfunctions such as a Main Bus failure while the four scientists solved 
problems with the experiments.  Another simulation close to launch lasted three days, so 
that the crew could rehearse coordinating their actions with flight controllers in Houston 
and scientists at the Payload Operations Control Center in Huntsville.  This differed 
from previous missions in that crews now had more time with which to speak to 
controllers and scientists.  The TDRS deployed during STS-6 could now relay voice and 
data signals between an orbiter and the ground, eliminating gaps in coverage.  This 
meant astronauts needed to rehearse coordinating their work with Principal Investigators  
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who could speak with them far more often than earlier crews, while more data flowed to  
Mission Control.52               
 The first Spacelab mission demonstrated that the flexibility of shuttle astronauts  
extended to science as well.  These six crewmembers who had trained for years to 
advance scientific knowledge and for the past year to do so on this specific flight could 
perform work that automatons could not.  This included communicating with scientists 
in real time thanks to the TDRS, replanning observations, and fine-tuning their 
instruments.53  Parker even used a screwdriver to repair a reel on a damaged high speed 
data recorder and freed stuck film on a camera.  University of Naples physicist Luigi 
Napolitano therefore argued, “One of the biggest lessons we have learned this week is 
that nobody has the right to ask anymore why a man is needed up there.  You know, 
without those guys, the mission would have been a failure the first day.”54  When the 
mission ended on December 8, the flight had downlinked more data in 10 days than 
Skylab had during six months of crew operations: two trillion bits of raw data.  As 
Commander, Young argued that the training done in collaboration with MSFC was 
essential in making this possible.55  Thanks in part to the success of STS-9 and the 
lobbying of NASA Administrator Jim Beggs, President Ronald Reagan challenged the 
space agency to build Space Station Freedom in his 1984 State of the Union address.56   
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 Young and Shaw benefited from training in different ways than their four 
crewmates, with one rather embarrassing lesson learned.  While the other four worked 
on Spacelab, these two spent most of the mission on the flight deck, where their 
expertise guided them in making a record 216 maneuvers of Columbia, making 15,000 
keystrokes to do so.  They had also trained to operate a new device called the Shuttle 
Portable Onboard Computer, one of the first laptop computers ever used, which 
displayed Columbia’s track on a world map.  The malfunction filled simulations they 
had received over the past year received vindication on the last day of the mission, when 
two of the ship’s computers failed.  “I turned to jelly,” Young recalled, but he and Shaw 
worked on computer recovery procedures just as they had in the SMS.  If the computers 
had failed to prevent a sideslip angle of just a couple of degrees from occurring, 
Columbia and crew would have been lost.  Columbia did return safely, though when 
Young made an input on the hand controller, the orbiter responded differently than it had 
during his training.  Software engineers had tightened the gains on this device prior to 
flight, so that when he moved the controller to pitch the nose to a touchdown and 
brought it back into detent, the nose stopped pitching unexpectedly.  When he finally did 
bring the nose down, the landing gear smacked unexpectedly hard onto the Edwards 
runway.  “The lesson was, never let them change the software in the flight control 
system without having adequate opportunity to train for it,” Shaw explained, a lesson 
that benefited future Commanders.57   
 Shuttle astronauts delved even further into their expanding bag of tricks in 1984,  
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guided by outstanding training facilities.  First came STS-41B, during which Bruce 
McCandless and Bob Stewart became the first to venture outside the orbiter and use the 
MMU backpack to fly free of their ship.  “It was supposed to be an early-day Buck 
Rogers flying belt, if you know what I mean, except it didn’t have the person zooming 
real fast,” explained Vance Brand, the STS-41B Commander.  “It used cold nitrogen gas 
coming out in spurts to thrust you around at about one or two or three miles per hour.”58  
McCandless was an ideal candidate to pioneer the backpack, as he had participated in a 
backpack experiment performed by the Skylab 3 crew inside that space station and 
represented the astronaut office in MMU development.  But zipping through space in his 
own portable spacecraft for STS-41B required training to precisely control his motion.  
He and Stewart would have to climb out Challenger’s airlock, don their backpacks in the 
payload bay, and then control their position (forward/backward, left/right, up/down) with 
their left hands while controlling rotation with their right hands.  They could travel up to 
450 feet away from the orbiter by this method, a far cry from the tether method of EVAs.  
McCandless and Stewart developed their proficiency by receiving 18 hours of training 
with an MMU simulator at the Martin Marietta plant.  The simulator featured a large-
screen television display to mimic what they would see in orbit and a carriage that 
moved across six degrees of freedom.  One journalist who used the device wrote, “The 
precision flying features were demonstrated by my ability, with only a few minutes  
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practice, to maneuver the unit safely in close proximity to fixed objects.”59         
 On February 7, McCandless and Stewart maneuvered over 300 feet away from 
Challenger and back again on the strength of their training in the MMU simulator and 
WETF.  The two astronauts reported that the increasingly intense schedule of their 
WETF sessions especially helped them, with runs scheduled at a rate of one per month 
early but then ramped up to one per week.  The crew did make some recommendations 
for WETF training as well: that the television showing the astronauts working in the 
pool should be controllable by their fellow astronauts working in the SMS, and that 
underwater helmet lights and flashlights were needed when working in poorly lit areas.  
Although training in this facility was an evolving process based on recommendations 
from each crew, McCandless and Stewart needed the experience to confidently 
maneuver farther away from an orbiting spacecraft than anyone before.  Brand and Pilot 
Robert “Hoot” Gibson also trained to not let the spacewalkers move so far away from 
Challenger that orbital mechanics separated them.  “We didn’t want to come back and 
face their wives if we lost either one of them up there,” Brand explained.  The astronauts 
and their equipment did their jobs well, paving the way for future astronauts to use 
MMUs to retrieve and service satellites hundreds of feet away from an orbiter.60     
 This happened on the very next mission, STS-41C.  This crew called themselves 
the Ace Satellite Repair Company, because for the first time they would demonstrate one 
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of the shuttle’s most unique capabilities: servicing of another spacecraft by skilled 
astronauts on an EVA.  The Solar Max satellite had been in orbit since 1980, but the 
fuses that powered the attitude control electronics failed and thus the satellite could not 
remain stable enough to return data for scientists studying the Sun.  Engineers at the 
Goddard Spaceflight Center in Maryland had attached a grapple fixture to the satellite 
prior to its launch, however, so the STS-41C crew could service it.61  The mission proved 
instructive from a training perspective, because more than any crew before them these 
astronauts would have to draw on a bevy of devices to do this.  Commander Bob 
Crippen and Pilot Dick Scobee trained to rendezvous with the Solar Max satellite via the 
SMS and SES.  They reported that they doubled their actual training over original 
projections and that this “was necessary and should be included in future training plans.”  
MS 1 Terry Hart trained to deploy the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), grapple 
Solar Max, and then redeploy it after his crewmates serviced it using three devices: the 
SMS, SES, and MDF.  The training forced him to “develop good techniques with 
smooth inputs,” according to the flight crew report.62   
Meanwhile, James van Hoften and George “Pinky” Nelson trained to service 
Solar Max at several facilities.  They traveled to Denver for one session per month on 
the MMU Simulator, which they reported had excellent fidelity and prepared them well 
for malfunctions during the last three months before launch.  The only recommendation 
they had was for the device to simulate the effect of MMU plumes on Solar Max.  They 
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also complimented the Martin Marietta staff on their response to the astronauts’ 
technical questions.  Their WETF sessions in Houston allowed them to rehearse 
maneuvering to Solar Max and operating their two power tools to service the satellite.  
The pool contained a mockup of the satellite that the two astronauts called “outstanding” 
in fidelity.  Since their procedures were frozen and all training hardware was on hand six 
months before the flight, van Hoften and Nelson had time to climb into the pool and 
build their confidence in performing their unprecedented feat.  After making one-G 
walkthroughs with flight hardware, KC-135 aircraft flights, Air Bearing Floor 
simulations, and even one trip to the Goddard Spaceflight Center to look at flight tools, 
the two men were finally ready.63  Although these astronauts would not travel as far 
away from Earth or receive as much public acclaim as the Apollo crews, the volume and 
variation of their training demonstrated how far the profession had advanced since the 
1960s and 1970s.   
 The actual task proved worthy of the training, especially because it required the 
crew to overcome adversity.  On April 8, van Hoften and Nelson donned their MMUs 
and maneuvered about 200 feet from Challenger to Solar Max.  But when Nelson tried 
to grasp the tumbling satellite with his Trunnion Pin Acquisition Device, he failed to do 
so three times.  “I could see myself spending the next six months in Washington 
explaining why we didn’t grab that satellite,” Crippen explained.  But the Solar Max 
flight controllers send commands to stabilize it and cleared the way for another attempt.  
On April 11, the entire crew placed their training in dynamic operations to the test in a 
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way none of their predecessors had done.  Not only had the five astronauts trained 
individually in numerous facilities, they had developed the teamwork to implement their 
training so it would flow together.  Crippen and Scobee maneuvered Challenger, Hart 
grappled Solar Max with the robotic arm, and Nelson and van Hoften went to work on 
replacing the satellite’s attitude control system and electronics.  This required the fine 
work of undoing electrical connectors, not easy using bulky gloves, but the WETF 
sessions had prepared them for this.64  Hart redeployed the satellite the next day and it 
resumed its study of the Sun.  “The most obvious reason that the EVA repair activities 
went smoothly was the extensive amount of training,” the crew argued in their report.65  
Since they had prepared so thoroughly, they demonstrated the value of sending humans 
into space.  No robot of the time could have performed the fine work of Nelson and van 
Hoften, or adapted to the problems of their first EVA.  Launching another satellite to 
replace Solar Max would have cost $235 million, but sending trained astronauts to 
replace it cost far less.66              
 The shuttle program went through a more troubling first that summer that related 
to training.  The STS-41D crew of Hank Hartsfield, Mike Coats, Mike Mullane, Steve 
Hawley, Judy Resnik, and Charlie Walker was just four seconds away from the maiden 
launch of Discovery when the main engines shut down (one of them had failed a valve 
position check).  The controllers at KSC’s Launch Control Center then noticed a fire on 
the pad, caused by hydrogen fuel that had collected around the engine nozzles following 
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the shutdown.  They considered having the crew leave Discovery, climb into baskets 
attached to a slide wire, and evacuate the pad.  But neither these astronauts nor any 
others had trained to ride this Emergency Egress System, which factored into the 
controllers’ decision not to give this order.  Hartsfield remembered this as a “bad 
situation” given that he and his crewmates were attached to millions of gallons of rocket 
fuel.  This one ended well because the pad deluge system combated the fire and the crew 
managed to leave the pad via the elevator.  But the incident prompted the first test of the 
slide wire system with a human occupant (astronaut Charlie Bolden) and additional 
training in “safing” the orbiter following aborts.  This lack of preparedness prior to this 
twelfth shuttle flight contributed to the rigorous preparation that subsequent crews had in 
dealing with launch aborts.67   
Discovery did make its maiden voyage from August 30 to September 5, 1984, 
with the crew deploying three satellites and making a valuable demonstration of the 
value of Payload Specialists.  Charlie Walker was the first commercial PS, being an 
engineer at McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis who specialized in a shuttle electrophoresis 
experiment for which this company provided the apparatus.  He had taught crews of four 
previous shuttle flights in operating this experiment, but McDonnell Douglas manager 
Jim Rose pressed shuttle program manager Glynn Lunney to fly Walker himself on a 
mission.  Lunney agreed, meaning Walker spent over a year training for STS-41D and 
set a standard for future Payload Specialists.  NASA and McDonnell Douglas negotiated 
so that he could spend part of each month at the company plant in St. Louis but two 
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weeks of each month training at JSC.  Shuttle managers decided that he did not need to 
train on equipment he would not use in flight, which saved time and money.  But he did 
enter Discovery trained to respond to emergencies and to make more of a contribution to 
electrophoresis research than a Mission Specialist who could only spend a small portion 
of the training sequence focusing on this experiment.  He then operated it for more than 
100 hours on this mission, which proved so successful that he flew again on STS-51D 
and STS-61B over the next two years.  Walker believed his experience proved that 
spaceflight training had reached a point where a “working passenger” could safely fly 
after following an abbreviated training syllabus.68 
The last two missions of the year offered strong evidence that the state of training 
remained strong.  Challenger roared into space in October on the STS-41G mission, 
carrying the first crew of seven: Bob Crippen, Jon McBride, Kathy Sullivan, Sally Ride, 
David Leestma, Paul Scully-Power, and Marc Garneau.  Five of the astronauts were 
making their first missions, and after being assigned in January they had gone through 
the first half of the training sequence without their Commander.  Crippen did not join 
this crew until after finishing his STS-41C mission.69  But the other astronauts proved 
they could become proficient while working with their Commander only for a few 
months.  When Crippen did join them, the crew benefited from having a Commander in 
training for his fourth mission.  Training Team Lead Ted Browder exclaimed, “With 
Crippen there, we had a harder time fooling the crew.  Crippen has seen about every 
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training scenario there is!”70  Browder also monitored the entire crew through all of their 
mistakes early in the process until feeling that the seven gelled in their last, three-day 
integrated simulation.  He believed that the crew was ahead of the flight controllers in 
reacting to simulated malfunctions, the best sign that they were ready to fly.71              
 But as always, the mission itself offered the best evidence of the state of training.   
Browder observed all eight days from the Simulation Control Area, because his job 
involved evaluating simulations in light of the mission results.  The results pleased him.  
He noticed that the crew remained ahead of Mission Control and remained gelled, as the 
astronauts helped each other and almost always retained their patience in the face of 
problems.  McBride had no prior space experience, but when Browder asked him if 
anything had happened during the mission that he wished he had examined more 
thoroughly in simulations, he said no.  This was a quite a statement, because STS-41G 
tested their problem solving abilities.72  The crew had difficulty folding a radar antenna 
in Challenger’s payload bay, which they needed to do before Sullivan and Leestma 
made an EVA.  But Ride improvised, setting the robotic arm down on one of the antenna 
leaves and pushing down on it far enough that it latched.  More urgently, when the crew 
deployed the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS), only one of the two solar arrays 
unfurled.  Ride had to shake the array free with the arm, moving the arm joints at a faster 
rate than mission rules allowed.  The crew had simulated both of these problems in 
advance, contributing to their success and demonstrating again that trained humans 
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could solve problems that automatons could not.  “Clearly, missions played into training 
as much as training played into planning and into missions; missions, training, and 
planning formed a tight, interlocking triangle,” Henry Cooper rightly argued in his book 
about the mission.73                        
 The year ended with STS-51A, one of the program’s greatest triumphs in terms of 
EVA training.  Spacewalkers Joe Allen and Dale Gardner went through at least fifteen 
major exercises in the WETF to rehearse the capture and retrieval of two communication 
satellites that had been launched on 41B earlier that year but failed to reach their proper 
orbits.  Allen and Gardner trained to maneuver to them with their MMUs, grapple them 
using a capture device they called a “stinger,” and return them to Earth in Discovery’s 
payload bay.  But in orbit that November, the tool designed to fit on top of the Palapa 
B2 satellite did not fit.  Anna Fisher used the robotic arm to maneuver the satellite 
around to where Allen could grab it and hold it while Gardner then attached a large 
clamp to the bottom of the satellite.  According to Allen, Gardner “did the impossible” in 
pulling off this feat thanks to his strength, persistence, and training over the next two 
hours, then placed the Palapa B2 in its payload bay cradle.  The same qualities allowed 
him to retrieve the Wester VI two days later.  On November 16, Discovery landed 
carrying these two satellites so they could be relaunched and sent to proper orbits.74  
Astronauts had again accomplished what no automaton could have achieved and the 
crew was quick to credit several features of their training in making this possible.  Allen 
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had already trained in the WETF for STS-5, which gave him a head start in tackling STS-
51A simulations; this was a factor to consider in selecting crews for challenging future 
missions.  He and Gardner also benefited from Pilot David Walker’s training to 
choreograph their EVA movements; this allowed Gardner to concentrate on his manual 
tasks while Walker choreographed.  Finally, hands-on experience with actual flight  
hardware on the ground helped the spacewalkers handle the satellites in orbit.75                 
 The shuttle entered the busiest year in its entire history when 1985 began.  The 
nine missions produced a bonanza of satellite deployments and scientific research that 
enhanced America’s status as a space superpower, but not without several burdens on 
training.  The first new burden was the need to train for classified Department of 
Defense missions.  The STS-51C crew of Ken Mattingly, Loren Shriver, Ellison 
Onizuka, Jim Buchli, and Gary Payton needed to keep all details of their training secret 
prior to their launch on January 24.  The astronauts wondered whether this would work 
given that successful astronaut training had always depended on open communication in 
addressing any issues that needed to be resolved.  The training personnel placed cipher 
locks on all facilities used by this crew and reserved a room for storing classified 
documents and making classified telephone conversations.  When the crew needed to 
travel to a contractor associated with the mission, they had to fly equal time in day and 
night, use unpredictable routes to reach destinations, and check into hotels using cover 
names.  “But within that classification shell, so to speak, the system was able to find a 
way to operate and operate very efficiently, I thought,” Shriver argued.  Though details 
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about exactly what the crew did remained classified, he and Mattingly have said in 
interviews that the information necessary to become skilled crewmembers reached them 
without jeopardizing national security.  The crew is believed to have deployed a 
Magnum satellite used to monitor military transmissions from the Soviet Union and 
China, enhancing American intelligence in the latter days of the Cold War.  The shuttle 
flew several more classified missions through 1992, producing what Mattingly called 
“spectacular” results worthy of the secretive training procedures.76                     
 Another burden was the training of more outsiders who served as Payload 
Specialists.  Saudi prince Sultan bin Salman Al Saud flew aboard Discovery’s STS-51G 
mission in June after receiving training to take photos of his home nation and operate 
some experiments that were part of NASA’s Getaway Special program (payloads 
contributed to a mission by educational, foreign, commercial, or U.S. government 
entities).  The other six crewmembers trained with him to help him with setup for his 
camera work and experiments.  Although the crew featured five Americans, one 
Frenchman, and one Saudi prince, the astronauts did not find any friction develop 
between them during their training or mission.  Training helped the crew avoid the kind 
of tension that would have placed a damper on the image NASA wanted to project.77   
Two other shuttle crews trained with sitting U.S. Congressmen, who only had 
especially brief exposure to the usual regimen astronauts went through.  Utah Senator 
Jake Garn had about ten thousand hours of flight experience as a naval aviator when he 
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lobbied James Beggs for a flight, making him a natural choice in terms of training.  He 
was only selected to the STS-51D crew a few months before launch and had to fly to JSC 
for training on weekends while serving as a Senator in Washington, D.C. on weekdays.  
Garn’s presence did spark some grumbling in the Astronaut Office, but Commander 
Karol Bobko praised his willingness to work with the crew in understanding shuttle 
operations and participating in simulations.  He could also draw upon veteran shuttle 
travelers Bobko and Charlie Walker to learn about aspects such as weightlessness, 
eating, sleeping, or emergency procedures.78  Florida Representative Bill Nelson had a 
similar experience with the STS-61C prior to his flight in January 1986, except that he 
was a lawyer who did not have Garn’s aviation experience.  His crewmate “Pinky” 
Nelson remembered that he faced a steep learning curve in just a few months, “but that 
didn’t stop him from trying, and I think he knew what his limitations were.  He wanted 
to jump in and help a lot of times, but just didn’t have the wherewithal to do it, but 
worked very hard and was incredibly enthusiastic.”79  The decision to give flights to 
Garn and Nelson is questionable, given that the shuttle remained a dangerous vehicle 
and their minimal training did not prepare them to make a major contribution to a vital 
area like EVAs, robotic arm operation, or science research.  But according to their 
crewmates, they did prove a person could live safely on the shuttle and respond to 
potential emergencies with just a few months of training. 
 Even as politicians took up seats, the list of malfunctions on shuttle flights made 
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 painfully clear that the vehicle remained experimental and in need of skilled 
crewmembers.  An external tank door motor, payload bay door latches, flash evaporator 
system, fuel cells, thermal protection tiles, and RCS heaters, regulators, and thrusters all 
suffered damage during 1985 flights alone.80  During the STS-51F launch on July 29, 
one of the three main engines shut down when a temperature sensor incorrectly indicated 
that the fuel turbine discharge temperature exceeded the limit.  If this malfunction had 
happened thirty-two seconds earlier in the ascent, Commander Fullerton would have had 
to make an abort landing at a site across the Atlantic Ocean.  Fortunately, Challenger 
was high and fast enough that he could perform the much easier Abort to Orbit.  He 
confirmed with Mission Control on this abort mode, rotated the Abort Selector switch to 
ATO, pushed a button, and watched in relief as the vehicle reached a lower orbit than 
planned but still high enough to perform an eight day Spacelab mission.  This event lent 
credence to the malfunction filled simulations that tested the resolve of Commanders, 
Pilots, and Mission Control.  The latter especially applied in this case, because flight 
controller Jenny Howard told the crew to throw a Main Engine Limits switch.  This 
inhibited the shutdown of further engines, which could have happened since other 
sensors were malfunctioning, and possibly the loss of the vehicle and crew.  Her success 
in making this call just in time was a tribute to the simulations and instructors followed 
up by discussing this particular switch with later crews, as Andy Foster remembers.81 
 Other incidents that cropped up during the flood of 1985 missions proved the  
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value of having trained Mission Specialists.  The best example came during Garn’s STS-
41D mission.  After the crew deployed a satellite called SYNCOM IV-3, the spacecraft 
sequencer failed to initiate.  The crew scavenged about Discovery’s cabin to construct 
two “flyswatter” like devices that flight controllers thought an astronaut could use on an 
EVA to flip a switch to start the sequencer.  This required Commander Karol Bobko and 
Pilot Don Williams to rendezvous with the satellite, Jeff Hoffman and David Griggs to 
step outside the orbiter and attach the two devices to the robotic arm, and Seddon to 
operate the arm.  The crew unfortunately found that flipping the switch did not solve the 
problem, but controllers traced the satellite’s troubles to an electronics issue and the 
STS-51I crew repaired it later that year.  The point here from a training perspective was 
that the crew had the ability to improvise from the skills they had developed for several 
years as astronauts.  The crew had not even done a rendezvous simulation for several 
months and had to rely on instructions sent to them via teleprinter, but their skills went 
beyond what they had simulated for just this mission.  “This was all done just with the 
skills that the crew had been trained with generically,” Payload Specialist Charlie 
Walker explained.  “And yet we pulled it off; the crew pulled it off expertly, did 
everything, including throwing the switch.”82  
 The most frightening malfunction of the year took place at the end of that same 
mission.  When Bobko brought Discovery to the Kennedy Space Center runway on April 
19, he was making the fifth landing at this facility but the first with crosswinds that 
could affect it (the several runways available at Edwards were wider, meaning there was 
                                                          
82  Hitt and Smith, 249-251.  
505 
 
less concern about crosswinds there).  Even with a modest wind speed of about 9 miles 
per hour, Bobko had to apply differential braking to keep the vehicle on the centerline.  
The differential loads stressed the landing gear so much that one of the tires blew out, 
another eroded, and one of the brakes jammed.  Bobko did bring Discovery to a safe 
stop, but if the tire failure had happened earlier, the vehicle could have swerved into the 
Florida scrub rather than rest safely on the runway.  His actions lent much credence to 
STA and VMS training, because he had rehearsed landings in these simulators that could 
mimic the conditions he faced when his life depended on keeping Discovery on a 300 
foot wide runway with crosswinds.83             
 As crewmembers applied their training to the myriad of vehicle malfunctions, 
they also gained a clearer understanding of what their future had in store near the end of 
1985.  Jerry Ross and Sherwood Spring made two EVAs outside the new orbiter Atlantis 
during the STS-61B mission to experiment with assembling structures in space.  While 
riding on the robotic arm, the men simulated maneuvering a truss segment, running an 
electrical cable through one, and repairing one.  Ross confirmed that the experience 
yielded data about in-space construction that helped the engineers working on Space 
Station Freedom.  But one problem needed to be solved before astronauts could build a 
space station: the WETF was not large enough to train them for this.  “In the facility we 
had when we built the ACCESS truss, we could only build like one and a half bays 
before it started sticking out of the surface of the water,” Ross said.  “And the EASE 
experiment, when we did it, basically our backpacks of our suits when we were at the 
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top of the structure were right at the surface of the water.  So if you’re going to build 
anything that’s anywhere close to being big on orbit, that wasn’t going to get it.”  STS-
61B had helped lay the foundation for the demise of the WETF and installation of the 
NBL, although Congress did not approve funds for the new training facility until the 
1990s.84         
 Although the performance of the astronauts remained exemplary throughout the 
nine flights of 1985, one question that bears consideration is whether the rapidly 
expanding flight rate placed too much of a burden on crew training.  When asked today, 
Pete Beauregard argues that the processing of the shuttles at KSC was a far greater 
concern than training crews.  But he does admit, “Higher flight rates were challenging in 
various aspects.  From a training standpoint these were usually related to competition 
(not literally) for specific training facilities, or the ability to develop a computer 
simulation of a new payload with the most desired timeframe before launch.  Also, 
simulation time was generally prioritized by how close a given crew was to flying.  The 
further out your flight was, the more late night sim sessions there would be.  The main 
effect on training was usually the availability of the flight specific simulation 
configuration for each mission as per the desired training schedule.  That sometimes had 
little effect as some missions were almost copies of previous missions, allowing the use 
of a prior flight simulation configuration early in the training flow.  But sometimes this 
had significant impact.  The high flight rate also resulted in more rookies on some crews.  
As the training lead for STS-61B, my team affectionately referred to the crew as 
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‘Brewster and the kids.’  Brewster Shaw, as Commander, was the only one on the seven 
person crew to have previously flown except Payload Specialist Charlie Walker.  
Interestingly, my training team somewhat reflected the crew as the team was also mostly 
rookies.  As Lead, I had previously led the training for 41C, but three of the other four 
team members were training their first crew.  Again, a reflection of a very 
 busy time.”85   
 One group that considered this question and gave a discouraging answer was the 
Rogers Commission that investigated the Space Shuttle Challenger accident.  The group 
noted that during the 1984 to 1986 period, crews generally trained over a 25 week 
period.  The first 14 of those weeks consisted of standalone training using software loads 
for other missions, while the last 11 consisted of integrated simulations with the flight 
specific software and SMS configuration.  As Beauregard remembers today, attaining 
that flight specific content was a bottleneck toward the goal of attaining a high flight 
rate.  A trend began with the STS-51I mission in summer 1985 towards a late start of that 
content arriving and the integrated training phase beginning.  The trend worsened until 
the crews of the two 1986 missions, STS-61C and STS-51L, began this phase three weeks 
late.  This placed a burden on the astronauts, flight controllers, and instructors who 
needed to train, to the point that these people worked at least 60 hours per week during 
the last few weeks before launch.  This ran the risk of sending tired crews into orbit and 
having tired controllers to support them.  “It was not a pace we could sustain forever and  
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we knew it,” ascent instructor Foster comments when asked about this today.86 
 The Rogers Commission pointed to other bottlenecks toward a high flight rate as 
well.  About the SMS itself, the report read, “It has been a constant source of problems 
throughout the entire program.  Today, the facility computers and equipment are old and 
obsolete.”  A study by JSC training personnel concluded that the SMS could not support 
more than 12 to 15 flights per year and even then needed funding for equipment 
upgrades and maintenance.  About the STA, the report noted that only three of these 
vital training tools for Commanders and Pilots were available, which also placed a 
limitation on the number of flights per year.  Nonetheless, the original flight manifest for 
1986 called for NASA to fly 15 missions and more in future years, overriding the 
recommendation of that JSC training study.87  The concern about this extended not just 
to government investigators, but also to the astronauts themselves.  “Had we not had the 
accident, we were going to be up against a wall,” Hank Hartsfield commented.  “For the 
first time, somebody was going to have to stand up and say we have got to slip the 
launch because we are not going to have the crew trained.”88  Though the astronauts 
successfully avoided any serious mistakes during 1985 missions, this could not continue 
if the trend toward increasingly compressed training and serious malfunctions on the 
actual missions continued.  It was just one more reason, along with the infamous SRB O-
Rings, that expectations for the Space Shuttle exceeded what was realistically possible as  
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January 1986 began.   
 After Representative Nelson’s STS-61C flight aboard Columbia, which overcame 
four launch delays to fly successfully from January 12 to 18, the much anticipated 
Teacher in Space mission was next.  President Reagan had announced in 1984, “I’m 
directing NASA to begin a search in all our elementary and secondary schools and to 
choose as the first citizen passenger in our space program, one of America’s finest, a 
teacher.”  Out of about 11,000 teachers who sent completed applications to NASA, a 
selection committee of seven decided in July 1985 on a New Hampshire social studies 
teacher named Christa McAuliffe.  She traveled to JSC in September to meet the rest of 
the STS-51L crew, already assigned in January: Commander Dick Scobee, Pilot Mike 
Smith, MS 1 Ellison Onizuka, MS 2 Judy Resnik, MS 3 Ron McNair, and PS 1 Greg 
Jarvis.  The crew planned to take Challenger on a six-day flight to deploy the second 
TDRS satellite, deploy and retrieve a Spartan astronomical spacecraft to study Halley’s 
Comet, and perform some middeck experiments while McAuliffe taught two lessons 
from orbit to a worldwide television audience.  Their well documented training offers 
another window into how crews rehearsed for missions during the busiest phase in the 
history of the Space Shuttle.89   
 The training sequence largely met expectations and resulted in a well-trained 
crew, despite the schedule pressure.  During the standalone sessions from L-37 to L-9 
weeks, the five crewmembers who were not Payload Specialists even exceeded the  
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number of hours planned for them to spend on various training courses.  This meant that 
a lesson took longer than planned or a crewmember repeated a lesson, which instructors 
encouraged if astronauts deemed this necessary.  Scobee and Smith spent 478 and 482 
hours, respectively, on courses ranging from orbiter systems, to ascent, to orbit, to entry, 
to crew systems, to the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) that would propel the TDRS into its 
geosynchronous orbit, to payload deployment and retrieval, to proximity operations with 
the Spartan, to rendezvous with the Spartan.  Resnik had the next greatest training load 
as the flight engineer, 467 hours, because she would have to assist Scobee and Smith in 
the flight deck with those last three areas.  Onizuka and McNair did not have those 
responsibilities, so they trained for just 281 and 332 hours, respectively.  These two did 
have the extra burden of training for an emergency EVA.  Jarvis and McAuliffe trained 
for just 74 and 53 hours, respectively, with the bulk of them focused on crew systems 
such as the galley or sleep stations.  The flight specific SMS training began at L-9 weeks 
and the integrated simulations at L-7 weeks, with the crew reaching a high of 34 hours in 
simulations with flight controllers during the week before launch.  The crew and 
controllers worked together on three simulations to deploy the TDRS, one to deploy 
Spartan, and two to rendezvous with Spartan.  Even the team of TDRS controllers in Las 
Cruces, New Mexico, the IUS controllers at the Air Force Satellite Control Facility in 
Sunnyvale, California, and the Spartan engineering support personnel took part in these 
grueling 12 hour simulations, to make them as realistic as possible.90         
 Thus when the crew traveled to Florida, each of the seven could feel comfortable  
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that their training had met the standard that had worked very well thus far in the shuttle 
program.  They had withstood compression in their training schedule resulting from the 
slips in the STS-61C launch and their own, and as a result had worked as many as 70 
hours per week during December and January.  But because of their strong work ethic 
and the fact that there were no radically new tasks planned for this 25th shuttle mission, 
they still managed to meet the training time allotted for them.91  Yet there was one issue 
they were not prepared for at all: the effect of cold weather on the SRBs that would take 
them into orbit.  Morton Thiokol engineers knew about the problem of O-Rings failing 
to contain hot gases from their analysis of previous flights, as documented in the 
infamous teleconference with NASA managers on the night of January 27.  The tradition 
dating back to Alan Shepard’s Mercury flight had been to keep astronauts in the loop on 
critical issues such as this.  This was normally part of an astronaut’s preparation for 
flight, but the STS-51L crew knew nothing about it.  One can only guess how Scobee 
would have reacted to this controversial safety of flight issue.  “If I had known these 
things, I would have made them aware, that’s for damn sure,” Chief Astronaut John 
Young recalled.92     
 Thus on January 28, Challenger lifted off with seven crewmembers highly 
trained to respond to emergencies but entirely unaware of a fatal flaw.  The crew actions 
were normal through Scobee’s call “Roger, Go at throttle up” seventy seconds into the 
launch.  They did not report any abnormal readings from the instrument panel, nor did 
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flight controllers notice any such readings on their consoles.  Even if they did, the 
Rogers Commission concluded that no abort would have been survivable during those 
seventy seconds.93  Then Mike Smith said, “Uh oh,” presumably either in response to an 
instrument panel reading or the sheet of flame that he would have seen across his 
window.  The evidence indicates that the crew survived the breakup of Challenger that 
took place right at that moment.  This gave them a chance to implement their emergency 
training.  Investigators found that three of the four astronauts sitting in the flight deck 
had their Personal Egress Air Packs (PEAPs) turned on.  They also found that several 
switches on Smith’s side of the cockpit had been moved from their launch positions.  
Since lever locks protected these switches, the only way for this to happen was for Smith 
to have moved them.  Thus one can form an image of what likely happened in those 
agonizing seconds.  The cabin went dark when Challenger’s crew compartment broke 
apart from the rest of the vehicle.  Dick  Scobee tried to make calls to Mission Control 
and manually guide the vehicle, but the radio system and the hand controller no longer 
worked.  Smith flipped switches in an effort to restore electrical power and solve these 
problems.  Ellison Onizuka and Judy Resnik activated their PEAPs, then one of them 
reached forward to activate Smith’s.  Two minutes and forty-five seconds after the 
breakup, the crew compartment slammed into the Atlantic Ocean and killed all seven 
onboard.94       
 The lesson of the Challenger tragedy from a crew training standpoint is very  
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different from the lesson usually cited about the tragedy.  Engineering students to this 
day learn about the tragedy as a lesson in managers failing to heed the warnings of 
qualified engineers who knew about the O-Ring sealing problem, due to the pressures of 
groupthink and of meeting a schedule.  Schedule pressure did have a direct effect on 
training, as noted earlier.  But the astronauts had prepared for the flight in an exemplary 
manner in spite of this.  Though the Rogers Commission investigators looked for every 
piece of evidence concerning why the tragedy had happened, the report read, “The flight 
crew preparations for STS-51L were typical and satisfactory and had no effect on the 
accident.”95  Even when placed in an impossible situation, the crew rapidly went to work 
troubleshooting the problem before either loss of consciousness or the ocean impact.  
Fellow astronaut Mike Mullane even wondered if he would have had the presence of 
mind to reach forward and assist another crewmember with PEAP activation.  The 
lesson from a training standpoint was that a crew could take proper actions even when at 
the end of a grueling work schedule and when confronted with a shocking, catastrophic 
event.  The crew needed situational awareness to react properly to this.  Though no one 
will ever know exactly how the astronauts reacted, the evidence supports the conclusion 
that they reacted as a well-trained crew with situational awareness should.  Thus even in 
a national tragedy, one positive lesson emerged.96                        
 Over the next few months, the Rogers Commission members (including Sally 
Ride and Neil Armstrong) developed a list of recommendations for the future of the 
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shuttle program that had a direct effect on training.  Four of them stand out as especially 
applicable.  The report called for the use of more astronauts in management positions.  
Astronauts who had served in these positions in the past “brought to their positions flight 
experience and a keen appreciation of operations and flight safety.”  This would help 
prevent a repeat of the situation where Scobee’s crew had been unaware of the SRB O-
Ring flaw.  The report also read, “NASA must establish a flight rate that is consistent 
with its resources.”  A reduced flight rate meant the shuttle could not meet the lofty 
expectations originally placed upon it, but also meant instructors could stop compressing 
the crew training process.  This might have resulted in tired and inadequately trained 
crews if the shuttle had made all fifteen missions planned for 1986.  Related to this 
recommendation, the report argued that the shuttle should no longer be used as the only 
launch vehicle capable of taking payloads to space.  If unmanned launch vehicles 
returned to launching satellites, this would also reduce the number of missions for the 
shuttle to accomplish and reduce the burden on crew training.  The report also called for 
NASA to develop a crew escape system for the shuttle.  Astronauts had trained to use 
such a system from Mercury through the STS-4 mission, when ejection seats had been 
eliminated.  If Challenger had carried a bailout system, a strong person sitting close to 
the middeck hatch (like Ron McNair) might have been able to escape after the crew 
compartment broke apart from the rest of the vehicle.  If post-Challenger crews were 
trained in the operation of such a system, they would have a better chance of surviving a 
similar event.97     
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 In June, the Rogers Commission delivered the report to President Reagan and the 
onus fell on JSC personnel to make the improvements that would help ensure the 
Challenger seven had not died in vain.  “The findings and recommendations presented in 
this report are intended to contribute to the future NASA successes that the nation both 
expects and requires as the 21st century approaches,” the commission members 
declared.98  By the summer of 1987, NASA could report on the successful 
implementation of the four recommendations noted above, as well as a redesigned solid 
rocket motor.  The practice of placing astronauts in management positions and trusting 
their judgment on safety issues, which remains very robust today, was already well 
underway by 1987.  James Adamson, Charlie Bolden, Bob Crippen, Fred Gregory, Rick 
Hauck, Bryan O’Connor, Sally Ride, Brewster Shaw, Dick Truly, Paul Weitz, and John 
Young were already in these positions.  A Flight Rate Capability Working Group, which 
included a representative from the JSC training division, met in 1986 and 1987 to 
determine how many shuttle missions could realistically fly per year. The end result was 
a program that never again flew more than eight missions in a year, thus removing the 
burden of heavily compressed training that pre-accident crews had withstood.  The 
shuttle became only one of the vehicles counted on to send payloads to space, not the 
sole launch capability.  Another piece of good news came with the approval of a 
replacement orbiter for Challenger, which eventually became Endeavour.  Finally, the 
space agency reported on the several options under consideration as a crew escape 
system: ejection seats, tractor rocket extraction of seated crewmembers, bailout through 
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 the bottom of the orbiter, and tractor rocket ejection through the side hatch.99    
 Meanwhile, the instructors in JSC’s training division were already back at work 
by the summer of 1986.  The Astronaut Office contained about ninety members, so the 
instructors were busy providing generic and proficiency simulator training at a rate of 
110 hours per week.  Instructors and astronauts alike felt emotions ranging from anger to 
guilt to depression at this time, even as the report made clear that the training process 
had not contributed to the Challenger tragedy.  Many wondered what they could have 
done to prevent the loss of their colleagues and made use of the counseling services 
offered to them.  Ted Browder remarked that the instructors had forever lost their sense 
of innocence in preparing shuttle crews for emergencies.  But instructors and astronauts 
each understood that Columbia, Discovery, Atlantis, and the replacement orbiter had 
many missions ahead of them that required crewmembers capable of utilizing skills 
honed during training.  None wanted Dick Scobee, Mike Smith, Ellison Onizuka, Judy 
Resnik, Ron McNair, Greg Jarvis, and Christa McAuliffe to be the last people to “slip 
the surly bonds of Earth” aboard a Space Shuttle that had shown so much promise.100    
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CHAPTER XIV 
STS: “WE ARE TRAINING TO FLY IN OUTER SPACE!” 
 
 “It was a beautiful day, and I remember watching the birds go by and just 
looking out at the tranquil scene,” David Hilmers reflected.  Two years and eight months 
after the fiery destruction of Challenger and seven of his colleagues, he stood at the 
same Launch Pad 39B where the tragedy had happened, ready to return America to 
space.  He paused to think about the scenic Florida landscape and the journey he had 
taken to get here.  The STS-26 crew—Commander Rick Hauck, Pilot Dick Covey, and 
Mission Specialists John Lounge, David Hilmers, and George “Pinky” Nelson—had 
been assigned to fly Discovery in January 1987, meaning they were one of the best 
trained crews in the history of American spaceflight.  The training process had delivered 
spectacular results over the last quarter of a century, but the onus had fallen on these five 
astronauts and their instructors to prove they had heeded the lessons learned from the 
Challenger tragedy in preparing for spaceflight.  Several elements of their training 
differed from the busy days of 1985 and 1986.1    
 Ascent instructor Andy Foster remembers that one change made the process 
easier in the post-Challenger era.  As explained in the NASA report on the 
implementation of Rogers Commission recommendations and as Foster remembers 
today, “The loss of two or three SSMEs (contingency aborts) has always been 
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recognized as a potential event for any shuttle launch, and manual piloting procedures 
were in place to cover these engine failure cases.”  But after the accident, “In those cases 
where piloting techniques are critical, with small tolerance for errors or deviations, 
automatic techniques are being evaluated for incorporation into the onboard software.”  
Foster confirms that whereas the effort to do this had been “ad hoc” before the accident, 
afterwards “the program provided funding for procedure and database development and 
expansion, and the addition of that to crew procedures and training.  The crew 
procedures for aborts were eventually automated, which didn’t affect the number of 
lessons but did affect the amount of manual flying within each lesson that we trained.”2  
Making the aborts automated resulted in safer vehicle operations and freed astronauts 
from having to train for the manual aborts that Foster remembered as “brutal.”  This was 
one way that the accident and the Rogers Commission that investigated it had a direct 
effect on subsequent crew training. 
 Another way was the new escape system.  After rejecting several options based 
on performance, schedule, or budget, engineers decided in 1986 on an escape pole.  If an 
orbiter suffered a catastrophic problem while in controlled gliding flight, below about 
50,000 feet, a post-Challenger shuttle crew had procedures to follow that could result in 
their surviving the loss of the vehicle.  They would gather in the middeck, equalize the 
pressure of the middeck with the outside atmosphere, pyrotechnically jettison the side 
hatch, and manually deploy an escape pole to extend 9.8 feet downward.  Then each 
astronaut, one by one, would attach the parachute harness they would be wearing to a 
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lanyard on the pole and slide down on a path that took them under the orbiter’s left wing, 
allowing them to descend to a gentle landing by parachute.  Engineers tested this system 
on an Air Force C-141B Starlifter aircraft during the spring of 1988, then added it to the 
orbiters along with a new inflatable escape slide for use during ground evacuations.3  
Mike Mullane remembered that many astronauts considered this escape system 
inadequate, and as it turned out the system could not prevent the one remaining disaster 
in the shuttle program (the STS-107 crew was over 200,000 feet high, leaving them with 
no chance to use the escape pole).  But all astronauts needed to train with this system in 
the very unlikely case that it would become needed during a mission.4  
 Training for use of the escape pole was linked with one other element of training 
for and executing missions that returned in the post-Challenger era: pressure suits.  
During the pre-Challenger era, only the first four shuttle crews had worn suits.  But 
NASA physiologists decided that astronauts should return to wearing suits to provide 
protection during emergencies.  If an orbiter cabin lost pressure, the suits would keep 
them alive.  If they had to use that escape pole to bail out over an ocean, the suits would 
also keep them alive while they were bobbing around in cold water and waiting for 
rescue forces to arrive.  The David Clark company thus developed the Launch and Entry 
Suits (LES).  The suits contained not only a means of life support for loss of cabin 
pressure, but also a parachute pack, a life raft, a survival radio, a strobe light, a signal 
mirror, a flare kit, motion sickness pills, and a water pouch assembly for use after bailing 
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out of an orbiter.  The suits were also orange to enhance their visibility by rescue forces.  
Tests at the Naval Air Development Center showed that the suits could protect 
astronauts for up to three hours in 40 degree Fahrenheit water, meaning they could 
indeed save lives.  Thus along with training to bail out of the vehicle, astronauts needed 
to train with the suits that would protect them after they did this.  This took the form of 
training to don and doff the suits as well as wearing the suits in the SMS so astronauts 
could understand the reach and visibility restrictions that came with wearing them.  Jim 
Bagian, an astronaut who eventually flew two missions, performed a study of this prior 
to STS-26 and found a reduction of forward and overhead reach capability, but 
considered this offset by the survival potential the suits offered.5 
 Astronauts tied together their training with the escape pole and the suits by going 
to the WETF and later the NBL.  John Glenn recalled what this training entailed after his 
famous return to space as a Payload Specialist on the STS-95 mission in 1998.  “We had 
about a two hour session in which they laid out on the table all of this equipment and 
showed us exactly how you work all the different parts of it,” he explained of the 
survival gear included with the LES.  Then came a trip to the pool to rehearse using this 
equipment.  The pool contained a mockup of the side hatch and pole on a platform above 
the water.  The instructors hoisted the astronauts about ten feet above the pool, so they 
could use the pole and then rehearse falling toward the water as they might one day have 
to do during a bailout.  This “gives you an impact not too different than you would have 
if you came down in the parachute,” Glenn explained.  “You actually inflate your life 
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vest before you hit the water.  And after you hit the water, of course, you go under and 
have to come back up again to get in your life raft.  For safety’s sake, they have a half-
dozen frogmen in the pool who are watching everything you do underwater so that they 
can make sure that you’re absolutely safe.  And they coach you a little bit also, if you’re 
doing something wrong.  We were in the pool and the life rafts for the better part of an 
hour getting all the equipment out and checking it out and how to use it.  It was a lot of 
fun in the pool and it was excellent training.”  Though Glenn was only there to make his 
one flight as a PS, career astronauts had to go through this process every two years to 
remain flight eligible during the post-Challenger era.6    
 In addition to less manual flying in the simulator and more work with new 
equipment such as the escape pole and pressure suits, Pete Beauregard remembers one 
other new element of training beginning with the return to flight on STS-26.  “They also 
added, at least for a while, a few range safety simulations.  These would include the Air 
Force range safety personnel at Cape Canaveral that had the responsibility to initiate the 
self-destruction of the shuttle stack in flight if they determined a major malfunction 
similar to Challenger occurred.  In these simulations, the SimSup included a malfunction 
that would result in the shuttle stack deviating from the planned flight path such that 
people on the ground were in danger.  The malfunctions required for this had to result in 
both the need to issue a self-destruct signal and allow the crew time to execute a fast 
separation of the orbiter from the ET/SRB stack (which contained the destruct devices).  
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Typically the SimSups picked an onboard computer guidance malfunction or one or 
more stuck engine nozzle gimbals as the issue that required the crew and range safety 
personnel to do this.”  In the moments after the Challenger catastrophe had happened, 
the two SRBs flew along uncontrolled trajectories away from the fireball.  The Range 
Safety Officer had thus given the self-destruct signal to the SRBs.  The memory of this 
tragedy alerted SimSups to train for the possibility of another disaster.  Though there 
was no point in simulating exactly what had happened to Challenger, because there was 
no chance of crew survival, the simulation Beauregard describes tested the abilities of 
astronauts and controllers.7    
 New technology allowed one more training innovation during the post-
Challenger years: the Personal Computer.  “PCs were becoming more portable, they’re 
smaller, not the big mainframes, not the huge contraptions they would use to run 
simulators,” explained Lisa Reed, who joined JSC shortly after the tragedy.  Thus she 
and the other instructors began advocating for astronauts and flight controllers to learn 
about the Space Shuttle via Computer Based Training.  Today, a person interested in 
learning a task can go online and watch a YouTube video.  But during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the instructors used a PC to drive a videodisc (a precursor of today’s DVDs) 
that pulled up pictures, graphics, and video.  This allowed astronauts, beginning with the 
1990 ASCAN class, to learn shuttle systems less expensively than sitting with an 
instructor in a simulator.  In yet another way, the march of technology had taken training  
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a step beyond that enjoyed by the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo astronauts.8                    
 The post-Challenger era also featured much more of a slow and steady approach 
to the training and execution of missions than just before the tragedy.  This was true for 
vehicle processing, as Discovery underwent more than two hundred modifications at 
KSC from 1987 to 1988.  Whereas orbiters had gone from landing to rollout to the pad 
in as few as twenty-five days before the tragedy, afterwards engineers always took at 
least ninety days to do this.  This was also true for training, as the first post-accident 
crew began their simulator sessions nineteen months before a mission that was one of 
the simplest in shuttle history: deploy a TDRS, perform some middeck experiments, and 
come home.  Thus Rick Hauck, Dick Covey, John Lounge, David Hilmers, and “Pinky” 
Nelson had the luxury of time in making sure they prepared as thoroughly as possible.  
The five attended many briefings on the post-accident changes to the training process, 
then steadily ramped up their SMS training once the simulator was equipped with a 
software load similar to and then identical to their mission profile.  Then came training 
with the TDRS payload, the IUS that would take it to orbit, and the emergency EVA 
Lounge and Nelson might have to make.  Rick Bush had the honor of serving as their 
Training Team Lead, with Dudley Long serving as their training manager, Steve 
Messersmith specializing in computers and navigation, Darrel McGregor in systems, and 
Bill O’Keefe in control and propulsion.  Through all of this, engineers aided training by 
performing maintenance and restoration of the SMS.  As in the case of Apollo 1, the 
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downtime after a fatal accident allowed engineers to improve the quality of simulations.  
On September 29, 1988, Discovery returned America to space and the five STS-26  
crewmembers accomplished every mission objective until their landing four days later.9   
 The first post-accident missions focused mainly on deploying payloads for 
scientific or national security purposes, and the onus fell on the astronauts to make sure 
they were trained to correct any problems that might emerge with this.  Whether the 
payload was the Magellan probe to Venus, the Galileo probe to Jupiter, the Hubble 
Space Telescope, or the many classified reconnaissance satellites, SimSups made sure 
they were informed about payload malfunctions prior to the mission so they could test 
astronauts’ and flight controllers’ knowledge about the proper course of action.  By the 
time the real mission began, this placed flight directors like Milt Heflin in a mindset 
where he expected an emergency to take place anytime.10  The fact that crews and flight 
controllers went into a mission in this battle hardened state aided them in solving the 
glitches that unsurprisingly cropped up on a vehicle as complex as the orbiter or its 
payloads.  The crew of STS-30 (the mission that deployed Magellan in May 1989) 
became the first to replace a failed computer with a spare, performing an in-flight 
maintenance procedure that astronauts had long trained to accomplish.11  When the STS-
31 crew deployed Hubble in April 1990, with Steve Hawley having trained to grapple 
the telescope with Discovery’s robotic arm and maneuver it out of the payload bay with 
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very little clearance on either side, the second set of solar arrays abruptly stopped 
unfurling.  Bruce McCandless and Kathy Sullivan had trained to crank the array out by 
hand and went to the airlock, only to find that their services were not needed because 
controllers had found a work-around for the computer glitch that hampered the unfurling 
of the arrays.  The tradition of training giving crews the flexibility to increase the 
chances of mission success was gathering strength.12                    
 But one element was missing from those first two and a half years of flying after 
the accident: EVAs.  This changed on the STS-37 mission in April 1991, when Jerry 
Ross and Jay Apt went outside Atlantis.  The Compton Gamma Ray Observatory the 
crew deployed had a high gain antenna that would not deploy, meaning scientists could 
not receive the data they wanted.  Using the robotic arm or firing the orbiter’s RCS 
thrusters to shake the antenna free did not work.  But Ross and Apt had trained for hours 
in the WETF for just this possibility, so they could demonstrate their flexibility in aiding 
mission success in a way a purely automated mission could not.  Ross simply pushed the 
antenna several times until it shook free.  Though some astronomers have criticized the 
value of human spaceflight over the years, those who studied the observations that this 
spacecraft made over the next nine years could only do so because a knowledgeable 
crew had deployed its antenna in orbit, using the skills gathered during WETF training.  
Ross recalled that STS-37 was a much needed milestone in training for and executing 
EVAs, because JSC had lost much spacewalking expertise in the six years since the last 
one had happened.  Both astronauts and WETF instructors had left the space agency in 
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large numbers.  Yet “we needed a very robust team to be able to address the looming 
EVA wall that was coming at us to build the station,” Ross explained.  If the elected 
officials in Congress could see evidence of effective EVA operations, they would be 
more willing to support funding for Space Station Freedom, a project still in planning 
stages at the time.13 
 One of the most impressive feats along those lines, and instructive from an EVA 
training standpoint, came on the maiden flight of Endeavour in May 1992.  The seven 
members of the STS-49 crew had spent a tremendous amount of time training to 
coordinate their actions for the EVA retrieval of an Intelsat satellite that had failed to 
achieve geosynchronous orbit.  Rick Hieb and Pierre Thuot had been assigned to 
perform the EVA, so they had rehearsed their motions in the WETF with a mockup of 
the satellite.  One innovation in their training was the Errant Satellite Simulator (ESS), a 
low cost facility designed for this mission.  The other five crewmembers had tasks to 
perform as well, so Tom Akers trained to choreograph the spacewalkers’ actions as the 
intravehicular crewmember, Bruce Melnick trained to operate the robotic arm, Kathy 
Thornton trained to operate the onboard cameras, and Commander Dan Brandenstein 
and Pilot Kevin Chilton trained to fly Endeavour in formation with the satellite.  The 
seven placed that teamwork to the test successfully in orbit on May 10, but still 
encountered a snafu.  In the WETF, Thuot had placed a capture bar on the bottom of the 
satellite and it had always remained stationary so he could grab the satellite by the bar 
and return it to the payload bay.  But when he did this in orbit, Intelsat quickly wobbled 
                                                          
13  Ibid, 44.  
527 
 
out of control.  Over two EVAs, he did not succeed in placing the capture bar on 
Intelsat.  Would all of this crew’s training go for naught?  Melnick suggested an idea: 
Thuot, Hieb, and Akers should go outside to perform the first ever three person EVA.  
This way there would be an extra set of hands to control all three axes of the wobbling 
satellite and grab it by hand.  Despite initial reluctance, the flight controllers agreed to 
the idea.14      
 As usual in the now more than thirty year history of American human 
spaceflight, the training the crew had done helped them improvise successfully.  Thuot, 
Hieb, and Akers took three hours to maneuver into position and grasp Intelsat by hand, 
then five more to install a motor that took it to the desired geosynchronous orbit.  Going 
through the longest EVA ever to that point (today it is the second longest) was a tiring 
experience and required delicate work to safely grasp a set of rods on the bottom of the 
satellite while not slicing open a glove.  This would have been challenging in any case, 
but the training the crew had received underwater made it feasible.  When the three men 
made it back inside Endeavour, they were not exhausted because they had trained 
properly.  Other astronauts had gone to the WETF ahead of time to determine exactly 
where the three spacewalkers would need to position themselves, demonstrating the 
value of this facility as an on-the-fly training tool as well.15           
 During the post-Challenger years in general, the lessons learned from missions 
that related to training were most pronounced in the area of EVAs.  This was especially 
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true for STS-49, not only due to the Intelsat capture but also because Akers and Thornton 
made another 7 hour, 49 minute EVA to assemble a truss pyramid as preparation for  
space station assembly.  The astronauts returned with a whole host of recommendations.  
They gave a positive report for the Errant Satellite Simulator in the sense that this 
facility prepared them to learn the feel of an 8,600 pound mass in rotation, but reported 
that the sensitivity of Intelsat was far greater in orbit than in the simulator.  The crew 
attributed this to the fact that the simulator only operated in five degrees of freedom and 
recommended upgrading to six degrees.  They recommended that future astronauts work 
at a slow pace during WETF training, always train for tasks with two people rather than 
one, and always be vigilant in understanding the limits of the realism the WETF could 
offer.  This crew had found that water drag resulted in them coming to a stop in the pool 
earlier than in space, for instance, which future spacewalkers needed to understand.  
They also called for their successors to make one pool session per month early in their 
training and one per week during the last month, to ensure proficiency and conditioning.  
They made a host of suggestions to improve the WETF itself as well: prompt delivery of 
training hardware in the pool, prompt delivery of spare pins and bolts with that 
hardware, prompt upgrading of that hardware with the flight hardware, and a full set of 
cameras in the pool.16     
 The STS-54 crew undertook their training with these lessons in mind and made 
an extensive host of recommendations themselves.  The crew of Commander John 
Casper, Pilot Don McMonagle, and Mission Specialists Mario Runco, Greg Harbaugh, 
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and Susan Helms had planned to make a standard TDRS deployment mission.  But after 
the EVA to capture Intelsat had taken longer than planned and proved more difficult 
than WETF training had suggested, NASA managers changed their thinking toward 
EVAs in general.  Despite the euphoria for the improvisation that had overcome those 
difficulties, the STS-49 experience prompted the scheduling of an additional EVA on 
STS-54 to rehearse basic tasks.  Just as their predecessors had during the Gemini 
program, these managers worried that past difficulty posed trouble for the more 
challenging EVAs ahead (first a Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission and then 
dozens of missions to construct what would soon become known as the International 
Space Station) and perceived a benefit in going “back to the basics.”17  Thus Runco and 
Harbaugh spent nearly five hours outside Endeavour on January 17, 1993, testing their 
ability to climb into foot restraints, translate across the payload bay, and handle a bulky 
object called an Orbital Replacement Unit.  Despite encountering some fatigue, the two 
men proved they had a solid grasp of the basics in advance of the most complex work 
ever done in space.18   
 Since different astronauts would undertake those feats, Runco and Harbaugh 
offered much advice for them related to training.  This had been one of the objectives of 
their “back to the basics” EVA in the first place.  Many of their recommendations 
stressed the need to avoid moving too quickly in the WETF, because this only reduced a 
spacewalkers’ body control and efficiency in the pool or in space.  Since EVAs lasted 
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several hours each, astronauts had to work in the daytime and nighttime of each orbit.  
Thus Runco and Harbaugh recommended training for the reduced visibility of nighttime 
tasks by placing WETF lights on the orbital day/night cycle.  The two men also had a 
recommendation concerning fitness: future spacewalkers should undertake independent 
exercise to enhance hand, wrist, and forearm endurance, as this was more crucial than 
cardiovascular endurance.  Some of their recommendations related to the divers who 
worked with astronauts, such as the idea that divers should impart very small disturbing 
forces to the water to counter its damping effect on the astronauts’ motions.  Divers 
could do too much, though.  Runco and Harbaugh recommended not letting divers clear 
any tether snags, so the astronauts could learn to be aware of their tether and clear the 
snags by themselves.19  The JSC training personnel could not implement every 
recommendation that astronauts like these two made, because NASA had a finite budget 
allocated for training crews.  But several pieces of advice could be quickly implemented 
because they did not require any spending and information flowed freely among 
astronauts and instructors.                
 But throughout 1993, the STS-61 crew assigned to make the first Hubble 
servicing mission had more than their predecessors’ advice to help them train.  They had 
an entirely new training method that drew upon a still young technology.  When the 
Mercury astronauts reported for work in 1959, virtual reality was relegated to the pages 
of science fiction novels.  In 1962, cinematographer Morton Hellig did succeed in 
building a prototype of a bulky machine called Sensorama that showed movies while 
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engaging the viewer’s sense of sight, sound, smell, and touch.  But not until the 1980s 
did entrepreneurs form virtual reality companies in large numbers for training of medical 
personnel, airline pilots, soldiers, and eventually for the enjoyment of video game 
players.20  By 1990, JSC housed a Virtual Reality Laboratory (VRL) where astronauts 
could wear a headset and see images of the Earth, the orbiter payload bay, and tools they 
would work with in space.  Software developers had written the lines of code for the 
Dynamic Onboard Ubiquitous Graphics (DOUG) that generated these images.21  When 
Kathy Thornton, Tom Akers, Jeff Hoffman, and Story Musgrave began training for the 
STS-61 mission, they met with the VRL manager David Homan and pioneered this 
facility as a crew training device.  Astronauts who had trained for EVAs prior to this 
mission had only worked inside the orbiter payload bay, a mockup of which fit inside the 
WETF.  But Hubble was 43.3 feet long, taller than the depth of the WETF, so the 
training personnel had to cut the telescope mockup in half for pool exercises.  This 
meant the STS-61 crew needed another method to train to work with Hubble in a 
geometrically correct form and found it in the VRL.22    
 The four spacewalkers and robotic arm operator Claude Niccolier all found 
several benefits to virtual reality training.  First, training in a virtual environment rather 
than the physical environment of the pool meant there was no limitation on the size of 
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the equipment the astronauts worked with.  Second, the virtual environment eliminated a 
problem associated with gravity while working in the pool.  While astronauts were 
neutrally buoyant in the WETF, when they turned upside down they still felt the 
uncomfortable effect of gravity when they did so.  This was not realistic to spaceflight 
and there were even issues of astronauts developing shoulder problems due to their 
hanging in their suits while inverted.  In the virtual environment, they could see the same 
scene they would see in space and even receive haptic feedback to give them the same 
sense of touch without feeling these physical effects.  Third, arm operators like Niccolier 
could rehearse taking the arm through its various angles while seeing it digitally 
generated through the headset.  As noted in an earlier chapter, robotic arm operations in 
the WETF suffered from a lack of fidelity.  Fourth, the STS-61 crew found that because 
the VRL was still a novelty for astronaut training, Homan did not have to answer to the 
JSC training bureaucracy.  He could implement astronaut’s suggestions more easily as a 
result.  Astronauts beginning with Hoffman have been quick to point out that virtual 
reality should not replace neutral buoyancy.  The physical environment has remained the 
best place to rehearse translating from one worksite to another over the last two decades.  
But as a supplement, Hoffman remembers that the STS-61 crew felt impressed about the 
virtues of virtual reality and “a lot of people who came and take a look at it obviously 
became convinced as well, because it’s become a pretty widely used training tool.”23           
 The technology has steadily progressed over the last two decades, as seen in the 
comments of Hoffman and Clay Anderson, an astronaut who flew in 2007 and 2010.  
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Hoffman remembered that when he trained in 1993, the computers in the VRL were 
slow enough that he experienced a one-second time lag in using the headset.  If he 
suddenly turned his head to look in a different direction, it took a second for the visual 
scene to catch up with him.  Only one person at a time could use the headset, another 
limitation in 1993.24  Anderson comments that by the 21st century, the speed and visual 
representation of the experience had improved drastically while multiple people could 
participate.  “For a long time in my early training, we did not have good visual models of 
the Earth, the clouds, the sunrise, and the sunset,” he explains.  “But if you were to see 
the VRL today, it would take your breath away how realistic it looks.  Just look at the 
way technology has advanced in virtual reality games over the last ten years.  People are 
puking when they ride a virtual reality roller coaster.  That advancement in capability is 
hugely important because it doesn’t take a lot of computer power and doesn’t take a lot 
of money.  The whole deal with NASA is to do stuff as cheaply as possible, because it’s 
on the taxpayer dime.”25         
 There was a plenty valid reason for the investment of money and time in STS-61 
EVA training, whether in the pool or the VRL.  Scientists had found after the STS-31 
crew deployed Hubble, the telescope returned blurry images due to a slightly misshapen 
mirror.  The telescope had become a national embarrassment, which only the STS-61 
crew could remedy by taking advantage of the fact that engineers had designed the 
telescope for human repair in orbit.  Only one year earlier, Thornton and Akers had 
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encountered difficulty in retrieving a communications satellite.  It had taken them eight 
hours just to retrieve Intelsat and take it to the orbiter’s payload bay.  Now this crew 
would have to maneuver along the largest object any group of spacewalkers had ever 
confronted and do the delicate work of installing a massive device that would correct 
Hubble’s vision: the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR).  
If the STS-61 spacewalkers could not do this, the recent agreement with Russia to build 
an International Space Station would be for naught.  NASA Administrator Dan Goldin 
even visited them during their training and told them the future of American human 
spaceflight was in their hands.  How could the crew make sure they would not let down 
the scientific community, the space agency, and taxpayers alike?26      
 The crew relied on three methods: virtual reality, the pool, and visits to Goddard 
Spaceflight Center.  Hoffman remembered that the crew did most of their pool training 
at the Marshall Spaceflight Center, which featured a larger facility than the WETF.  
“We’d go down there for a week or so, and it was basically a routine which we’d get 
right back into the next time we went down,” he explained.  “You get up early in the 
morning.  We’d all gather around the table.  There’d be a model of the Shuttle, Hubble, 
the arm, and the little toy astronauts.  We’d go through the entire ‘This is what we’re 
going to do,’ because we were really trying to choreograph to try to eliminate any 
wasted motion.”  Between pool sessions and virtual reality sessions, the spacewalkers 
were able to rehearse techniques like Hoffman grabbing Musgrave by the boots and 
feeding him into the telescope.  Musgrave then removed components to get access to the 
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rate gyroscopes.  He replaced these old units, looked for the holes where the pins for the 
new units were supposed to go, and installed the new rate gyroscopes.  This was only 
one example, as the crew needed to replace solar arrays, the drive electronics for the 
arrays, and the Wide Field Planetary Camera as well as install COSTAR.  Nobody had 
ever done work of this complexity in orbit before.  The fact that there so many variables 
at play for the spacewalkers, from what tools to use (there would be about 200 onboard), 
to how much force to exert, to the effect of daytime and nighttime on their visibility, to 
how they were restrained, to the coordination of their movements with the arm operated 
by Niccolier, meant the spacewalkers needed the training.  The trips to Goddard also 
helped because the astronauts could see the real hardware there and could rehearse 
placing these components into a mechanical simulator of the telescope.27         
 The mission itself was one of the greatest testaments to training in the history of 
the shuttle program.  From December 5-9, 1993 the STS-61 crew performed an 
unprecedented five EVAs in as many days.  As the Gemini program had shown, an 
astronaut who had not trained for this unforgiving environment outside a spacecraft 
would become quickly fatigued in translating from one place to another, let alone in 
doing significant work.  Earlier in the shuttle program, the thought of two astronauts 
opening the doors of a giant telescope, loosening latches, removing electrical connectors, 
sliding out an old instrument, and installing the refrigerator sized COSTAR in its place 
had been wishful thinking.  This also went well beyond the capability of any robotic 
mission, underscoring the importance of training astronauts.  But since they had done so 
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time and time again in a realistic ground environment, Thornton and Akers had the 
confidence to do just that.  The four spacewalkers accomplished every task set out for 
them.  After Endeavour left the telescope behind, the mirrors in the new COSTAR could 
relay corrected beams of light to Hubble’s scientific instruments and the telescope could 
awe scientists with vivid photos of distant galaxies.  “Of all the programs that I have 
been associated with, it’s the one that was best planned and has been best executed,” 
argued Dick Covey, the STS-61 Commander.28  It was the first of five Hubble servicing 
missions (STS-61 in 1993, STS-82 in 1997, STS-103 in 1999, STS-109 in 2002, and STS-
125 in 2009), each of which succeeded in upgrading the telescope and keeping it in 
operation. 
 While STS-61 was probably the greatest landmark in the evolution of shuttle 
EVA training, STS-64 provided another one the following year.  Carl Meade and Mark 
Lee spent nine months training for the use of a backpack called Simplified Aid for EVA 
Rescue (SAFER).  Ten years had passed since the last time astronauts had made an EVA 
in which they were untethered from an orbiter, using the MMU backpack.  Now Meade 
and Lee trained to use a more lightweight backpack that could move them at up to 10 
feet per second through bursts of nitrogen.  The idea was that if astronauts became 
disconnected from their tethers during future Hubble or ISS missions, they could 
maneuver themselves back to their worksite using the SAFER controls secured to their 
suit torsos.  They would have to use just the right amount of thrust and maintain just the 
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right attitude, which called for training.  Doing this in a pool was not practical, so 
astronauts relied on virtual reality to become proficient.  “It was the only way you could 
train for that,” remembers Jim Voss, who became one of the many astronauts to use 
SAFER while working outside the ISS.  The virtual reality training worked well for 
Meade and Lee when they climbed outside Discovery on September 16, 1994, as they 
performed demonstrations of an EVA self-rescue and precision flying by tracking the 
robotic arm.  Their success helped to further legitimize the use of virtual reality as a 
training tool.29         
 While spectacular missions like the Intelsat repair, Hubble repairs, and the 
SAFER test broke new ground, the shuttle program settled into a routine of scientific 
research and spacecraft deployments by the early 1990s.  Despite the repetition of crew 
tasks, Pete Beauregard remembers, “Each flight had postflight lessons learned that 
would also apply to training.”  He cites two examples of how these lessons learned 
resulted in updates to the training plan for subsequent missions.  One was the need to 
find a balance between simulations filled with too many malfunctions and too few.  “If 
the training included what might be reasonably expected malfunctions, the training 
sessions would be pretty boring, and even the crews would complain,” he explains.  “On 
the other hand, sometimes the training teams would get a little carried away, and over 
time multiple malfunction scenarios were scaled back.”  A second example was the 
testing of flight rules in simulations.  “There were nearly unlimited ways to test these 
and the training teams were good at finding malfunction combinations that might 
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uncover holes in the flight rules,” Beauregard recalls.  “Many flight rules were changed 
over the years.  Often this was for very good lessons learned from training sessions, but 
also from too many unrealistic or smart malfunctions.  So that scaled back over the 
years.”  Although the four orbiters were typically flying six to eight missions per year by 
this point, the Space Shuttle program was still experimental.  Military aircraft, after all, 
are not declared operational until after hundreds of flights.  Thus the training for and 
flying of this much more complex vehicle was still subject to revision.30 
 As the missions sent an increasing number of rookie astronauts into orbit, the 
first time flyers learned from the more experienced astronauts during training.  “When 
you are in a simulator, often there was a group of people with a mix of experience and 
inexperience and you can learn by watching and talking to them,” remembers Jim Voss, 
who flew his first mission in 1991.31  This was especially true when Pilots trained for 
their first missions next to Commanders, who always had the experience of at least one 
previous mission.  “Jim Wetherbee was a mentor to me, especially since it was my first 
flight and he had flown twice before,” explains Eileen Collins of her time training to 
become the first woman to serve as Pilot in 1995.  “To throw out one of the things he 
taught me, I learned about the value of memorizing certain emergency procedures.  I 
memorized the procedures on my first flight so I could be faster in the simulator.”32  But 
in the 1990s, the learning from more experienced astronauts became formalized through 
the Instructor Astronaut (IA) program.  “Individuals will be assigned as IAs based upon 
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their experience level, past performance, duty assignment, and availability,” read a 
document belonging to Rick Husband, who was one of them.  IAs supported newly 
selected ASCANs by providing them with technical expertise in spacecraft systems, as 
well as supporting assigned crews by observing them in the SMS and providing 
“constructive feedback on the crew’s ability to work through problems together and to 
exercise effective Spaceflight Resource Management.”  IAs received notice that “No 
skill is more important than your ability to analyze and appraise crew performance.  
Your critique to the crew may be either oral or written.”33     
 Husband’s personal collection contains several examples of the kind of critiques 
that IAs made.  During one simulation, he observed the performances of Bjarni 
Tryggvason, Nick Patrick, and Clay Anderson.  “Training consisted of a prebrief, three 
entry runs (the first from deorbit through landing, the last two from 200,000 feet), and 
debrief after each run,” Husband wrote.  “Bjarni, Nick, and Clay rotated through the MS 
1, MS 2, and CDR seats.”  He then offered a positive evaluation of those he observed: 
“Clay fully participated in the prebrief and was good about asking questions on the 
various topics.  He had a super attitude toward learning and improving his knowledge.  
During the sim, Clay did well and had a good feel for the entry profile and events.”  
Husband found himself evaluated as well by IA Bob Curbeam, who made comments on 
the teamwork of the four crewmembers sitting in the SMS for an entry simulation: 
“Extremely good at backing each other up—only one instance where this was not done, 
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and it cost them dearly.  I bet it will never happen again!34  When asked today, Anderson 
remarks, “Not all astronauts were good instructor astronauts.  This was because the 
competition level was so fierce, especially in the world of EVAs.  When you are 
assigned to a crew, you’re not competing anymore.  The mission is your total focus and 
anything you can do to improve yourself or your crewmates to execute the mission is 
paramount.  When you’re not assigned, though, there is competition to become assigned.  
Some astronauts withheld information because they didn’t want you to become more 
qualified than them for that assignment.”  He does admit, “The majority of astronauts 
were good people.”35 
 Even if some astronauts were less receptive than others to helping less 
experienced colleagues, the IA program provided two valuable benefits that earlier 
astronauts did not have.  First, the IAs could judge the progress of their colleagues and 
comment on strengths or weaknesses.  Second, the IAs could point out to their 
colleagues the differences between simulations and flights.  Though the JSC instructors 
were very well qualified, none had actually been in space themselves.  Since the IAs did 
have this experience, they were a valuable resource for the astronauts still waiting for 
their first flights.  “It goes beyond noting the differences, but also helps to highlight the 
most critical factors to focus on,” explains Greg Chamitoff, selected with Clay Anderson 
in the 1998 class.  “A good example might be coping with the glare from the Sun during 
critical robotics operations.  This is not something easy to simulate and isn’t typically 
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dealt with much in training, but can be critical during actual operations.”36  David 
Brown, from the 1996 class, had a list of notes containing practical advice along these 
lines.  The advice covered diverse areas, from “Make sure you manifest heavy sweat 
pants and a heavy sweat shirt with a hood,” to “No dry wipes or wet wipes should go in 
the Waste Containment System,” to “The whole rendezvous day seems to go faster than 
the sims, even with no malfunctions.”37  In short, rookie astronauts could benefit from 
reading manuals and speaking to instructors but the IAs provided expertise that went 
beyond those methods.                      
 One other related innovation during the 1990s was the Commander Upgrade 
Program.  All astronauts on the pilot track flew at least one mission as a Pilot before 
being promoted to Commander for their next mission.  Before being assigned as 
Commanders, these astronauts went through an upgrade program to test their leadership 
ability.  This included SMS sessions with a generic crew that gave the prospective 
Commander the experience of leading all of these crewmembers.  An IA was present to 
evaluate the Commander during these sessions, with Curbeam being the person who 
evaluated Husband on September 24, 2001.  The idea here was that Commander was the 
position of greatest responsibility on a crew and prospective Commanders required 
special attention for this reason.  The briefing guide belonging to Husband listed the 
leadership traits NASA wanted to cultivate through this program.  They included, 
“Know when to be strict,” “Admit your mistakes,” and “Be disciplined at all times.”  
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The guide also stated that Commanders “are responsible for your crew’s training.  Work 
with your training manager to ensure you are getting everything your crew needs and 
that your training is optimized.”38 
 As the program continued through the 1990s, training for Commanders, Pilots, 
and Mission Specialists alike became more realistic due to simulator upgrades.  Clay 
Anderson saw the progression of the SMS across thirty-two years: from his first 
experience as a JSC intern in 1981 through his departure from the Astronaut Office in 
2013.  “In the early 1980s, you were limited by computer size and graphics capability,” 
he explains.  “As the graphics capability improved, and computer technology improved, 
and we had funding to upgrade the simulator, we did.  In addition to that, if we were 
doing projects to upgrade the shuttle avionics capability in the real vehicle, your 
simulator had to match that upgrade.”39  The upgrades included the simulation of out-
the-window visuals, as Eileen Collins remembers from her time as Pilot and 
Commander.  “It never reached what you can get in the real vehicle, as far as clarity and 
depth perception were concerned,” she recalls.  “But it did improve over time and I 
know the simulator personnel spent a lot of time upgrading the visuals.”40  When John 
Glenn trained for his STS-95 mission, the same person who had once used a Mercury 
Procedures Trainer that could simulate only a small amount of switches and dials and 
only a crude representation of out-the-window visuals now used an SMS powered by  
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computers that could simulate a vehicle several times more complex.  
 Another alteration to training during the 1990s was the transfer of Space Shuttle 
 operations to a company called United Space Alliance (USA, a hybrid enterprise 
between the two large aerospace firms Rockwell International and Lockheed Martin).  
On October 1, 1996, NASA signed a six year, $7 billion contract with USA to turn over 
critical areas like orbiter processing at KSC and training of astronauts and flight 
controllers at JSC.  NASA Administrator Goldin supported the idea as part of President 
Bill Clinton’s goal of cutting the federal budget and increasing efficiency in government.  
Though the agreement to entrust a private company provoked worries that safety would 
be compromised, Space Shuttle Program Manager Tommy Holloway declared that this 
would not happen.  He explained that the contract included incentives based on USA’s 
ability to meet safety goals and that NASA employees would retain the final say in 
critical flight operations where safety was at risk.  The first mission with the program 
under USA control was STS-80 in November and December 1996.  The all-veteran crew 
undertook the longest mission in shuttle history (17 days) and returned more data than  
expected from a Wake Shield Facility and ORFEUS-SPAS satellite, quieting worries 
about the contract.41  The crew made minor criticisms about their training in their 
mission debriefing, such as “Poor headwork in scheduling SMS upgrades” but gave a 
positive impression overall.  The astronauts even commented, “The WETF staff were 
stars,” “David Shaw was a star” in scheduling training activities, and “Martha May was  
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a star” in training the crew for photo and TV operations.42   
 As these changes took place, one useful barometer of the quality of training 
concerns the mistakes astronauts made.  Astronauts did make mistakes during simulator 
sessions, as had been the case since Mercury.  “As Commander, if we did a simulator 
session and my crew did everything perfect, I would ask my instructors to make it 
harder,” Eileen Collins explains.  “I wanted to see how each crewmember would handle 
mistakes, how they would recover from them, and how their attitude would be about a 
mistake.  You don’t want to make mistakes on orbit, so our philosophy was to make 
training hard on the ground and force crews into mistakes there so they will be better 
prepared in space.”  The record shows that in the actual missions during the busy 1990s, 
this strategy succeeded very well in eliminating mistakes.  Astronauts made silly errors 
from time to time, such as Collins pushing in a wrong circuit breaker for a ham radio and 
being unable to contact a school.  But when asked today about major errors concerning a 
mission objective or the safety of an orbiter, she reflects, “Nothing really comes to 
mind.”  The record supports the lack of significant mistakes, with one notable 
exception.43     
 The one exception came during the STS-87 mission on November 21, 1997.  
Kalpana Chawla was making her first flight aboard Columbia.  As the robotic arm 
operator, she deployed a Spartan spacecraft to make solar observations.  But two and a 
half minutes later, the crew noticed that Spartan had not performed the preprogrammed 
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pirouette maneuver they expected.  Chawla tried to grapple Spartan, but did not receive a 
firm capture signal and accidently gave the spacecraft a rotational spin of about two 
degrees per second.  “That snowballed, because Commander Kevin Kregel ended up 
having to chase down Spartan with Columbia,” recalls Eileen Collins of her colleagues’ 
mission.  “He was trying to match the rotation rate of the Spartan, which was an 
extremely difficult if not impossible flying job.”  Kregel did succeed in bringing 
Columbia close enough that Winston Scott and Takao Doi could perform a seven-hour, 
forty-three-minute EVA to capture Spartan by hand.  But the spacecraft did not return 
any science data.44   
 An investigation board determined what had happened: Chawla had missed a 
step in the checklist to turn on Spartan, resulting in the failure of its Attitude Control 
System.  The missed step and the imparting of the spin were the human errors, although 
the board also blamed the design of the orbiter software by which Chawla deployed 
Spartan.  The software did not give the crew any warnings that they were going to 
deploy Spartan without completing the activation sequence.  The board report 
recommended that programmers make the software more user friendly and that 
instructors emphasize similar malfunctions in training.45  “Kalpana’s robotic arm 
operation had to do with crew coordination,” remembers Susan Helms.  “I know what 
she was doing, because I did the same task of capturing a Spartan spacecraft (on her 
STS-64 mission).  I think crew coordination is a lot of what’s involved in training and I 
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think there was a continuous process of improvement by the training team to improve 
this.  I think that was evident in the shuttle program throughout all the years I spent at 
NASA.”46  Thus on this extremely rare occasion when a crewmember made a serious 
mistake, JSC personnel did learn from it.  Chawla admitted her mistake and received an 
assignment to STS-107.                 
 The most significant milestone during the 1990s, though, came with the dawn of 
cooperation between two former Cold War enemies: the Shuttle-Mir program.  Although 
plans for international missions had fallen dormant since Apollo-Soyuz, President George 
H.W. Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle succeeded in reaching out to the new 
Russian Federation in 1992, the year after the Soviet Union collapsed.  The “Joint 
Statement on Cooperation in Space” that the two nations signed called for Russian 
cosmonauts to fly aboard the Space Shuttle by 1994 and for the shuttle to then dock with 
the space station Mir.  Thus in November 1992, two veteran cosmonauts flew to 
Houston to undertake shuttle training: Sergei Krikalev and Vladimir Titov.  These two 
knew very well the vehicles they had flown aboard in the past: Mir and the Soyuz vehicle 
they had ridden to reach the station.  But Krikalev and Titov now had the task of proving 
they could adjust to the more complex shuttle training, overcome the language barrier, 
and prove the struggling new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin was right to 
pursue a cooperative space project.47    
 JSC instructors worked with Krikalev and Titov alone during their first three  
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months in Houston, which meant overcoming the language barrier to teach them shuttle 
systems and operations.  “We, the instructors, spent eight hours a day with them,” Lisa 
Reed explained.  This included an exhaustive series of briefings and SST sessions made 
more difficult by the fact that the instructors spoke to the cosmonauts through 
translators.  If a briefing took one hour to teach an astronaut, it took three hours to teach 
a cosmonaut.  Reed called this “like drinking from a fire hose for them,” but Krikalev 
and Titov “rose to the task and did very well.”48  In February 1993, Krikalev began 
simulations with the STS-60 crew: Commander Charlie Bolden, Pilot Ken Reightler, and 
Mission Specialists Jan Davis, Ron Sega, and Franklin Chang-Diaz.  Though these five 
and the instructors had spent almost all of their lives in a Cold War environment, 
including Bolden’s combat missions in Vietnam, all adjusted to working with Krikalev.  
The social events the crew attended helped to integrate Krikalev into the American way 
of life.  Krikalev also adjusted to training for a shuttle flight that was much more hectic 
than his Mir flights; the flight plan for every day was laid out in fifteen-minute 
segments, because the crew only had eight days to perform their scientific research as 
opposed to the months Krikalev had aboard Mir.  When Discovery roared into orbit on 
February 3, 1994, he felt well trained to operate the robotic arm, the Space Acceleration 
Measurement System, and several joint experiments in Spacehab.49 
 The next step called for Discovery to rendezvous with Mir.  For the first time in  
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the long history of the Space Shuttle, the vehicle finally had a chance to “shuttle” a crew  
to a space station.  The STS-63 crew featured Titov, so once again the JSC instructors 
worked with a Russian while the five Americans spent a couple of weeks in Russia.  A 
group of Americans had begun training in Star City for long duration Mir missions by 
this point (see Chapter 15), so shuttle crews began much briefer training sessions there in 
anticipation of the day that they would climb aboard Mir as well.50  But the most 
significant aspect of training for this mission was the rendezvous with Mir, the largest 
spacecraft an orbiter had ever confronted.  The momentum and mass of these two 
vehicles—87 tons for Discovery and 103 tons for Mir—meant that a small human error 
could have hazardous consequences when the two were in proximity.  Thus the crew 
spent numerous hours in the SMS and SES, made especially effective by the SFRM 
techniques that instructors had recently introduced.  As Commander, Jim Wetherbee had 
to fly the vehicle toward Mir.  Pilot Eileen Collins and MS 2 Mike Foale paid attention 
to orbiter systems and the ship’s trajectory.  MS 1 Bernard Harris worked with a hand 
held laser that gave navigation data.  On future docking missions, the MS 3 would have 
to prepare the docking system as well.  In the course of training for these tasks, all the 
astronauts learned about SFRM techniques such as maintaining communication 
discipline with Mission Control, prioritizing failures and analyzing them for impact, and 
giving fellow crewmembers verbal or visual confirmation that they were cleared to take 
a critical action.  To reduce the chances of the kind of mistake mentioned earlier, two  
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people observed each switch throw or hand controller input.51 
 When Discovery reached orbit on February 3, 1995, the training paid off.  The 
crew and flight controllers handled some adversity by stopping a leak in one RCS 
thruster and shutting off fuel to another leaking thruster.  On February 6, this allowed the 
crew to make a flawless approach to within 35 feet of Mir, stationkeep for 15 minutes, 
and then fly around the station at 400 feet away.  The flight provided a strong indication 
of the effectiveness of the training regimen.  Though Wetherbee primarily earned credit 
for the feat, he had trained as only one component of a team which was well honed by 
the time they reached orbit thanks to SFRM.52   
 Taking the last step and docking the orbiter to Mir during the STS-71 mission in 
June called for new training methods.  Like past missions, the STS-71 training team 
consisted of one lead and four core discipline instructors.  But given the complexity of 
rendezvous and docking, the team included additional instructors in those disciplines as 
well.  Lisa Reed instructed the crew in the Orbiter Docking System, which engineers had 
just affixed to Atlantis and which would need to make hard contact with Mir’s docking 
system.  She went to Rockwell International, watched the operation of the docking ring, 
and then wrote the programming requirements for the SMS to simulate this system.  “I 
would teach them, once we had contact with the Mir docking mechanism and capture, 
how to bring the two together to create an airtight seal so that we could eventually open 
the hatches and see all those wonderful welcoming ceremonies,” she explained.  Along 
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with this came simulations to “teach them how to potentially get out of a hairy situation 
should it arise.”  By launch day, the crew understood how to recognize the sounds for 
fire, cabin depressurization, or cabin leak and when to make an emergency undocking.  
Other simulations in Star City taught them to transfer cargo through a mockup of Mir, in 
a preview of the ISS missions to come.  Ellen Baker trained as a Payload Commander, 
meaning she was in charge of nearly three tons of science cargo aboard Atlantis.  The 
training included 12 hour integrated simulations with flight controllers in Houston and 
Moscow, which added complexity.53 
 On June 29, Commander Robert “Hoot Gibson” and Pilot Charlie Precourt 
proved the value of having trained human operators at the controls aboard Atlantis.  
Their small engine firings brought the orbiter to a point about nine miles behind Mir.  
After beginning their terminal phase initiation burn, the crew benefited from a new 
procedure called an R-bar approach.  This meant approaching Mir from directly below, 
which allowed gravitational forces to slow Atlantis’s speed relative to Mir more than if 
the approach came from directly in front of Mir.  This reduced the need for RCS thruster 
firings, but Gibson still needed the piloting skill to exert manual control when Atlantis 
was half a mile below Mir.  He went to the aft flight deck that overlooked the payload 
bay, pulsed the hand controller in response to a camera fixed to the docking system, and 
centered this system with Mir’s docking system.  Having slowed his approach to 0.1 feet 
per second, he made a docking that was off by less than one inch and 0.5 degrees.  Reed 
                                                          
53  Interview with Reed, June 19, 1998 and Lisa M. Reed, Interviewed by Jennifer Ross-Nazzal, July 24, 2015, 
Houston, Texas, http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/ oral_histories/ReedLM/ReedLM_7-24-15.htm (accessed January 23, 
2017).  
551 
 
felt thrilled that the training had paid off.  “The last time we actually docked during 
Apollo-Soyuz, it was a different time, it was a different place, and we weren’t necessarily 
friendly,” she reflected.  “This time it just had an overwhelming impact on me…The rest 
of the day—the training team—we just walked around.  We were all kind of in a daze 
because we had trained these people to do this, and they had gone up and done it 
perfectly.”  The cargo transfer and joint scientific investigations also succeeded, as did 
the first crew transfer in shuttle history.  Laid out in custom seats, Gennady Strekalov, 
Vladimir Dezhurov, and Norm Thagard returned aboard Atlantis on July 7 after 115 days 
aboard Mir.54             
 The shuttle docked eight more times with Mir until STS-91 in June 1998, with the 
training and execution becoming smoother with the passing missions.  Shuttle crews 
followed a pattern of spending a few days each in Russia, allowing them to take classes 
on Mir’s construction, components, life support, and communication systems, as well as 
going through docking and transfer procedures.  As these trips and the actual missions 
progressed, one of the greatest benefits was that astronauts learned how to become more 
effective loadmasters when transferring thousands of pounds of cargo into Mir.  Bonnie 
Dunbar remembered that past experience indicated how long this should take and this 
made training and execution smoother by the time of her STS-89 mission.  Crews needed 
to be loadmasters on every Mir mission and ISS mission to come, so this had particular 
value.55   
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 Another benefit of training came in preparation for STS-74, a 1995 mission when 
Atlantis delivered a Russian-built docking module to Mir.  This was the first time an 
orbiter carried a space station module in its payload bay that the crew then had to 
assemble to a station, which would become the primary function of the Space Shuttle 
program during the ISS era to come.  Once again, teamwork became a guiding principle 
of training for this task.  MS 1 Chris Hadfield had to use the robotic arm to grab the 
docking module, lift it out of the payload bay, rotate it into a vertical position, and place 
it just a few inches away from Mir.  Then Commander Ken Cameron and Pilot Jim 
Halsell had to fire RCS thrusters to ram the module into a connection with Mir.  
Meanwhile, MS 2 Jerry Ross and MS 3 Bill McArthur trained for an emergency EVA to 
use a set of straps to ratchet the module into place.  Thus all five STS-74 crewmembers 
had roles to rehearse during this operation.  Their actual mission went smoothly and 
demonstrated convincingly that ISS construction would be feasible.56                 
 The rendezvous and docking training also became more sophisticated as the 
missions progressed, especially with the addition of a new training device.  A machine 
called a Part-Task Trainer used Silicon Graphics technology to display a view of the 
approach to Mir while astronauts used a hand controller to rehearse making the kind of 
precision docking Gibson had made.  The advantage of this device was that it was easier 
for astronauts to schedule time here than the SMS or SES.  Astronauts could also begin 
simulating an approach at different points here and with different failures, such as the 
loss of RCS thrusters, mixed in.  After STS-91, Pilot Dom Gorie wrote, “The training 
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with several attitudes, ranges and station-keeping options builds a much deeper 
knowledge base of orbital mechanics and orbiter flying qualities.”  This proved 
especially useful due to the problems with Mir that will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Knowing that Mir lost attitude control in 1997, shuttle crews had to train for several 
variations of those options Gorie mentioned to make sure the orbiter would safely link 
with the station.  But all of the crews successfully rendezvoused and docked on the 
strength of their training.  On June 12, 1998, Charlie Precourt and Gorie brought 
Discovery to a landing and the Shuttle-Mir program to a close.57             
 Most of the shuttle flights from this point focused on the daunting task of ISS 
construction, although one additional milestone came in 1998 and demonstrated another 
way that shuttle training in this era had departed from the pre-Challenger era.  Before 
the tragedy, Payload Specialists such as Jake Garn, Bill Nelson, and Christa McAuliffe 
had only meager training duties before their flights.  At the time McAuliffe was in 
training, there were even plans to fly a journalist after her.  The accident put a stop to 
these plans.  During the post-Challenger era, the Payload Specialists had backgrounds 
more suited to making mission contributions than politician, high school teacher, or 
journalist.  Usually they were either academics whose research prepared them for the 
experiments aboard a specific mission or foreign astronauts given a chance to fly on the 
shuttle.  Each of them participated in the training and science research more thoroughly 
than Garn, Nelson, or McAuliffe.  On January 16, 1998, Administrator Goldin made an 
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announcement that provoked controversy even as it stirred the public imagination: Ohio 
Senator John Glenn would return to space aboard the STS-95 mission that October.  
Critics claimed this was simply a matter of NASA seeking publicity and refusing to say 
no to a politician who wanted a flight.  But Goldin made clear he would not have granted 
Glenn his wish without approval from the National Institutes of Health that his proposed 
experiments on the aging process had scientific merit, or without the training that 
accompanied them.58 
 True to Goldin’s word, Glenn took on a significant responsibility during his 
training and flight that demonstrated how far PS training had come since the 1980s.  He 
went through briefings on the shuttle cabin, equipment, and emergency procedures, just 
as his politician predecessors Garn and Nelson had.  But he also had responsibility for 
more experiments than any of the other six STS-95 crewmembers, which covered vital 
areas of biological research such as the immune system, muscle loss, bone loss, and 
sleep disorders.  After meeting with each Principal Investigator for a familiarization 
session, he used computer based training to electronically interact with the equipment 
and payloads that would fly in the Spacehab module, located in Discovery’s payload 
bay.  Even the 77 year old who had become the first American to orbit Earth in an age of 
primitive computer technology embraced the use of laptop computers in 1998.  Payload 
Commander Steve Robinson remembered, “I had the training people calling me up, 
saying, ‘Would you get this guy to quit asking for more training?’  He just went after it.  
By the time we flew, he knew more about laptop computers than I did.”  Then he 
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rehearsed his tasks alongside the other six crewmembers in two timeline simulations that 
were integrated with Mission Control and three simulations that were integrated with 
Mission Control and the Payload Operations Control Center.  There were over eighty 
experiments onboard, which placed time pressure on the entire crew and especially 
Robinson as Payload Commander.  A post-flight report called STS-95 “one of the most 
challenging missions to train to date” due to late manifest changes, several payloads not 
being ready to train until a late date, and reduction of the crew time available for the 
payloads.  But the astronauts proved their flight readiness in the simulations and went on 
to return useful data over just under nine days in orbit.59   
 While this mission proved the value of having trained humans overcoming 
challenges to return a myriad of scientific data, one mission the following year proved 
the value of having them to respond to malfunctions.  As Commander of STS-93, Eileen 
Collins trained to become the first woman to command a shuttle mission.  She reflects 
today that flying the aborts and manually flying the ascent to orbit, in case it was 
necessary to take over from the autopilot and place the vehicle in a very specific orbital 
inclination, were the most challenging flying she did in the SMS prior to the mission.  
STS-93 presented a significant challenge in case an abort was needed, because Columbia 
carried the heavy Chandra X-Ray Observatory in the payload bay.  “We used to go 
around saying we had the heaviest payload in the history of the shuttle program,” she 
says.  “We were very heavy and had a very aft center of gravity, which made an abort 
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very tricky.  In fact, we had a lot of what we called black zones.  If we had two or three 
engines out, you just had to accept the fact that you weren’t going to make it.  It was 
important that the engines were running.  But by the time I flew, I had a high degree of 
confidence because I had the ability to ask for more training if I wasn’t confident.”  As 
she sat in the SMS, she had no way of knowing that STS-93 would become one of the 
troubled launches in shuttle history.60   
 On July 23, 1999, the trouble for Columbia began about five seconds after liftoff.  
An electrical bus called AC-1 failed, which resulted in the failure of a primary controller 
of one main engine and backup controller of another.  That abort Collins had trained for 
would have come to fruition at this point, except the redundancy of the main engine 
controllers fortunately made this unnecessary.  “We did train for this, and you’re going 
to love this story,” she remembers.  “During the launch, the CapCom called back to us, 
‘Columbia, AC bus sensors off.’  This was an action that the Pilot did.  He has to throw 
three switches and that protects us for the next failure.  So Jeff Ashby did that.  Then the 
CapCom told us what the failure was.  The funny thing about that was that the very last 
simulator session that my crew did before launch had the same failure: the AC-1.  That 
was extremely odd, you might want to call it a coincidence, but it was extremely 
unlikely that the SimSup would do this.  We were all kind of joking about it because it 
was kind of unusual that this would happen.  The training was just outstanding.  I don’t 
know how much more praise I can give the training, because I thought it really prepared 
us well.”  Thus as the world celebrated the 30th anniversary of Apollo 11 that month, a 
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SimSup had unwittingly trained astronauts in a malfunction that was about to occur on a 
real mission, just as Dick Koos had in 1969.  Columbia did have one other serious 
launch malfunction which the crew could not train for: a hydrogen leak in one of the 
main engines.  The crew took no action and did not even know about it until told in 
orbit, but Columbia had an early main engine cutoff because it had run out of fuel.  Still, 
the STS-93 crew reached orbit after all.61         
 Later that day, Catherine Coleman used the robotic arm to deploy the 50,162 
pound observatory.  Two other crewmembers had trained to perform an EVA after the 
deployment, in case they were needed to solve a malfunction like Jerry Ross and Jay Apt 
with the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory on STS-37.  The deployment went perfectly 
instead, but Collins cites this as a reason that having trained humans on the mission 
offered benefits that a completely automated mission would not have had.  “Chandra 
could have been launched on an expendable rocket,” she explains.  “It was more 
expensive to launch it instead on the shuttle, but the advantage of having it on the shuttle 
was having a crew there.  We were trained to deal with a whole list of things on Chandra 
that could fail.  The mission had a higher probability of success because people were 
there.”  NASA now had three “Great Observatories” in orbit, surveying distant galaxies 
in light across the electromagnetic spectrum, and trained crewmembers had been  
responsible for deploying all of them (Hubble, Compton, and Chandra).62        
 By this point, the last and most daunting task in shuttle history had begun:  
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construction of the ISS.  While astronauts had traveled much farther away from Earth 
during Apollo, never had they confronted a project as challenging from a standpoint of 
robotics and EVA operations as this one.  The completed station would be 239 feet long 
by 356 feet wide, meaning it could not be launched in one piece and astronauts needed to 
assemble the components using the robotic arm and tools carried by hand during EVAs.  
Fortunately, the results from training and execution of these tasks during the 1990s had 
built confidence.  The NBL had replaced the WETF in 1998, meaning astronauts had a 
pool large enough to house full-scale mockups of ISS modules for EVA training.  If the 
astronauts wanted to remove the elements of training in the pool that did not match the 
real experience, they also had virtual reality simulations that were unrestricted by size 
limitations.  Ross, one of the most experienced spacewalkers in the Astronaut Office, 
helped formulate the training requirements for these astronauts who would construct the 
ISS.  His plan called for at least three runs in the NBL to evaluate every assembly or 
maintenance task that would be required.  He and the neutral buoyancy instructors chose 
a cadre of astronauts to carry out these runs that varied widely in size, strength, and EVA 
experience.  Those deemed suitable to build the ISS received the attention of Astronaut 
Office Chief Bob Cabana and Director of Flight Crew Operations Dave Leestma for 
assignment to crews.  Whereas their Apollo predecessors had demonstrated the value of 
training by becoming field geologists, these people would train to become “orbital hard 
hats.”63    
 The task of beginning ISS construction fell to the STS-88 crew: Commander Bob  
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Cabana, Pilot Frederick Sturckow, MS 1 Jerry Ross, MS 2 Nancy Currie, MS 3 James 
Newman, and MS 4 Sergei Krikalev.  These astronauts had the assignment of carrying a 
node named Unity in Endeavour’s payload bay and connecting it to a Russian module 
called Zarya, which would launch the previous month atop a Proton rocket.  Training 
the crew to operate the orbiter and reach another spacecraft had reached a mature stage 
by the point, especially given the Shuttle-Mir experience.  Cabana remembered traveling 
to Russia to learn about the docking system for the ISS from the person who designed it, 
Vladimir Syromyatnikov, and feeling confident about this aspect of training.  But the 
crew quickly learned that simulating Unity and Zarya themselves was another matter.  
“At that point in the program, they did not have the simulator up in Houston, where 
things actually worked, and you could train on it reliably,” Cabana explained.  The 
astronauts had nothing like an SMS, which mimicked the operation of a vehicle using 
powerful computers.  Training thus posed a new challenge that the crew of the 93rd 
shuttle mission would not have otherwise confronted.  As per the tradition in American 
spaceflight dating back to Mercury, the crew relied heavily instead on learning the 
systems of Unity and Zarya as they were being built.  They visited the Khrunichev plant 
in Russia to learn about Zarya and the Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville to see 
Unity as it progressed from an empty aluminum shell to a finished product at the Cape.  
This allowed them to understand the essential resources that were routed through these 
two modules, such as fluids, the environmental system, and electrical system, and the  
electronics work they would have to do once inside the new ISS.64        
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 When Endeavour soared into orbit to chase down Zarya on December 4, the 
mission provided a strong testament to training.  More than previous missions, these 
construction flights had to be tightly choreographed with each crewmember knowing 
what task to accomplish in a specified amount of time.  Ross reflected, “The assembly 
flights are not only time packed, but everything has to stack on top of each other.  It’s 
kind of like building a house of cards.”65  This flight provided a great indication of what 
he meant.  As described earlier for the Mir missions, rendezvous required the 
Commander, Pilot, and Mission Specialists to assist each other.  Once the orbiter had 
reached Zarya, Currie used the robotic arm to lift Unity out of the payload bay and 
carried it into place on Endeavour’s docking port.  Then she used the arm to capture 
Zarya and mate it to Unity.  Ross and Newman proceeded to climb outside and do the 
delicate work that needed to be done by hand: the attachment of cables, connectors, and 
hand rails to the two docked modules.  The rest of the crew had to assist them, with 
Currie operating the arm and another astronaut choreographing the spacewalkers’ 
activities.  Then the crew became the first to float through the tunnel from Endeavour to 
the ISS, where they installed the electronics that brought the Unity-Zarya combination to 
life.  The need to become successful in these orbital construction duties placed a high 
premium on working together as a team and following a timeline in realistic simulations.  
But the crew of the long delayed STS-88 mission had that training and proved successful, 
demonstrating in the process that human ability went beyond what an automaton could  
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accomplish.66     
 Yet as Cabana implied, the training to operate ISS modules definitely required 
improvement.  The seven astronauts of the next mission to visit the station, the STS-96 
crew, supported this point during their postflight debriefing.  They commented that 
training for ascent and entry aboard Discovery “was great” and argued, “In general, 
when a crewmember completes the shuttle training flow they know everything they need 
to know to fly their mission.”  But this contrasted with the training to learn ISS systems.  
The seven astronauts did work with a Station Training Lead as well as a Shuttle Training 
Lead for this mission, but found that JSC instructors did not have as extensive a depth of 
knowledge on ISS systems as on shuttle systems.  The astronauts did compliment the 
instructors for “running down the answers to their questions,” but developing American 
expertise in a new international project presented a new challenge that had yet to be fully 
met.  The training hardware also needed improvement, according to the STS-96 crew.  
They did get a chance to train in mockups of the Unity and Zarya modules, but for every 
two hour session they would lose about 30 minutes due to simulator breakdowns.67   
 In addition to these problems, the crew faced a new problem in training for ISS 
flights: the sheer amount they needed to undergo.  For instance, MS 4 Julie Payette had 
to become proficient in ISS systems during an early phase of that program while also 
training to make Earth observations, operate a camera, choreograph an EVA from inside 
Discovery, assist with the deployment of a satellite called Starshine, transfer supplies 
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into the ISS, assist with the reentry on the flight deck, and serve as backup for a host of 
other chores.  To add to the challenge, she was making her first flight.  The crew ran the 
risk of becoming tired prior to their flight, a problem that other shuttle crews had faced.  
But these seven astronauts “did not feel tired when they launched,” for which they 
credited longtime Training Manager Myron Fullmer.  They believed that if they had a 
new Training Manager, “it would cause the crew to spend additional time coordinating 
scheduling details.  In some cases, crews may even sign up to do things that are not 
essential, driving their workload even higher than necessary.”  But Fullmer helped the 
astronauts maintain a reasonable schedule prior to launch so that they could launch 
“physically and mentally in good shape.”  After the crew succeeded in performing the 
first ever docking with the ISS, restocking the facility and landing Discovery on June 6, 
1999, Pilot Rick Husband scrawled two notes at the top of the STS-96 postflight debrief 
outline: “Amazing job” and “Everyone happy.”  Even if the new program was a work in 
progress, this did not stop talented astronauts and instructors from accomplishing their 
jobs.68 
 In July 2000, the Russians finally achieved a much delayed milestone that 
transformed the station itself and the training process: the launch of the Zvezda module 
in which a crew of three could fly long duration missions.  Thus the ISS now consisted 
of two Russian components and one American component.  The Russian flight 
controllers were responsible for sending commands to Zarya and Zvezda, while 
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American flight controllers were responsible for sending commands to Unity.  This 
resulted in the need for a high degree of synchronization between the two control centers 
and the crews of subsequent shuttle missions.  Thus Station Training Lead Marc Reagan 
remembers the first joint integrated simulations between all three of these entities as 
taking place that year.  Reagan worked with his instructor counterparts in Russia to make 
these simulations possible.  “Figuring out how we were going to work together and how 
we were going to simulate together and figuring out what each of our priorities were and 
executing them was a ton of work,” he remembers.  “We broke new ground.  We did not 
have to do that during Shuttle-Mir, because there was just one American astronaut 
showing up at a Russian space station that was completely under Russian control.”  But 
since America and Russia shared this new facility, “The work in terms of figuring out 
how we were going to train together was basically done by me and our STS-92 team.”69         
 According to Reagan, the STS-92 crew met the new challenges presented to 
them.  “STS-92 was a very veteran crew,” he reflects.  “They were very solid veterans 
and you didn’t have to train them over and over to get things right.”  These seven 
astronauts also had two and a half years to train, due to the long delay in the Zvezda 
launch.  According to Pilot Pam Melroy, this time helped the crew meld their 
personalities into an effective unit, helped by the fact that Commander Brian Duffy did 
not have a dictator’s mentality.  He made all seven feel as if they made decisions 
together, which helped morale during challenging times.  Thus the crew succeeded in 
learning how to coordinate their actions between two control centers during the 
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rendezvous and docking, the four EVAs required to connect cables to the Z1 Truss 
Structure they would bring inside Discovery’s payload bay (the first piece of the 
enormous metal backbone for the space station), and their actions inside the growing 
ISS.  The training that Duffy did in making a rendezvous with the station came in 
especially handy when Discovery made its approach on October 13, 2000.  The orbiter’s 
KU band system failed, meaning he did not have radar for the rendezvous.  But he relied 
on a laser system in the payload bay, a handheld laser in the flight deck, and his own 
“seat-of-the-pants” judgment honed from hours of training in the SES and SMS to dock 
with the ISS successfully.  By the time Discovery left, the crew had left the ISS finally 
capable of housing a permanent crew.70 
 The construction tasks grew ever more daunting during the several shuttle 
missions that visited the station over the next two years.  Yet every mission succeeded 
and this would not have been possible without the recent advances in EVA training.  If 
astronauts had tried to build this unprecedentedly large outpost by training in the old 
WETF, or if a pool had been their only means of training, their chances of success would 
have been far lower.  But when crews trained to install a truss segment that was over 40 
feet long, for instance, a mockup could fit in the NBL and the astronauts could rehearse 
maneuvering around it just as they would in space.  This allowed Andy Thomas to 
remark after his STS-102 EVA in 2001: “You do it almost by memory, each step.  You 
know where the handrails are, because you’ve trained on a very high fidelity mockup.  In 
fact, that’s what surprised me about it.  It had this sense of, ‘I’ve done this before.  I’ve 
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been here before.’  It was all because the pool training is such high fidelity training.”71  
When robotic arm operators wanted to rehearse carrying a spacewalker to a worksite via 
the arm, virtual reality training came in especially handy as well.  “To do that in the 
water, the robotic arm that was in the water was typically not very helpful,” says Clay 
Anderson.  “It was big, cumbersome, and broke down a lot.  It wasn’t the same as flying 
the arm in space.  Oftentimes, astronauts who tried to fly the arm in the pool got negative 
training.”72  But the combination of virtual reality to train for this task and the NBL to 
train for the delicate work done by hand resulted in a record where by the end of 2002, 
spacewalkers had accumulated over 300 hours working outside the station.  During the 
long political debate concerning Space Station Freedom and then the ISS before it was 
built, one of the points of controversy was whether such an extreme amount of EVAs 
was feasible.  Training allowed astronauts to dispel that worry.73     
 Training for robotic arm operators, whether via virtual reality or the MDF, also 
stands out as a critical element of what made the construction missions successful.  
When Marsha Ivins used the robotic arm to deploy the Destiny laboratory module in 
January 2001, for instance, the module was so large that she had remarkably little 
clearance on either side of Atlantis’s payload bay when she lifted it out.  She also had the 
task of removing a mating adapter from the Unity module, but had her view blocked by 
the module.  She met the first challenge by acquiring the precision through training to 
lift the module out, rotate it 180 degrees, and position it within reach of two 
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spacewalkers.  She met the second challenge by training to use a Space Vision System 
that calculated the 3D position of an object for her even as her view was blocked.  
Having highly trained robotics operators resulted in a station that was over 40 feet long 
by the end of 2002, since all truss segments and habitable modules had been added with 
their work.74   
 Shuttle crews also had to coordinate their training with station crews who were 
conducting expeditions several months long by this point.  For instance, Chris Hadfield 
operated Endeavour’s robotic arm during the STS-100 mission in 2001.  But the 
objective of that mission was to assemble another robotic arm on the ISS for the 
Expedition 2 crew.  Late in the mission, Expedition 2 crewmember Susan Helms used 
the newly delivered arm to hand over a pallet to Endeavour’s arm under Hadfield’s 
control.  Later that year, another shuttle crew delivered an airlock and Helms had to 
work the arm again to assist visiting spacewalkers Jim Reilly and Mike Gernhardt.  
Reilly, Gernhardt, and Helms had trained together for this, but not for three months by 
the time the EVA happened.  “It was an interesting experience, in that when it did come 
time to do the task, it was almost like we’d never been apart,” Reilly explained.  “It was 
just a joy to watch that whole system operate, in terms of our performance.  I was 
intrigued by that, fascinated by the dynamics of how the team worked and how we  
gelled.  All the shuttle and station crews worked pretty much the same way.”75 
 While several crews succeeded in building the ISS and one more succeeded in  
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upgrading the Hubble Space Telescope by the end of 2002, another patiently awaited 
their turn.  A largely inexperienced STS-107 crew had begun training in 2000 for the last 
shuttle flight devoted solely to science research in a Spacehab module, rather than the 
ISS or Hubble: Commander Rick Husband, Pilot Willie McCool, MS 1 David Brown, 
MS 2 Kalpana Chawla, MS 3 Mike Anderson, MS 4 Laurel Clark, and PS 1 Ilan Ramon, 
the first Israeli in space.  This remains the last mission of its kind, in that astronauts have 
performed science research on the ISS ever since rather than rushing through a 16-day 
research program.  STS-107 therefore deserves consideration as a means of 
understanding how sophisticated training had become to do as productive a job as 
possible for Principal Investigators in a small amount of time.  Given that the crew 
needed to perform more than eighty experiments, 16 days aboard Columbia became a 
short time frame that challenged these seven astronauts to make the most of their 
training.76 
 The most striking aspect of training concerned how multitalented the seven 
needed to become.  Husband and McCool needed to learn orbiter systems and abort 
procedures just like all Commanders and Pilots before them, but also know how to give 
injections and draw blood for life science experiments and make Earth observations 
studies.  The other five each needed to know systems for the orbiter and Spacehab as 
well as attend briefings on each experiment, but their knowledge went well beyond even 
that.  Chawla trained to assist Husband and McCool with dynamic events as the Flight 
Engineer.  As the Payload Commander, Anderson needed to keep track of the Flight 
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Data File that laid out the activity plans for everyone in Spacehab.  Brown and Clark 
trained as crew medical officers, certified to administer procedures from first aid to 
surgery.  Brown and Ramon trained to become inflight maintenance technicians on 
Spacehab, meaning they could make repairs to an experiment if necessary, and operate 
computers.  Brown and Anderson trained to make an emergency EVA (investigators 
would later wonder if these two could have spotted the catastrophic damage to 
Columbia’s left wing and what they could have done about it).  The preflight 
assignments even extended to taking care of the crew photo (McCool) and making a 
mission patch and shirts (Clark).77  In the case of STS-107, having seven people onboard 
did not mean a leisurely training pace at all.  The astronauts ran the risk of becoming 
fatigued before they left the ground.  But their mission, slated to take place in the 
summer of 2001 when they were first assigned, experienced an amazing 18 delays 
before finally leaving the ground.  Problems with Columbia’s processing and the higher 
priority of ISS and Hubble missions pushed the launch to January 16, 2003, which gave 
the crew the benefit of much more training time than originally expected.78                  
 Training until that time required a tremendous amount of travel.  The crew met 
with Principal Investigators at a European Space Agency site in Noordwijk, Netherlands, 
while also visiting Bremen, Germany, the Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio, 
the University of Colorado at Boulder, and KSC.  Susan Helms remembers traveling to 
Noordwijk prior to her similar STS-78 mission aboard Columbia, remarking, “I think 
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anytime you get a chance to talk face to face with the people whose experiments you’re 
running, that’s helpful.”  Attending these briefings allowed the astronauts to understand 
how each experiment functioned and the scientific goal behind them while also giving 
them hands-on experience with the hardware, but the level of training required to operate 
them varied.  Some simply required flipping a switch and letting the experiment function 
by itself.  Others required inspections and adjustments by crewmembers who needed to 
be trained in these tasks.79   
 Others required more complex knowledge of how to meet the Principal 
Investigators’ needs.  For instance, the European ARMS experiment required the 
astronauts to wear special sensors that monitored their heartbeat and respiration while 
they rode an ergometer.  A Mediterranean Israeli Dust Experiment required them to use 
a laptop computer to command a camera that studied the physical properties of 
atmospheric dust over North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea.  The crew thus had a 
degree of interactivity with experiments like these that required taking informed minds 
into space for the sake of the PIs who could not go themselves.  For instance, Dr. Paul 
Ronney reflected that he had worked since 1984 on an experiment to study the structure 
of flame balls in microgravity.  He felt pride in seeing it come to fruition and was 
pleased to see the astronauts feel the same way.  Chawla was the only Ph.D. scientist on 
the crew, but he said all “worked very hard on the development of the crew procedures 
to minimize the chance of mistakes and extract every possible bit of data.”80 
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 Though the seven astronauts had only three flights of experience between them, 
the SimSups could draw upon the experience of numerous simulations in preparing 
astronauts for around the clock research flights, dating back to STS-9.  The most 
effective simulations were those integrated with Mission Control and the Payload 
Operations Control Center, so that the crew could work with these two entities to solve 
the problems the SimSups inserted as a team.  Some of the problems required immediate 
action, but some were open ended that required the crew to plan ahead over 24 hours in 
the Spacehab simulator.  For instance, a slow cabin leak meant they had to re-plan their 
activities to accomplish as much science as possible before returning home.  The 
simulations even included physical issues, such as an injury to Ramon while the timeline 
called for him to ride an ergometer.  The crew and controllers in Houston and Huntsville 
had to decide whether this activity needed to be rescheduled, throwing a wrench into a 
hectic schedule, and whether Ramon needed to be medically examined by Clark (these 
were two of the four astronauts who worked on the Red Team, while the Blue Team 
rotated with them).81   
 In August 2001, the crew had the chance to undertake a training method that was 
still fairly new.  Experiment briefings and simulations helped them develop their 
knowledge and test their problem solving skills, but these training methods were sharply 
limited in duration and did not require the astronauts to confront actual physical 
hardship.  At the end of a day in a simulator, the astronauts could feel comfortable in the 
knowledge that they could drive home and sleep in their own beds.  JSC instructors 
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wondered what would happen if they instead forced astronauts to live outside for several 
days to work as a team in “a prolonged stressful, isolated, and confined environment.”  
Thus an agreement with NASA and the National Outdoor Leadership School (NOLS) 
called for the astronauts to go on camping trips and work with NOLS instructors who 
would evaluate them on their leadership, teamwork, and self-management skills.  This 
will be covered in more detail in the next chapter, because this expeditionary training 
applied more to ISS crews.  Shuttle crews spent a much smaller amount of time together 
in training and flying, so their expeditionary skills were less important.  But since the 
STS-107 crew inadvertently ended up training together for about two and a half years, 
they had time to make this NOLS outing and the desire to bond as a crew during such a 
long process.82     
 The trip took them a mountain range in Wyoming from August 20-31.  The 
astronauts walked among the mountains for an average of about four miles each day 
while carrying backpacks that weighed up to 70 pounds.  They had to navigate the 
correct routes during their climbs of daunting mountains, including the 13,200 foot Wind 
River Peak (the 95th highest peak in the United States), with no help from instructors.  
Then they had to eat and camp at altitudes consistently above 9,000 feet, where the air 
pressure was significantly lower than at sea level.  But according to NOLS instructors 
John Kanengieter and Andy Cline, the crew assisted each other rather than complain 
about the workload or the heat.  Since Husband was the Commander, the goal of 
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demonstrating leadership especially applied to him.  “Rick is an exceptional leader, 
regardless of the environment he finds himself in,” the instructors wrote.  “He sees 
unfamiliar situations as learning opportunities and confronts them with optimism and 
excitement.  He is self-effacing and humble in a way that draws people to him and 
exposes them to his competence and leadership abilities.”  They also evaluated him 
favorably on his safety awareness and outdoor skills.  The two instructors thought so 
highly of his performance that they handwrote “Will follow you anywhere, Rick!” right 
above their signatures on the evaluation form.83  Thus Husband demonstrated that NASA 
had the right person in command of the mission, while saying himself that the trip “was 
a great experience” for him from a leadership standpoint.84        
 Part of Husband’s leadership capacity for this trip involved evaluating his six 
crewmates, and his glowing comments indicated how strong a crew NASA had 
assembled for STS-107.  When asked if their performance traits were below standards, 
met standards, or greatly exceeded standards, he answered with the latter for all traits for 
all crewmembers.  When asked to “please write observations of effective or ineffective 
behaviors,” he complimented them on all accounts.  When asked if he would like to fly 
with them on a long duration ISS mission, he answered yes for all of them.  By all 
accounts, the talents that these astronauts brought into the corps upon their selection 
along with their training at JSC prepared them exceptionally well for spaceflight.  
Enduring the challenging work of this trip only allowed them to form an even stronger  
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bond.85  
 The numbers support the idea that none of the previous 112 shuttle crews were 
better prepared than these seven.  In June 2002, the crew completed their training 
requirements and continued the shuttle tradition of enjoying a cake cutting ceremony at 
JSC with their families to mark this milestone.  But the delays meant they needed to 
maintain their proficiency and resulted in their training 74 weeks longer than a typical 
crew.  Their most striking expenditure of time was the 3,506 hours they spent training 
with Spacehab.  They also spent 15 weeks traveling to meet with Principal Investigators 
and learn about experiments.  The simulations continued until January 2003, so there 
was no chance of the crew becoming rusty.  The crew made their last ascent and entry 
simulations about a week before launch, while Husband and McCool performed  
their last STA landing at KSC the day before launch.86  
 For 16 days, it appeared that the training had paid off.  The STS-107 crew met the 
challenge of performing all the experiments on their agenda.  The flight plan called for 
468 hours of their time in performing these experiments and the astronauts went 23 
hours even beyond that, giving up free time to make sure they did the best job possible 
for the Principal Investigators.  They also performed a variety of repairs to the Spacehab 
cooling system and several payloads that demonstrated the value of having humans in 
space who had received in-flight maintenance training.  NASA scientist Dr. John 
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Charles felt enthused about the results.87  Video that Laurel Clark filmed on the morning 
of February 1 showed the crew happy and confident as Columbia plunged back into the 
atmosphere.  They had no way of knowing tragedy was about to strike.   
 A report released several years later made numerous insights into how the 
tragedy unfolded inside Columbia’s cockpit and connected them to crew training.  At 
8:58 a.m., Husband and McCool received their first sign that something was amiss: a 
reading on a monitor indicating a loss of pressure on the left main landing gear tires.  
Their training in the SMS had included a circuit breaker trip that resulted in tire pressure 
sensors being disabled, so they were undoubtedly concerned but prepared to diagnose 
the problem based on their simulator experience.  But the problems quickly stacked up: a 
left main landing gear indicator transitioned to an indeterminate state, a light illuminated 
as two RCS thrusters began firing continuously, and the master alarm sounded due to a 
fault in the flight control system.  Again, training prepared them to examine these 
malfunctions and look for commonality in them.  But the crew could not know what was 
really happening: as superheated air passed into a breach in Columbia’s left wing, it 
melted the wing structure, which caused the vehicle to become aerodynamically unstable 
and break apart.  Husband tried to call Mission Control, but was cut off after his words, 
“Roger, uh, buh.”  In the seconds right after this, the investigators concluded that the 
crew would have noticed Columbia yawing and rolling uncontrollably, as well as a 
master alarm indicating the loss of hydraulic pressure that powered the ship’s control 
surfaces.  The astronauts had to have known that something had gone catastrophically  
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wrong.88      
 Physical evidence from the debris indicated that like the crews of Apollo 1 and 
STS-51L Challenger before them, the STS-107 crew reacted in accordance with their 
training right until the end.  A panel on McCool’s side of the cockpit showed switches in 
off-nominal positions.  Investigators realized that he had tried to recover hydraulic 
pressure by flipping these switches to begin a restart of Columbia’s APUs and to turn on 
hydraulic circulation pumps.  “While turning on the hydraulic circulation pump is not on 
the emergency checklist, it nonetheless can provide some limited hydraulic pressure and 
shows good systems knowledge by the crew members as they worked to attempt to 
restore orbiter control,” read the report.  Investigators did find that not all of the 
astronauts were fully prepared at this point, as one middeck crewmember was not 
wearing a helmet and was not fully strapped into his seat.  But it was Husband and 
McCool on the flight deck who had the responsibility of responding to orbiter 
malfunctions, and even though their simulations had not exposed them to a catastrophic 
event like this, their training gave McCool the presence of mind to respond 
appropriately.  Yet about 40 seconds after Husband’s voice transmission had been cut 
off, the crew compartment broke free from the remainder of the orbiter and  
depressurized within 17 seconds at most.  The astronauts lost consciousness and died  
due to blunt force trauma as the debris fell above Texas.89                   
 The investigators praised the training of the fallen crew in their report, making  
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clear that the astronauts did everything they could have done, but did include a few 
training related recommendations.  “Throughout their training, the STS-107 
crewmembers displayed expert orbiter systems knowledge, correct and thorough 
procedure execution, and excellent SFRM techniques,” the report read.  During one 
simulation, the crew even demonstrated this by performing the entire session without 
verbal communication.  The astronauts knew the procedures and each other’s duties so 
well that they could function using only nonverbal communication.  The investigators 
did make one unexpected finding from the tragedy: the debris indicated that the 
astronauts had not closed and locked their helmet visors prior to cabin depressurization.  
Their training had exposed them to several situations requiring closed visors, such as 
smoke and fire, cabin leaks, broken window panes, and contingency aborts requiring in-
flight bailouts, so why did the crew apparently not close them during this catastrophe?  
According to the report, they were probably focused on solving problems such as the 
loss of hydraulic pressure during that 40 second period after Husband’s last transmission 
rather than their own survival.  This is what their training in the SMS had emphasized.  
Though all astronauts went through emergency egress training as well, this took place on 
different days as the SMS sessions, with little discussion of the transition from solving 
problems to bailing out of a vehicle.  Thus the investigators recommended that future 
training instructors emphasize to astronauts “the transition from recoverable systems 
problems to impending survival situations.”  Though the STS-107 crew had been in an 
impossible situation, this training might make a difference for a future crew in a different  
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emergency situation.90             
 After the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) released an August 
2003 report detailing why the tragedy had happened and recommending the changes to 
minimize the threat of External Tank foam again impacting an orbiter, attention shifted 
more to the next mission: STS-114.  The CAIB report did speed along the pending 
retirement of the Space Shuttle program, announced in 2004 by President George W. 
Bush.  But the astronauts and instructors knew that NASA needed to honor its 
commitment to completing construction of the ISS and this could not happen if the 
remaining shuttles (Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour) stopped flying.  Even more than 
that, ending the program would have failed to honor the memory of Rick Husband, 
Willie McCool, David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Mike Anderson, Laurel Clark, and Ilan 
Ramon.  Family escort Clay Anderson spoke for many of his colleagues when he wrote 
in a letter to his alma mater, Hastings College, “It will be better than before; it has to be, 
or my friends will have died in vain.”91  For the remaining eight years of the shuttle 
program, astronauts and instructors walking around JSC frequently saw photos of the 
crew and the STS-107 mission patch to remind them of the legacy they sought to  
continue.  The memory of Chawla’s excited words, “We are training to fly in outer  
space!” inspired them to make training more productive than ever.92  The task of 
carrying out the STS-114 Return to Flight mission fell to Commander Eileen Collins, 
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Pilot Jim Kelly, MS 1 Soichi Noguchi, MS 2 Steve Robinson, MS 3 Andy Thomas, MS 
4 Wendy Lawrence, and MS 5 Charles Camarda. 
 The training of these seven and all subsequent shuttle crews changed in three 
ways, all of which concerned the need to examine an orbiter’s Thermal Protection 
System (TPS) prior to reentry for the kind of damage that had doomed Columbia.  First, 
crews needed to use a 50 foot robotic arm called the Orbiter Boom Sensing System 
(OBSS) that was equipped with cameras and lasers to scan the leading edges of the 
wings, the nose cap, and the crew compartment.  “It added a lot of time to the first day or 
two of on-orbit activities,” explains Pete Beauregard, the Chief of the Spaceflight 
Training Division when the accident and return to flight happened.  “Inspection was 
slow and tedious, and then a special ground team had to analyze the data over the course 
of the flight.”93  Collins remembers the work that her crew performed to make sure they 
were ready to carry out this procedure.  “My arm operators were Jim Kelly, Andy 
Thomas, and Charles Camarda,” she explains.  “They and the engineers and instructors 
worked together to develop all of these arm positions, and it was very challenging to get 
them right.  My crew took so much time with this, working on it for a year and a half.”94     
 Second, crews needed to perform a Rendezvous Pitch Maneuver (RPM) when  
approaching the ISS.  This meant the Commander would take the hand controller and  
perform a back flip, or pirouette, 600 below the station to expose the tiles on the 
underside of the orbiter to an ISS expedition crew.  The ISS crew could then take photos 
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and the Mission Management Team could decide if the ship was safe for reentry.  In the 
worst case scenario, the shuttle crew could take up residence on the ISS until another 
orbiter could launch and rescue them.  Training for this was where the SES dome came 
in especially handy.  The operation required the orbiter to flip at three-fourths of a 
degree per second and hit six different parameters on the hand controller with a 
corresponding rate (up and down, right and left, and fore and aft), but Commanders 
could rehearse this using a training device Eileen Collins calls “very helpful.”  “We 
started developing the RPM maneuver using the SES in 2003 and then we trained for it 
during the first half of 2005,” she explains.  “It was developed by engineers in their 
offices, but we used the SES to test their calculations on the operational side.  We 
worked very well together as a team, including my STS-114 crew, several other 
astronauts who were working on the RPM maneuver, and the rendezvous engineers.  
Then we flew this maneuver on STS-114 and it worked almost exactly the same as it was 
simulated on the SES.  When I flew the maneuver on the actual mission, I was  
calm, confident, and very pleased that it went as well as it did.”95                
 Third, Mission Specialists needed to repair damage to the TPS by EVA if 
necessary.  This procedure called for an astronaut to ride the robotic arm to potential 
damage sites, including to the underside of the shuttle where no spacewalker had ever 
ventured before and where this person would be out of view of the rest of the crew.  
Neutral buoyancy instructors therefore had to teach astronauts about the hazards 
associated with this, so they could rehearse their movements in the pool or with a virtual 
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reality headset.  A spacewalker ran the risk of suit damage due to sharp edges, 
protrusions, thermal extremes, molten metal, or impact with the orbiter.  He or she could 
suffer a laser injury, electric shock, or inadvertently be released from the robotic arm.  
The TPS could also suffer damage from a loose tool, the robotic arm, or an  
astronaut’s movement.  As for the work of actually repairing tiles, the astronauts trained 
for several methods.  One involved using a caulking gun to fill a damaged tile with an 
ablative substance called Shuttle Tire Ablator (STA)-54.  Another involved using a 
handheld device called the Emittance Wash Applicator to squeeze a foam mesh onto a 
damaged tile.  Another involved affixing an overlay panel made of carbon silicon 
carbide over a damaged tile with screws.  In case of a damaged RCC panel on the 
leading edge of a wing, the specific cause of the Columbia tragedy, the astronauts 
trained to use a caulking gun to fill it with a substance called Non-Oxide Adhesive 
Experimental (NOAX).  “Tile and panel repair is difficult because the tiles are fragile,” 
explained Stephen Robinson after one neutral buoyancy session for STS-114.  “And if 
they’re damaged, they are more fragile.”  This called for training, both in the NBL and 
KC-135 aircraft, to master the delicate techniques required to repair damage rather than 
create more damage.96 
 Juan Garriga, who had been a JSC instructor since 1991, still has vivid memories  
of his job as the Training Team Lead for STS-114.  Speaking of this job in general, he 
reflects, “The crews were outstanding in making difficult tasks seem easy.  Astronauts 
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are the crème de la crème, like athletes making amazing performances that you or I 
could never do…The training team spends a considerable amount of time working with 
the crew.  Ultimately we develop a bond.  They become not just our friends but our 
family.  It’s no different than if your spouse or sibling were sitting in the cockpit.”  He 
especially remembers STS-114 in this regard, saying, “This was a highly visible mission 
and we added the means to inspect the shuttle tiles for damage the vehicle may have 
experienced during the ascent phase.  That posed a new task we had never performed 
before.  To prepare we spent a significant time simulating the activity.  The world’s eyes 
were upon us and that alone made it challenging.  As usual, everything had to go right.  
More so now than ever.”97                     
 Discovery finally took the STS-114 crew aloft on July 26, 2005, to place the new 
training techniques to the ultimate test.  The simulations succeeded in building the 
crew’s confidence to make inspections with the OBSS, make the RPM maneuver for a 
further inspection, and perform an EVA on July 30 to experiment with RCC repair.  This 
EVA lasted several hours, but the NBL in Houston had the capability to simulate 
sessions this long.  The inspections revealed several pieces of gap filler protruding from 
the underside of the orbiter.  Since gap fillers had the potential to create turbulence and 
an increase in temperature during the reentry, flight controllers had a decision to make: 
should they allow Stephen Robinson to make an unprecedented EVA onto the underside 
of Discovery, with the aforementioned hazards that this posed, or accept the risk of 
leaving the gap fillers in place?  The flight controllers decided on the former, despite the 
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fact that Robinson had not trained for gap filler removal.  As it turned out, he simply 
needed to make a gentle pull with his spacesuited fingers when he went outside on 
August 3 to remove them.  His movements honed via the pool and virtual reality headset 
succeeded in avoiding damage to himself or the orbiter.  He explained, “We hadn’t 
trained specifically for that, but it’s sort of like when you learn to fly an airplane.  You 
can land at an airport you’ve never even seen before, and it’s because you’ve got all the 
skills you need.”  Thanks to their actions, the astronauts knew the health of their vehicle 
and did not have to fear a repeat of the Columbia accident when they reentered and 
landed at Edwards Air Force Base on August 9.98     
 Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour went on to fly 22 times after the accident, 
with the state of training arguably at its highest point yet.  Beginning with STS-115 in 
September 2006, ISS construction finally resumed after a gap of nearly four years.  
Astronauts succeeded in utilizing their robotics and EVA skills to install the enormous 
truss segments for the port and starboard sides of the ISS, the U.S. Harmony and 
Tranquility nodes, the Cupola, the European laboratory Columbus, the Japanese 
laboratory Kibo, and an Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer that searched for evidence of dark 
matter.  Training reached such a high point for these activities for multiple reasons.  
First, the missions were spread farther out than earlier in program history as engineers 
and managers worked through technical issues such as External Tank foam liberation, 
the effects of Hurricane Katrina on the facility in New Orleans, Louisiana where the 
tanks were manufactured, the effects of a hail storm on one tank at the launch pad, and a 
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hydrogen leak at the launch pad.  This allowed crews to prepare more thoroughly than 
some of their predecessors.  As one example, the STS-124 crew spent six hours in 
training for every hour of flight.  This worked out to about 1,940 hours per crewmember, 
or nearly a year of 8 hour workdays (compared to the less than 500 hours that the STS-
51L crewmembers received over twenty years earlier).  Commander Mark Kelly even 
had time to take this crew and a flight director on a 10 day expedition training trip to 
Alaska, following in Husband’s footsteps.99   
 Second, as the number of shuttle missions to the ISS increased, more astronauts 
could offer feedback to subsequent crews on how to train for their flights.  Stephanie 
Wilson remembered one example as the robotic arm operator for STS-121, the second 
post-Columbia mission.  She received feedback from the STS-114 crew on the operation 
of the OBSS arm, especially concerning the clearances of the arm as it came close to the 
orbiter.100  Jim Reilly described another example as an STS-117 spacewalker who 
learned from the truss installation performed by the STS-115 crew.  “Joe Tanner, Steve 
MacLean, Dan Burbank, and Heidemarie Stefanyshyn-Piper all kind of ran across a 
problem with some of the bolts and connectors on (the truss they installed),” he 
explained.  “We’ve taken those lessons and applied them to what we’re doing so that we 
can work around some of the limitations in the hardware that they experienced.  We’ll be 
taking a torque multiplier up with us that will allow us to take bolts off should they bind 
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up.”101  As the experience level in the Astronaut Office went up and the number of first 
time flyers assigned to crews generally went down during the last years of the shuttle 
era, the instructors understood the impressive array of knowledge they had on hand.  “At 
face value, having previously experienced astronauts may seem like a gift from above,” 
Garriga says.  “In numerous ways, it was.  But the pressure was on!  Imagine if you were 
the driving instructor that was teaching a handful of NASCAR drivers to drive a new 
car.  The bar was seriously raised!  I and the other members of training teams were very 
excited because it was going to drive us to work even harder to teach a crew of 
experienced astronauts.”102     
 Third, the size of ISS expedition crews increased to six in 2009, which meant 
more people were available to assist with tasks as the station underwent construction.  
This eased the task of training even as the level of work went to unprecedented levels of 
complexity.  In July of that year, Endeavour soared to the ISS on the STS-127 mission to 
complete installation of the Japanese Experiment Module Kibo.  The shuttle crew plus 
the station crew equaled 13 people on the station.  But Pilot Doug Hurley still recalled 
that all of them had robotics and EVA work to perform and benefited from having a 
larger station crew onboard as well as the training that came with them.  “Everybody had 
to do their jobs,” he said.  It wasn’t a case where it was just a couple of people that were 
key to this mission.  Everybody who was up there greatly influenced the success and/or 
possible failure, if you didn’t do your job.  We had multiple robotic operations with three 
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different robotic arms (Endeavour, the ISS, and Kibo all had arms in use), and it was all 
operational type uses.  I know everybody says they do a complicated mission, but I’m 
going to let the facts speak for themselves.  I’d argue that you’d have to dig pretty deep 
into the books to find a more complicated mission.”103 
 But the most spectacular demonstration of the skills that trained astronauts 
brought to the final Space Shuttle missions came on STS-120 in October and November 
2007.  Scott Parazynski had been the lead astronaut for shuttle repair techniques via 
EVA, meaning he spent two and a half years in the NBL and KC-135 aircraft perfecting 
this new concept.  He wrapped up his career with his fifth shuttle mission, which he 
called “the ultimate space station assembly flight, because it was a big module coming 
up (the Harmony node) plus a very, very challenging combination of EVA and robotics 
to (relocate and) install the P6 (truss) segment and arrays.  It was really, in my mind, the 
most exciting assembly mission of the entire sequence.”  The EVAs fell to him and 
Doug Wheelock.  Their training exemplified the value of having experienced 
spacewalkers work with rookie spacewalkers, because Wheelock called Parazynski “just 
a terrific mentor for me.  I don’t know how I could learn from anyone any better.  He’s 
just a wealth of knowledge for me.”  He also had vivid memories of how the virtual 
reality simulations helped him, especially in terms of malfunctions.  “They’ve been nice 
enough to throw in for us attitude errors, translation errors, and maybe some unexpected 
arm motion that we would normally not see…They’ve also thrown things at us that 
we’ve practiced that have caused us to very, very finely tune our cadence.”  At the end 
                                                          
103  Houston, 304.  
586 
 
of the process, he commented, “I can close my eyes and walk through the timeline.”  
Wheelock thus went into his first flight with superb knowledge of his STS-120 objectives 
and well-honed spacewalking skill, but as it turned out the most worthwhile piece of 
advice came from Parazynski: “You’re going to get out there and find that something 
doesn’t work.”104    
 On October 30, the shuttle and station crews encountered one of the most 
frustrating days of ISS construction and the onus fell to Parazynski and Wheelock to 
solve a major problem.  A steel guide wire intended to keep the solar array panels for the 
P6 truss aligned jammed and tore a gash through one of the arrays.  If the astronauts 
could not repair the damage, the station might not have had the power to support the 
European and Japanese modules scheduled to launch the following year.  All who 
eagerly awaited the completion of this massive international project looked to 
Parazynski and Wheelock to repair the array on an EVA.  In a dramatic moment 
reminiscent of the Skylab era, flight controllers had to re-plan a spacewalk and trust that 
their new instructions as well as the skills these two astronauts had acquired in training 
would be enough to save an expensive facility.  In addition to that, a group went to the 
NBL and simulated the procedure: cut out the damaged guide wire and sew the rip 
together with five wire “cuff links.”  “A bunch of brilliant, unsung heroes spent seventy-
two hours working around the clock, looking at different ways to get an astronaut out  
there to repair,” Parazynski reflected.105   
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 Why did the seemingly simple task of sewing cuff links require the training that  
Parazynski and Wheelock had done before the flight and that their colleagues were doing 
now?  The unforgiving variables of spaceflight transformed that simple task into a 
dramatic one.  No spacewalkers had ever maneuvered to a workspace this distant, far 
removed from a protective spacecraft.  Stephanie Wilson and Dan Tani needed to couple 
the OBSS robotic arm onto Discovery’s robotic arm so that they could move Parazynski 
and Wheelock 165 feet across the truss, then move Parazynski 90 more feet up to the 
damage site.  This required trained arm operators, because Wilson and Tani would be 
maneuvering this unprecedentedly long structure to within a foot of a highly charged 
solar array and needed to avoid a collision.  Parazynski also needed trained judgment in 
working next to an array that could have electrocuted him.  If he did not work fast 
enough, he also ran the risk of using up his oxygen supply before his 45 minute trip back 
to Discovery’s airlock.  Meanwhile, Wheelock was in a shadow and experiencing a 
temperature of minus 300 degrees.  Despite the presence of his suit, he reached the point 
where he could not feel his hands.  The success of this seven hour, 19 minute EVA in 
repairing the array epitomized Stephen Robinson’s point about training giving astronauts 
a general skill set that allowed them to adjust to new demands.  The two men literally 
grabbed onto one another and climbed across each other’s bodies to reach their difficult 
worksite, then accomplished their job because the pool and virtual reality simulations 
had given them experience in choreographing their movements and working with their 
tools.  These astronauts had made the difficult look easy and they could not simply do  
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this overnight; only training for years made this possible.106   
 Similar comments apply to the last Hubble servicing mission, STS-125.  On May 
11, 2009, a crew of seven rode Atlantis into orbit knowing nobody would ever visit 
Hubble again and that the pressure was therefore on them to accomplish all the tasks on 
their agenda: removing and replacing a camera, installing a Cosmic Origins 
Spectrograph, and repairing a Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS).  MS 4 
Mike Massimino remembered that training for this took on an urgency reflecting the end 
of the shuttle program.  The funding for new tools the astronauts would have to use in 
the NBL and in space, as well as helmet cameras that worked in the NBL, quickly 
arrived for them.  Even apart from the trips to the NBL and the Hubble mockup at 
Goddard, spacewalkers Massimino and Michael Good could train to repair the STIS on a 
model of this device located down the hall from their office.  There was a good reason 
Hubble engineers gave the crew this model: repairing the STIS is still today the hardest 
task any person has ever done during an EVA.  Massimino and Good needed to remove 
a metal clamp, a handrail, six screws, 111 tiny screws (with the bulky gloves they were 
wearing), a rubber gasket, a grounding wire, and channel locks just to access this 
instrument.  Then they needed to remove the power board to the STIS and slide in a new 
board, perfectly straight so that all 120 tiny metal pins could slide in flush.  “We must 
have done it hundreds of times,” Massimino recalled of training at the STIS model.  He 
remembered the training giving him not only confidence in working with the hardware, 
but in coordinating with his crewmates to the point that “It was like we had one  
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brain.”107 
 One other aspect of training for STS-125 covered a grimmer scenario: what if 
Atlantis suffered Columbia-like damage to its Thermal Protection System?  This was the 
last shuttle flight not going to the ISS, so this crew could not use the station as a safe 
haven.  Thus the crew prepared for a potential rescue launch of Endeavour, after which 
this vehicle would rendezvous with Atlantis and the crew would translate across a 
robotic arm into Endeavour.  The crew felt prepared to wait up to 21 days for a rescue, 
while turning off systems to conserve electricity and subsisting on a diet of protein bars 
and water.  “It was morbid and not at all pleasant, but it served to bond us closer as a 
crew,” Massimino explained.108  
 The mission succeeded, again because a group of astronauts had the skill set 
honed from training to overcome adversity.  The adversity in this case was that 
Massimino found he could not remove one of the screws holding a handrail in place that 
blocked access to the STIS.  Flight Director Tony Ceccacci decided that, based in part on 
the results of a test done at Goddard, Massimino should apply sixty pounds of linear 
force to simply yank the handrail loose.  He did this successfully without puncturing his 
suit.109  No person could have felt confident in his or her ability to improvise on the spot 
without training and certainly no person could have felt confident about the delicate task 
of working with such tiny equipment without it.  Once again, training had empowered 
astronauts to perform tasks that an automated machine could not have performed on its 
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own.  Massimino recalled a proposal from 2004 to launch a robotic mission to rescue 
Hubble.  But “with all the different contingencies you’d have to plan and design for, it 
would have cost a bazillion dollars and you still wouldn’t get the same quality of repair.  
Ultimately, what the robot mission ended up proving was the value of astronauts.  
Astronauts can think on the spot, improvise solutions, communicate abstract 
thoughts…If you have a person with a human brain operating hands with opposable 
thumbs, you can shift gears on the fly, work the problem, devise a solution.”  A robot 
could not be trained to accomplish those feats.110   
 The shuttle program reached a grand finale two years later with Atlantis’s STS-
135 mission.  Commander Chris Ferguson, Pilot Doug Hurley, MS 1 Sandy Magnus, and 
MS 2 Rex Walheim became the last crew to use the training facilities that had served 
astronauts so well for thirty years.  Juan Garriga remembers this as one of his most 
challenging missions as a Training Team Lead.  “Again, all the crewmembers were 
experienced,” he reflects.  “What made it challenging was that this was the last mission 
and everything had to go right.  There was a lot of press presence.”111  The crew and 
instructors indeed had the familiar challenge of working around the intense media 
interest in the flight, including a Houston Chronicle photographer who followed them.  
Training contained two other challenges beyond what Garriga mentions, though.  The 
crew consisted of only four people, because this was the last mission and no rescue 
shuttle could be launched in case of irreparable Thermal Protection System damage.  
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This marked the smallest shuttle crew since STS-6 in 1983.  Magnus remembered that 
she and her colleagues had to do more cross training so that such a small crew could 
accomplish the combination of tasks from orbiter inspection, to rendezvous, to docking, 
to robotics, to cargo transfer, to photography, to landing.  The astronauts did not have the 
luxury of specializing on just one or a few areas.  Their need to become multitalented 
more reflected the ISS crews discussed in the next chapter than shuttle crews.112 
 Another challenge concerned the attitude of the crew and instructors.  Given that 
all four crewmembers had flown before and the program was coming to an end, would 
their dedication level remain high?  All accounts confirmed that this did happen.  
“Nobody showed up at any sim or training event and said, ‘We’re not going to do 
this…I’m just going to phone it in,” Hurley remembered.  “That just never happened.”  
He also hailed the “unbelievably incredible professionalism” of the United Space 
Alliance instructors with whom he worked.113  The instructors maintained their 
professionalism despite the fact that they knew the retirement of the shuttle would spell 
the loss of many jobs.  ISS crewmembers still required training and eventually astronauts 
would ride the Orion spacecraft still under development.  But the capability of launching 
astronauts from American soil would be gone for several years to come, meaning the 
retirement of the shuttle was a devastating event for the astronaut training profession.  
“We come in and certify and serve just like the civil servants and often stay here for an 
entire career,” explains longtime USA instructor Mike Sterling of his organization.  
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“However, like at the end of the shuttle program, we can be laid off easier when staffing 
needs decrease significantly.”114  The day finally came in July 2011 when the last shuttle 
mission simulation took place.  Lisa Martignetti maintained, “Nobody’s performance 
level or dedication has changed.  All these people who know it’s going to be their last 
sim are excited about it…I’m just so proud of everyone I work with.”115  On July 21, 
2011, Chris Ferguson landed Atlantis after one last successful mission with the words, 
“After serving the world for over thirty years, the Space Shuttle found its place in 
history, and it’s come to a final stop.”116     
 The Space Shuttle program ended carrying a considerable legacy, in that the 
process of training astronauts differed from previous programs in several ways.  Flying 
the first reusable spacecraft thus broke new ground that future astronauts and instructors 
will have to consider.  The most significant legacy concerns the fact that five orbiters 
took 355 people into orbit over thirty years.  The number of people and length of the 
program dwarfed the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab programs.  This meant that 
the training flow could become more standardized, from the briefings that ASCANs 
received upon their selection, to the grades they received upon their first sessions in the 
NBL or MDF, to the number of hours called for in using the various simulation facilities 
once astronauts were assigned to crews.  This also meant that instructors could make 
more standardized suggestions to help new flyers, with some of the most valuable 
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instructors being astronauts themselves who had previously flown.  The Space Shuttle 
program was the antithesis of Mercury in this respect.  The notion of Training Team 
Leads staying with shuttle crews throughout their training is another legacy that 
benefited astronauts and marked a departure from previous programs.  Another legacy 
that differed from the earlier programs concerns the progression of technology.  
Computers increasingly shaped the teaching profession throughout the last decades of 
the 20th century, in that they provided a tool that was often more convenient and 
provided more thorough information than a person could.  The Space Shuttle program 
was no exception to this rule, in that computers aided astronauts’ understanding of the 
many systems they had to learn.  Virtual reality proved to be the ultimate manifestation 
of advanced technology shaping teaching and the astronauts would have had more 
difficulty working on Hubble or the ISS without it.   
 Yet another legacy concerned the wealth of tasks astronauts needed to perform.  
Astronauts had traveled much farther from Earth during Apollo, but this did not mean 
astronaut tasks during the shuttle era were less complex.  The work in constructing and 
repairing large structures with a combination of robotic and EVA operations, the sheer 
number of experiments requiring operation, and the need to pilot the vehicle to a landing 
back on Earth stand out as clear steps beyond Apollo.  But in each case, the instructors 
answered the need for briefings and high-fidelity simulations of these tasks with aplomb.  
The training division at JSC weathered changes over the course of the 30 years that  
ranged from an expansion in the number of instructors to hire, to an expansion in the  
number of astronauts to train, to the gender and race diversity of instructors and  
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astronauts, to the transition to the United Space Alliance for employment, to the new 
technologies that affected training, to the Challenger and Columbia tragedies that 
spurred new training methods.  But the evidence could not be clearer that astronauts 
from 1981 to 2011 went to space prepared despite these changes and the challenge of 
assigning a wealth of tasks to each crewmember.  The comments of the instructors and 
astronauts, and more importantly the quality of work astronauts performed during 135 
missions, supports this with very few exceptions.  No person died due to inadequate 
training and, except for the STS-87 accident, historians will search in vain for crew 
mistakes that seriously affected a mission.  As the 21st century brings new programs, 
whether operated by a government or a company, instructors and astronauts will have 
the knowledge that that it is possible to confront adversity or change and still accomplish 
an objective.  They will have a model to emulate, given that these people have  
adequate funding and the sense to look to history as a guide. 
 Space Shuttle training did not mark a complete departure from Mercury, Gemini, 
Apollo, or Skylab, however.  Several practices stood the test of time from the 1960s to 
the 2010s, from the use of electronic simulators that were often integrated with Mission 
Control, to debriefings involving astronauts, flight controllers, and SimSups after 
sessions in those simulators, to pools to rehearse for EVAs, to direct astronaut contact 
with the hardware they would be operating, to briefings from experiment Principal 
Investigators.  After Chris Ferguson, Doug Hurley, Sandy Magnus, and Rex Walheim 
landed aboard Atlantis, they took part in a mission debriefing where instructors and 
engineers valued their suggestions as users of technology, just as Alan Shepard had 
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exactly fifty years before.  Thus even as this new program broke new ground, astronaut 
training remained an evolutionary process.  The thread running from Mercury-Redstone 
3 through STS-135, that training empowered humans to accomplish tasks automatons 
could not, also remained as strong as ever.  The astronauts who did construction work on 
Hubble and the ISS, deployed satellites, made adjustments to experiments, and solved 
glitches with the orbiters themselves left no doubt that their abilities went beyond robots.  
Only robust training that developed the minds and bodies of the 355 people who flew 
aboard the shuttle could ever have made this statement possible.  When future 
generations of tourists flock to the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum to see 
Discovery, the Kennedy Space Center to see Atlantis, and the California Science Center 
to see Endeavour, they would do well to understand that these vehicles did not make 
history by themselves.  The people who flew aboard them had to develop the skills to 
perform the tasks that made these vehicles worthwhile.             
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CHAPTER XV 
MIR AND ISS: “A MARATHON, NOT A SPRINT” 
 
 Lucia McCullough remembers the phrase.  Ever since Jerry Carr, Ed Gibson, and 
Bill Pogue had splashed down on February 8, 1974, American human space missions 
had not lasted any longer than about two weeks.  Astronauts needed to train for specific 
tasks laid out for them in high detail throughout every day of those many shuttle flights, 
reflecting a “sprint” of activity.  The idea of sending astronauts to train for a space 
station flight of several months remained frustratingly out of reach.  Though the Space 
Station Freedom proposed by President Ronald Reagan in 1984 produced hardware 
mockups that astronauts trained with in the neutral buoyancy pool, the proposal 
remained dormant until a breakthrough from the new administration of President Bill 
Clinton in 1993.  As described in the last chapter, the Bush administration had succeeded 
in reaching an agreement with the new Russian Federation in 1992 for cosmonauts to fly 
aboard the Space Shuttle and the shuttle to dock with Russia’s space station Mir.  But the 
Clinton administration pushed the cooperation into a higher gear with an agreement for 
several Americans to live aboard Mir for missions several months in duration, followed 
by the construction of an International Space Station that the U.S., Russia, and 14 other 
nations would have a hand in assembling and staffing with crewmembers.  Though the 
Space Shuttle would continue flying to facilitate the construction and make a few 
additional missions, for the most part astronauts would undertake scientific research on 
the ISS instead.  They would fly for several months, not one or two weeks.  As an ISS 
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instructor who joined NASA in 1999, McCullough knew that training these astronauts 
would have to reflect the fact that missions several months long were “a marathon, not a 
sprint.”1 
 Thus ever since 1993, the training of astronauts has had to reconcile two issues: 
how to adjust to missions several months long and how to adjust to joint missions with 
Russia.  The previous chapter only described the brief interactions of shuttle 
crewmembers with Russians.  The long duration missions required an entirely different 
level of interaction with a former Cold War enemy now struggling as an independent 
nation.  Many astronauts did not want to undertake a long duration mission that required 
extensive training in Russia, wanting instead to stick to the shuttle.  Norm Thagard 
received word that he would become the first American to live aboard Mir.  The task of 
becoming the guinea pigs in terms of adjusting to life in Russia and the training 
procedures favored by the Russians fell to him and his backup Bonnie Dunbar, who 
traveled there in February 1994.  Thagard would then launch aboard a Soyuz spacecraft 
one year later, which would deliver him to a 115 day stint aboard Mir with cosmonauts 
Vladimir Dezhurov and Gennady Strekalov.  Though the Apollo-Soyuz crew had 
traveled to Russia two decades earlier, so much had changed since then.  Not only had 
the Soviet Union ceased to exist, but Thagard would be inaugurating the process of 
learning how to operate another country’s space station and working with people from 
that foreign nation for several months both on the ground and in orbit.  Joint American-
Russian training had reached a state of permanency that the brief Apollo-Soyuz mission  
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had not brought about.2             
 His training over the one year after he arrived at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training 
Center (GCTC) in Star City differed dramatically from his four shuttle flights.  As the 
Apollo-Soyuz crew had learned, becoming proficient in the Russian language was one of 
the most difficult and time consuming differences.  The briefings that Thagard and 
Dunbar went through were all in Russian, prompting Dunbar to compare the experience 
to a first grader going to graduate school.  Thagard remembered thinking that sending 
Dunbar to Russia without previous Russian language training had been a mistake.  One 
of the later Americans to train for a Mir mission, John Blaha, also remembered thinking 
that NASA had inadequately prepared him for language study.  Thagard, on the other 
hand, had gone through several months of language training at the Defense Language 
Institute in Monterey, California just before his trip to Russia.  The Shuttle-Mir 
astronauts thus took to Russia varying levels of fluency in the language and experienced 
varying degrees of difficulty in learning and speaking the Cyrillic alphabet.  The 
hundreds of hours the astronauts had to spend on this task bogged down the training 
process in a way that shuttle astronauts did not have to deal with, and this was one of the 
reasons for the reluctance to volunteer for the Shuttle-Mir project.  But all who did 
volunteer eventually surmounted the challenge.3       
 Survival training was another difference from the shuttle program that harkened 
back to the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo days.  Though all Shuttle-Mir astronauts went 
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home on the shuttle, they had to train for the possibility of an emergency necessitating 
their reentry and landing aboard Soyuz.  As ISS instructor Marc Reagan points out today, 
when all Americans do have to land aboard Soyuz, “Astronauts may end up bobbing 
around in a lake upon their touchdown at the end of a mission, or in a desert, or in an 
ocean, or in a jungle, depending on what caused them to evacuate and make an 
emergency landing.  It could be days before a search and rescue force finds you.”  One 
of the early Soviet space crews, Pavel Belayayev and Alexei Leonov, had to undergo an 
emergency landing and recovery in a cold and inhospitable forest in 1965.  Thagard 
therefore underwent a survival simulation in the woods.  He, Dunbar, and Dezhurov sat 
in a Soyuz that had been plopped there, changed from their suits into their winter clothes, 
and spent forty-eight hours in the woods trying to keep warm in the subfreezing 
temperatures of a Russian winter.  Instructors were nearby to ensure the astronauts’ 
safety if necessary.  Astronauts also went to the Black Sea to simulate climbing out of a 
Soyuz immersed in water that might be very cold.  This required donning four layers of 
Arctic clothing and life jackets, launching signal flares, and finally climbing out for a 
rescue.4                 
 Another difference concerned learning the Russian spacecraft themselves.  The 
Russians were still using the Soyuz that Tom Stafford, Vance Brand, and Deke Slayton 
had once learned.  But Thagard was going to become the first American to ride the Soyuz 
into space and to a docking with Mir.  Reagan remembers the requirements for 
Americans training to operate the Soyuz during ascent and docking, which began with 
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Thagard and continue to this day.  “If you’re going to be a left seater, which is the flight 
engineer, you will spend a significant amount of time in Russia because the flight 
engineer has some significant duties,” he says.  “The flight engineer is really the copilot 
of the spacecraft.  If you’re going to be a right seater, you have far fewer duties and far 
fewer systems you are responsible for.  You can cut down the training quite a bit.”5  
Thagard was a right seater, but went through simulations with Dezhurov and Strekalov 
to make sure he was comfortable operating the Soyuz.  He also went through briefings on 
Mir systems.  Though less complex than the Space Shuttle he had already flown on, Mir 
featured a living quarters as well as modules for scientific research called Kvant, Kvant-
2, and Kristall.  The classroom briefings prepared him to operate Mir’s scientific 
equipment such as telescopes, cameras, and spectrometers, the life support equipment 
that would keep him alive, the attitude control equipment that kept the station in the right 
orbit, and his means of everyday tasks such as sleeping, eating, bathing, and urinating.6  
 The astronauts needed to learn not only about different spacecraft than the Space 
Shuttle while sitting in Russian classrooms, but also adjust to a different method of 
evaluating their learning.  As indicated in an earlier chapter, NASA instructors 
succeeded in constructing workbooks for newly selected shuttle astronauts to study.  But 
as Blaha explained, “In Russia, they do it the old-fashioned way.  A person takes a piece 
of chalk and he goes to a chalkboard, and you’re sitting as one or two students, no more.  
That piece of chalk goes to the chalkboard, and the man starts teaching you a particular 
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system in a Soyuz or on Mir.  And you take notes and you ask questions.  When the 
course is complete, the Russians have another team administer an oral exam to the 
student.”  The Russian method of training therefore relied less on written material and 
less on sessions in expensive, high-fidelity simulators than American shuttle training.  
Though there were simulators for Soyuz and Mir, the emphasis on simulation sessions 
declined as astronauts went to Russia.  The focus was more on oral material presented in 
a classroom than simulation sessions, partly because the Russian program was less well 
funded but partly because this approach had worked well for them throughout the more 
than two decades that cosmonauts had now been living on space stations.  The notion of 
placing an astronaut on the spot for an oral exam, with a group of experts frighteningly 
staring right at them and noticing any weaknesses in their knowledge, also differed from 
the shuttle experience.7               
 Susan Helms also remembers a different philosophy of instruction when she 
made her first training trip to Russia in the 1990s.  “The Russian philosophy is very 
much starting with the basics,” she explains. “For example, when the Russians talked to 
crewmembers about the life support system, the instructors started at the level of ‘how 
much water does a human need to drink every day?’  There is a reason that they did that.  
It’s because they did not at that time have the kind of continuous communication links 
with Mir that the Americans were used to having with the Space Shuttle.  The American 
philosophy of training made some assumptions about reliance on Mission Control, 
whereas the Russian philosophy of training goes back and trains the Russian  
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crewmembers on the basics during the many times they cannot talk to Mission  
Control.”8  This strong emphasis on teaching crewmembers the ins and outs of space 
station systems also reflected the Russian concept of system maintenance, as Greg 
Chamitoff learned in the 2000s.  “For those who are trained as system experts on 
Russian systems, we know the details of each system down to low level components, 
sensors, flow diagrams, expected internal signals, and all the parts that could be 
replaced,” he explains.  “The U.S. hardware redundancy philosophy is based on the 
notion of replacing a box when it fails instead of fixing it.  We don’t plan to open things 
up and tinker with them on a large scale.  As such, our training and knowledge of the 
internal workings of many systems is much less detailed.”9     
 Not all of the Russian classroom instruction was unfamiliar territory to 
Americans, as Chamitoff remembers today.  “In many ways, given the barriers due to the 
Cold War, it is amazing to see the similar approaches to many of the technologies used 
and the operational techniques for utilizing them,” he explains of the American and 
Russian approaches to human spaceflight.  “These similarities go down as deep as the 
mathematics to describe trajectories and control systems to fly them, the various sensors 
used, and the use and management of data to control the vehicle overall.  System by 
system, there are parallel methods for accomplishing similar functionality.”10  Besides 
the systems they would have to learn themselves, the astronauts could see similarities in 
the training process.  The Russian instructors asked the astronauts to make a progression 
                                                          
8  Author Phone Interview with Helms.    
9  Chamitoff, E-Mail Correspondence with Author.  
10  Ibid.  
603 
 
from learning single systems to operating them in a full-scale simulation of an entire 
vehicle, just as in the United States.  Shortly before the launch, crews went to the launch 
site in Baikonur for a countdown demonstration test before beginning a quarantine 
period in a crew quarters, just as in the U.S.11  The first American astronauts who trained 
in Russia therefore did have a head start in their learning because they already 
understood American spaceflight operations.  But differences continued to abound, as 
Thagard learned when he moved past classroom instruction and into sessions aboard the 
Mir simulator.  
 The relationship of the crew with flight controllers was one of the biggest 
differences.  In the United States, astronauts and flight controllers trained to work as a 
part of team that worked together on a fairly equal footing.  Ever since the Mercury 
program, the controllers encouraged astronauts to share their opinions about issues 
concerning training or operations, and valued those opinions.  But Chamitoff makes 
clear that, “The Russian approach is that the crew is there to do what they are told.  
There is an opportunity for crew feedback, but the debriefs are more a process of telling 
the crew what they did right and what they did wrong, and therefore how much pay they 
will receive…One of the stressful things for Russian cosmonauts is wondering how their 
pay or career will suffer as a result of infractions or unsuccessful activities.”  Thagard 
became the first American to experience this during simulations in advance of his March 
1995 liftoff.  Not only did he have to apply his knowledge earned in the classroom of 
how Mir functioned and carry out his tasks accordingly, he had to adjust to a new 
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 environment where his voice had less clout than in the United States.  The power 
belonged with flight controllers ordering him what to do, whether in training or flight.12   
 But above all else, Thagard’s training differed from his previous shuttle training 
because he had to prepare to spend 115 days in space instead of a week or two.  “Shuttle 
flights are short, so you can intensively train for virtually every aspect of them, and 
that’s not true for a three-month flight,” he remembered.  “In fact, you’re going to have 
to wind up having things happen over the course of a flight that you never anticipated at 
all.”  When the STS-107 crew had prepared for their sixteen day research flight, as 
described in the last chapter, each crewmember had a responsibility in performing over 
80 experiments that he or she knew would have to be fulfilled at a certain time on a 
certain day.  Training reflected the need to prepare astronauts for this highly structured 
environment.  But this was not realistic in Thagard’s case, because he simply had too 
many days in space ahead of him to train in this way.  By 1995, the Russian instructors 
felt confident in him not because he had prepared for every single day in miniscule 
detail, but because he had passed the oral exams in Soyuz and Mir systems while 
standing in front of a group of experts in Star City, placed his knowledge of systems 
together in the Soyuz and Mir simulators where he had worked well with his Russian 
colleagues and flight controllers, undergone survival training, and stayed proficient in 
Space Shuttle systems on top of that since he would have to land aboard Atlantis.  
Though he had to go through the whole process with a higher workload and less time 
than cosmonauts in the past, he maintained, “I don’t remember feeling very daunted by 
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that, because…I knew they had a fairly structured program in Russia.  So my attitude 
was whatever we need to know or do, they’ll take us through it, and, indeed, that  
was the case.”13 
 By the day he became the first American to launch from the Baikonur 
Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, Thagard totaled 1,728 training hours.  883 of the hours 
came in training with a generic group of cosmonauts, while 845 came in training with a 
specific crew.  His Soyuz training took up the most amount of his time, at 169 hours of 
classroom instruction and 263 hours in a simulator.  This prepared him to fulfill his tasks 
during the upcoming rendezvous and docking with Mir, as well as execute an emergency 
evacuation to Soyuz and safe landing.  His Mir training amounted to 248 hours of 
classroom instruction and 118 hours in a simulator.  The simulator time allowed him to 
rehearse his actions during a standard flight day, which was a challenge because several 
systems and science hardware operated simultaneously, flight controllers participated via 
radio communications, and video showed the crew at work to the controllers who were 
ready to make note of any mistake.  The nature of a mission several months long was 
that an astronaut might have to reschedule a task and refresh his or her knowledge about 
how to perform a task.  The sessions in the Mir simulator gave Thagard and his 
successors experience in planning and organizing so they could do this effectively.  The 
syllabus also called for six hours of training in responding to a fire and eight hours in 
responding to a cabin depressurization, which would unfortunately come in handy later 
in the program.  Studying the Russian language took up another 174 hours of Thagard’s 
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time.  Thus he had an extremely busy schedule even without taking into account his 
training to conduct science experiments.14  
He spent another 311 hours training for this aspect of his flight, thanks to the 
teamwork of instructors in Houston and Star City.  JSC instructors gave him a basic 
familiarization with the goals of the experiments and hardware associated with them 
over three weeks.  GCTC instructors then had their turn in training him.  Six months 
before launch, he went through another three week session at JSC, this time meeting 
with experiment suppliers.  Then he underwent his final training back in Star City, this 
time with the flight data file for his specific mission.  Medical experiments called for 
over 200 more hours of training to prepare him in drawing blood, taking biological 
materials samples, and processing the samples.  Tasks such as drawing blood with a 
catheter were acquired skills, which made these sessions invaluable.  A report on the 
Shuttle-Mir program written jointly by Americans and Russians made a telling statement 
about the importance of experiment training: “Experience acquired in implementation of 
long-term crewed flight testifies that effective execution of the science program is 
possible only when the crewmembers are active participants in the scientific 
investigations and experiments.  This in turn is achieved when in the training process the 
cosmonauts are not restricted to forming the skills of experiment algorithm execution, 
but acquire some fundamental knowledge about the studied phenomenon in the 
necessary scope, and become acquainted with the design principles of the science 
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hardware, its design, and functioning.”  The report therefore made clear that Shuttle-Mir 
crewmembers were not automatons sent to blindly carry out research, but humans who 
should utilize the knowledge that training gave them.15               
 Thagard rewarded the instructors’ faith in him with a productive 115 days aboard 
Mir, although his experience did call for more training attention in a couple of areas.  
His training aboard Soyuz prepared him well for the launch experience on March 15, 
1995 and the docking with Mir on March 16, when he controlled the radios and 
television cameras and monitored spacecraft systems for any anomaly.  He then 
benefited from speaking with the crewmembers who were leaving Mir concerning the 
state of the space station; they could help him prepare for his stay by giving him details 
on inventory control that nobody relegated to the ground could.  He still said he had 
trouble finding equipment and getting started on his science research and passed this 
along as a message for future crewmembers to train in the Mir simulator for those initial 
operations.  He performed his 28 experiments well along with performing maintenance 
tasks, supporting an EVA by his two Russian crewmates, and helping to activate the new 
Spektr module.  The maintenance tasks on an outpost over ten years old were especially 
crucial, because Mir crewmembers spent over half their time on this chore.  The flight 
did pose psychological challenges for him that shuttle crewmembers had not faced.  As a 
U.S. Marine who had flown combat missions in the Vietnam War, he had to coexist for 
115 days with two Russians just a few years after the end of the Cold War.  Though he 
considered Vladimir Dezhurov a more autocratic Commander than the Commanders of 
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his shuttle flights, and had to deal with a much more autocratic group of flight 
controllers as well, he did maintain a positive relationship with his colleagues.  The 
psychological problem he did struggle with concerned underwork.  He felt he did not 
have enough meaningful work to keep him busy, while the flight controllers overworked 
the cosmonauts to keep Mir in operation.  Future Shuttle-Mir crewmembers now had this 
firsthand experience to consider as they went through their training process.16    
 Thagard did have additional training resources to assist him in orbit, as a way to 
counteract a problem an astronaut had to deal with for the first time since Skylab: the 
time lag between training for a task on the ground and performing it in orbit.  He had one 
technology that his Skylab predecessors did not: a laptop personal computer with a CD-
ROM drive that could play discs containing training material.  If he needed a refresher 
on the characteristics of a system or on operating an experiment, he could watch the 
videos on the discs.  The instructors often videotaped the astronauts’ last training 
sessions before leaving Earth so that when it came time to perform a critical operation 
during a mission, the astronauts could see themselves asking questions and operating the 
same equipment.  Though shuttle Commanders had used simulation software in orbit to 
train for landings beginning in 1993, this Crew On-Orbit Support System aboard Mir 
went well beyond any training resources astronauts had ever used in space before.  It 
marked a step toward the future of spaceflight training, as journeys to Mars will be so 
long that crews who go there will especially benefit from in-flight training.  Thagard also 
benefited from speaking with an instructor he had worked with for the past year in Star 
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City during his 115 days in space.  In the Space Shuttle program, instructors did not 
continue working with crews once their missions began.  But Thagard felt his 
communication with the ground benefited from the chance to continue speaking with 
this Russian Air Force Captain who had instructed him.17 
 After Norm Thagard, Shannon Lucid, and John Blaha completed their 
increments, Jerry Linenger began a more troubling mission.  In the history of Americans 
living aboard space stations, 1997 was easily the most difficult year from a crew 
perspective and highlighted the necessity of the emergency training that continues today 
for ISS missions.  On February 24, Aleksandr Lazutkin was in the Kvant-1 module when 
he saw an oxygen-generating canister erupt into flame.  The crew had trained for 
emergency evacuation prior to the flight and handled themselves in this fire crisis well, 
even as they encountered trouble with their equipment.  Their response required quick 
teamwork, which they implemented by ordering a Soyuz readied for evacuation from Mir 
(Commander Valery Korzun), printing out reentry information for the two Soyuz 
vehicles currently docked to the station (Lazutkin), passing out fire extinguishers and 
oxygen masks (Linenger), and fighting the fire with the extinguishers (an effort led by 
Korzun).  One problem concerning the response was that when the crew heard the 
master alarm go off, they were accustomed to hearing four or five such alarms per day.  
The frequency of the alarms resulted in them feeling less urgency in responding to them 
by the time this one life threatening issue emerged.  Linenger found that his first oxygen 
mask did not work, which caused him to fear for his life.  The crew also found the fire 
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extinguishers ineffective, as the oxygen canister needed to burn itself out for the crisis to 
end.  But from a training standpoint, the three felt satisfied with their personal responses.  
Linenger’s training as a doctor also came in handy right after the incident when he did 
medical exams on his crewmates and found that none of them suffered from serious 
smoke inhalation.  If they had not responded as quickly as they did in finding oxygen 
masks, their health may have been in serious danger.18            
 Linenger also became the first American to train for and perform an EVA in a 
Russian Orlan suit.  After briefings covering the design of the suit, he climbed into the 
Hydrolab, Russia’s equivalent of the NBL, for 46 hours of EVA training.  This facility 
was similar to Houston’s version in several ways, from the depth of the pool, to the 
length of the runs, to the team of scuba divers ready to offer assistance.  It did contain 
one system unique to Russia: a suspension system connected to the spacesuits that offset 
their weight, which simulated the weightlessness of space and let spacewalkers 
understand how to maneuver within their suits while in this condition.19  When he 
actually went outside Mir on April 29 with Vasily Tsibliev, he did encounter one 
surprise: the sensation of falling.  He believed that astronauts who performed EVAs on 
shuttle missions felt more contained due to the presence of the massive  
payload bay.  But his training prepared him well to install an optical properties monitor 
and radiation dosimeter as well as retrieve several materials exposure panels.20         
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As it turned out, the fire was not even the most severe crisis of the year.  On June 
25, England native Mike Foale was onboard when a Progress resupply ship remotely 
controlled by Tsibliev collided with the Spektr module and caused a pressure leak.  The 
crew heard a hissing sound as Mir’s life sustaining air escaped into the vacuum of space.  
When Tsibliev saw a pressure meter drop toward 600 millibars, with 540 millibars 
needed to maintain consciousness, the three men knew their lives were in jeopardy and 
time was quickly running out to isolate the leak.  Their training had taught them to avoid 
panic in situations like this one and had given them the knowledge to seal off Spektr 
from the rest of the station.  This required disconnecting cables that ran through the 
hatch between Spektr and an adjoining node, then popping a hatch cover into place.  The 
crew avoided losing consciousness just in time, but the disconnection of those cables and 
the tumbling of the station after the collision resulted in a power loss.  How were they 
supposed to stop the tumble and point the solar arrays toward the Sun while their 
computer was knocked out by the power outage?  Foale answered by holding his fingers 
up to a field of stars to estimate Mir’s spin rate, evoking memories of sailors from 
centuries past.  When he radioed his estimate to Mission Control in Moscow, the flight 
controllers fired an engine to stop the spin.  He also kept a star watch while Tsibliev sat 
inside a Soyuz spacecraft, so that he could shout instructions to his Commander in firing 
Soyuz jets as a way to orient Mir’s solar arrays toward the Sun.21  The crew therefore 
succeeded in saving their lives and restoring power to Mir thanks in part to Foale’s skill. 
 Despite his safe return aboard Atlantis on October 6, Foale’s mission stirred  
                                                          
21  Morgan, 105-111.  
612 
 
controversy about the wisdom of continuing Shuttle-Mir that reached the highest level of 
the U.S. government.  Blaine Hammond, the Chief of the Astronaut Office Safety 
Branch, sent letters to NASA Inspector General Roberta Gross arguing “that politics of 
cooperation had come to overshadow NASA’s judgments on safety and technical 
integrity.”  He also argued that the Russians were being too secretive by withholding 
training information from the five Americans who had now flown on Mir.  He even 
wrote about the crises thus far, “We may not be so lucky next time and, in my personal 
opinion, there will be a next time, it’s just a matter of when and how bad.”22  Although 
Shuttle-Mir Program Manager Frank Culbertson had to assuage criticism of the project 
by testifying before Congress, several review boards determined that the effort should 
continue and NASA Administrator Dan Goldin gave the green light.  The review of the 
program did lead to some changes from a training standpoint.  Tsibliev had not rehearsed 
the remote controlled docking of a Progress vehicle in more than four months when the 
collision happened, resulting in the Star City instructors admitting a mistake in training 
him and vowing not to repeat it.  Foale had not been briefed about the test of the manual 
docking system, another mistake that needed correction.23  In the future, the Americans 
on Mir would have the chance to offer “safety and mission assurance” inputs for critical 
mission events.   
But Foale’s actions after the crisis happened bore the mark of a well-trained  
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crewmember.  Not only did he nearly lose consciousness after the collision, he lost 
access to the Spektr that had been his bedroom and housed many of his experiments.  He 
could not even reach his own toothbrush, needing to borrow Tsibliev’s until another 
Progress arrived on July 7.  He needed to spend many hours mopping up water and 
ethylene glycol.  In a mission that still had several months to go while trapped inside this 
confined space, a person without his training might have lost patience or willingness to 
perform assigned tasks.  Yet he displayed his professionalism and determination by 
saying just before his return that his successor David Wolf should continue the program.  
In explaining why, he said, “Really, I think it comes down to the fact that, even though 
this flight has been one of the hardest things I have ever attempted in my life, I have to 
remember what John F. Kennedy said when I was about four years old…He said, ‘We 
do not attempt things because they are easy, but because they are hard, and in that way 
we achieve greatness.’”  His mission epitomized better than any other why expedition 
training later became such a valuable resource for space station crews.  ISS instructor 
Marc Reagan remembers that Foale was one of the Shuttle-Mir crewmembers who 
recommended the training expeditions to distant landforms and the ocean floor that 
would give crews experience in working together in a hostile environment.24  
 The last two missions for Americans on Mir went more smoothly, although not 
without the challenges that reminded both astronauts and instructors that international 
long-duration spaceflight was still in its infancy.  When Wendy Lawrence was 
disqualified from long-duration flight because she did not fit within the size limits of the 
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Orlan suit, David Wolf had to test whether a backup crewmember could step in and be 
trained adequately.  “The training accelerated in the last month because suddenly I was 
going flying in a month or so instead of five or six months,” he recalled.  “I was a 
backup, and that was invoked very late in the game, and I felt full of energy and ready to 
tackle that.”25  Compressing his EVA training from six months to about three weeks 
especially posed a challenge, because he had to spend mornings through evenings every 
day in the Hydrolab or in classroom instruction.  But despite this and his knowledge that 
people ranging from journalists, to politicians, to former astronauts did not want 
Americans to continue going to Mir, Wolf did not feel worried.  He explained that 
training helped him to push worry out of his mindset: “I had studied the systems for 
quite a long time.  I had discussed all of the failures with the people that experienced 
them and knew the most about them.  I had a good plan of action should such similar 
problems occur again or any other such problems that were anticipated, and I was 
extremely comfortable with the mission as a result of the training and the closeness to 
the issues.”  He had to perform a four-hour EVA, improvise manual procedures to 
command a solar array to deploy, recover from a temporary power loss, weather the loss 
of Russian E-mail communication, and complete 36 experiments during his four months 
aboard Mir, but he persevered.  Andy Thomas then wrapped up the Shuttle-Mir program 
with a four and a half month mission in 1998 that was the smoothest yet.26      
 After Thomas returned aboard shuttle Discovery in June, Aleksandr Aleksandrov  
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and Yuri Kargopolov collaborated with William Brown and Tommy Capps on the 
chapter of a joint report that evaluated training.  The authors generally praised the 
training process, citing the crewmembers’ ability to perform scientific research and 
maintenance on the aging Mir as strong points.  But they also made three primary 
suggestions in looking forward to the ISS.  First, astronauts should be proficient in the 
Russian language before beginning training on the Soyuz vehicle.  Training for this task 
in the Shuttle-Mir program “was hampered by the poor knowledge that some of them 
had” of the language.  Second, all members of a crew should train together as often as 
possible.  During Shuttle-Mir, the replacement of cosmonauts did not coincide with the 
 replacement of astronauts.  For instance, Andy Thomas had to spend time with Anatoly 
Solovyov and Pavel Vinogradov for just over a month and Talgat Musabayev and 
Nikolai Budarin for just under four months.  Thomas did not have the chance to train 
adequately with all four of these people before launch.  On some flights, a Russian 
Commander did not even trust an astronaut to perform operations because the two had 
not trained together.  Training for ISS missions thus needed improvement in preparing 
astronauts for staggered increments.  Third, the authors cited the argument of all 
astronauts and cosmonauts involved in Shuttle-Mir that ISS training should focus more 
heavily on psychological preparation.  In addition to dealing with the stress of the 
aforementioned crises, astronauts had experienced sensory and social deprivation while 
spending several months aboard Mir.  The authors thus suggested a longer training 
period for ISS crewmembers, including training under extreme conditions.27   
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 By the time Andy Thomas returned, the first ISS crews who hoped to benefit 
from the implementation of these suggestions were already in training.  Bill Shepherd, 
Sergei Krikalev, and Yuri Gidzenko were selected in 1996 as the crew of Expedition 1.  
By 1997, the crews of Expeditions Two, Three, and Four had been formed (with the U.S. 
and Russia alternating Commanders).28  Whereas their predecessors prepared for their 
stay on Mir solely in Russia, NASA had the responsibility of creating a training 
infrastructure for forthcoming ISS components that the U.S. would contribute such as 
the Unity node and the Destiny science laboratory.  When training to operate individual 
systems in these components, crews could use a laptop interface to study them.  “There’s 
a lot to learn about how the systems work, how you can monitor them, and respond to 
anomalies—all from the laptop interface,” Greg Chamitoff explains.  Engineers also 
constructed mockups of the planned modules to size at JSC’s Space Vehicle Mockup 
Facility so crewmembers could rehearse physical procedures in them.  Finally, engineers 
constructed yet another facility for electronic simulations.  This facility featured 
communications, data, and live displays for the crewmembers as they worked with 
Mission Control to solve simulated malfunctions (although, as discussed later, the 
astronauts did not believe this facility offered sufficiently high fidelity at the outset).  
Thus crews had several methods of training for a mission that drew on the technological 
advances of the 1990s.29             
By all accounts, training for these first ISS crews drew upon past spaceflight  
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programs as a guide.  “The early ISS instructors talked with experienced shuttle 
instructors to find out what they knew, and we also read lessons learned from Skylab and 
Mir,” confirms Lucia McCullough.30  Greg Chamitoff elaborates on this point, 
explaining, “Countless aspects of training were very similar to that for the Shuttle, 
because in many cases things were just an evolution of a previous approach.  For 
example, things like photo operations, meals, housekeeping, communication style, and 
procedure format began in a similar fashion to Space Shuttle operations.”  In addition, 
the first ISS crews worked with a Station Training Lead who followed them throughout 
the training process just as Training Leads had done with shuttle crews.  As had been the 
case for many years already, these Training Leads worked with crews as they progressed 
from studying individual systems, to electronic simulations that were integrated with 
Mission Control, to large scale simulations that took days and involved all the personnel 
assigned to the mission solving malfunctions inserted by SimSups.31  Thus although 
Shepherd was the Commander of a groundbreaking Expedition 1 mission, he could feel 
comfortable that training for this was an iterative process that drew on what had worked 
during the Space Shuttle program he had represented on three earlier missions. 
 Similar comments apply to an even greater extent to his training in Russia, where 
instructors drew on what had worked in training crews for Mir missions (the old space 
station deorbited and burned up in March 2001, with no funding left to support it).  
Shepherd, Krikalev, and Gidzenko trained in a mockup of the Zvezda living quarters 
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while in Star City, which Chamitoff remembers as “essentially the core of the Mir base 
block with a few upgrades.”  After spending a lot of time training in the Zvezda mockup, 
crews found that their operations were almost exactly the same as onboard Mir.  
Moreover, the Russian training for the ISS was given by the same senior instructors who 
trained all previous crews for Mir.  Different from the U.S., where JSC contained 
hundreds of people working in different aspects of operations and who were quite fluid 
with respect to job changes, the Russian hierarchy typically consisted of a senior person 
with one apprentice.  Those people knew everything about a system and there was little 
to no mobility between groups.  Even when Chamitoff went through training in Star City 
several years later, the senior instructors could say that they had trained every single 
person who had ever sat in a Soyuz capsule or flown on Mir.  These instructors taught 
largely the same syllabus, with any evolution of the training simply due to additional 
hardware or software.  “While I can’t say that nothing has changed, it is not apparent 
that training has changed much over the past 20-30 years on the Russian side,” 
Chamitoff concludes.  Thus Krikalev and Gidzenko could each feel comfortable as Mir 
veterans that training for the new ISS was an iterative process that reflected what they 
had already done as well.32 
 Even so, Shepard, Krikalev, and Gidzenko were pioneers who went through a 
more demanding training process than the shuttle crews who had come before them and 
the ISS crews who have come after them.  The three men trained from 1996 until their 
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launch on October 31, 2000 due to delays in launching their Zvezda living quarters.33  
Besides the daunting duration of the training flow, the process challenged them due to 
the sheer number of details the three of them needed to know.  The crew needed to 
become experts in each of the major ISS systems: Command and Data Handling, 
Communications and Tracking, Operations Local Area Network, the Inventory 
Management System, Guidance, Navigation, and Control, the Electrical Power System, 
the Thermal Control System, the Environmental Control and Life Support System, 
Structures and Mechanisms, and Robotics.  Shepherd, Krikalev, and Gidzenko learned 
all of these systems in high detail by working with one instructor for each system, each 
of whom worked for a Station Training Lead (STL) who oversaw all of them.  Thus STL 
Marc Reagan had his hands full trying to coordinate the activity of all the instructors 
who worked with the crew and the crew had their hands full learning about this complex 
station.34   
 Though the experience Shepherd, Krikalev, and Gidzenko had from previous 
programs certainly helped them understand those systems, Chamitoff notes that 
differences quickly emerged in learning ISS systems.  “Much of that is a transformation 
due to the use of computers for everything from procedure following to command 
execution,” he explains.  “The ISS systems were monitored and controlled via thousands 
of displays on a laptop.  The procedures were both hard copy and electronic, but 
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typically executed from a computer display as well.  So the mechanisms of operation and 
the training to go with it changed to adapt to this new paradigm.”35  Software skills thus 
became more important than ever if crewmembers hoped to succeed in 21st century 
spaceflight, as in so many tasks throughout the world. 
 Besides the intensive training with Reagan and the systems instructors who he 
oversaw, Shepherd also encountered a challenge with the amount of time he had to 
spend away from home.  He made four or five one-month visits to Star City per year 
beginning in 1997 with Krikalev and Gidzenko.  He went through classroom lectures on 
the Soyuz spacecraft, Zarya module, Zvezda living quarters, EVA, the Orlan suits, and 
the Russian language in sessions which took place every day from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.  
Though most of the instruction was theoretical and based in a classroom, he did receive 
several hours of practical instruction inside the simulators for the Zarya and Zvezda 
modules.  He also underwent physical training in a personal gym located in the 
American Houses basement, which contained weight machines and aerobic equipment.  
For outdoors exercise, he ran a track around Star City and in nearby woods that covered 
over 3 miles round trip.  He also received two days of survival training, a holdover from 
the Shuttle-Mir era.  The instruction progressed until Shepherd was ready for his oral 
exams, some of which took place in a classroom and some in the simulators.  The day 
before the exams, he took part in a review session during which he could ask any 
question he liked as a way to prepare.  Then the instructors administered the exams, 
which lasted about one hour each, before giving Shepherd a grade from 1 (fail) to 5 
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(excellent pass).  Clay Anderson remembered 5 as the standard grade that astronauts 
received.36  As Shepherd went through all of this, he learned about the family separation 
that made ISS training less glamorous than shuttle training.  His commutes to Star City 
were frequent enough that he described the process as very hard on him and his wife 
Beth.37 
 As Shepherd commuted between Houston and Star City, Marc Reagan developed 
his own memories as the STL coordinating training for the Expedition 1 crew.  He 
describes the process of negotiating between the U.S. and Russia on training 
requirements as contentious.  “The Russians had a model of Shuttle-Mir, where the 
American astronauts came to Russia, learned Russian, and received all of their training 
from Russian instructors,” he recalls.  “But now there were agreements that the language 
to be used on the ISS would be English and Expedition 1 would have an American 
Commander.  This was a significant departure from the Shuttle-Mir days.”  The 
departure from that Russian-centric model resulted in clashes concerning how much time 
each crewmember would have to spend in which country and what language each would 
have to speak in training.  The Russians did win the argument that Americans would 
have to speak Russian while training in Russia.  They also won the argument that 
Americans would have to spend one year in Russia to train on the Soyuz spacecraft, even 
though this seemed excessive to the Americans.  The two sides even had to decide on 
which holidays to recognize.  Russians celebrated Christmas in the first week of January, 
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not on December 25, so the sides had to make a decision on whether Shepherd should 
train on Russia’s Christmas Day.  Reagan remembers Shepherd as having strong 
opinions in sorting out these issues, as the ISS Deputy Program Manager before being 
assigned to the crew and a strong willed former Navy SEAL.  “It was very contentious, 
yet it also led to very close friendships, some of which endure to this day,” Reagan 
reflects.  “This was because we worked so hard in trying to meet a common goal.”38              
As if learning a new language and commuting between two nations to learn 
systems and operate simulators on an expert level was not enough, Shepherd had still 
more tasks to fulfill during those years from selection in 1996 to flight in 2000.  A 
NASA official even created a pie chart to explain how training time was divided back in 
those early years of the ISS.  Shepherd, Krikalev, and Gidzenko trained to make an EVA 
should it become necessary.  This was the largest part of the chart.  Next came robotics 
operations, although this crew was scheduled to return before the delivery of the station 
robotic arm so they would not have to worry about operating an arm of their own.  They 
did have to train to work with the STS-97 and STS-98 shuttle crews that would visit 
them, making sure the ISS systems reacted properly to the addition of new components 
as the shuttle robotic arm installed them.  Next came payloads, which meant training to 
operate the equipment that would arrive on the shuttles and Progress resupply vehicles.  
Though the primary purpose of the mission was to activate station systems and 
participate in the construction of the outpost, the payloads did include a few scientific 
experiments.  Next came medical operations, as the crew needed to know how to care for 
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one another during the 140 days they would be in space.  Next came ISS simulations, 
meaning the time honored process of working with flight controllers and SimSups before 
flight.  Next came learning each of the ISS systems mentioned earlier.  Finally, the crew 
needed to learn how to respond to three life threatening potential emergencies—fire, 
depressurization, and toxic spills—and learn photo/TV operations.  There was no 
wonder that Shepherd, Krikalev, and Gidzenko needed such a lengthy training process 
given the number of demanding tasks they needed to pioneer for a new program.  The 
three men needed to take on a “jack of all trades” mentality.39 
 The three men had to confront yet another challenge during these first years of 
the ISS program: those simulations that took up a significant portion of that pie chart 
were not yet as high fidelity as they were later in the program.  Their colleague Jim 
Voss, then training for the second mission that followed theirs, quickly answers “No” 
when asked if the electronic ISS simulator in Houston accurately represented the real 
station during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  “We did have computers that could issue 
commands, but even the screens for the computers were not fully developed when we 
were training,” he says.  “We learned a lot instead by looking at real hardware before it 
launched and then we looked at it when we got on orbit.”  He praises the training in Star 
City as far superior to the training in Houston at this time.  “The Russians had modules 
up there that were like Mir modules,” he remembers, echoing Chamitoff’s comments.  
“They had very high fidelity mockups on the ground, which contained functional 
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systems that looked exactly the same as the real modules.”  Thus the first American 
residents of the ISS—Bill Shepherd, Jim Voss, Susan Helms, Frank Culbertson, Dan 
Bursch, and Carl Walz—could rehearse realistic operations in Star City but not so much 
in Houston.  Like the astronauts who had successfully inaugurated new programs before 
them in Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and the Space Shuttle, these astronauts would 
have to christen the ISS despite having a simulator in a primitive state.40   
 Mark Sonoda gives a technical explanation for the discouraging state of the ISS 
simulator in Houston from his experience as a Station Training Lead.  The real ISS 
featured a computer called the Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM).  The simulator had to 
emulate the MDM, but “when we started training for ISS we only had Functionally 
Equivalent Unit MDMs,” Sonoda explains.  “The FEU is basically a test unit that the 
avionics and software folks use for testing the flight software.  It was high fidelity on the 
normal operation of the MDM, but not good at training malfunctions.”  Sonoda 
remembers having to compensate for this by using an alternative method of presenting a 
malfunction that was not supported by the simulator.  “For example, if the simulator 
could not accurately simulate a computer failure, we as instructors would find out all the 
signatures the crew and flight controllers would expect to see and we would either mock 
that up on a paper copy of the display or tell the astronauts something like, ‘on display 
XXX you see YYYY message,’” he recalls.  When told of Voss’s comments, he says, “I 
agree, the facilities we had when he was training were very primitive and limited in 
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capability.”41  A 2014 document on lessons learned from the International Space Station 
supports the comments of both Voss and Sonoda, stating, “For the first ISS crew, the 
training facilities and crew procedures were not fully ready.  As crews for increments 1-
4 were going through training, we provided information on everything we thought they 
needed to know based on our best estimate of the operational concepts both for 
individual systems and the integrated system.  It was a painful startup experience.”42   
 But all of these challenges thrust upon them in training were still not enough to 
derail them from a successful mission.  On October 31, 2000, the three men launched 
from Baikonur aboard a Soyuz.  For the 136 days from November 2, 2000 to March 18, 
2001, they went through an Expedition 1 mission in which they benefited from training 
that was more skill based than task based.  Space Shuttle Mission Specialists who 
performed dozens of experiments during a brief mission needed heavily task based 
training to prepare them for what they knew they would have to do every day.  But these 
three made greater use of skill based training, because their days in orbit were not filled 
with those predetermined tasks.  There were tasks they knew they would have to perform 
and did, such as activating the station’s life support systems, computers, and the Crew 
Health Care System in the initial weeks, performing a small number of experiments, and 
helping the STS-97 and STS-98 crews in their construction missions.  But in general, 
their work aboard the ISS was different than the shuttle experience because it was more 
spontaneous.  Every afternoon, they communicated with flight controllers in planning 
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sessions concerning what they would have to do the next day.43  Then the crew would 
have to make use of the skills acquired during training to fulfill the flight controllers’ 
requests.  They had to deal with issues like the stationary bicycle and treadmill breaking 
down, or malfunctions in the oxygen generation and carbon dioxide scrubbing systems.  
In short, Shepherd, Krikalev, and Gidzenko had to become maintenance technicians.  
They had learned how to troubleshoot during four years of training and, despite the lack 
of simulation fidelity, still managed to overcome all malfunctions on the strength of their 
systems knowledge.44 
 Yury Usachev, Jim Voss, and Susan Helms were up next as the Expedition 2 
crew, reaching orbit aboard Discovery in February 2001 and entering the station for the 
first handover ceremony from one crew to another.  Voss offers yet another perspective 
on the difference between American training and Russian training based on his 
experience as a backup during the Shuttle-Mir program and nearly four years training for 
Expedition 2.  He remembers the “very detailed level” of systems knowledge the 
Russian instructors drilled into him.  “When things went wrong, you’re expected to use 
your brain to figure out what happened,” he explains.  “It’s a lot less simulator 
procedural based than in the United States.  It’s like, hey, our carbon dioxide removal 
system broke.  What do we think is wrong with it?  It’s not a matter of following a flow 
chart through, it’s a matter of using your brain a bit more.”  He remembers the 
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cosmonauts he worked with as helpful during these challenging times, including 
Commander Usachev.  “They were all helpful and taught me to overcome the language 
difficulties,” he says.  “There were a lot of things that Usachev helped us with since he 
had made two six-month flights on Mir.  He was very experienced and taught us some 
very practical things that you don’t get in training.”  Though Voss and Helms were both 
U.S. military officers who had served during the Cold War and understood the irony of 
now working under a Russian Commander, they knew Usachev’s knowledge was an 
asset they could draw upon in training and flight.45               
 This crew had to christen another critical aspect of training, because the STS-100 
crew sent the robotic arm to the ISS during their stay.  Operating the arm required 
training even for veteran shuttle crewmembers because this arm was much larger than 
the shuttle arm and able to reach distant workstations on the ISS that the shuttle arm 
could not.  “For three years we’ve been training some with the Canadians and some with 
our own people,” Helms recalled before the flight.  “And having flown the shuttle arm 
before, I would say that the station arm is about ten times more complex; there’s a lot 
more to it.  It’s got a lot more flexibility; it also has a lot more redundancy.”  Her 
training took her to the Canadian Space Agency headquarters in Saint-Hubert, Quebec, 
which housed a virtual reality system in which she could watch a simulated arm move in 
three dimensions.  She praised the virtual reality simulations as crucial in making her 
task of installing the Quest airlock that a shuttle crew had delivered onto the ISS as 
simply as possible.  By making a large rotational movement around the elbow, Helms  
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installed the airlock that astronauts use to make EVAs outside the ISS to this day.46   
 This crew dealt with an increasing emphasis on science experiments from 
Expedition 1 to their stay, as they performed 18 experiments over their 163 days on the 
ISS.  Still, the comments of Voss and Helms suggest that training for and operating the 
experiments was in a primitive state as well.  Helms remembers asking several questions 
about the life science experiments “where we were the guinea pigs,” but most of the 
experiments were autonomous.  In most cases, “we just had to set up the experiment, put 
it in place, turn it on, do a few steps to activate it, and periodically monitor it and extract 
data to send to the ground,” Voss recalls.  The two do not remember doing much training 
for these experiments, because this was not necessary in those early years of the program 
for experiments far less complex than those that crews carry out today.47  The ISS was 
still far away from reaching its full scientific potential at this point.          
 One way in which this crew did have to call on their training concerned their 
response to the frequent caution and warning alarms that marred their stay.  While in 
Star City, Usachev, Voss, and Helms used fire extinguishers and emergency masks in 
case a situation like the one Jerry Linenger had faced repeated itself.    On their first 
night alone on the ISS after the departure of shuttle Discovery, a smoke alarm went off.  
“That was because some dust had been picked up,” Helms remembers.  “We did not 
have a fire.  But we went through the emergency procedure because this alarm went off.  
I felt like the training we had for that was sufficient.  What we had to accomplish in real 
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time, though, was to discern the difference between a false alarm and a real alarm.  We 
did not smell smoke or see flames, so we had to ask, ‘What could be the issue here?’  
We also had a lot of issues with over annunciation of problems on the space station.  We 
were up there 163 days and we had something like 900 plus caution and warning 
alarms.”  Despite the alarms and a computer crash in the Destiny laboratory, Usachev, 
Voss, and Helms left the ISS in a larger and better state than they had found it when they 
returned in August 2001.48 
 As the missions progressed, the training burden on crewmembers decreased.  
Instead of four years, crews began training for 24-30 months.  Meanwhile, the fidelity of 
simulations that were electronically integrated with flight controllers and SimSups 
increased.  This removed another burden by allowing crewmembers to train more 
effectively for malfunctions.  When asked about the fidelity of simulations, Greg 
Chamitoff’s answer is very different from Jim Voss’s because their missions were seven 
years apart.  By the time Chamitoff trained for his Expedition 17/18 mission in 2008, he 
found that fidelity had grown high enough to give him a strong degree of confidence 
about working in orbit.  Some of the system racks in the Destiny laboratory simulator 
might have been missing, for instance, but he explains that “it is a game of diminishing 
returns once you’ve matched things well enough for the specific training at hand.”49  
Mark Sonoda again has a more technical answer on how fidelity improved.  “We went 
from FEUs to simulate the MDMs aboard the space station to emulated MDMs on 
                                                          
48  Author Phone Interview with Helms.  
49  Chamitoff, E-Mail Correspondence with Author.  
630 
 
Single Board Computers to virtualized MDMs within the simulator itself,” he 
remembers.  As with all simulators dating back to the Mercury program, computer 
improvements made the most critical difference in increasing fidelity.  The added 
fidelity allowed crews to develop more experience in solving complex failure scenarios 
that had always been so critical in preparing astronauts.50         
 The training for life threatening emergencies grew more complex and realistic 
over time as well.  Jim Voss recalls when asked about emergency training for Expedition 
2, “We couldn’t prepare for much because, like I said, the fidelity of our simulations was 
very low.  We really did our emergency training after we got on orbit.”  But this changed 
as the years passed.  Instructors understood that the safest course of action was to give 
crews training on the ground.  The station grew so radically in the years after Voss’s 
mission that instructors also understood the need to teach crews how to respond to an 
emergency that might arise in a new location.  Though the emergency training focused 
on just the three main scenarios of fire, depressurization, and toxic spills, “the books to 
handle them are very thick with countless variations and issues depending on location 
for these problems,” Chamitoff remembers.  “So the procedures are involved and so is 
the training.”  He recalls the realism as frighteningly accurate as well: “When you see 
smoke coming from behind a panel, even if you know it is a simulation, you are 
psychologically 100 percent engaged in the situation as if it was real.”  When asked if 
the preparation was sufficient for an actual emergency in space, he answers yes.  “That 
doesn’t mean you feel 100 percent ready for anything,” he admits.  “There’s a lot to 
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know, but with the help of written procedures and Mission Control, we have done pretty 
well handling the anomalies that have occurred.51       
 As more and more astronauts reported to Russia for training, the Americans 
benefited from the written guidance they received concerned their overseas trips.  Some 
of the guidance concerned proper social etiquette, as seen in a manual prepared for 
NASA by Steven D. Jones of the East-West Business Strategies organization.  The 
astronauts learned, “Alcohol is part of any Russian meal with the faintest trace of 
‘special’ overtones, so as a foreign visitor, you are likely to see a lot of it…Refusing 
alcohol is a bit dicey socially; it’s like rejecting part of the hospitality.”  They learned the 
Russian standard of treating women with deference, from holding doors, to helping them 
in and out of cars and on and off buses, to lighting cigarettes.  They learned about the 
inconvenience of air travel in Russia and the warnings to not take rubles into and out of 
the country or certain valuable items out of the country without special export permits.  
They learned that in the midst of all of this, “The key difference is that with our 
comparatively expensive and colorful dress, Westerners stand out as dramatically 
wealthy in Russian society.”  Astronaut David Brown even filled out a “Cultural 
Awareness Questionnaire for Russian Training” in which he answered questions such as, 
“An acquaintance surprises you with a present.  Do you accept it politely and open it 
later at home, or accept it with effusive thanks and open it on the spot?”52  Thus for 
about the last 20 years, astronauts have benefited from  
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resources designed to help them avoid any embarrassing situations in a foreign nation. 
 JSC instructors also heeded the advice from the report on the Shuttle-Mir 
program by focusing on giving astronauts psychological preparation for long duration 
flight and the training that came with it.  Astronauts received a Family Support and 
Separation Guide advising them about how to handle the changes in their families’ 
routines prior to embarking for Star City and then several months in space.53  They also 
received a document called “Preparing for Long Duration Space Missions: Discussion & 
Resource Guide for Astronauts.”  This document defined the situation in which ISS 
astronauts found themselves, stating “Long duration flight is qualitatively, as well as 
quantitatively different from short flight,” and elaborated on why with examples from 
history.  Astronauts learned about the effects of personal confinement that emerged at 3-
5 months for people at Antarctic field sites or astronauts aboard Mir, such as boredom, 
irritability, reduced motivation, fatigue, reduced short term memory, and disturbed sleep.  
Explorers at early Antarctic field sites had to deal with depression and suicide due to 
their unawareness of these issues, while John Blaha reportedly suffered from depression 
aboard Mir and prompted JSC instructors to give this psychological guidance to ISS 
crewmembers.54 
 The document contained examples of positive and negative cases concerning the 
psychological effects of long duration flight and helpful suggestions that ISS 
                                                          
53  “Family Support and Separation Guide,” September 14, 1999, Box 29, Folder 4, David M. Brown Collection, 
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, Chantilly, VA.   
54  “Preparation for Long Duration Space Missions: Discussion & Resource Guide for Astronauts,” April 2000, Box 
29, Folder 7, David M. Brown Collection, Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, Chantilly, VA.  
633 
 
crewmembers read during their training to avoid repeating the negative cases.  The 
suggestions included finding enough engaging work to fill up the day, exercising, 
communicating with one’s family, taking part in personally relaxing activities such as 
journal writing, letter writing, reading, drawing, and use of a ham radio, and physically 
removing oneself from the stress of an interpersonal conflict when necessary.  Another 
portion of the document detailed the challenge of maintaining a strong relationship with 
Mission Control.  “Significant stress can be unintentionally placed on crewmembers by 
the ground organization,” the document stated.  The document cited incidents from the 
Skylab and Mir programs as examples.  During Skylab, the flight controllers did not 
adequately understand the real situation that crews faced onboard and overtaxed Jerry 
Carr, Bill Pogue, and Ed Gibson as a result.  The Russians who had flown aboard Mir 
also encountered conflicts, because cosmonauts were often blamed for any problems 
onboard by flight controllers in Moscow that were more autocratic than those in 
Houston.  The document detailed strategies to overcome these conflicts, such as looking 
at flight controllers “as part of your team and not another organization” and developing 
personal relationships with flight controllers during training.55                           
 Extreme environment training became another of the best measures of how ISS 
training psychologically prepared crewmembers.  On the recommendation of Mir 
veterans such as Foale, astronauts from the late 1990s to the present have made training 
trips designed to develop “expeditionary behavior.”  Greg Chamitoff defines this as 
“experiences that create personal, inter-personal, and team stresses that must be managed 
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and overcome.”56  This began with one’s selection as an ASCAN.  Clay Anderson 
remembers traveling to the Brunswick Naval Air Station in Maine with his astronaut 
class of 1998, one of the first activities the ASCANs undertook together.  For two and a 
half days, the astronauts had to read and follow maps, construct personal and group 
shelters, search for food using traps and fishing lines, and build fires.  A rainstorm on the 
second day prompted one astronaut to declare in frustration, “This is bullshit!”  But after 
persevering through this experience, ASCANs felt more comfortable in undergoing 
expeditionary training as mission crewmembers.  As described in the last chapter, the 
STS-107 and other shuttle crews partnered with NOLS to make productive trips to sites 
in the western United States.  But expeditionary training applied most to ISS 
crewmembers preparing to spend several months together, because those stresses that 
Chamitoff mentions were more likely to disrupt missions that lasted for several months.  
After being assigned to a mission, crewmembers spent one or two days in a classroom 
learning about expeditionary skills before making trips to extreme locations ranging 
from mountainous terrain in the heat of summer to lakes in the coldest part of winter.57              
Chamitoff remembers how his trip to Cold Lakes, Canada in 2000 was applicable 
to preparing him for a long expedition in space.   He explains, “We took turns being 
leader for the day, while pulling around our supplies and equipment on sleds in 
temperatures that were often below -4 degrees Fahrenheit and reaching -40 degrees at 
times.  We were rarely allowed time to sleep, and we were continually given tasks that 
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stressed the team.  For example, we would be told by radio to move our camp to a new 
location in the middle of the night.  Then just after we arrived and got everything set up 
again, we were told to move again immediately.  Managing tasks with thick gloves was a 
continuous frustration, being cold was a continuous challenge, being tired was a 
continual stressor, and there were other obstacles, such as cracked skin on fingers that 
eventually made every task difficult.  This brings out emotions and, of course, pushes 
people to their limits.  A situation could certainly arise on a mission in which you need 
the mental toughness, perseverance, and confidence to get through it.  This was certainly 
practice for such a scenario.  Ultimately, this exercise is also a filter, because it is 
impossible to hide any issues that an individual has.  If someone cannot work well as a 
member of a team during good times and bad, then we probably don’t want to be stuck 
with that person on a small crew on a long duration space mission.”58  Thus Chamitoff 
and his colleagues had a way of preparing for the psychological aspect of a mission that 
Skylab or Shuttle-Mir crewmembers did not have.  The training process had become 
more sophisticated to meet the challenges of the ISS era. 
But the most useful expeditionary training came aboard an undersea habitat 
called Aquarius.  Bill Todd, who had trained shuttle crews since the 1980s, hit upon the 
idea of giving ISS crews a chance to live and work underwater off the coast of Florida as 
an analog for living and working in space.  From October 21-27, 2001, he commanded 
three astronauts (Mike Gernhardt, Michael López-Alegria, and Dafydd Williams) on the 
first mission of NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO).  The crew 
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spent six days underwater aboard Aquarius, living in tight quarters and surrounded by an 
environment inhospitable to unprotected human life just as the astronauts hoped to 
encounter aboard the ISS.  Again, crewmembers during the Skylab and Shuttle-Mir 
programs, or even the initial ISS expeditions, did not have this analog to prepare them 
for long duration spaceflight.  The NEEMO program proved so successful that 21 
missions have now taken place.  Marc Reagan, a veteran of the second mission and now 
the Project Manager of NEEMO, points out that the assignment of an astronaut to an  
ISS mission often closely follows their serving on a NEEMO mission.  This underscores 
just how closely the two operations mirror each other.59     
Chamitoff calls his 2002 NEEMO expedition one of the best training tools for his 
ISS mission.  “There were mission objectives, and these evolved over time,” he explains.  
“For ours, they were mostly related to science aimed at studying the health of the coral 
reef.  This involved detailed measurements and required careful work outside the habitat 
to observe, count, and measure coral heads and their relative health.  Other exercises 
outside the habitat attempted to simulate EVA operations, while inside the habitat we 
had a daily schedule and many tasks that paralleled ISS operations.  We even had a live 
link-up with the ISS and did several PR events with schools and news channel 
interviews.  We also worked with Mission Control as they managed our schedule and 
activities in a similar fashion to how we operate ISS every day.  So NEEMO was a real 
mission, even if it served as a practice mission for the ISS.  It was a fantastic training 
tool in terms of schedule, life support criticality, procedure following, communications, 
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PR events, photo processing, command structure, daily operations, EVA operations, and 
so on.  In short, there was no single training exercise that more closely resembled 
spaceflight operations or psychologically prepared us more for the real thing.”60 
 JSC instructors thus addressed the issues of training fidelity and the 
psychological aspect of training after the first few expeditions, but life aboard the ISS 
has not been completely smooth sailing ever since.  Like all previous programs dating 
back to Mercury, challenging and unexpected situations arose that demonstrated why 
crews needed training.  Valery Korzun, Sergei Treschev, and Peggy Whitson found this 
out during their Expedition 5 mission from June to December 2002.  The crew had to 
manually steer the solar panels for hours in order to avoid a total power failure due to a 
combination of failures.  Situations like these are why Greg Chamitoff argues, “The 
training for off-nominal or emergency response is the most important training we do.  In 
many ways, this is why the human is so useful and effective in space.  We have the tools 
and the training to work around obstacles as they arise.”61   
 The Expedition 6 crew faced unique challenges of their own.  Ken Bowersox, 
Don Pettit, and Nikolai Budarin were aboard the ISS on February 1, 2003 when JSC 
Director Jefferson Howell passed along the news that seven of their colleagues had died 
in the Columbia tragedy.  Like sailors on an oceangoing vessel, the crew needed to cope 
with the psychological burden of a change in their plans.  Bowersox and Pettit said they 
were prepared to spend up to a year on the station if this proved necessary, since now the  
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remaining shuttles would be grounded.  “Right away, it wasn’t clear if the Russians were 
going to let them come home on a Soyuz,” recalls Marc Reagan.  “That had not been 
negotiated, that if the shuttle should end up being lost, a crew would have to come home 
on a Soyuz.  Whether the crew had the food and clothing to make it through to the next 
resupply mission was also unknown.”62  This situation epitomized why JSC instructors 
had recently emphasized training crewmembers on the psychological burdens they might 
face during a mission.  Pettit reflected of ISS history in general, “Crews have been gone 
during every holiday, anniversaries, birthdays, recitals, graduations, weddings, family 
breakups, stock market crashes, wars, terrorist attacks (Expedition 3 Commander Frank 
Culbertson had received word of the September 11, 2001 attacks and taken photos from 
orbit of the smoke emanating from the World Trade Center towers), voting, jury duty, 
death in the family, funerals, and taxes.  Death of fellow crewmembers occurred for us 
when Columbia disintegrated on entry…After a short time of reflection, I returned to the 
ever present work of the mission.”  The grief and uncertainty following the tragedy did 
not prevent the Expedition 6 crew from achieving what Petit called “a full pallet of tasks 
including space station construction, maintenance, and scientific investigations in human 
physiology.”63                   
  On May 3, 2003, Bowersox and Pettit became the first American astronauts to 
return to Earth in a Soyuz spacecraft.  But their reentry and landing with Budarin 
produced further drama.  A malfunction caused their Soyuz to lose its reaction control 
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system and take the ship onto a ballistic reentry that exposed them to 8 Gs.  When the 
Soyuz rolled to a stop, the three were almost 300 miles away from their planned landing 
spot and the ground support team did not know their location.  Making the transition 
from 161 days in the zero G of orbit, to a sudden and unplanned 8 Gs, to the 1 G of a 
Kazakhstan field posed a physical challenge for Bowersox, Pettit, and Budarin.  But they 
had withstood high G loads in a Russian centrifuge, like all ISS crews before them, and 
had undergone medical exams to make sure they were in peak condition prior to launch.  
Their training helped assure everybody supporting the mission that the three would be 
physically capable of taking care of themselves, even if they did have to crawl due to 
their weakened state.  Due to their Soyuz training, the three could read procedures in 
Russian to power down the spacecraft.  On the strength of their survival training, they 
then deployed survival gear including woolen clothes, food, water, a medical kit, a 
portable radio, and a signaling kit containing a shotgun pistol.  When a helicopter arrived 
about three hours later, they fired the pistol to signal their location and were recovered.64    
 The loss of the Space Shuttle for the next two years proved disruptive, because 
ISS crews that had been training were split up and asked to take on new responsibilities.  
Because fewer consumables could reach the station without the shuttle flying, the crew 
size was reduced to two.  Ed Lu had planned to fly as a right seater aboard Soyuz with 
Yuri Malenchenko and Alexander Kaleri for the Expedition 7 mission.  But since he 
actually undertook the mission with Malenchenko only, Lu had to train to become a 
flight engineer aboard Soyuz and take on additional duties in ISS maintenance and 
                                                          
64  Ibid.  
640 
 
research.  “We only had nine and a half weeks from that point until launch,” he recalled 
of the time that the Columbia tragedy happened and he received these responsibilities.  
“So, we’re running at about five to ten times normal pace, which means I’m in class with 
a simulator seven days a week, morning until night, and hit the books after that.”65  Marc 
Reagan describes crew changes such as this one as the most disruptive aspect of ISS 
training.  But Malenchenko and Lu overcame the adversity of the training sequence over 
an ambitious 184 day mission filled with equipment repairs and research in technology 
development, physical science, biological science, countermeasures to the physiological 
effects of microgravity, and Earth observations.66     
 The challenging and unexpected situations continued during the era of two 
person crews and continued proving the value of having adequately trained 
crewmembers.  On New Year’s Day 2004, Mike Foale and Alexander Kaleri received 
word from flight controllers that the ISS was suffering a slow pressure leak.  The onus 
fell on the crew to identify the leak and solve the problem, which Foale did on January 
11.  He used an ultrasonic probe to find that a cable called a vacuum jumper used to 
equalize pressure between the panes in the Destiny laboratory main window was causing 
a leak.  If he did not have the skill to solve this problem, he and Kaleri would have had 
to take part in a lockdown of the ISS, which would have disrupted their scientific 
research.  The Commander of the next crew, Gennady Padalka, summarized the 
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significance of the episode when he said, “the last malfunction—I mean the situation 
with the leakage—showed us that if we had not had crew on board, we could have lost 
the space station.”  The Expedition 8 crewmembers had the mental and physical 
flexibility to respond to the surprising development.67    
 The resumption of shuttle flights and the addition of new modules brought up by 
the orbiters brought new challenges in training ISS crews.  Beginning with the 
Expedition 13 crew of Pavel Vinogradov, Jeff Williams, and Thomas Reiter in 2006, 
missions consisted of three crewmembers each again.  The German native Reiter was the 
first astronaut not from the United States or Russia to serve as an ISS crewmember, 
which presented the challenge to astronauts of adjusting to training with people who 
represented still more cultures.  From this point, astronauts rotated onto the ISS in 
staggered increments.  For instance, Suni Williams flew with Michael Lopez-Alegria 
and Mikhail Tyurin for about four months during Expedition 14 and Fyodor Yurchikhin 
and Oleg Kotov for about two months during Expedition 15.  Then Clay Anderson 
replaced her to fly with Yurchikhin and Kotov.  The Station Training Lead and team of 
instructors had to account for the need to train all the crewmembers who would be living 
together, which Williams and Anderson remember as adding expense and complexity.  
Anderson did not train much with his two Russian colleagues, but became good friends 
with them and learned he could trust them as an astronaut training for his first flight.  
“Oleg was extremely capable technically,” he remembers.  “Fyodor was good too.  He 
was the Commander, so he was more the fatherly figure for the three of us.  When I went 
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to Russia, we worked well together.  They seemed to enjoy their trips to Houston, for the 
most part.”  Just as rookies could draw on the advice of Instructor Astronauts in the 
United States, they could draw on the advice of Russian and eventually European and 
Japanese crewmembers for long duration flight.68  
 The addition of new modules also meant new training requirements in Europe 
and Japan.  In 2008, the shuttle added the European laboratory Columbus and Japanese 
Experiment Module (JEM) Kibo.  This meant astronauts had to travel to the European 
Astronaut Center in Cologne, Germany and the Tsukuba Space Center in Tsukuba, Japan 
for training with the new components.  Greg Chamitoff remembers receiving extensive 
training on Columbus and Kibo systems and science facilities in advance of his 
Expedition 17/18 mission that year.  He was the one who had to set up tons of hardware 
and configure these modules to begin their science programs, so the trips especially 
benefited him.  “The fidelity of the hardware available in a simulation varies 
significantly from country to country,” he explains.  “In Japan we can do high fidelity 
training in the JEM simulator, and the same for Columbus in Cologne.”  Thus NASA 
took the expense of sending him overseas to receive training from the instructors who 
were responsible for these modules and the most accurate simulators of them.  Chamitoff 
remembered being trained to an expert level on these foreign modules.69  The 
requirement to learn this new hardware and the experiments that came with it posed new  
training challenges, but once again instructors adapted to meet them.            
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 First, a change after Chamitoff’s expedition removed the need for everybody 
needing to train for every single system.  Instructors instead required only U.S. 
astronauts to handle U.S. systems and only Russian cosmonauts to handle Russian 
systems.  Crewmembers did not have to know every system at an expert level, either.  
NASA introduced the categories of operator, specialist, and user to describe the level of 
expertise each crewmember would train to develop on a system.  An operator needed to 
know the nominal operation of a certain system.  A specialist needed to receive 
additional training for off-nominal operation.  A user received only a brief 
familiarization session on a system.70  This cut the training time for the six person crews 
who occupied the ISS beginning with Expedition 20 in May 2009.  Chamitoff recalls the 
United States was well ahead of Russia on this idea of streamlining training down to 
what a crew really needed to know.  “Russia had the old school idea of one instructor per 
subject wanting each student to study the entire subject,” he explains.  “NASA 
spearheaded the effort to streamline training, which has worked well because there’s no 
reason for a Japanese astronaut to fix a Russian oxygen generator if there are three 
Russians onboard.”71       
 Training also evolved to meet the crewmembers’ needs in operating scientific 
experiments.  With American, Russian, European, and Japanese laboratories now part of 
the ISS, each crew needed to operate an increasing number of experiments (by 2016, one 
expedition included 275 of them) and in some cases had not trained to operate them for a 
                                                          
70  Lengyel and Newman, eds., 46.    
71  Chamitoff, E-Mail Correspondence with Author.  
644 
 
year or more.  Chamitoff explains that training for the research suffered due to the many 
other training needs each crew had.  “Of course, we were briefed on the purpose and the 
science behind each investigation,” he remembers.  “We did get hands on training with 
most experiments at some point in our training flow.  However, it typically amounts to 
single digit hours or less for any given experiment.  On the bright side, this has forced 
investigators to concentrate their training efforts on exactly what they think the crew 
needs to know.”72  But the time lag between these meetings with investigators and the 
actual operation of the experiments posed a challenge for crews.  Meeting the challenge 
called for a technique called “Just in Time Training.”  When an astronaut needed a 
refresher on a certain experiment, he or she could watch a brief video on the ISS and 
thus train “on the fly” for the benefit of Principal Investigators.  “To use an analogy, if I 
need to work on my refrigerator, I can go to Google and replace my refrigerator filter on 
a General Electric X598,” explains Clay Anderson.  “And oftentimes I can find a video 
done by an expert who can show me how to do it.  That is the principle that led us to 
change the way we train astronauts, such that they can do it in space for the first time 
without needing a two or three hour class on the ground.  And if that class was three 
years before they flew, they have probably forgotten it all anyway.”  Thus technology 
enabled this paradigm shift from the training of astronauts in previous programs.73                     
 When astronauts have to conduct an especially groundbreaking experiment 
during an expedition, one technique is to assign an astronaut with a background in that 
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field of research to that expedition.  Kate Rubins earned her Ph.D. in cancer biology 
before running a laboratory at the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  NASA selected her as part of the 2009 class of astronauts.  
She then found herself utilizing her experience in life science during the Expedition 
48/49 mission in 2016.  She sequenced over 2 billion base pairs of DNA, becoming the 
first astronaut ever to do so, while performing numerous microbiome experiments.  Her 
presence on the ISS benefited the Principal Investigators who sought new knowledge 
about the space environment, because she had been a PI herself in Massachusetts and 
had published and presented her research around the world.  Her background provided a 
way to make sure that the first person to sequence DNA in space would be 
knowledgeable about the activity, despite the lack of time for detailed science training.74 
 If one were to go back in time and speak to the Mercury astronauts, they would 
undoubtedly express surprise about how the job of astronaut has changed since the 
1960s.  These astronauts had backgrounds as pilots and spent most of their time 
preparing for the dynamic events of spaceflight, rather than scientific research.  Their 
successors continued to spend much time preparing for these events until the STS-135 
flight in July 2011, but then the Space Shuttle program ended.  The only way for 
Americans to reach space over the last several years has been aboard a Soyuz spacecraft 
commanded by a Russian.  Thus pilot training has given way to training designed to help 
astronauts understand how space station systems work, how to maintain a space station, 
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and how to operate experiments on a space station.  “On a given day, the team at 
Mission Control sends about 3,000 commands to the American segment of the ISS,” 
Marc Reagan explains.75  This means that flight controllers now have responsibility for 
those dynamic events that used to be the responsibility of astronauts, such as controlling 
a spacecraft’s attitude.  Even the robotic arms are now partially controlled by flight 
controllers.76  Thus the value of having trained astronauts in space in the 2010s concerns 
troubleshooting technical issues and making the adjustments or insights required to make 
the most out of experiments. 
 With astronauts now having spent over 16 years continuously occupying the ISS 
through fifty expeditions, the list of scientific investigations has now reached into the 
thousands and continues to grow.  In some cases, the database of knowledge has 
benefited the future astronauts who will make long duration flights beyond low Earth 
orbit.  ISS residents have returned data on how every component of the human body 
from ears, to eyes, to bones, to muscles respond to weightlessness over six months in 
orbit or one year in the case of Scott Kelly and Mikhail Kornienko in 2015-2016.  Over 
the last few years, the breakthroughs that will benefit future astronauts include 3D 
printing, the growth of lettuce harvested on the station, and the aforementioned DNA 
sampling.  A NASA guide explains in thorough detail how the database of knowledge 
benefits lives on Earth as well, whether in the form of data on human biology, materials 
processing, or even a humanoid machine called Robonaut that will have applications in 
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medicine and industry.  Ever since Expedition 1, crews have also observed Earth and 
made insights on coral reefs, deltas, glaciers, urban systems, and natural disasters.  But 
the one constant with these experiments is that crewmembers have the training to adjust 
them, observe them, and speak words about them both in space and on the ground 
afterwards to Principal Investigators.  As the astronauts perform hundreds of 
experiments per expedition, the PIs continue to benefit from the fact that astronauts are 
not automatons; they have trained minds to utilize in carrying out new research.77 
 The 2010s have also brought occasional reminders of the flexibility that trained 
humans can bring in maintaining the ISS.  On July 31, 2010, the Expedition 24 crew 
heard an alarm alerting them of a power loss.  Tracy Caldwell Dyson and Doug 
Wheelock had to work with flight controllers to repower components and ascertain that a 
module that pumped ammonia coolant throughout the station had failed.  Their three 
EVAs in August to remove and replace the ammonia pump module posed danger 
because they were working with a hazardous gas, but on the strength of their extensive 
EVA training the two astronauts solved the problem.  In 2012, the failure of a Main Bus 
Switching Unit reduced ISS power to just five of eight solar arrays, a highly unusual 
situation.  But Expedition 32 crewmembers Suni Williams and Akihiko Hoshide were 
prepared to make an EVA on September 5 to replace the unit and restore the facility to 
full power.  On May 9, 2013, the Expedition 35 crew reported seeing small white flakes 
emanate from their outpost and realized with the help of flight controllers that ammonia 
coolant was leaking.  Chris Cassidy and Tom Marshburn made an EVA to inspect and 
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replace a pump controller box suspected of leaking.  None of these astronauts could have 
known during training on the ground that these issues would arise and prompt them to 
perform these jobs.  But the emphasis on skill based training nonetheless gave them the 
flexibility to maintain the facility.  This is another reason why Principal Investigators 
should feel thankful for the training that astronauts receive; when technical issues arise 
that threaten the continued flow of scientific data, astronauts have the training to solve 
the problems.78 
 The psychological training has generally proven effective as well.  In addition to 
the extreme environment training, ISS crewmembers have met with a Behavioral Health 
and Performance Group during their training at JSC.  Five people from this group have 
been assigned to each crewmember, with one hour meetings taking place at one year, six 
months, and 30-60 days prior to launch.  These meetings cover issues such as training 
workload and fatigue levels, crew training interactions, NASA management concerns, 
personal relationships, mood and anxiety, mission challenges and risks, and the 
crewmember’s preferred method of emergency notification in orbit.  The person 
designated as the Crew Medical Officer for each expedition also undergoes training in 
treating worst case scenarios concerning mood and anxiety disorders, in addition to the 
training for treating physical ailments.  The attention to this matter continues through 
Private Psychological Conferences (PPCs) that crewmembers take part in every two 
weeks during ISS expeditions.  After going through years of these conferences, Gary 
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Beven reported in 2012 that no astronaut had ever reported issues such as physical 
aggression, major depression, suicidality, or panic attacks during a flight.  He also 
reported that the standard mission featured good morale, friendly relations between 
American, Russian, European, and Japanese crewmembers, friendly relations with the 
Mission Control teams throughout the world, personal enjoyment of the mission, 
optimistic mood, and only occasional frustration concerning high workload, fatigue, lack 
of sleep, food, and items that broke aboard the station.  Thus he concludes that the 
psychological preparation has proven successful.79 
 The current agreement among the participating nations is to keep the 
International Space Station operational until 2024, meaning astronauts and instructors 
are still looking for ways to improve training.  The crews of every expedition have taken 
part in a debriefing covering the training process.  Several astronauts have complained 
that they would be better served by having less training on how the core ISS systems 
work, which are largely controlled by flight controllers anyway, and having training 
more focused on the tasks they know they will have to perform.  Marc Reagan explains 
that he and his colleagues have proven reluctant to accept this comment.  “If you do have 
a significant systems failure and you don’t have communications with Mission Control 
to bail you out, you must have training to safe the situation and not make it worse,” he 
argues.  He calls this the “dynamic tension” between the astronauts and instructors.  But 
the instructors have won the argument by requiring crews to undergo system training, 
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which means crews still train for 24-30 months.  The process may not be glamorous or 
easy on families, but it prepares astronauts so well for their flights that they generally 
have few noteworthy criticisms.  Reagan supports this by stating, “My experience is that 
in recent years, crews that have come back have not given any groundbreaking training 
input.  The feedback that I’ve seen has tended to be nickel and dime improvements, not 
radical changes.”80    
   With the Space Shuttle program over, having delivered all of the U.S. 
components to orbit, much focus has turned to the efficiency of training and operations.  
“We made numerous changes to procedure execution, planning, stowage, and 
communications to minimize errors and improve onboard efficiency,” Greg Chamitoff 
recalls of his last years at NASA prior to leaving the Astronaut Office in 2013.81  Lucia 
McCullough, who began her job as the Chief of the Training Branch in December 2016, 
confirms that space station instructors pride themselves on teaching efficiency to 
astronauts.  “We learned the importance of practicing with tools and finding those tools 
in the ISS stowage locations so that an end to end task could be done efficiently,” she 
recalls.  “We started building training timelines to incorporate a full task that included 
coordination with experienced CapComs roleplaying the ground.  We used timelines and 
hardware such as cameras for photo documentation of a task so that crews learned what 
a ‘day in the life’ was really like.”82  The initial ISS crews found that it could take two or 
three times as long to complete a task as was budgeted in a mission timeline, but training  
                                                          
80  Author Phone Interview with Reagan.    
81  Chamitoff, E-Mail Correspondence with Author.  
82  McCullough, E-Mail Correspondence with Author.      
651 
 
has helped subsequent crews develop more exactitude in their operations.83      
 What should historians conclude about the legacy of ISS training?  The most 
accurate statement is that instructors have confronted no shortage of new challenges but 
have met them in virtually every case and have sent well prepared astronauts to the 
station.  This was less true at the beginning of the program.  “My general feeling is that 
the training needs to be prepared early so that the simulators parallel the real hardware,” 
comments Jim Voss today.  This lesson from his experience as an Expedition 2 
crewmember should guide future astronauts, instructors, and engineers in charge of 
developing training hardware.  It will not be desirable to repeat the training experience 
that he and the other early ISS crewmembers had.84  But future astronauts and instructors 
will also have an outstanding model to follow from the more recent years of ISS 
training.  Two components of that model are probably most important.  First, prior to 
sending astronauts on a long duration flight, instructors should subject these people to 
stressors that reveal which astronauts are able to get along in all kinds of situations with 
all kinds of people.  Second, astronauts should receive skill based training that prepares 
them for unexpected contingencies that are more likely to arise during a long duration 
mission than a short duration mission like those the Space Shuttle undertook.  These 
astronauts will not need to carry out the incredibly scripted timelines of tasks that Space 
Shuttle crews did, but will need to know how to remedy failures that could happen at any 
point during a several month mission.85  McCullough comments, “The smart person 
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talks to and gathers as much of the history and lessons learned as they possibly can, from 
several perspectives.”86  The lessons learned from ISS training are not universally 
positive, but far more successful than unsuccessful based on the first 50 expeditions.            
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CHAPTER XVI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 “We stand at the birth of a new millennium, ready to unlock the mysteries of 
space,” declared President Donald Trump on January 20, 2017.1  When the 45th 
President of the United States gave his inaugural address, his nation had indeed moved 
close to two landmark developments in human spaceflight.  The first concerns 
commercial spaceflight, as the Boeing and SpaceX companies each hope to launch 
astronauts to the ISS aboard their own vehicles (named Starliner and Dragon, 
respectively) in 2018.  This will return the ability to send Americans into space aboard 
an American spacecraft for the first time since 2011 and will mark a paradigm shift in 
that astronauts will be riding aboard commercially operated vehicles for the first time.2  
The second development concerns a cone shaped spacecraft called Orion.  This vehicle 
made its first unmanned test flight in December 2014, orbiting the Earth for four hours.  
Orion remains on track toward a fall 2018 launch atop the new Space Launch System 
(SLS) booster, which will take it around the Moon.  By 2023, the plan is for a crew of 
four astronauts to voyage to lunar orbit and perform a flyby of a captured asteroid.  Just 
over half a century after Apollo 17, astronauts will finally voyage beyond low Earth orbit 
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again.  The current NASA goal is to then send humans to Mars as early as the 2030s.3  
The next twenty years have a chance to be one of the most exciting eras in the history of 
spaceflight, but to take such revolutionary steps astronauts and instructors will have to 
evaluate the lessons learned over the nearly sixty years that astronauts have now trained 
and adapt them to meet new circumstances.                            
 This process is already underway for both of these two developments.  Four 
astronauts are currently training for the first commercial flights aboard the Dragon and 
Starliner: Bob Behnken, Eric Boe, Doug Hurley, and Suni Williams.  Two of them will 
make the first flight, a 14 day test mission.  As of 2017, they are in the process of 
rehearsing mission phases aboard part-task simulators that allow one person to sit in 
front of an instrument panel.  “Think of the part-task trainers as our training wheels,” 
Boe explains.  “As we get more familiar with the systems, the training wheels will come 
off and we will start advancing to the next systems.  Eventually, we will work with 
another crewmember, then with the whole flight control team.”4  Astronauts are also 
currently rehearsing for Orion flights though water recovery exercises, sessions aboard a 
mockup at the JSC Space Vehicle Mockup Facility, and sessions aboard an electronic 
simulator.  Since 2013, they have developed experience in the latter by responding to 
malfunctions during an Orion-SLS launch.  Engineers have valued the questions and 
comments the astronauts have made during the simulations as they look to fine tune the 
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spacecraft design.5  But integrated simulations involving an entire crew working with 
flight controllers are still in the future.  Thus the question remains: how will Starliner, 
Dragon, and Orion training differ from the past and how will it draw on the past? 
 The flights aboard commercially operated vehicles will necessarily differ from 
the past because all people who have flown in space to date have done so aboard 
government operated vehicles.  The first Dragon and Starliner flights to carry crews will 
take place with heavy NASA oversight and carry the aforementioned veteran astronauts 
who belong to NASA.  But eventually, the companies should develop independence 
from NASA.  Commercial space advocates believe that the notion of companies 
competing against each other to send people into Earth orbit will result in flights that 
happen much more frequently and at a lower cost than present, just as airline companies 
revolutionized aviation in this way.  People do not book flights with a government 
airliner; with a few clicks of a mouse they do so with a commercial airliner and fly to 
their destinations aboard planes operated by pilots who have received training from the 
company that employs them.  This training reflects the fact that airline companies are 
profit oriented.  If transportation to Earth orbit takes the same form, this will be true for 
space pilots as well.  “I fear that because these companies are profit motivated, 
astronauts asking for extra training will be discouraged because this will delay a launch,” 
Eileen Collins says.  “A company might not have the resources or the time, or a culture 
might develop where somebody asks, ‘What, you need more training?  What’s wrong 
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with you?  You’re not good enough?’  That attitude did not develop at NASA, because 
everybody respected what other people said.  Somebody would say, ‘Hey, I want another 
session,’ and they would hear back, ‘Great!’”  But when companies strive to meet high 
launch rates and collect the profits that come with them, Collins believes that this will 
place a strain on training.  She correctly believes that these companies should emulate 
the NASA training culture instead.6   
 Collins also cites one lesson learned from the shuttle era that companies should 
heed to improve upon past NASA training, however: do not overwork astronauts in 
training.  She remembers meeting with one astronaut in the hallway, getting ready for his 
quarantine a couple of weeks before his mission: “I said, ‘How are you doing?’  And he 
said, ‘I have never been this exhausted in my entire life!”  Astronauts will run the risk of 
seeing their skills diminish and even getting sick “if you’re working 20 hour days and 
sleeping two hours at night,” as she relates.  “Some people don’t want to admit that they 
have limits or don’t want to delay a launch, so these crewmembers need to be taken care 
of.”7  Mike Sterling adds based on his experience as a shuttle instructor, “It really is 
possible to train too much.  If your training curriculum is too long, you burden the 
student and cause issues with proficiency and currency in the tasks and skills that you 
trained early in the curriculum.”8  Companies will have to resist the temptation of “go 
fever” that will push them toward training as many astronauts and launching them on as 
many missions as possible within a short time frame to collect profits.  A more measured 
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pace will help astronauts develop their skills and avoid fatigue, not to mention help 
engineers resolve the kind of technical issues that have caused the Challenger and 
Columbia tragedies in the past.   
 As future crews train for spaceflights, Susan Helms believes another lesson from 
the past should guide them.  “You have to have a sense of mission,” she argues.  “I think 
that’s one of the things that’s very important for the people involved if they’re doing 
something that’s difficult.  That is incredibly important psychologically.  I’m not talking 
about a technical lesson here, I’m talking about a human lesson.”  During the long 
training flows for her five shuttle missions and especially her ISS Expedition 2 mission, 
then during her time aboard the ISS as well, she felt a psychological boost by knowing 
she had something beneficial to do every single day.  As crews spent long days in 
training studying detailed procedures, they should keep in mind the “big picture” 
concerning the importance of their mission.  Astronauts in the past have always been 
motivated to spend long training hours and then fly in space to advance American 
national interests, and this will continue.  Crewmembers of future commercial missions 
will not be U.S. government employees, however.  They must find the motivation of 
advancing their company’s interests and advancing human spaceflight just as airline 
pilots advanced aviation when the era of commercial flights began.9                    
 Meanwhile, NASA’s Orion flights will send astronauts to destinations beyond 
what commercial vehicles will initially be able to reach.  Technological advances will 
alter the training of Orion crews from crews in the Space Shuttle era.  The Space Shuttle 
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orbiters had as many as 10 display screens and 1,200 dials, gauges, and switches.  Orion 
will contain just three screens, each the size of a sheet of paper.  The spacecraft will even 
bring up the relevant display page for a procedure the crew needs automatically.  Most 
of the switches will be electronic rather than physical, another critical change from past 
vehicles.  The Dragon and Starliner vehicles feature similar cockpits in this respect.  
The improvements in information technology that have made this possible should ease 
the task of training astronauts.  Lee Morin, the astronaut who has worked on the Orion 
cockpit for the past several years, says these changes from the shuttle era will reduce 
workload and improve coordination between crewmembers.  This way the astronauts 
sitting in the cockpit will need to undergo less training in spacecraft operation and have 
more time to train for a mission objective like exploring an asteroid, the Moon, or 
Mars.10   
 Another critical difference that will separate an exploration mission from Space 
Shuttle or ISS missions concerns the time delay in communications between the crew 
and Mission Control.  When humans voyage to Mars, it will take up to about 20 minutes 
for the crew to communicate with Mission Control.  “Presently, all onboard procedures 
assume the ability to discuss or ask the ground for assistance or clarification,” Greg 
Chamitoff explains of ISS missions.  “Even when communication gaps may exist, they 
are temporary.  Crew autonomy for task execution and for daily planning will have to 
change dramatically for future operations beyond low Earth orbit.  Skill-based training 
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will have to evolve to a higher level in which the crew is not tied so closely to line-by-
line procedures.”  Chamitoff’s words suggest that astronauts on an exploration mission 
will be trained more like ISS crews than shuttle crews, in that they will need skill based  
training to remedy unexpected failures that may arise over several months in space.  But  
even ISS crews have the luxury of knowing that help from flight controllers is almost 
instantaneous.  If a crew encounters a dust storm while trying to land a spacecraft on 
Mars, for instance, help will be 20 minutes away in a dynamic situation.  The astronauts 
will need the skills to determine if they can proceed or not and the skills to make a gentle 
touchdown on another planet without consulting Mission Control.11 
 Developing those skills in situations where Mission Control is not immediately 
available is an ongoing process, as former astronaut Steve Robinson explains.  As a 
Professor at the University of California-Davis, he is working with NASA funding to try 
to quantify human performance in spaceflight skills.  “Once you know how to measure 
how well somebody is doing, then you have a way of comparing different training 
approaches, different customization, and different environmental effects such as time on 
orbit, health, G-loads, vibration, and sound,” he says.  “We have to know how to 
measure something before we can start changing those variables.  We have had success 
in that.  We think all of that is really important in the future, especially for long duration 
missions far out in space because at some point carrying out tasks will have to be much 
more self-directed by the crew onboard.”12   
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 Marc Reagan adds that quantifying performance for exploration missions will be 
 different than what instructors are used to teaching from the Space Shuttle and ISS 
 programs.  The job for astronauts exploring a near-Earth asteroid, the Moon, or Mars  
will be about “collecting the most interesting and valuable rocks, and keeping them in a 
pristine state as you collect them so when they’re analyzed, you know they have not 
been contaminated,” he says.  “I think that is going to be a big challenge we have not 
wrapped our heads around so much.  For the ISS, the measurement is minutes or hours 
spent on doing a certain amount of work.  But there is a much more qualitative 
measurement for long term planetary exploration that is a whole different thing from 
what we are doing now.”13  Reagan’s comments suggest that instructors read about the 
lessons learned from the Apollo exploration of the Moon discussed at the end of an 
earlier chapter.  But future exploration missions will differ dramatically from Apollo due 
to the longer amount of time that crews spend on the surface, the much more advanced 
technology, and the tasks that will go well beyond what the Apollo astronauts 
accomplished in complexity.  The famous Mars exploration advocate Robert Zubrin has 
written at length about what astronauts will need to do to determine if life once existed 
on the Red Planet.  They will have to set up drilling rigs capable of penetrating over half 
a mile below the Martian surface to reach liquid ground water and the biosphere it might 
host.14  This will require work by instructors in determining how to quantify tasks like 
these, along the lines of the comments made by Robinson and Reagan, and how to train  
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astronauts in them.  It will mark a new departure in astronaut training.                 
 Thus there are several obvious differences between the past training of astronauts  
and future plans, but many chances to draw upon lessons learned from the past as well.   
Crews of Mars missions will spend several months traveling to the Red Planet (as long 
as current propulsion technology is used), so their training in classrooms and simulators 
on Earth will not be fresh in their minds.  This relates to the importance of training in 
space, which is not a new phenomenon and will need to increase for voyages to Mars.  
Chamitoff cites the importance of Just in Time Training aboard the ISS as one of the 
critical lessons learned from the past that will benefit the crews of Mars missions.15  Just 
in Time Training for Mars missions will probably entail the spacecraft containing video 
demonstrations of spacecraft systems to aid astronauts in troubleshooting them.  Other 
videos will probably cover the science experiments and drilling operations they will 
have to conduct on the Martian surface.  The pilot will probably have a simulator 
onboard with which to rehearse landing on Mars, just as Space Shuttle Commanders did 
for landing on Earth.  Another of the lessons learned from the shuttle era, the 
effectiveness of virtual reality in preparing astronauts to maneuver in space, should also 
come into play during the long outbound voyage to Mars.  Clay Anderson points out that 
current astronauts would benefit from using cutting edge Oculus Rift virtual reality 
technology in preparing for EVAs aboard the ISS.  “Unfortunately, we do not have an 
Oculus Rift capability aboard the ISS to refresh astronauts,” he says.16  But if this issue 
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can be resolved, astronauts would have a way of minimizing the gap in rehearsing their 
actions which would be especially useful in training to explore the surface of another  
planet.  
 Future astronauts and instructors will have to grapple with several other issues 
that will be familiar to veterans of the ISS experience as well.  Greg Chamitoff argues 
that training for future exploration missions must focus on what the crew needs to know, 
as a way of streamlining the process to a more reasonable load than what the first ISS 
crews experienced.  He argues, “As vehicles and missions get more complex, it’s 
important to divide and conquer expertise among the crew.  Early ISS crews had to 
know everything at the expert level, similar to the Shuttle and previous missions.  As 
soon as crew size permits specialization, it should be used to reduce training overload.”17  
In the case of a Mars mission, as Zubrin describes, this specialization will probably take 
the form of crewmembers who are flight engineers and those who are scientists.  The 
flight engineers will have to know how to troubleshoot the spacecraft that will take them 
to Mars and the rover they will ride on the surface.  The scientists will have to know how 
to collect the most intriguing samples and analyze them, which will require skills in 
geology and biology because the most intriguing question of all concerns whether life 
has ever graced the Red Planet.  Part of the crew will specialize on technical issues and 
part will specialize on scientific issues, which will allow for a streamlined process 
during the long months on Earth.  The crew will then work as a team to integrate their  
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individual knowledge during a Mars mission that will last up to 2.5 years.18   
 Instructors will have a clearer idea of how to prepare crews for those long  
prelaunch months from experience.  They will know about the importance of  
synchronizing simulations with onboard configurations.  “It’s easy for things to get out 
of sync between training and operations,” Chamitoff states from ISS experience.  “There 
is re-training that happens onboard because of the way things are done by the crew.  It’s 
very important to have feedback from onboard back to the training personnel to assure 
relevance and currency.”  Instructors will know about the importance of training 
methods that have benefited crews dating back to Alan Shepard’s Freedom 7 flight: 
hands-on experiences with hardware before launch and end to end integrated simulations 
where the crew and flight controllers develop their skills in nominal and off-nominal 
operations.  They will know about the benefit of the Instructor Astronaut program, which 
Chamitoff calls “an extremely valuable practice.”  If exploration missions feature 
international crews, the instructors who train them will also have to decide whether or 
not the astronauts need to learn foreign languages.  The ISS experience makes clear that 
language training is a life enriching experience for American astronauts, but places a 
time consuming burden on training requirements and introduces opportunities for 
miscommunication and mistakes.  Finally, instructors will know about the importance of 
asking timely debriefing questions concerning training to a crew.  “Current ISS 
crewmembers go through weeks of debriefing sessions that are very useful, but too often 
the questions come too long after the actual situation,” Chamitoff argues.  “Timely 
                                                          
18  Zubrin with Wagner, 97-99.  
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debrief questions and answers should happen on a weekly basis for topics that will be 
hard to recapture months later.”  Instructors are easily more prepared to send well trained 
crews to Mars now than their predecessors were in 1961 to send well trained crews to  
the Moon, based on this experience of what has worked best in the past.19 
 The lesson that training empowers humans to develop the mental and physical 
flexibility to contribute to the success of a spaceflight should also drive future 
exploration.  The entire history of spaceflight demonstrates over and over again that 
vehicles as complex as spacecraft do not function correctly 100 percent of the time, no 
matter how sophisticated the technology.  Humans have increased the reliability of 
missions with their mental skills in diagnosing problems and physical skills in solving 
them that they have honed during training, and they will do so again while exploring a 
near earth asteroid, the Moon, or Mars.  The exploration of Mars will especially 
demonstrate that this flexibility extends to gathering data about another body in this solar 
system.  Mars landers from Viking in 1976 to Curiosity in 2012 have returned a wealth 
of data on the geological history of the planet, most notably that it has contained oceans 
of water potentially capable of supporting life.  But the data concerning that search for 
life has not been conclusive, in part because robots lack the ability to bring trained minds 
and bodies to the scene of investigation.  The mobility to drive a rover around the 
surface of a planet containing a land mass about the size of Earth’s, the drilling 
operations, the ability to find intriguing rocks, and the ability to take the rocks back into 
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a habitat and subject them to scientific tests, will go beyond the ability of robots.20  If 
human explorers ever find life on another planet, they will reach the discovery on the 
basis of their knowledge about how to perform these tasks and about the principles of 
life science.  Even if this does not happen, human explorers will be able to extract 
resources from the space environment on the basis of their knowledge.  This is why 
those explorers need to understand the history of astronaut training and what has made it 
successful.                            
 The training of astronauts from the Mercury era through the ISS contains lessons 
for those explorers who will follow them as well as people in workplaces on Earth.  
Astronauts have trained under exceptionally unique circumstances, because workers in a 
typical U.S. workplace do not have the multimillion dollar training devices, or the 
national prestige associated with their jobs, that astronauts have had for nearly sixty 
years.  But some of the factors that have contributed to their success would also 
contribute to the success of a workplace in any discipline.  The selection committees 
have picked the most qualified candidates for the job over the years, so as to minimize 
the amount of training required.  Instructors have taken into account the evaluations of 
the trainees, knowing the training is designed for their benefit.  They have placed a 
strong value on integrated training that has tested the teamwork of all personnel 
responsible for a task.  They have also adjusted the training program when necessary, in 
light of knowledge from new developments.21  Astronauts have demonstrated the value 
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of successfully cross-training employees time and time again, whether through their 
work in learning geology during the Apollo program or in learning to become doctors 
during long duration space station missions.  Effective responses to emergencies 
throughout the world also require gifted people willing to cross traditional professional 
boundaries.22  The Apollo-Soyuz, Shuttle-Mir, and ISS programs have involved giving 
astronauts cross-cultural training, which again has proven successful and which people 
in business, education, and health services also require.23   
 Two scholars have argued that change is a useful way of understanding the 
importance of training.  “In this environment where change is frequent, the training 
function cannot allow itself to become the ‘dinosaur’ of the organization,” they write.  
“It too must explore and introduce new strategies and methods of learning to meet the 
changing needs of the organization and of its learners.”24  Instructors have met the 
changing needs of astronauts time and time again, whether through simulator advances 
to rehearse for changing mission tasks, cultural training to rehearse for changing 
international objectives, or extreme environment training to rehearse for changing 
mission duration.  The record is clear that though technical failures have plagued 
numerous spaceflights from Mercury to the ISS, the skill of crewmembers on those 
flights has by and large been an asset and not a liability.  All workplaces that involve 
people performing complex tasks which require training must strive for this record.  
                                                          
22  Gregory Bennett, Cross-Training for First Responders (Boca Raton: Taylor and Francis, 2010), 8. 
23  Richard W. Brislin and Tomoko Yoshida, eds., Improving Intercultural Interactions: Modules for Cross-Cultural 
Training Programs (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 3-12.    
24  Roger Buckley and Jim Caple, The Theory and Practice of Training (Sterling, VA: Kogan Page, 2008), 2.   
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There are certainly other fields in which human error has proven to be a major problem.  
In aviation, for instance, Mike Sterling points out that “Research has long shown that 
around 70 percent of all accidents are not caused by technical problems but rather by 
failures in the ‘soft skills.’  This includes things like communication, decision making, 
leadership/followership, teamwork, etc.”25  But the examples of human error by 
astronauts who have taken part in flight beyond Earth’s atmosphere are severely lacking.  
This is why people who train to perform complex tasks should seek to understand what 
has made astronaut training successful.     
 When seven young men reported for work in Virginia one spring day almost 
sixty years ago, they could not have known just what they were getting into.  Their pilot 
brethren mocked them as “spam in a can.”  But the seven original astronauts and their 
successors have demonstrated that their skills honed through training have made them 
anything but “spam in a can.”  They have not simply gone along for rides, but have 
increased the chances of mission success through their flexibility in responding to 
malfunctions and returning scientific data that has advanced human knowledge of the 
Earth and the solar system.  None has ever died during a spaceflight due to an egregious 
error of their own making.  When people go to Arlington National Cemetery to pay their 
respects to the crews of Apollo 1, STS-51L Challenger, and STS-107 Columbia, they can 
take comfort in the knowledge that all undertook their well-rehearsed actions until the 
end.  As for those original seven who began the process, Scott Carpenter, Gordon 
Cooper, John Glenn, Gus Grissom, Wally Schirra, Alan Shepard, and Deke Slayton have 
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all made their final voyages now.  But they have left behind the memory of their success 
and the lessons learned that they spurred which astronauts and instructors will have for 
all time.             
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